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Abstract 
The punishment of white-collar offenders poses a unique problem for sentencing 
courts in Australia. The paradigms for punishing non-white-collar offenders do not 
translate seamlessly to white-collar offenders, raising both conceptual and pragmatic 
difficulties for the criminal justice system generally, and sentencing courts 
specifically. The title of this thesis, ‘A Rational Approach to Sentencing White-
Collar Offenders’, implicitly assumes that the current treatment of white-collar 
offenders is irrational. Certainly, that was the experience of Professor Bagaric and I 
in relation to the series of co-authored articles we published between 2011 and 2015. 
This thesis examines more closely the assertion that irrationality pervades this area of 
the law by undertaking and analysing detailed empirical research. As is discussed in 
the methodology part of the research (Chapter VII), the application of scientific 
rigour to research in the social sciences is a difficult task. Notwithstanding that 
difficulty, it is not novel. Other legal academics have undertaken similar research, 
albeit by adopting a different approach. 
 
The arguments advanced in the articles were predicated on some underlying 
assumptions. First, the profile of the white-collar offender and the nature of the 
white-collar offence differ markedly from the usual criminal law construct. White-
collar offenders do not fit traditional sentencing stereotypes:  they are often of 
previous good character; come from a privileged social background rather than one 
of disadvantage or deprivation; their offences are pecuniary not violent; and, but for 
their offending, they are often conspicuous contributors to the community in which 
they live. Second, the paradigm sentencing models do not readily acknowledge or 
accommodate the unique consequences that usually follow the sentencing of white-
collar offenders. The consequences of conviction can extend beyond the immediate 
hardship imposed by the sentencing court; they may include public embarrassment, 
loss of social standing and loss of employment prospects. These are consequences 
that are, arguably, visited upon white-collar offenders to a much greater degree than 
other offenders. The harm caused by such offending also often extends beyond an 
immediate identifiable victim or affects a multitude of victims in circumstances 
where they may be unaware that a crime has even been committed against them (for 
example, market manipulation offences or revenue offences). Third, in addition to 
the usual punishments of fines, imprisonment etc (formal punishment), the 
complexity of sentencing white-collar offenders is compounded by the additional 
burdens sometimes imposed on white-collar offenders by cognate legislation, such as 
civil penalties and director disqualifications (informal punishment). 
  
Some of these assumptions were tested in the research I undertook. The results of the 
research reveal that white-collar sentencing is, in some respects, inconsistent and 
irrational. The data also allowed me to identify with greater accuracy and clarity why 
the tentative conclusions expressed in the articles were, in the main, correct. 
However, this thesis represents a return to theory: to demonstrate why the current 
approach to sentencing is erroneous; and to justify the changes to sentencing practice 
and proposals for legislative reform that I ultimately make. Neither the sentencing 
statutes in the State or Federal jurisdictions, nor the common law, have developed 
clear principles relevant to the infliction of formal punishment on white-collar 
offenders, nor articulated the relative weight to be given to informal punishment 
when meting out ‘just punishment’. 
 xi 
 
The sole authored part of the thesis provides a doctrinal justification for the views 
that have been expressed in the articles and provides some proposals for a reform of 
the law to achieve what I argue is a more rational approach to sentencing white-
collar offenders.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
 
‘All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the 
understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason.’ 
 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781 
 
 
A Composition and Arrangement of Thesis 
 
This thesis (in part) by publication draws together five co-authored articles, which 
were written and published in law journals between 2011 and 2015 and examined 
what I, and my co-author Professor Bagaric, perceived as systemic flaws in the 
sentencing of criminal offenders generally, and white-collar offenders specifically.1   
 
The publication details of the five articles are as follows: 
 
● Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘(Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t 
Work – and What it Means for Sentencing’ (2011) 35 Criminal Law Journal 
269; 
 
● Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to 
Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, 
Rehabilitation Might and the Implications for Sentencing’ (2012) 36(3) 
Criminal Law Journal 159; 
 
● Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘Rehabilitating Totality in Sentencing: 
from Obscurity to Principle’ (2013) 36(1) University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 139; 
 
● Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘First-time Offender, Productive 
Offender, Offender with Dependents: Why the Profile of Offenders 
(Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing’ (2015) 78(2) Albany Law Review 397; 
 
● Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘A Rational Approach to Sentencing 
White-collar Offenders in Australia’ (2014) 34 Adelaide Law Review 317. 
 
The five articles (copies of which are attached at the end of the thesis) each involve 
an analysis of one or more aspects of sentencing law. They systematically and 
comprehensively examine key themes and unresolved issues relating to sentencing. 
What emerged from the articles was that there are a number of flaws in the current 
sentencing orthodoxy: flaws that require a review of the framework in which 
theorists conceptualise, and jurists undertake, the process of sentencing.   
                                                
1	An earlier article I co-wrote with Professor Bagaric was not included in the thesis due to limited 
capacity. However, ideas and arguments from the article are considered throughout the dissertation. 
See Mirko Bagaric, Theo Alexander and Athula Pathinayake, ‘The Fallacy of General Deterrence and 
the Futility of Imprisoning Offenders for Tax Fraud’ (2011) 26(3) Australian Tax Forum 511. 
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This document is approximately 80,000 words, and hence, satisfies the length 
required for a PhD thesis.  All of the research, analysis and writing in this document 
are my sole work. Nonetheless, the five articles identified above also form part of the 
thesis. My contribution to the five articles amounts to approximately a further 20,000 
words. Accordingly, the total length of the thesis is approximately 100,000 words. 
My exact contribution to each of the articles is set out in the Author Contribution 
Statements included at the end of the thesis, and the manner in which each of the 
articles links in with the contentions in the thesis are recorded below under the sub-
heading ‘Overview of Articles’.  
 
Broadly, the main hypotheses set out in the thesis are contained in ‘A Rational 
Approach to Sentencing White-collar Offenders in Australia’ (‘Rational Approach 
Article’). This article was written in 2011 and 2012. In it, Professor Bagaric and I 
more fully explore the jurisprudential, normative and, most importantly, empirical 
underpinnings of the assumptions and premises which have formed the substratum to 
the arguments that we have advanced across the series of articles. The article 
examines more deeply the theoretical underpinnings of punishment and sentencing 
law, in order to provide an overarching framework for the sentencing of the white-
collar offenders. Of particular relevance is Chapter VIII of this thesis, which 
constitutes new research undertaken after the Rational Approach Article was 
published in the Adelaide Law Review. As far as I have been able to discover, 
research of this type has not been undertaken by any other Australian academic.  The 
purpose of that research was to empirically test one aspect of sentencing law: the 
(in)consistent application of certain aggravating and mitigating factors by courts 
when sentencing white-collar offenders. The findings in Chapter VIII essentially 
result in a firmer commitment to the primary recommendations in the Rational 
Approach Article, but in some instances, has necessitated slight changes to those 
recommendations.  
 
This thesis is intended to be a coherent, independent and exhaustive narrative of the 
research and recommendations that were separately considered across the five 
articles. Thus, it should be read first.  Following that, each article should be read in 
order to provide a wider backdrop and justification to the recommendations in the 
thesis.  
 
B Introduction to Thesis 
 
Despite its ancient pedigree,2 sentencing law in Australia suffers from what may be 
contemporarily termed a strategic failure.3 Indeed, the commonality between the 
                                                
2 Chapter II of this thesis explores the contemporary history of sentencing law. There is evidence of 
sentencing as a juridical act in historical works - ancient, pre-biblical and biblical - and instances to be 
found in mythological works across cultures. See, eg, David Lorton, ‘Legal and Social Institutions of 
Pharaonic Egypt’ in Jack Sasson (ed), Civilizations of the Ancient Near East (Scribners, 1995) 355; 
George Calhoun, The Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece (Law Book Exchange, 1999); 
Martin Pritikin, ‘Punishment, Prisons and The Bible: Does ‘Old Testament Justice’ Justify our 
Retributive Culture’ (2006) 28(2) Cardozo Law Review 715; James Whitman, ‘The Comparative 
Study of Criminal Punishment’ (2005) 1 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 17. 
3 In science, research design refers to the strategy chosen to integrate different parts of the study in a 
logical way to effectively address the problem. Therefore, where the results do not address the 
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processes of industry (from whence the term derives) and the legal system, is that 
both seek to achieve an outcome: in the former case, usually some type of product; in 
the latter case, a human result.4  If the desired product or result is not achieved by the 
process or system, then the outcome is termed a failure. In sentencing law, the 
evidence of failure is obvious: ever-higher rates of incarceration and stagnating or 
increasing rates of recidivism.5 
 
Most other areas of human knowledge or endeavour respond to failure by seeking to 
review as many components, assemblies, and subsystems as possible to identify 
failure modes, and their causes and effects.6 Remedial action based on those findings 
then follows. For example, in the realm of finance, economic failure may be met with 
adjustments to interests rates, with austerity measures, or a stimulus package. In the 
automotive industry, a recall notice may be issued. In the health sciences, failure 
might require a return to the laboratory to reassess the problem, test and re-test 
hypotheses and thereby develop new solutions. The legal system, in terms of 
sentencing law, has largely failed to achieve its objectives, but unlike other areas of 
human endeavour, it has also failed, or refused, to identify and articulate the failure 
modes; to rationally examine the root causes and effects; to institute meaningful 
action to precipitate change; or to persist with change, however elusive it may 
appear. It is a form of intellectual and imaginative indolence that would not be 
tolerated in any other social faculty. Whilst contemporary society venerates reason, 
the law seems incapable of learning from the ‘logic of failure’.  
 
To quote Dörner: 
 
It appears that, very early on, human beings developed a tendency to deal with 
problems on an ad hoc basis. The task at hand was to gather firewood, to drive a 
herd of horses into a canyon, or to build a trap for a mammoth. All these were 
problems of the moment and usually had no significance beyond themselves.  The 
amount of firewood the members of a Stone Age tribe needed was no more a threat 
to the forest than their hunting activity was a threat to wildlife populations.  
Although certain animal species seem to have been overhunted and eradicated in 
prehistoric times, on the whole our prehistoric ancestors did not have to think 
beyond the situation itself. The need to see a problem embedded in the context of 
other problems rarely arose.7  
 
                                                                                                                                     
problem, it may be a result of an inappropriate strategy or design: see New York University, What is 
Research Design? <https://www.nyu.edu/classes/bkg/methods/005847ch1.pdf>.  
4 This proposition is not intended to invite a comparison between retributivist and consequentialist 
theories of punishment – but rather to reflect the general proposition that punishment is there to do 
something; what that might properly be is a matter which is pursued in Chapter III. But the result is 
unarguably intended to be the reduction of crime. 
5 See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends March 2010 – Repeat Imprisonment 
(ABS Catalogue No 4102.0, 2010) 1 (‘Social Trends’); Australian Institute of Criminology, ‘Chapter 
5: Corrections’ in Australian Crime: Facts & Figures: 2014, 71; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Prisoners in Australia 2016 (ABS Catalogue No 4517.0, 2016). Since 1989 imprisonment rates have 
increased. Between 2008 and 2013 the rate of return to prison remained stable, with 40 per cent 
returning to prison under sentence. The most recent statistics from 2016 show the total prison 
population has also increased.  
6 See, eg, Marvin Rausand and Arnljot Høylan, System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical 
Methods, and Applications (Wiley, 2nd ed, 2004) 88. 
7 Dietrich Dörner, The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations 
(Metropolitan Books, 1996) 5–6 [trans of: Die Logik des Misslingens (first published 1989)]. 
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Indeed, sentencing law is perhaps an archetypal example of a (necessarily) ad hoc 
problem, or more accurately, set of problems, being dealt with in an (unnecessarily) 
ad hoc manner. But that fact magnifies, rather than diminishes, the importance of a 
rational approach to sentencing. As we point out in our research, it is a failure of both 
proof and inquiry.8     
 
Helpfully, Dörner also provides a possible solution to the problem: 
 
Real improvement can be achieved, however, if we understand the demands that 
problem solving places on us and the errors that we are prone to make when we 
attempt to meet them. Our brains are not fundamentally flawed; we have simply 
developed bad habits. When we fail to solve a problem, we fail because we tend to 
make a small mistake here, a small mistake there, and these mistakes add up.  Here 
we have forgotten to make our goal specific enough. There we have over-
generalized. Here we have planned too elaborately, there too sketchily.9    
 
The many, relatively small flaws, which the articles identify in sentencing law can be 
distilled to a single larger failure:  the discord between the empirical evidence and 
the objectives of sentencing. It is the benign indifference of the courts and the 
legislature to that discord which perpetuates the failure.    
 
Unlike the ‘embedded problem’ hidden in a thicket of other problems, that 
sentencing law has failed, is known. Hutton says that sentencing law is ‘neither 
formal nor rational ... [i]t is one part of a modern legal system which has remained 
substantive and irrational.’10 Further, the discord between evidence and outcome is 
known.  As Judge Michael Marcus, a US circuit court judge, frankly observes: 
  
Our persistence in ignoring research when exercising sentencing discretion exceeds 
even offenders’ persistence in crime. Although academia and corrections agencies 
have learned a great deal about how to reduce recidivism, we judges ignore their 
wisdom while they are content to defer to and even enable our hubris. We adhere to 
a liturgy of just deserts that celebrate aggravation and mitigation. We invoke 
reformation only rarely, and then only by assumption – with no more attention to 
results than when we purport to ‘send a message.’11 
 
In order to advance beyond the hubris, the five articles we published and this thesis, 
attempt to reconcile the theories and empirical evidence with what judges are (or 
should be) doing when sentencing white-collar offenders. The articles, and the thesis, 
draw on the earlier work of my supervisor, Professor Bagaric, entitled ‘Punishment 
and Sentencing: A Rational Approach’.12 However, the thesis enjoys the advantage 
of over a decade of further scholarly output, considers sentencing directly in relation 
to the white-collar offender subset, and draws conclusions based on empirical 
                                                
8 Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to Shape the Behaviour of 
Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might and the Implications for 
Sentencing’ (2012) 36(3) Criminal Law Journal 159, 159.  
9 Dörner, above n 7, 7. 
10	Neil Hutton, ‘Sentencing, Rationality, and Computer Technology’ (1995) 22(4) Journal of Law and 
Society 549, 551. A commentator who produced dozens of commentaries is D A Thomas: see, eg, D A 
Thomas, Principles of Sentencing (Heinemann Educational Books, 1970).  
11 Michael Marcus, ‘Archaic Sentencing Liturgy Sacrifices Public Safety: What’s Wrong and How 
We Can Fix it’ (2003) 16(1) Federal Sentencing Reporter 76, 76. 
12	Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (Cavendish, 2001).  
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research which I conducted specifically for the purpose of examining the 
recommendations contained in the articles.     
 
C Purpose of Thesis: Identification of Failure and Reform 
 
The purpose of the body of work comprehended by this thesis is to identify the 
failure mode and to create a platform for change through action.  
 
Because many of the recommendations in the articles suggest reform which requires 
jettisoning long-held and deeply ingrained ideas about sentencing, the written part of 
this thesis attempts to more closely examine the two basic conclusions which the 
articles have produced: (a) that the criticisms of the current approach to sentencing 
generally, and specifically in relation to white-collar offenders, are justified; and, (b) 
the current approach to sentencing is irrational and the recommendations for reform 
set out in the articles are supported by evidence.  
 
In order to test the validity of the first conclusion, this thesis contains a 
comprehensive series of charts setting out the results of some empirical research 
regarding the considerations that, in practice, actually influence the sentencing of 
white-collar offenders. This data examines over 60 white-collar cases drawn from the 
Victorian and Federal jurisdictions. The illuminating aspect about the empirical 
research is that it not only identifies the exact considerations which most influence 
the sanctions imposed on white-collar offenders, but also highlights the discord 
between sentencing principles and practice in some aspects of sentencing white-
collar offenders.    
 
In relation to the second conclusion, this thesis explores the theoretical and 
philosophical justifications for sentencing and considers how these manifest in the 
sentencing objectives pursued by the courts. What constitutes a rational approach to 
sentencing is examined in light of the theories that underpin sentencing and the data.  
The sentencing of white-collar offenders, while raising some unique considerations, 
also involves the application of general sentencing principles and objectives; indeed, 
the substrata to sentencing white-collar offenders are the general sentencing 
principles and purposes. In order to provide an overarching account of the most 
appropriate manner for dealing with white-collar offenders, it is necessary to analyse 
the operation of the key sentencing objectives, and in particular, those that typically 
apply to white-collar offenders. Generalizations and conclusions made in relation to 
all offenders should then logically be applied to the white-collar offender subset, 
unless a relevant difference can be identified. The corollary of these two conclusions 
is the stark realization that the current approach to sentencing must, in some respects 
at least, be completely reimagined.   
 
D Focus of Thesis: White-Collar Crime 
 
This thesis focuses on sentencing in the area of white-collar crime. That is because, 
as we point out in Rational Approach Article, white-collar crime stands apart from 
other criminal offences, predominantly because of certain characteristics attributed to 
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these offences of this type and/or those who commit such offences.13 This 
offender/offence dichotomy is particularly important in relation to defining what 
constitutes white-collar crime: a necessary step in its theoretical analysis and its 
judicial application. These issues are explored in greater detail in Chapter VI. 
 
Certainly, the concept of white-collar crime is not new. Wakelam identifies an early 
reference to the white-collar offender in the work of Ross: 
 
In 1907, controversial American sociologist Edward Ross took early theories on 
economics and corporate offending and steered them towards what would eventually 
become known as white-collar crime. He introduced the concept of the criminaloid, 
‘a social type who enjoys a public image as a pillar of the community and a paragon 
of virtue, but beneath the veneer of respectability [lies] a very different persona; one 
committed to personal gain [by] any means necessary’. Ross described the 
criminaloid as one acting not on evil impulse, but through a lack of moral sensibility; 
he or she prefers to prey on the anonymous public, while shielded behind an image 
of virtue. Despite this obvious leap towards an early definition of the white-collar 
criminal, it would be another 30 years before that phrase entered the criminological 
vocabulary.14 
 
Braithwaite traces the development of the criminological theory of the white-collar 
offender (for it was, at first instance, a sociological phenomenon rather than a legal 
one) from the early 1900s American sociologists, through the Dutch Marxist Willem 
Bonger, in his 1916 work Criminality and Economic Conditions, to Edwin 
Sutherland, who coined the term in the title to his Presidential Address to the 
American Sociological Society in 1939: ‘The White Collar Criminal.’15 In the 
stratified, class-based society in which Sutherland located the white-collar criminal, 
the paradigmatic offender was a man of low station, perhaps also of low birth, and 
whose crime was committed out of emotion or perhaps avarice, but which almost 
always involved acts of violence towards other members of society for some gain.  
Braithwaite sees the acceptance and development of the subset as ‘…a rare case of 
sociological scholarship having a substantial impact on public policy and public 
opinion.’16  
 
The examination of subsets within the criminal law is itself not new. Children,17 
women,18 indigenous,19 addicted20 and insane21 persons have also occupied the minds 
                                                
13 Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘A Rational Approach to Sentencing White-collar Offenders in 
Australia’ (2014) 34 Adelaide Law Review 317, 317–8. 
14 Spencer Wakelam, ‘Corporate and White-collar Crime: Defining the Risk’ (2015) 25(2) Risk 
Management Today 26, 26 (footnotes omitted). See also Edward Alsworth Ross, Sin and Society: An 
Analysis of Latter-Day Iniquity (Houghton Mifflin, 1907). 
15	John Braithwaite, ‘White Collar Crime’ (1985) 11 Annual Review of Sociology 1.  
16 Ibid. 
17 See, eg, Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), which deals, inter alia, with the sentencing 
of children. 
18	Particularly in feminist critiques of the law: see Margaret Thornton, ‘The Development of Feminist 
Jurisprudence’ (1998) 9(2) Legal Education Review 171, 183–6. 
19	See, eg, Wanganeen v Smith (1977) 73 LSJS 139; Jabaltjari v Hammersley (1977) 15 ALR 94; R v 
Ceissman (2001) NSWCCA 73; R v Fuller-Cust [2002] VSCA 168; Bugmy v R (2013) 249 CLR 571. 
20	See, eg, R v Phelan [1976] VSC 355; Attorney-General v Krone [1979] VSC 257; R v Brewster 
[1998] 1 Cr App R 220. 
21 See, eg, R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398; DPP v Weidlich [2008] 
VSCA 203; R v Vuadreu [2009] VSCA 262; Green v The Queen [2011] VSCA 311; R v Anderson 
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of lawyers and sociologists. So too have violent offenders and sex offenders: both the 
subject of specific legislation creating a unique set of sentencing objectives.22 
 
More specifically, the justification for the focus on white-collar offending in this 
thesis is consistent with the public perception that white-collar criminals, as a group 
of offenders, are sui generis and a serious threat to social order. For example, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (‘ABS’) Research Methodology Monograph entitled 
Measuring Wellbeing: Frameworks for Australian Social Statistics identified white-
collar crime as a separate category in the area of social concern to be identified in 
data collection and measurement by the ABS.23 In terms of seriousness, Grabosky et 
al have reported that the public perceives many forms of white-collar crime as more 
serious, and more deserving of condign punishment, than many forms of common 
crime.24 The same view has been reported in some overseas jurisdictions including 
the United States,25 the United Kingdom26 and Sweden.27 
	
E Overview of the Articles 
 
The first article, ‘(Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work – and What it Means 
for Sentencing’ (‘General Deterrence Article’), looks at the objective of general 
deterrence. This is a universal sentencing objective and key sentencing consideration 
throughout all Australian jurisdictions. It is a justification for increasing the 
harshness of a sentence.  Moreover, it is a consideration that is particularly important 
in the sentencing of white-collar offenders. The article analyses the efficacy of 
criminal punishment to reduce crime through the imposition of harsher sentences. It 
concludes that there is no correlation between harsher penalties and a lower crime 
rate. It argues that this logically means that general deterrence should not influence 
the choice of sanction in the case of general crimes or, by extrapolation, in white-
collar crimes. Thus, this article examines general deterrence in the context of all 
offence types. It is relevant to this thesis because the general conclusions in this 
article apply to the specific case of white-collar offences. This is especially pertinent 
given that, as I shall demonstrate, general deterrence is one of the key sentencing 
objectives that informs sentences for white-collar offences. 
 
The second article that forms part of the thesis, ‘The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions 
to Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, 
Rehabilitation Might and the Implications for Sentencing’ (‘Specific Deterrence 
Article’), explores two further general sentencing objectives, namely, specific 
                                                                                                                                     
[1981] VR 155; Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; R v Vardouniotis (2007) 171 A Crim R 
227; R v Smith (1987) 44 SASR 587.  
22	See, eg, Crimes Amendment (Gross Violence Offences) Act 2013 (Vic); Sex Offenders Registration 
Act 2004 (Vic) where the paramount consideration is community protection.  
23	Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Measuring Wellbeing: Frameworks for Australian Social Statistics’ 
(ABS Catalogue No 4160.0, 12 October 2001) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/44AD1E3F6E6F27A2CA25713F0014E6D
A?opendocument>. 
24 Peter Grabosky, John Braithwaite and Paul R Wilson, ‘The Myth of Community Tolerance Toward 
White-Collar Crime’ (1987) 20 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 33. 
25	Kristy Holtfreter et al, ‘Public Perceptions of White-Collar Crime and Punishment’ (2008) 36 
Journal of Criminal Justice 50. 
26	Grabosky, Braithwaite and Wilson, above n 24. 
27 Daniel Larsson and Tage Alalehto, ‘The Reaction Towards White Collar Crime: When White 
Collar Crime Matters’ (2013) 6 Open Criminology Journal 1. 
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deterrence and rehabilitation. Following the review of the evidence regarding the 
relationship between specific deterrence, rehabilitation and recidivism rates, it 
concludes that specific deterrence is an unobtainable sentencing goal and that there is 
insufficient empirical data to determine if rehabilitation can be achieved. It follows, 
so we argued, that neither of these considerations should weigh heavily in the 
sentencing of offenders in general, or white-collar offenders in particular. Thus, this 
article examines specific deterrence and rehabilitation in the context of all offence 
types. The general conclusions in the article apply to the specific case of white-collar 
offences. 
 
The third article, ‘Rehabilitating Totality in Sentencing: from Obscurity to Principle’ 
(‘Totality Article’), analyses the issue of totality. Unlike (marginal) general 
deterrence, specific deterrence and rehabilitation, totality is a principle of sentencing, 
rather than an objective.28 However, because it involves one of the ‘small mistakes’ 
that lead to systemic failure, it comprises an important part of the program for 
change. The principle arises in relation to a large number of criminal offences but is 
particularly apposite with regard to white-collar offences, given that many offenders 
are sentenced on the basis of the commission of more than one offence.  People who 
commit white-collar crime tend to not stop after the first offence (for example, 
repeated tax evasion offences),29 and hence there is a particular need to ascertain how 
this principle ought to operate in relation to white-collar offenders.  In this article, we 
conclude that the current justification for the totality principle is misconceived, and 
that a different rationale is necessary to ground the principle.  This is found in the 
fact that offenders who are not sentenced cumulatively for their offences are denied 
the opportunity of reforming or correcting their behaviour. Thus, this article 
examines the principle of totality in the context of all offence types, and is relevant to 
the thesis because its general conclusions apply to the specific case of white-collar 
offences. This is especially pertinent given that, as I shall demonstrate, most cases of 
white-collar offending involve multiple offences. 
 
The fourth article, ‘First-time Offender, Productive Offender, Offender with 
Dependents: Why the Profile of Offenders (Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing’ 
(‘First-time Offender Article’), looks at specific mitigating factors which are often 
relevant in the case of white-collar offenders. Again, mitigating factors represent a 
different part of the sentencing calculus: this time examining not an objective or 
principle, but rather a specific set of factors which impact upon sentence. These 
factors involve considerations that stem from the profile of the offender; the absence 
of prior convictions, previous good deeds, and where offenders have financial and 
physical dependents. The article concludes that only the first and last of these 
considerations should mitigate penalty for offenders in general and white-collar 
offenders in particular. The offender traits considered in this article are especially 
relevant in the context of white-collar offending given that many white-collar 
offenders have no criminal history and are employed at the time of offending and 
often have financial dependents.  
 
The fifth article, which constitutes the final publication, Rational Approach Article, 
captures and examines the current approach to sentencing white-collar offenders and 
                                                
28 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic): s 5(1) expresses the purposes for which sentences may be imposed, 
however, s 5(2F) expresses that a sentence must ‘reflect the totality of the offending…’. 
29 Bagairc, Alexander and Pathinayake, above n 1. 
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identifies what we saw as the flaws with that approach. The article includes a 
discussion of the principles that the superior courts have articulated regarding the 
sentencing of white-collar offenders. In essence, it provides the base 
recommendations set out in Chapter X. The fact that there is not only a paucity of 
jurisprudentially sound sentencing principles for white-collar offenders but also a 
discord between the principles that do exist and current practice, further highlights 
the need for greater clarity and certainty in this area of law. As indicated above, some 
of the recommendations set out in the article have been adapted following the results 
of the empirical analysis of the cases, which are discussed in Chapters VIII and XI. 
 
Collectively, the articles expose the various aspects of sentencing law which 
contribute to the systemic failure of sentencing law to achieve its objective, and 
which justify the criticism that it is irrational. The sole authored part of the thesis, 
which I summarise below, examines the conclusions reached in the articles and tests 
those conclusions for theoretical and practical soundness before reconsidering the 
previous recommendations for reform against the empirical research.  
 
F Chapter Summaries 
 
I commence in Chapter II, by exploring the basic concepts that underpin the law of 
sentencing: punishment and sentencing.  I consider the theories of punishment upon 
which sentencing, as a social practice, is based.  It is trite to observe that no proposal 
for sentencing reform can be meaningful unless it is consonant with the basic 
theories broadly propounded as justification for criminal punishment.  This chapter 
explains what it is that the imposition of a sentence might sensibly be intended, and 
able, to achieve. 
 
In Chapter III, I articulate the sentencing schema to provide some terminological 
consistency, and to provide a locus to the reform proposals which I later make.  I 
then set out the current approach to sentencing law and practice in respect to white-
collar crime. This chapter provides the tableau against which the process of 
sentencing takes place. 
 
In Chapter IV, I discuss what rationality in law might mean, and then attempt to 
discern what constitutes rationality in sentencing law. The analysis applies to 
sentencing in globo in order to establish the normative benchmark against which the 
measurement of white-collar sentencing can be set.  
 
In Chapter V, I examine the general problems with current sentencing practices 
revealed by the research, and make some further observations about the veracity of 
the conclusions reached in the articles. 
 
In Chapter VI, I set out the specific problems in sentencing white-collar offenders 
and the definitional problems of white-collar crime.   This includes an analysis of 
whether or not white-collar offences, and white-collar offenders, are indeed a sui 
generis and therefore warrant separate treatment.  The existing tension within 
academia between constructing white-collar crime as a type of offence or as a type of 
offender is explored.  I establish the qualitative differences between white-collar 
offending and other types of crime to help explain the unique features of sentencing 
white-collar offenders.  
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In Chapter VII, I set out the process by which the cases that I analysed were 
selected, the research methodology employed and the limitations inherent in 
analysing sentencing decisions.  The specific analysis of the individual cases appears 
in Appendix A – Research. 
 
In Chapter VIII, the results of the research in relation to the eight selected 
sentencing variables (quantitative results) and judicial observations regarding the 
reasons for the specific treatment of those variables (qualitative results) are recorded 
and tabulated. 
 
In Chapter IX, I review, interpret and discuss the data from the empirical research.  
The data is used to examine, test, and sometimes adapt, the assertions made in the 
five articles. The conclusions which flow from the results of the research provide a 
further foundation for the reform proposals. 
 
I conclude in Chapter X, by advancing a series of reform proposals which the 
discussion in the preceding eight chapters have precipitated, as well as examining the 
reform proposals that were previously set out in the five articles; specifically testing 
them against the results of the research and the theoretical analysis contained in the 
thesis. I then make some final observations regarding the need for a rational 
approach to sentencing. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING  
 
 
‘The imposition of punishment requires justification. We should not be satisfied with 
the proposition that anyone who commits any offence forfeits all rights, and may be 
dealt with by the state in whatever manner the courts decree. That would be to 
suggest that any convicted person is entirely at the disposal of the criminal justice 
system…Instead, we should seek strong justifications for contemporary sentencing 
practices, not least because of the increasing use of imprisonment and the greater 
restrictiveness of non-custodial sentences in many countries.’ 
 
   Andrew Ashworth QC, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (6th ed, 2015) 74 
 
 
A Introduction 
 
As established in the Specific Deterrence and Rehabilitation Article, sentencing is a 
purposeful endeavour. But the elegant simplicity of this observation belies the 
obscurity of its meaning: what is that purpose? Or are there many purposes?  
Whether there be one or many purposes, how are they to be identified and 
elucidated? What happens if the purposes conflict? What if they cannot be achieved? 
 
The concepts of punishment and sentencing have been the subject of consideration 
far beyond the confines of the law. Within the social sciences, the major disciplines 
of philosophy, criminology, sociology,30 economics, and even psycho-analytics,31 
have each contributed to the dialogue about the purpose(s) of punishment and 
sentencing.  Perhaps more than all other areas of the law, sentencing captures public 
attention most often and most acutely (through media and other fora).32 And yet, 
simultaneously, sentencing law is necessarily the most reflexive of all areas of the 
law – exhibiting a bidirectional relationship between flexibility and certainty – an 
area where nuance and subtlety and instinct are an unavoidable part of a just 
outcome. The offender, the victim and the community each expect sentencers and 
sentences to exhibit a wisdom commensurate with the judgment of King Solomon; 
                                                
30	Jeremy Bentham was a philosopher, jurist and social reformer; Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Igor Primoratz and Robert Nozick were philosophers; Cesare 
Beccaria was a criminologist, jurist, philosopher and politician; John Stuart Mill was a philosopher, 
political economist and civil servant.		 
31 Donald Carveth, ‘The Unconscious Need for Punishment: Expression or Evasion of the Sense of 
Guilt?’ (2001) 3(1) Psychoanalytic Studies 9. 
32 Karen Gelb, Sentencing Advisory Council, ‘Myths and Misconceptions: Public Opinion versus 
Public Judgment about Sentencing’ Federal Sentencing Report (2006); Julian Roberts, ‘Public 
Opinion and Sentencing Policy’ in Sue Rex and Michael Tonry (eds), Reform and Punishment: The 
Future of Sentencing (Routledge, 2002); Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Courts and Public Opinion’ 
(Speech delivered at the National Institute of Government and Law Inaugural Public Lecture, 
Parliament House Canberra, 20 March 2002); John Walker, Mark Collins and Paul Wilson, ‘How the 
Public Sees Sentencing: an Australian Survey’, (Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 
Report No 4, Australian Institution of Criminology, April 1987); Kate Warner et al, ‘Gauging Public 
Opinion on Sentencing: Can Asking Jurors Help?’ (Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 
Report No 371, Australian Institute of Criminology, March 2009). 
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but what constitutes a just sentence is probably more difficult to ascertain than the 
maternity of an infant.33 
 
B The Relationship Between Punishment and Sentencing 
 
Philosophers have long sought to explain punishment as a social instrument and 
mechanism of justice. The chief aim of this instrument has been to attain a system of 
criminal law which is more just, humane and rational,34 the achievement of which 
would be a ‘[win for] the cause of humanity.’35 These broad and aspirational 
statements satisfactorily express the basic reason for law, but do little to identify the 
role of punishment within the law.   
 
In the sentencing process, punishment has been described as the ‘logical prior 
inquiry’36 and thus the two concepts are related. Arguably, if it can be shown that 
punishment in the form of current sentencing practices is empirically, economically 
or even morally effective, then it does not require reform at all.37  Indeed, assessing 
the rationality of sentencing white-collar offenders in Australia necessarily involves 
articulating, as a first step, why we impose punishment on offenders.38 Only once the 
purpose of punishment has been identified is it possible to make a normative 
assessment of the purposes themselves, or of the process by which those purposes are 
sought to be achieved. Construed in this light, the true purpose of this ‘purposeful 
endeavour’ becomes clearer: sentencing is intended to achieve those aims which are 
said to justify the infliction of punishment. Punishment is the fulcrum: sentencing the 
lever. A simple example makes the point: if the purpose of punishment is only to 
demonstrate to the offender that certain behaviour is socially unacceptable, any 
punishment which constitutes a hardship to the individual would suffice. If the 
purpose of punishment is to ensure that other potential offenders do not repeat the 
offending behaviour, then a punishment which constitutes a hardship to the 
individual and which will act as a deterrent to other individuals would be necessary.  
The ultimate sentence in those two cases might look very different, because that 
which is sufficient in one case may not be sufficient in the other. Thus, the purpose 
of sentencing is simply to achieve the aims identified as desirable according to the 
claimed theoretical justifications for the infliction of punishment.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 This is not to undervalue King Solomon’s achievement.  Of course, he is reputed to have had the 
assistance of the Divine. Most sentencers are not so lucky. 
34 Mike Materni, ‘Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice’ (2013) 2 British Journal of 
American Legal Studies 263, 454. 
35 J D Bessler, ‘Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and the 
Abolition Movement’ (2009) 4(2) Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 195, 220 quoting 
Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings (Aaron Thomas and Jeremy Parzen, 
University of Toronto Press, 2008) 26 [trans of: Dei delitti e delle pene (first published 1764)]. 
36 Mirko Bagaric, ‘From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: Reducing the Rate of 
Imprisonment and Crime While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars’ (2014) 19 Michigan Journal of 
Race and Law 349, 353. 
37 This will be discussed in detail in Chapters IV and VI.  
38 Materni, above n 34, 265. Along with morality in the criminal law, Materni identifies sentencing as 
another reason why we should care about criminal punishment and the pursuit of justice.	 
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C Competing Theories: Retributivism, Utilitarianism and Just Deserts 
 
Haist provides the context in which the main theories of punishment have been 
considered as follows (citations omitted): 
 
Punishing what society deems wrong or unwise seems to be an integral part of any 
civilization. Specific guidelines for punishment date back to Hammurabi's Code, 
while theoretical and philosophical justifications for punishment can be seen as early 
as Aristotle. Simply put, criminal justice is, and has always been, at the center of 
public concern, so much so that modem societies often view and compare 
themselves to one another through the lens of what we now call criminal justice.39 
 
According to Stearns, punishment is the ‘outgrowth of private vengeance, …[an 
immediate] reaction to annoyance and irritation…[that is]…almost reflex in 
character’ and is ultimately imposed for the purpose of ‘individual or social 
defense.’40 The social defense justification arises as a result of the commission of an 
offence that constitutes a breach of the implied social contract to which all citizens 
are party.41 The earliest recorded punishments appear to originate from Mosaic Law 
whereby the focus was, often vengefully,42 on equalizing the punishment with the 
crime. It is here that we see the genesis of the (modern day) concept of 
proportionality; that the punishment must fit the crime, albeit very strictly interpreted 
at its inception.43 Secular philosophers later coined this concept retributivism.44  
 
The fathers of retributive theory, Kant and Hegel,45 justify the imposition of 
punishment as a consequence of the commission of a crime.46 Kant goes as far as 
categorising punishment as a ‘right of the sovereign’47 and a high moral duty.48 In 
this way evil is compensated by evil (of no more than equal value). Therefore, 
retribution and just punishment have been described as strongly resembling ‘public 
vengeance at the hand of the state.’49 Modern-day retributivism says that state-
                                                
39 Matthew Haist, ‘Deterrence in a Sea of Just Deserts: Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable in a World of 
Limiting Retributivism’ (2009) 99 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 789. 
40 A Warren Stearns, ‘Evolution of Punishment’ (1936) 27(2) Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 219, 219–20; George Kateb, ‘Punishment and the Spirit of Democracy’ (2007) 74(2) 
Social Research 269, 270. 
41 Kateb, above n 40, 284. He identifies the social contract as the Constitution. 
42 Ibid 287. Not always revenge – sometimes restitution. 
43 Stearns, above n 40, 221. This is where the phrase ‘eye for an eye’ originates and is known as the 
lex talionis approach. 
44 Materni, above n 34, 271-277. This is, along with utilitarianism, are the two modern justifications of 
punishment.  
45 Kant of course adopted the lex talionis concept from Mosaic law: see Immanuel Kant, Die 
Metaphysik der Sitten (1797-8). It has been argued that Kant was concerned with identifying a rational 
basis of the idea of retribution and did this by linking two basic ideas of his moral philosophy: the 
categorical imperative and the respect of persons. The categorical imperative is derived from the 
identification of a specific obligation. Kant says that ‘the principle of punishment is a categorical 
imperative’ (MS, 6:331): see Nelson T Potter Jr, ‘The Principle of Punishment Is a Categorical 
Imperative’ in Jane Kneller and Sidney Axinn (eds), Autonomy and Community: Readings in 
Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy (SUNY Press, 1998) 169, 169-70. 
46 Ibid, 272. See also Kateb, above n 40, 293–5 for Mill’s similar belief that crime entails punishment. 
47 Materni, above n 34, 271. 
48 Kateb, above n 40, 290 citing Immanuel Kant, Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, 2nd 
ed, 1991) 142. 
49 Materni, above n 34, 275–7. 
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imposed punishment of the guilty is, in itself, justice, where justice is the ‘reparation 
of the wrongs suffered; the restitution of the losses incurred; [and] the compensation 
for the suffering endured.’50 The modern retributivist distinguishes justice from 
vengeance on the grounds of power – that it is imposed by the state, as opposed to 
the aggrieved.51 It is for this reason that punishment has been described as the 
necessary and lesser evil,52 its necessity arising partly from the protection which it 
offers the offender from ‘excessive or unjust retaliation’53 at the hands of the 
aggrieved, and partly from its restorative function with respect to the altered status 
and power imbalance which eventuates between an offender and victim upon the 
commission of an offence.54 Recent research confirms that retributivism maintains its 
position as a popular theory and justification for punishment and is, to an extent, 
dependent on the social identity of the offender and the victim.55  
 
Between the time of Mosaic Law and the eighteenth century, the major change to 
punishment theory concerned the locus of the authority to impose punishment. 
During the Classical period, it was the head of the family; during the Draconic period 
it was the King; and during the Middle Ages it was the punishing class.56 The polity 
with the authority to punish was always co-extensive with the holder of social 
authority; no separate justification was necessary.   
 
It is only during the mid-eighteenth century that an intellectual search for a more 
rational justification for punishment commenced. Cessare Beccaria, in his then 
controversial book, On Crimes and Punishment, prompted the abolition of capital 
punishment in many countries around the world as a result of his re-imagining of 
established penal culture.57 For example, because Beccaria thought that the laws 
against suicide were ineffective, he argued that suicide laws should be eliminated, 
leaving punishment of suicide to God.  De-coupling religious dogma from man-made 
law was not unprecedented. Rather, it echoed a more ancient ideology that was to re-
emerge centuries later.58 The provenance of this conception of punishment was first 
recorded as advocated by Plato, who expressed it in his dialogue Protagoras: 
 
In punishing wrongdoers, no one concentrates on the fact that a man has done wrong 
in the past, or punishes him on that account, unless taking blind vengeance like a 
beast.  No, punishment is not inflicted by rational man for the sake of the crime that 
has been committed (after all one cannot undo what is past), but for the sake of the 
                                                
50 Ibid 283.  
51 Ibid, 286-8, citing Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment (Oxford, 1989); Michael S Moore, 
Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
52 Materni, above n 34, 288, quoting David Dolinko, ‘Three Mistakes of Retributivism’ (1992) 39 
University of California Los Angeles Law Review 1623, 1656; See also Kateb, above n 40, 302. 
53 Stearns, above n 41, 221. 
54 Michael Wenzel and Ines Thielmann, ‘Why We Punish in the Name of Justice: Just Desert versus 
Value Restoration and the Role of Social Identity’ (2006) 19(4) Social Justice Research 450, 451. 
55 Ibid 454. See also Kevin Carlsmith, John Darley and Paul Robinson, ‘Why Do We Punish? 
Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment’ (2002) 83(2) Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 284. It was found that ‘individual sentencing decisions seemed driven exclusively 
by just deserts concerns.’ 
56 Stearns, above n 40, 223. 
57 Ibid 224. See also Bessler, above n 35. 
58 Materni, above n 34, 289. ‘But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a 
past wrong which cannot be undone, he has regard to the future…he punishes for the sake of 
prevention.’ This concept later emerged as the basis of utilitarianism. 
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future, to prevent either the same man or, by the spectacle of his punishment, 
someone else from doing wrong again.  But to hold such a view amounts to holding 
that virtue can be instilled by education; at all events the punishment is inflicted as a 
deterrent.59 
 
The renewed criticism that punishment without purpose is liable to turn man into a 
beast resulted in a shift in the winds from eighteenth century onwards. Substituting 
vengeance for deterrence was a key theme of penology in the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries.60 Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill applied the social 
theory of utilitarianism to legal theory.61 Utilitarian penal law is framed in terms of 
the principle objective of deterrence; but it also embraces the secondary ends of 
disablement, moral reformation, and compensation.62 In other words, unlike 
retributivism – which is backward looking – utilitarianism is forward looking; with 
its predominant goal being deterrence,63 and its ancillary goals being community 
protection (generally through incapacitation) and rehabilitation. While retributivism 
focuses on deliberate infliction of pain on the offender for its own sake, the focus of 
utilitarian punishment is ‘neither to torment or afflict a sentient being, nor to undo a 
crime already committed.’64 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the English jurist, legal 
scholar and political theorist, perhaps best embodied l’esprit du temps of the late 
Victorian era; a blend of both retributive and consequentialist (utilitarian) thinking 
which permeated the criminal law. His writings have been sufficiently broad as to be 
labelled both retributive and utilitarian.65 This era gave birth to poor laws and prison 
reform (the panopticon), but retained the criminalisation of homosexuality66 and 
capital punishment.67 Transportation was justified not only as an economic and 
political expedient, but also as a means of reform: the creation of a number of British 
colonial polities in America, Australia and New Zealand were the result of an 
experiment in utilitarian penology.68 
 
                                                
59 R F Stalley, ‘Punishment in Plato’s ‘Protagoras’’ (1995) 40(1) Phronesis 1, 1. 
60 Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 251 (1952) where the following was stated ‘tardy and 
unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the 
motivation of public prosecution.'  
61 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford Clarendon 
Press, 1789) 92–5. See also John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Longman, Roberts, Green & Co, 4th ed, 
1869). 
62 James Crimmins, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (at 17 March 2015) Jeremy Bentham, 
‘7 Penal Law and Punishment’ <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/bentham/>.  
63 Materni, above n 34, 290. See also Cass Sunstein, ‘On the Psychology of Punishment’ (2003) 11 
Supreme Court Economic Review 171, 173. 
64 Bessler, above n 35, 223, quoting Beccaria, above n 35, 26. 
65 M O DeGirolami, ‘Against Theories of Punishment: The Thought of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’ 
(2012) 9 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 699, 703.   
66 Gross immorality without any evidence of any damage.  
67 See Death Penalty Abolition Act 1973 (Cth); Crimes Legislation Amendment (Torture Prohibition 
and Death Penalty Abolition) Act 2010 (Cth) which stops any state or territory attempting to 
reintroduce the death penalty. See also Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 (UK). 
68 Stearns, above n 40, 227. For example, the New England colonies of Maryland and Virginia: see 
James D Butler, ‘British Convicts Shipped to American Colonies’ (1896) 2(1) American Historical 
Review 12, 19. The penal colony of New Zealand: see John Pratt, ‘Penal History in Colonial Society: 
New Issues in the Sociology of Punishment’ (1995) 11 Australian Journal of Law and Society 3. Even 
the colony of South Australia, intended as a ‘convict free’ society, was devised as a scheme for the 
reform of prisoners by then serving prisoners, Gouger and Wakefield: see Jon Telfer, ‘With Greatest 
Expectation: The Colony, Crime and Corrections In South Australia’ (Paper presented at the History 
of Crime, Policing and Punishment Conference, Canberra, 9-10 December 1999). 
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Science entered the fray in the late nineteenth century, when we see the first 
psychological studies of individual criminals.69 The main goal of punishment 
advanced in this period adopted psychological perspectives and embraced the 
possibility of behavioural change, a clearly utilitarian motivation.70 It was in the mid 
twentieth century, in 1938 and 1944, that Skinner and Estes conducted studies on 
punishment that applied behavioural psychology to controlling conduct.71 The results 
showed punishment to be ineffective in eliminating undesirable behaviour in rats. 
 
However, later studies yielded contrary results, showing that punishment could be an 
effective tool for suppressing behaviour72 and may even have long-term economic 
benefits as a result of increased cooperation.73 However, the translational problem 
was never adequately addressed: results from behavioural studies on animals did not 
apply directly to humans, such that the results could only be applied to humans with 
some circumspection. Further, it is obviously unethical and impractical to conduct 
such studies directly on humans.74 Notwithstanding the lack of confirmation as to the 
true efficacy of punishment from a scientific standpoint, it appears that our 
‘willingness to engage in costly punishment may be part of human psychology’75 and 
something from which we derive pleasure.76 Despite the lack of evidence, 
punishment continued to be imposed on the assumption that it works. In the 1960s, 
Herbert Morris expressed a conceptually modern view of punishment, suggesting 
that it is a fundamental human right, necessary for the respect and maintenance of 
human dignity, through the imposition of rehabilitation and treatment, as opposed to 
purely retributivist aims.77 
 
Theoretical development continued into the 1970s. In 1976, Von Hirsch advocated a 
more sophisticated perspective known as ‘just deserts’ theory to justify punishment.78  
Edney explains the basic premise of the theory: 
 
Von Hirsch outlined a theory of punishment that did not concentrate on either the 
rehabilitation of the offender or the type of punishment that would deter the offender 
                                                
69 Ibid 228. 
70 Ann Sanson et al, ‘Punishment and Behaviour Change: An Australian Psychology Society Position 
Paper’ (1996) 31(3) Australian Psychologist 157, 158. Sanson et al describe punishment as ‘the 
response-contingent application of an unpleasant or aversive event in an attempt to suppress, or 
prevent the recurrence of that response.’ 
71 Barry Singer, ‘Psychological Studies of Punishment’ (1970) 58(2) California Law Review 405, 413, 
citing B Skinner, The Behaviour of Organisms (Appleton Century, 1938); W K Estes, ‘An 
Experimental Study of Punishment’ (1953) 57 Psychological Monographs 263. Skinner even 
suggested that punishment as a social instrument be eliminated.  
72 Ibid 414. 
73 Simon Gächter, Elke Runner and Martin Sefton, ‘The Long-Run Benefits of Punishment’ (2008) 
322 Science 1510, where it was stated that ‘punishment not only increases cooperation, it also makes 
groups and individuals better off in the long run because the costs of punishment become negligible 
and are outweighed by the increased gains from cooperation.’ 
74 It is clear what a severe punishment is to a rat (large shock c.f. small shock) however, in relation to 
humans, severity requires a much more subjective analysis: see also Singer, above n 71. 
75 Joseph Henrich et al, ‘Costly Punishment Across Human Societies’ (2006) 312 Science 1767. 
76 Bagaric, ‘From Arbitrariness to Coherency’, above n 36, 356, citing Dominique de Quervain et al, 
‘The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment (2004) 305 Science 1254, 1258. 
77 Herbert Morris, ‘Persons and Punishment’ (1968) 52(4) The Monist 475. See also Materni, above n 
34, 274. 
78 Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments: Report of the Committee for the 
Study of Incarceration (Will and Hang, 1976). 
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or others tempted to break the criminal law. Instead, the focus was on the offence 
committed by the offender. Punishment under such a model would only be justified 
by reference to the harm produced by the offender’s conduct in conjunction with her 
or his level of culpability. The offender’s deserts were the key to determining the 
level of intervention by the state in the offender’s life through the sanctions of the 
criminal law. Such an account of punishment was justified independently of the 
efficacy of punishment in deterring or reforming the offender. Punishment was to be 
allocated to an individual on the basis of the harm caused by her or his criminal 
behaviour, coupled with a consideration of her or his individual culpability. The 
concept of just deserts, in contending that punishment should be calibrated between 
offence, harm and culpability, is very similar to the concept of proportionality as 
understood under Australian criminal law.79 
 
 
As is evident, the confounding aspect of the just deserts theory is that whilst it 
reflects a retributivist approach towards the imposition of punishment, it is 
predicated upon a scale of measurement (matching harm with culpability) that is part 
of the Australian sentencing landscape under the rubric of the principle of 
proportionality. Whilst there has been strong academic criticism of the theory as a 
satisfactory justification for punishment overall,80 its utility as a justification seems 
misplaced in light of the development of the proportionality concept as a mechanism 
of severity control in such High Court cases as Veen v The Queen,81 Chester v The 
Queen,82 and Hoare v The Queen.83   
 
Nonetheless, today, just deserts is an attractive theory in an era where legislative and 
judicial responsiveness to public outrage about increasing crime rates is mooted as an 
important aspect of victims’ rights and public law-and-order agendas. The risk that 
the theory presents is that it provides an avenue by which potentially misinformed 
and emotionally driven opinions84 are injected into the sentencing process, while 
judges are still asked to sentence in a ‘just, impartial and independent’ manner.85 Of 
course, in both the Victoria and the Federal jurisdictions, public opinion is already 
imported into the sentencing process,86 at least in so far as informing offence 
seriousness,87 moral outrage and notions of dehumanisation.88   
                                                
79 Richard Edney, ‘Just deserts in Post-Colonial Society: Problems in the Punishment of Indigenous 
Offenders’ (2005) 9 Southern Cross University Law Review 73, 78. 
80 See, eg, Barbara Hudson, Penal Policy and Social Justice (Macmillan, 1993) 56. 
81 (1988) 164 CLR 465. 
82 (1988) 165 CLR 611. 
83 (1989) 167 CLR 348. 
84 Brock Bastian, Thomas Denson and Nick Haslan, ‘The Roles of Dehumanization and Moral 
Outrage in Retributive Justice’ (2013) 8(4) PLoS One 1, 1. See also Julian Roberts and Jan W de 
Keijser, ‘Democratising Punishment: Sentencing, Community Views and Values’ (2014) 16(4) 
Punishment and Society 474, 493, ‘proposals to introduce greater – and more direct – public 
involvement in sentencing as a threat to principled sentencing.’ 
85 Roberts and Keijser, above n 84, 489 quoting H Elffers and Jan De Keijser (2007) ‘Different 
Perspectives, Different Gaps: Does the General Public Demand a More Responsive Judge’ in Kury H 
(ed) Fear of Crime – Punitivity: New Developments in Theory and Research (Universitatsverlag 
Brockmeyer, 2007). 
86 Punishment expresses moral condemnation and conveys the values people want to see upheld: see 
Wenzel and Thielmann, above n 54, 453. See also Bagaric, ‘From Arbitrariness to Coherency’, above 
n 36, 358. 
87 Bagaric, ‘From Arbitrariness to Coherency’, above n 38, 358. 
88 Bastian, Denson and Haslan, above n 82. 
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D Competing Theories: Objectives and Justifications 
 
From the survey of the contemporary theories of punishment outlined above, it is 
possible to elucidate the central objectives and justifications of each theory. This is a 
necessary anterior step in the process of determining why punishment should be 
inflicted, and which punishment best serves that purpose. 
 
For retributivists, punishment is justified because an offender who commits a 
wrongful act morally deserves to suffer a proportionate punishment. The act of 
punishment itself is intrinsically good — without reference to any other good that 
might arise.89 Whilst retributive theories may not require any further moral 
justification,90 it has been argued that offenders deserve punishment to pay back a 
debt to victims or society, or simply to provide a response in kind (the biblical lex 
talionis), or as a form of sublimated vengeance,91 or to stop the growth of private 
vigilantism.92 This means that punishment can be inflicted, and the severity 
determined, without identification of, or regard to, deterrent or rehabilitative effects. 
 
For consequentialists, the justification for punishment is teleological. It is 
encapsulated in Bentham’s observation: ‘all punishment in itself is evil ... [I]f it 
ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to 
exclude some greater evil.’93 Criminal punishment is only acceptable if it increases 
future pleasure or decreases future pain. As Haist notes, the application of economic 
theory to law during the twentieth century created and supported policies revolving 
around deterrence. He cites Professor Albert Alschuler’s example of federal income 
tax evasion penalties (citations omitted):  
 
Even though physically stealing $100,000, for example, from the government would 
appear to most of us as worse than avoiding paying $100,000 worth of income tax, 
income tax evasion was punished much more severely than outright theft. The 
justification was that tax evaders were caught less often than thieves; therefore, 
harsher penalties were necessary to create a sufficient deterrent effect.94 
 
Thus, consequentialist theory requires demonstration of the pro-social benefit of 
punishment in the forms of deterrence and rehabilitation to justify sentence severity. 
Denunciation and incapacitation also play an ancillary role. 
 
                                                
89 The question about the relationship between deontological and teleological perspectives of morality 
are relevant. Some theorists believe that retributivism and deontology go hand in hand, in the sense 
that one requires the other. Yet deontology as such does not require retributivism to be true: see 
Michael S Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
90 The plural is used because there John Cottingham famously distinguished nine ‘varieties of 
retribution’, arguing that much discussion of retributive justice is confused because people are not 
clear what they mean: see John Cottingham, ‘Varieties of Retribution’ (1979) 29 Philosophical 
Quarterly 238. 
91 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Harvard University Press, 1981) 371. 
92 Alec Walen, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (as 18 June 2014) Retributive Justice, ‘3.8 
Safety Valve to Stop Vigilantism’ <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/justice-
retributive/>. 
93 Bentham, above n 61. 
94 Haist, above n 39, 798. 
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By contrast, the just deserts theorist argues that criminal activity is a choice, and 
justifies punishment as its corollary. As Starkweather explains: 
 
The concept of just deserts seeks to preserve human dignity through punishment. It 
asserts that a person is a rational individual with the free will to make a moral choice 
whether or not to engage in conduct known to be prohibited. Retribution under a just 
deserts principle treats a defendant as a dignified human being by responding to his 
or her conduct in a way that respects his or her choice to engage in wrongful 
behavior. This concept differs radically from the utilitarian theories of rehabilitation 
and deterrence.95 
 
The essential task of punishment in the just deserts theory is to ‘… [r]estore the 
relationships that have been broken, [so] a defendant must be punished only to the 
extent necessary to restore the relationships.’96 The just deserts theory engages a 
nuanced objective: it is essentially restorative and directed towards the recalibration 
of the human relationship between the offender and the victim. The recognition of 
free will and its sequels are the base justifications for punishment.  
 
E Competing Theories: Challenges 
 
Although the utilitarian theory dominated punishment models for a good part of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it has not remained pre-eminent.  There has been 
what Weisberg calls ‘a robust revival of retributivism’ (including both pure 
retributivism and just deserts theory) which, he argues, has led to the mass 
incarcerations in the United States.97 In Australia, where incarceration rates have also 
increased in almost all states and territories,98 there has also followed a steady 
rejection of the utilitarian model.99 Ultimately however, both theories appear to have 
failed to reduce, or even account for, current imprisonment rates. Some academics 
have suggested that a misguided intellectual attachment to these theories lies at the 
heart of the problem. As DeGirolami notes: 
 
In the last fifty years, punishment theorists have developed ‘hybrid’ or mixed 
theories of punishment, which blend strands of retributivist and consequentialist 
theories in philosophically precise portions. But the emergence of hybrid accounts 
has in many ways served exactly to highlight and reinforce the orthodox categories 
within which scholars think about punishment. For in reflecting on new directions 
for understanding punishment, the methodology of systemization – of carefully 
distinguishing the reasons that should count from those that should not in 
constructing an integrated whole – inescapably imprints and reproduces itself. So 
                                                
95 David A Starkweather, ‘The Retributive Theory of ‘Just Deserts’ and Victim Participation in Plea 
Bargaining’ (1992) 67(3) Indiana Law Journal Summer 853, 855. 
96 Ibid 857.	
97 Robert Weisberg, ‘Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment’ (2012) 95 Marquette Law 
Review 1203, 1204. See also Russell Christopher, ‘Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of ‘Just’ 
Punishment’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 843. 
98 See Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Prisoners in Australia’ (ABS Catalogue No 4517.0, 17 
December 2015) <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4517.0>. The national imprisonment 
rate increased by 6% since 2014, and is currently 196 prisoners per 100,000 adult population.  
99 Brett Mason, ‘A Not So Rational Philosophy: A Critique of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 
(Qld)’ (1995) 11 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 67. 
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powerful is the attachment to system in punishment theory that it is difficult even to 
imagine what thinking about punishment might be like without it.100 
 
Thus, when we identify sentencing as ‘unprincipled and a jurisprudential wasteland’ 
in the Totality Article,101 that conclusion follows from the fact that neither theory – 
nor their cultivars – is universally accepted or applied. Each has been largely 
ineffective in providing a rational or global justification for the imposition of one 
form of punishment over another. Despite the ostensible importance of achieving 
some theoretical or doctrinal consistency to underpin the sentencing process, this has 
remained elusive: there is little concordance between Australian legislatures and 
courts as to why punishment is to be inflicted, what the desired outcome of the 
punishment might be, and how a particular sentence might achieve that outcome. 
However, even achieving agreement about the importance of this task in sentencing 
law is itself contentious. Zimring and Hawkins examined the relationship between 
such theories and imprisonment rates and concluded that ‘there is no necessary 
concordance between a particular set of jurisprudential principles and the extent of 
the prison population resulting from the application of those principles.’102 
Contrarily, Weisberg points out that this lack of evidence is not decisive: 
 
But this empirical difficulty hardly exonerates those who place the rarefied 
jurisprudence of punishment at the center of the academic world of criminal justice 
at a time when the metastasis of punishment has become a defining feature of their 
society.103 
 
F Identifying the Purpose of Punishment is an Important but Not Essential 
Step Towards Rationality 
 
The complaint that there is no unifying or overarching rationale to imposing 
punishment is not simply polemical, but constitutes a serious practical failing in 
sentencing law. That is because of the potential mutual incompatibility of the 
objectives. The incompatibility arises because of the tension between the objectives. 
For example, pursuing (general or specific) deterrence might require a harsher 
sentence whereas rehabilitation might require a lighter sentence.104 Denunciation 
might be best achieved by immediate imprisonment, whereas community protection 
might be adequately achieved by professional disqualification. Further, if the purpose 
for which a sentence is imposed cannot be achieved, then the justification for 
imposing that sentence is – both practically and theoretically – indefensible.   
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to finally resolve these difficulties. Deciding 
which purposes or objectives should be pursued is fundamentally a debate between 
relativist and normativist ethics.105 Moreover, whilst it is important to understand the 
                                                
100 DeGirolami, above n 65, 701. 
101 Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘Rehabilitating Totality in Sentencing: from Obscurity to 
Principle’ (2013) 36(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 139 (‘Totality’). 
102 Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, The Scale of Imprisonment (University of Chicago Press, 
1991) xxi. 
103 Weisberg, above n 97, 1205. 
104 Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia, (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2015) 182.   
105 James M Smith, ‘Punishment: A Conceptual Map and a Normative Claim’ (1965) 75(4) University 
of Chicago Press 285. 
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central reasons for which a sentence is to be imposed,106 it is not essential. That is 
perhaps because the two main theories have gestated similar sentencing objectives 
that can – in pragmatic terms – substitute as the purpose for a particular sentence, 
and thus obviate any pressing need to identify the true source of, or justification for, 
a particular objective. In any event, some commentators have suggested that we are 
looking in the wrong place for the answers when we seek to determine the 
ideological source of the objectives of punishment. Although dealing with American 
jurisprudence, the observations of Bruce Western, cited by Weisberg, are apt: 
 
The penal system that Western documents has no rational connection to either 
retributive (individual desert) theories of punishment or deterrence or other 
consequentialist rationales.  It is a system that, deliberately or not, reinforces the 
economics and demographics of diminished social status, and does so in reckless 
disregard of its measurable consequences.107 
 
Whilst academics observe the ‘dizzyingly complex’ array of punishment theories, 
and frankly admit that it is difficult to predict in which direction future academic 
trends may take punishment theory,108 there remains the more immediate problem of 
passing sentence.  
 
G A Practical Compromise: Identifying Common Objectives 
 
Courts have historically been disinclined to concern themselves with the provenance 
of the purposes for which an offender is punished. As is evident from the cursory 
historical review of the theories of punishment above, neither retributivism, nor 
consequentialism, nor any hybrid of either has found universal application. It is clear 
that each theory directs its attention to a different outcome or set of outcomes when 
justifying the imposition of punishment: retributivist theory holds that just deserts is 
itself a sufficient reason to punish; consequentialist theory requires the identification 
of some positive outcome to punishment: deterrence, community protection, or 
rehabilitation.  
 
This duality has been bridged with admirable pragmatism by the courts. They have 
professed a desire to satisfy some or all of those outcomes simultaneously. For 
example, in Re Forbes,109 the New South Wales Supreme Court said that while it 
was important to be merciful when obtaining justice, ‘the exemplary and deterrent 
effect of punishment should be held steadily in view.’110 In the 1900s, we see a 
further application of mixed sentencing objectives when the court said that ‘in 
imposing a sentence [it] must give careful consideration to three aspects of a 
case…the retributive aspect, the reformatory aspect and the deterrent aspect.’111 The 
classic statement of Lawton LJ of the English Court of Appeal in R v Sargeant 
reflects this curial conflation: 
                                                
106 Arguably, if the legislature performed this task it may well provide a far greater degree of certainty 
than any other measure that the legislature might undertake in relation to sentencing law because a 
corollary of articulating the purpose(s) of sentencing would be the marshalling of all the other aspects 
of the sentencing calculus in line with a unified theory. 
107 Weisberg, above n 97, 1207.  
108 DeGirolami, above n 65, 707. 
109 (1887) 8 LR(NSW) 111. 
110 Here we see conflicting goals. 
111 R v Goodrich (1952) 70 WN (NSW) 42. 
 22 
 
[R]etribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation.  Any judge who comes to 
sentence ought always to have these four classical principles in mind and to apply 
them to the facts of the case to see which of them has the greatest importance in the 
case with which he is dealing.112 
 
The difficulty with this final statement of the ‘principles’ is of course that retribution 
is properly characterised as a theory of punishment, whereas deterrence, prevention 
and rehabilitation represent the consequentialist justification for punishment.113  This 
judicial faux pas has not gone unnoticed by academics, who have termed it part of 
the ‘policy free-for-all’ upon which the English courts embarked in the 1970s.114  
This observation continues to apply fifty years later half a world a way.   
 
 
H Relationship Between Theories of Punishment and Sentencing Objectives 
 
At least insofar as is evident when considering the Victorian and Federal sentencing 
legislation, the identified sentencing objectives are reflective of the two main 
theories of punishment. By distillation of the theories into these objectives, a 
concrete means by which the theories can be pursued is possible. The approach of 
sentencing courts provides some doctrinal cohesion between punishment theory and 
sentencing practice. 
 
                                                
112 (1974) 60 Cr App R 74, 77. 
113 Even more confusingly, there has also been a move to synthesise these purposes into a single one, 
‘the protection of the public’: R v Radich [1954] NZLR 86; R v Cooke (1955) 72 WN(NSW) 132; 
Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433, 437. See also R v Casey [1977] Qd R 132; Veen v The 
Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458. 
114 Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, The Penal System: An Introduction (Sage, 3rd ed, 2002) 117. 
115 John Seery, George Kateb: Dignity, Morality and Individuality (Routledge, 2015), 87, citing 
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Clarendon Press, 
1789). 
Statutory objective How it achieves retribution How it achieves 
utilitarianism 
Proportionality Seeks to achieve justice through 
punishment. This is 
retributivism. 
No identifiable relationship.  
Deterrence Designed to teach offender and 
others a lesson, and this justifies 
the infliction of pain through 
punishment in the retributivist 
sense. 
Also is a social defence 
mechanism designed to 
prevent crime. In this sense 
the focus is on prevention 
rather than punishment and 
this is the utilitarian aspect. 
Rehabilitation No identifiable relationship. Seeks to achieve behavioural 
change (also refer to 
psychological justifications 
for punishment) 
Denunciation The extent of denunciation 
informed by moral outrage also 
goes to offence seriousness in 
the retributivist sense. 
Seeks to ‘stamp ignominy on 
crime’ (Bentham).115 This 
expression of moral outrage 
is designed to promote 
respect for the law. 
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Table 1: Comparison showing how the legislative sentencing objectives achieve justifications for 
punishment pursuant to the theories of retribution and utilitarianism. 
 
I Conclusion 
 
A sentence is the embodiment and practical application of a punishment theory, 
which both justifies and dictates the form of a sentence. Despite the unsettled state of 
the theoretical basis for punishment, and the inconsistent and sometimes conflicting 
directions in which objectives of punishment might take a sentencing court, the key 
objectives of punishment in the form of general deterrence, specific deterrence, 
rehabilitation, denunciation and incapacitation are now firmly entrenched in most 
common law sentencing jurisdictions. Whether they are properly characterised as the 
aims of punishment or of sentencing, as objectives or justifications, they represent 
the current orthodoxy regarding the reasons professed by courts for imposing one 
type of sentence over another. An important part of this thesis is to test the validity of 
some of these reasons. As I demonstrate in Chapters VII and VIII, current learning, 
the empirical evidence and my research casts doubt about the legitimacy of these 
reasons for imposing ever harsher sentences. 
  
Community 
protection 
 
Satisfies the idea of social 
defence through incapacitation, 
that is, inflicting punishment by 
removing the offender from 
society for a period of time.  
This also achieves prevention 
of future crime which is a 
utilitarian objective. 
A combination of two 
or more of those 
purposes. 
This shows that the current sentencing system allows for, and 
may even expect, convergence between the two main theories of 
punishment, from which the objectives are largely derived. 
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CHAPTER III  
 
SENTENCING CALCULUS IN AUSTRALIA: 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
‘My object all sublime, 
I shall achieve in time- 
To let the punishment fit the crime, 
The punishment fit the crime’ 
 
Sir William Schwenk Gilbert, The Mikado, 1885 
 
 
A Introduction 
 
As set out in Chapter I, the critique of sentencing law upon which we embark in the 
series of articles spans each aspect of the sentencing arc. In order to locate and 
examine the utility of those critiques, it is beneficial to survey the conceptual 
framework in which the sentencing calculus takes place in Australia. The word 
‘calculus’ is used in this context to denote the method or system of calculation or 
reasoning by which a sentence is devised. By way of background, in their seminal 
text, Fox and Freiberg précis the history of sentencing law in the following terms: 
 
Over the past 200 years, sentencing has evolved from a ritual to a decision-making 
exercise. When the common law prescribed death as the mandatory punishment for 
most felonies, the allocutus provided the prisoner with his or her only formal right to 
address the court and seek mitigation of the penalty through the device of benefit of 
clergy. The sentencer’s discretion broadened in the nineteenth century as statutes 
allowing a choice of both type and quantum of penalty replaced capital punishment.  
The only substantial limit imposed on the exercise of these new powers was that the 
sentence should not be greater than that prescribed by law. The sentencing discretion 
was otherwise unfettered. In writing, in 1863, on the capriciousness of the criminal 
law, Sir James FitzJames Stephen drew attention to the discrepancy that existed 
between the attention paid to detail during the trial, and the perfunctory manner in 
which the sentencing function was performed: ‘…without consultation, advice, or 
guidance of any description whatsoever.’ ‘Yet’, he commented, ‘the sentence is the 
gist of the proceeding.  It is to the trial what the bullet is to the powder.’116  
 
The matrix in which sentencing takes place is now much more complex. It is 
comprised of a number of inter-linked aspects that are considered below. The High 
Court jurisprudence on sentencing has been claimed to be sufficiently developed that 
Australia now enjoys ‘…a distinctly Australian approach to the sentencing of 
offenders…’ which includes ‘…a comprehensive range of authorities concerning 
basic and fundamental aspects of the sentencing process that apply throughout 
Australia….’117 Those aspects are considered in detail in this chapter.  
 
 
                                                
116 Richard Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed, 1999) 2. 
117 Richard Edney, ‘In Spite of Itself? The High Court and the Development of Australian Sentencing 
Principles’ (2005) 2 University of New England Law Journal 1, 3. 
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B First Aspect – High Order Purpose: Reduction in Crime 
 
The high order purpose of the criminal law generally is the reduction of crime. 
Sentencing law is contributive: having any punishment helps to deter crime. This 
purpose is consistent with the concept of absolute general deterrence, considered in 
the General Deterrence Article. However, as Ashworth has pointed out, despite the 
dispositive function of sentencing law in crime prevention and reduction,118 its 
effectiveness in that role is limited:  
 
In cases where [crime] prevention has not worked, the state must be prepared to 
respond to an offence that has been committed. However, there are well-documented 
reasons why sentencing cannot and should not be expected to function efficiently as 
a crime prevention mechanism.119  
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission makes a similar observation:  
 
It is the criminal justice system, taken as a whole, with all its components, which 
deters crime.  While punishment is a significant part of the way the criminal justice 
system deters, it is inaccurate and imprecise to speak of punishment, or any other 
component of the criminal justice system, as alone deterring crime.120 
 
As Daly argues, this dispositive function of sentencing law is itself inherently 
contradictory:  sentencing decisions are guided by values of both proportionality 
(which restricts the amount of punishment) and crime prevention (which suggests 
that the greater the punishment, the lower the crime rate).  The relative importance of 
those two values is not settled, and indeed, are often in conflict.121 Notwithstanding 
these observations, and although only part of the social response to crime, the 
primary function of imposing punishment, through the mechanisms established by 
sentencing laws, must logically be the prevention and reduction of crime.122  
 
C Second Aspect – The Theories of Punishment 
 
In Chapter II, I traced the history of the predominant theories of punishment: 
retributivism and consequentialism. I adumbrated the conflict between the two 
theories. I also noted there are many and varied hybrid theories which have 
developed to attempt to capture, explain and justify the diverse objects for which 
sentencing laws are promulgated across Australian, and other common law, 
jurisdictions.  
 
As I further pointed out, the theoretical compromise that informs the approach taken  
by sentencing courts to these two theories is probably unassailable when the task at 
                                                
118 Andrew Ashworth, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study (Oxford, 2nd ed, 1998) 61–3. 
Ashworth makes the distinction between processual decisions (about processing the case from charge 
to trial) and dispositive decisions (about the disposal of a case before and after trial). The ‘well 
documented reasons’ include the very limited number of cases which ultimately proceed to sentence, 
meaning that sentencing can only play a minor role in the overall reduction of crime.  
119 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 73. 
120 Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’), Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 13. 
121 Kathleen Daly, ‘Aims of the Criminal Justice System’ in Marinella Marmo, Willem de Link and 
Darren Palmer (eds), Crime and Justice: A Guide to Criminology (Lawbook, 4th ed, 2012). 
122 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 1(d)–(iv). Indeed, one of the expressed purposes of the Sentencing Act 
1991 (Vic) is ‘to prevent crime and promote respect for the law.’ 
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hand is to examine the current approach to sentencing white-collar offenders. It is 
sufficient to note two points: first, that neither the Victorian nor the Federal 
sentencing landscape can be characterised as a pure model of either retributivism or 
consequentialism and both theories inform current sentencing practices; second, that 
any inconsistencies between the two theories may not practically matter in the end. 
DeGirolami explains why it does not matter (albeit that the comparators are 
‘expressivism’ and ‘communicative retribution’)123 in the these terms:  
 
In a significant number of criminal cases, if given a choice between these 
conceptually distinct – and even conflicting – options, why should one not say, ― 
‘both’? It seems plausible that legislators who fashion sentencing schemes would 
want punishments both to express social stigma or condemnation and to 
communicate moral and political values to the offender. That it is possible logically 
to distinguish expressivism from communicative retribution does not mean that 
someone contemplating the justifications of punishment might not sensibly be 
thinking simultaneously about both sorts of reasons. Indeed, the reasons may be 
called up in the legislator‘s mind together, as a justification with two moving parts, 
and it is not clear that breaking them apart serves a purpose other than to suggest 
falsely to the legislator that she must choose for the sake of theoretical order.124 
 
In other words, different and sometimes competing theoretical foundations may not 
adversely affect, or may even enhance rather than corrupt, the sentencing calculus. 
Indeed, there is no ‘theoretical order’ to be found in sentencing law because State 
and Federal sentencing legislation includes values ascribable to both theories. At 
least one attempt in Queensland to impose some theoretical discipline on sentencing 
law resulted in strident criticism.125 Potas notes that a clear theoretical framework is 
desirable to promote consistency in sentencing, but laments that (citations omitted): 
 
Neither the courts, which have embraced the maxim that in sentencing 'the only 
golden rule is that there is no golden rule' nor leading commentators such as Walker 
(1980) who have endorsed an eclectic stance, have provided an adequate formula for 
indicating whether sentences are intended to be primarily utilitarian, and concerned 
with future crime prevention and community protection, or retributive, where the 
emphasis is on bringing the offender to account through an appropriate measure of 
punishment for the particular offence which he or she has committed.126 
 
                                                
123 Expressivism in sentencing is the concept that punishment is designed to express social 
condemnation: see Jens David Ohlin, ‘Towards a Unique Theory of International Criminal 
Sentencing’ (2009) 23 Cornell Law Faculty Publications 373 
<http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=facpub>.  
Communicative retribution holds that punishment is justified as a response to past misconduct. It is 
communicative because, whilst the response is something done to the offender, it is also a message of 
censure to be conveyed to the offender: see Jimmy Cha Shin Hu, ‘Does Communicative Retributivism 
Necessarily Exclude Death Penalty?’ (2013) 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 
<http://idv.sinica.edu.tw/chhsu73/pdf/communicative_retributivism.pdf>. On the relationship between 
retributivism and expressivism: see H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford University 
Press, 1968) 234-5. See also Joel Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment,’ in Joel 
Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton University Press, 
1970). Cf Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Clarendon Press, 1993) 9. 
124 DeGirolami, above n 65, 710. 
125 Mason, above n 99. 
126 Ivan Potas, ‘The Principles of Sentencing Violent Offenders: Towards a More Structured 
Approach’ (1991) <http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/proceedings/19/potas.pdf>. 
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However, it is tolerably clear that the reasons for the imposition of punishment in the 
modern Australian sentencing calculus are both retributivist and consequentialist. 
because it is necessary for society and the victim to retaliate, and to facilitate the 
Punishment is imposed because it is necessary for society and the victim to retaliate 
against, and record censure for, wrongs; and to facilitate the reformation of the 
offender and his or her return to civil society. 
 
D Third Aspect – Sentencing Objectives 
 
Irrespective of the theoretical foundations set out in Chapter II, identifiable 
objectives for courts passing sentence can be found in both the State and Federal 
legislation. As we set out in each of the articles, there is considerable uniformity in 
the sentencing objectives in each of the nine Australian jurisdictions. The objectives 
of sentencing provide some (albeit marginal) guidance as to the reasons for which a 
sentence can be imposed. 
 
In the Federal jurisdiction, whilst there is no express statement of the objectives or 
purposes of sentencing in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), section 16A includes a list of 
matters to which the court must have regard in passing sentence: specific and general 
deterrence, punishment and rehabilitation.127 
 
The Victorian Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) (‘Sentencing Act’), expressly states the 
‘only purposes’ for which sentences may be imposed are: just punishment, specific 
deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, denunciation, and protection of the 
community, or a combination of ‘two or more of those purposes’.128 Nonetheless, 
there is no legislative guidance in either statute as to how those purposes should be 
combined or prioritized or what weight should be given to any particular purpose.  
That selective process occurs through the ‘instinctive synthesis’ of the sentencer, 
who may have regard to some, and must have regard to other, of the objectives. As 
the table below reveals, there is a substantial degree of commonality between the 
identifiable objectives in the two jurisdictions.  
 
 
Objective Federal 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
Victoria 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) 
Proportionality a court must impose a 
sentence or make an order that 
is of a severity appropriate in 
all the circumstances of the 
offence: 
s 16A(1) 
 
the need to ensure that the 
person is adequately punished 
for the offence: s 16A(2)(k) 
to punish the offender to an extent 
and in a manner which is just in all 
of the circumstances: 
s 5(1)(a) 
General 
deterrence 
the deterrent effect that any 
sentence or order under 
consideration may have on 
other persons: s 16A(2)(ja) 
to deter … other persons from 
committing offences of the same or 
a similar character: s 5(1)(b) 
                                                
127 ss 16A(2)(j), (ja), (k), (n). 
128 ss 5(1)(a)–(f). 
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Specific 
deterrence 
the deterrent effect that any 
sentence or order under 
consideration may have on the 
person: s 16A(2)(j) 
to deter the offender … from 
committing offences of the same or 
a similar character: s 5(1)(b) 
Rehabilitation the prospect of rehabilitation 
of the person: s 16A(2)(n) 
to establish conditions within which 
it is considered by the court that the 
rehabilitation of the offender may be 
facilitated: 
s 5(1)(c) 
Denunciation Not included  to manifest the denunciation by the 
court of the type of conduct in 
which the offender engaged: 
s 5(1)(d) 
Incapacitation Not included to protect the community from the 
offender: s 5(1)(e) 
 
Table 2: Comparison between Federal and Victorian legislative objectives.   
 
1 Statutory Recognition of the Sentencing Objectives 
 
The statutory inclusion of sentencing objectives is relatively new notwithstanding 
that they have ostensibly been pursued for centuries.  
 
In Victoria, in the legislation preceding the current Act, from The Criminal Law and 
Practice Statute 1864 to the Penalties and Sentences Act 1985 (Vic), no mention was 
made of the objectives of sentencing. Between the 1985 legislation and the 
commencement of the current Sentencing Act, there was community concern in 
relation to the sentencing of sexual and violent offenders.129 This prompted the 
establishment of the Victorian Sentencing Committee in October 1985 and a review 
of sentencing practices.130 The Committee’s report, released in 1988, recommended, 
amongst other things, the introduction of clear sentencing objectives to provide 
sentencers with guidance ‘as to the policies underlying the statutory sentencing 
system.’131 According to Douglas, the Committee’s recommendations involved ‘no 
more than the codification of existing principles.’132 The draft Act recognised only 
five grounds for sentencing: ‘retribution, special and general deterrence, 
rehabilitation, denunciation, and incapacitation.’133  
 
The Federal legislation followed a similar course, although the objectives are not 
listed explicitly. In its 2006 report, the Australian Law Reform Commission 
recommended the introduction of a federal sentencing Act with ‘clearly stated 
objects’, including the ‘promotion of greater consistency in the sentencing of federal 
                                                
129 Arie Freiberg, Stuart Ross and David Tait, Change and Stability in Sentencing: A Victorian Study 
(1996). See also Ivan Potas (ed), Australian Institute of Criminology, Sentencing in Australia: Issues, 
Policy and Reform (1986). 
130 See Victorian Attorney-General’s Department, Victorian Sentencing Committee, Sentencing: 
Report of the Victorian Sentencing Committee (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
131 Roger Douglas, ‘Rationalising Sentencing? The Victorian Sentencing Committee’s Report’ (1988) 
12 Criminal Law Journal 327, 328. See also Fox and Freiberg, above n 114. 
132 Douglas, above n 131, 330. 
133 Ibid 328. 
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offenders’, in order to ‘ensure that federal offenders are treated in a more consistent 
manner by state and territory courts.’134 
 
2 Role of the Sentencing Objectives 
 
The function of the sentencing objectives was explained most clearly by the High 
Court in Veen v The Queen [No 2] where Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey 
JJ said: 
 
… sentencing is not a purely logical exercise, and the troublesome nature of the 
sentencing discretion arises in large measure from unavoidable difficulty in giving 
weight to each of the purposes of punishment. The purposes of criminal punishment 
are various: protection of society, deterrence of the offender and of others who might 
be tempted to offend, retribution and reform. The purposes overlap and none of them 
can be considered in isolation from the others when determining what is an 
appropriate sentence in a particular case. They are guideposts to the appropriate 
sentence but sometimes they point in different directions.135 
 
To that can be added Gleeson CJ’s observations in R v Engert (after discussing Veen 
v The Queen [No 2]): 
 
A moment’s consideration will show that the interplay of the considerations relevant 
to sentencing may be complex and on occasion even intricate… 
 
It is therefore erroneous in principle to approach the law of sentencing as though 
automatic consequences follow from the presence or absence of particular factual 
circumstances. In every case, what is called for is the making of a discretionary 
decision in the light of the circumstances of the individual case, and in the light of 
the purposes to be served by the sentencing exercise.136 
 
And finally the observations of McHugh J in AB v The Queen: 
 
Many, probably the large bulk of, sentences reflect compromises between 
conflicting objectives of sentencing. One objective is to impose a sentence that 
reflects adequate punishment for the culpability of the convicted person, having 
regard to the community's view concerning the need for retribution, denunciation, 
deterrence, community protection and sometimes vindication. Another objective is 
to impose a sentence, with or without conditions, that will further the public interest 
by encouraging and not discouraging the convicted person to renounce criminal 
activity and to re-establish himself or herself as a law-abiding citizen.  Still another 
objective is that the sentence should reflect an allowance for those circumstances, 
personal to the convicted person, which call for mitigation. These objectives and 
others have to be achieved within a conceptual framework that requires that there 
should be parity between sentences, that the sentence should be proportional to the 
circumstances of the crime and that, where more than one sentence is involved, the 
total sentence should not exceed what is appropriate for the overall criminality of the 
convicted person.137 
 
                                                
134 ALRC, Same Crime, Same Time: The Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Report No 103 (2006) 
(‘Same Crime, Same Time’). 
135 Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465, 476. 
136 R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67, 68. 
137 AB v The Queen [1999] HCA 46 [14]. 
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E Fourth Aspect – Principles of Sentencing Law: Parsimony, Totality, Consistency 
and Proportionality  
 
The principles of parsimony, totality, consistency and proportionality are each 
fundamental aspects of the sentencing process. These common law principles 
circumscribe, and guide, the exercise of the sentencing discretion. They apply when 
offenders are sentenced to the extent that they are consistent with the provisions of 
sentencing legislation, such as Part IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) or section 5 of 
the Sentencing Act. They each operate in a different way but all are, except for 
consistency, designed to mitigate the harshness of a punishment.  
 
1 Parsimony 
 
Parsimony requires the imposition of a sentence that is no more severe than is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the sentence. In Webb v O’Sullivan, Napier CJ 
described the principle in the following terms: 
 
Our first concern is the protection of the public, but, subject to that, the court should 
lean towards mercy. We ought not to award the maximum which the offence will 
warrant, but rather the minimum which is consistent with a due regard for public 
interest.138 
 
The Victorian Sentencing Act explicitly enunciates parsimony as a sentencing 
principle.139 The Federal Crimes Act recognises a limited form of parsimony: eg it 
provides that the court is not to impose a sentence of imprisonment unless it is 
satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate in all of the circumstances of the 
offence.140 
 
2 Totality 
 
The totality principle applies in cases of multiple offences to reduce the total 
effective sentence that is imposed on offenders. This is normally achieved by either 
making some or all of the individual sentences concurrent, or by reducing the length 
of the individual sentences.141 In Mill v The Queen the High Court adopted the 
expression of the principle from a scholarly text: 
 
The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of 
sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed 
and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing 
consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the 
aggregate is  ‘just and appropriate.’142  
 
 
 
 
                                                
138 Webb v O'Sullivan [1952] SASR 65, 66. 
139 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 5(3)–(4). 
140 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 17A. 
141 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘Totality’, above n 101. 
142 Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59, 63, citing David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing 
(Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 56–57. 
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3 Consistency 
 
In the context of sentencing, consistency essentially means that similar cases should 
be treated similarly. Gleeson CJ articulated the principle in Wong v The Queen: 
 
All discretionary decision-making carries with it the probability of some degree of 
inconsistency. But there are limits beyond which such inconsistency itself constitutes 
a form of injustice. The outcome of discretionary decision-making can never be 
uniform, but it ought to depend as little as possible upon the identity of the judge 
who happens to hear the case. Like cases should be treated in a like manner. The 
administration of criminal justice works as a system; not merely as a multiplicity of 
unconnected single instances. It should be systematically fair, and that involves, 
amongst other things, reasonable consistency.143 
 
4 Proportionality 
 
Proportionality requires courts to impose sentences that bear a reasonable, or 
proportionate, relationship to the criminal conduct in question. Courts are required to 
impose a sentence on an offender which is of a severity that reflects the objective 
seriousness of the offence. The objective seriousness of the offence is determined by 
reference to the maximum statutory penalty for the offence, the degree of harm 
caused by the offence, and the degree of culpability of the offender.144 It has been 
argued that proportionality is linked to retributivism,145 and may itself form part of a 
justification for sentencing.146 However, proportionality has also been relied upon to 
support utilitarian goals of punishment, such as deterrence. The High Court has 
repeatedly emphasised that proportionality is a central tenet of sentencing law, which 
trumps all other principles except by legislative fiat.147 The importance of the 
principle has been widely accepted. In R v Scott, Howie J, Grove and Barr JJ of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal agreeing, said that: 
 
There is a fundamental and immutable principle of sentencing that the sentence 
imposed must ultimately reflect the objective seriousness of the offence committed 
and there must be a reasonable proportionality between the sentence passed and the 
circumstances of the crime committed. This principle arose under the common law: 
R v Geddes (1936) SR (NSW) 554 and R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349. It now 
finds statutory expression in the acknowledgment in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act that one of the purposes of punishment is ‘to ensure that an offender 
is adequately punished’.148 
 
 
 
 
                                                
143 Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 591. 
144 Fox and Freiberg, above n 116, 225; R Fox, ‘The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing’ (1994) 
19 Melbourne University Law Review 489, 498. 
145 Nora Demleitner et al, Sentencing Law and Policy: Cases, Statutes and Guidelines (Wolters 
Kluwer, 3rd ed, 2003) 40. 
146 Mirko Bagaric, ‘Proportionality in Sentencing: its Justification, Meaning and Role’ (2000) 12(2) 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 145. 
147 Veen v The Queen [No 1] (1979) 143 CLR 458; Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465; 
Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348. 
148 R v Scott [2005] NSWCCA 152 [15]. 
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F Fifth Aspect: Discretionary and Mandatory Sentencing Factors 
 
Section 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) sets out a non-exhaustive list of thirteen 
matters that a court must take into account in sentencing an offender, to the extent 
that they are relevant and known to the court. That section reads as follows: 
 
     (2) In addition to any other matters, the court must take into account such of the 
following matters as are relevant and known to the court: 
 
(a) the nature and circumstances of the offence; 
 
(b)  other offences (if any) that are required or permitted to be taken into 
      account; 
 
(c) if the offence forms part of a course of conduct consisting of a series of 
criminal acts of the same or a similar character – that course of conduct; 
 
(d) the personal circumstances of any victim of the offence; 
 
(e) any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence; 
 
(ea) if an individual who is a victim of the offence has suffered harm as a result 
of the offence – any victim impact statement for the victim; 
 
 (f) the degree to which the person has shown contrition for the offence: 
 
(i) by taking action to make reparation for any injury, loss or damage 
resulting from the offence; or 
(ii) in any other manner; 
 
 (fa)  the extent to which the person has failed to comply with: 
 
(i) any order under subsection 23CD(1) of the Federal Court of 
Australia Act 1976; or 
(ii) any obligation under a law of the Commonwealth; or 
(iii) any obligation under a law of the State or Territory applying under 
subsection 68(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903; 
 
about pre-trial disclosure, or ongoing disclosure, in proceedings relating to 
the offence; 
 
(g) if the person has pleaded guilty to the charge in respect of the offence 
that fact; 
 
(h) the degree to which the person has co-operated with law enforcement 
agencies in the investigation of the offence or of other offences; 
 
(j) the deterrent effect that any sentence or order under consideration may have 
on the person; 
 
(ja) the deterrent effect that any sentence or order under consideration may have 
on other persons; 
 
(k) the need to ensure that the person is adequately punished for the offence; 
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(m) the character, antecedents, age, means and physical or mental condition of 
the person; 
 
 (n) the prospect of rehabilitation of the person; 
 
(p) the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would 
have on any of the person's family or dependants. 
 
As is apparent, the list of factors includes matters that are properly considered 
sentencing objectives as well as identifying a list of matters that are conventionally 
called aggravating or mitigating factors. 
 
In Victoria, the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) sets out a list of mandatory factors to 
which the court must have regard; discretionary factors to which the court may have 
regard; and forbidden factors to which the court must not have regard.149 The 
mandatory factors are set out as follows: 
 
(2) In sentencing an offender a court must have regard to— 
 
        (a)  the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence; and 
 
        (ab) the baseline sentence for the offence; and 
 
        (b)  current sentencing practices; and 
 
        (c)  the nature and gravity of the offence; and 
 
(d)  the offender's culpability and degree of responsibility for the 
offence; and 
 
(daaa)  whether the offence was motivated (wholly or partly) by 
hatred for or prejudice against a group of people with common 
characteristics with which the victim was associated or with which 
the offender believed the victim was associated; and 
 
        (daa) the impact of the offence on any victim of the offence; and 
 
        (da) the personal circumstances of any victim of the offence; and 
 
(db) any injury, loss or damage resulting directly from the offence; and 
 
(e) whether the offender pleaded guilty to the offence and, if so, the 
stage in the proceedings at which the offender did so or indicated an 
intention to do so; and 
 
        (f)  the offender's previous character; and 
 
(g) the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the 
offender or of any other relevant circumstances. 
 
 
                                                
149 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2). 
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In addition to the mandatory factors, the legislation lists certain factors to which the 
court may have regard (s 5(2A)(a), (ab), (c)) and those to which a court must not 
have regard (ss 5(2AA), 5(2A) (b), (d), (e), (f)). These latter factors relate to the 
forfeiture of property, automatic forfeiture of property and pecuniary penalty orders. 
 
The categories of discretionary and mandatory sentencing factors, whether mitigating 
or aggravating, are not immutable. As Bagaric and Edney point out (citations 
omitted): 
 
…it is important to recognise that for the purpose of sentencing the categories of 
aggravating – and mitigating – factors are not closed but will continue to evolve as 
not only new offences emerge but also research into human behaviour may disclose 
reasons for offending behaviour.150 
 
G Sixth Aspect: Sentencing Method 
 
Along with the high order purpose of sentencing, the theories of punishment, and the 
sentencing objectives, another key aspect of the sentencing calculus is the way in 
which the task of sentencing is to be approached in order to impose just punishment. 
In Australia, judges are enjoined by the High Court to engage in an instinctive 
synthesis of all the relevant considerations, rather than taking a two-step approach.151 
As Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said in Wong: 
 
Secondly, and no less importantly, the reasons of the Court of Criminal Appeal 
suggest a mathematical approach to sentencing in which there are to be 
'increment[s]' to, or decrements from, a predetermined range of sentences.  That kind 
of approach, usually referred to as a 'two-stage approach' to sentencing, not only is 
apt to give rise to error, it is an approach that departs from principle. It should not be 
adopted. 
 
It departs from principle because it does not take account of the fact that there are 
many conflicting and contradictory elements which bear upon sentencing an 
offender. Attributing a particular weight to some factors, while leaving the 
significance of all other factors substantially unaltered, may be quite wrong. We say 
'may be' quite wrong because the task of the sentencer is to take account of all of the 
relevant factors and to arrive at a single result which takes due account of them all.  
That is what is meant by saying that the task is to arrive at an 'instinctive synthesis'.  
This expression is used, not as might be supposed, to cloak the task of the sentencer 
in some mystery, but to make plain that the sentencer is called on to reach a single 
sentence which, in the case of an offence like the one now under discussion, 
balances many different and conflicting features.152 
 
In like vein, in Markarian, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ said 
(citations omitted): 
 
Following the decision of this Court in Wong it cannot now be doubted that 
sentencing courts may not add and subtract item by item from some apparently 
subliminally derived figure, passages of time in order to fix the time which an 
                                                
150 Mirko Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia, (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2016) 230.  
151 Christopher Corns, ‘Destructuring Sentencing Decision-making in Victoria’ (1990) 23 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 145. 
152 Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 611-2. 
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offender must serve in prison. That is not to say that in a simple case, in which, for 
example, the circumstances of the crime have to be weighed against one or a small 
number of other important matters, indulgence in arithmetical deduction by the 
sentencing judges should be absolutely forbidden. An invitation to a sentencing 
judge to engage in a process of ‘instinctive synthesis’, as useful as shorthand 
terminology may on occasions be, is not desirable if no more is said or understood 
about what that means. The expression ‘instinctive synthesis’ may then be 
understood to suggest an arcane process into the mysteries of which only judges can 
be initiated. The law strongly favours transparency. Accessible reasoning is 
necessary in the interests of victims, of the parties, appeal courts, and the public.153 
 
This approach requires a consideration of not only the legislative objectives,154 which 
admittedly remain unprioritised, unproven and conflicting,155 but also the relevant 
aggravating and mitigating factors, of which there are almost three hundred 
identifiable possibilities at common law.156 It also requires (or at least permits) 
reference to sentencing statistics157 and minimum and standard penalties.158 
 
Approval of the instinctive synthesis approach is neither absolute nor universal. In 
Makarian, McHugh J’s reference to the ‘pseudo-science of two-tier sentencing’ was 
countered by Kirby J’s implied accusation that the instinctive synthesis approach 
defies the rule of law.159 The United States adopts a two-tier grid system. Whichever 
approach better reflects the reasoning that actually occurs in the judicial mind, the 
instinctive synthesis method prevails in the sentencing calculus in both Victoria and 
Federally.  
 
H Seventh Aspect: Statutory and Curial Guidelines 
 
The final part of the landscape is relatively new:  statutory guidelines in the form of 
baseline sentencing and curial guidelines in the form of guideline judgments.   
 
In Victoria, baseline sentences are specified prison sentences that the Victorian 
Parliament intends as the median sentence for seven nominated offences: murder, 
trafficking in a large commercial quantity of drugs, persistent sexual abuse, two 
types of incest, sexual penetration of a child and culpable driving. Victorian courts 
must sentence on a charge of a baseline offence in accordance with that intention if 
the offence is committed on or after 2 November 2014. Judges are required to 
sentence in order to achieve that median. However, in relation to that requirement a 
bench of five of the Victorian Court of Appeal unanimously held in DPP v Walters: 
 
In the baseline sentencing provisions, Parliament’s stated intention (as applicable to 
the present case) is that, at some unspecified time in the future, the ‘median 
sentence’ for the offence of incest will be a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. 
Parliament has thus expressed its intention using the language of statistics. ‘Median’ 
is a statistical term used to identify the middle number in a series of numbers ... 
 
                                                
153 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 [39]. 
154 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A. 
155 Bagaric, ‘From Arbitrariness to Coherency’, above n 34. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520. 
158 Muldrock v The Queen (2001) 244 CLR 120..  
159 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 [84] (McHugh J), [132] (Kirby J). 
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In the present case, the defect in the legislation is incurable. Parliament did not 
provide any mechanism for the achievement of the intended future median, and the 
Court has no authority to create one, as the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘the 
Director’) properly conceded. To do so would be to legislate, not to interpret. 
Acknowledging the absence of the necessary statutory language, the Director was 
constrained to rely on the aspirations of the Minister as stated in the second reading 
speech, but those statements could never have been a substitute for the missing 
statutory language.160 
 
The baseline sentence guidelines are not being followed at present and are set to be 
repealed in their current form.161 In any event, as framed, they do not have 
application to white-collar offences. 
 
The power of the Victorian Court of Appeal to give a guideline judgment is 
conferred by Part 2AA of the Sentencing Act, which was inserted in 2003. Guideline 
judgments are common to several other Australian jurisdictions, but there is no 
Commonwealth equivalent. The former Chief Justice of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court, James Spigelman, set out their purpose and effect as follows: 
 
Sentencing guidelines as promulgated by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal are not 
binding in a formal sense. They are not precedents that must be followed. They 
represent a relevant indicator for the sentencing judge. They are not intended to be 
applied to every case as if they were binding rules. The sentencing judge retains his 
or her discretion both within the guidelines as expressed, but also the discretion to 
depart from them if the particular circumstances of the case justify such departure.162 
 
In relation to guideline judgments, and the first such judgment in Victoria, Boulton v 
The Queen; Clements v The Queen; Fitzgerald v The Queen, the Court of Appeal 
said: 
 
The provision of a guideline judgment can promote consistency and public 
confidence in the sentencing process by articulating elements that must be taken into 
account in a particular sentencing context, and by giving guidance as to a unified 
approach. It can also facilitate the development of coherent sentencing practice by 
way of unified application of principle and, in turn, assist the identification of 
relevant similarities and differences between cases.163 
 
Hewton considered how these two forms of guidance ‘fit’ with the instinctive 
synthesis approach. He found that: 
 
Both forms of guideline are very new. It is in New South Wales that the stronger 
initiatives on guidelines, particularly for robbery and drugs offences, have occurred. 
A clear tendency to quantify penalties for such offences has emerged in that state in 
a way inevitably creating tension between the High Court and NSW State authority, 
as indicated by Wong and Markarian. In Wong the High Court considered a NSW 
                                                
160 [2015] VSCA 303 [5], [8]. 
161 Attorney-General’s Department (Vic), ‘Sentencing Reform for State’s Most Serious Crimes’ 
(Media Release, 10 June 2016).  See also: Sentencing Advisory Council, Baseline Sentencing Report, 
May 2012 
162 James Spigelman, ‘Sentencing Guideline Judgments’ (Speech delivered at the National Conference 
of District and County Court Judges, Sydney, 24 June 1999) 6-7. 
163 [2014] VSCA 342 [40].  Boulton v The Queen, for example, discusses the circumstances in which a 
community corrections order may be appropriately imposed. 
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State guideline judgment, in the form of a detailed grid of sentencing options, in its 
application to a drug offence. Markarian was a NSW drugs case which hinged on 
the application of a State statutory penalty scheme which measured the severity of 
the offence by the quantity of drugs involved. In both cases the High Court rejected 
the State guidelines for their lack of flexibility, excessive mathematicisation of 
penalty, and general unsuitability to provide a satisfactory sentencing outcome.164 
 
I Conclusion 
 
The sentencing calculus is a highly complex process requiring consideration of 
many, and sometimes conflicting, factors. Thus Potas notes: 
 
In order to achieve consistency of approach in sentencing, it is desirable to have a 
structure or theoretical framework in which that objective can be promoted. 
However, there are many competing philosophies and many judicial officers from 
diverse backgrounds, with differing attitudes, and this task of achieving consistency 
of approach is not a simple one.165 
 
In practice, sentencing decisions require balancing the crime prevention objects of 
sentencing with both retributivist and consequentialist theories, as well as the 
application of the statutory and common law sentencing objectives and principles, 
with an array of aggravating or mitigating factors, all by way of the highly 
discretionary instinctive synthesis approach. The statutory and curial guidelines, in 
their current form, do little to assist in untangling this mass of considerations. 
Whether this relatively amorphous mass that constitutes the sentencing landscape is 
capable of yielding a rational sentencing framework will be examined next.     
                                                
164 Terry Hewton, ‘Instinctive Synthesis, Structured Reasoning, and Punishment Guidelines: Judicial 
Discretion in the Modern Sentencing Process’ (2010) 31 Adelaide Law Review 79, 87. 
165 Potas, above n 126, 97. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RATIONALITY IN LAW 
 
 ‘Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason’ 
 
Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, 1628 
 
 
A Introduction 
 
It is possible to conceive of the law as comprising four identifiable parts: the law 
itself; those who write it; those who apply it; and, those to whom it applies. Of those 
four parts – the law itself, those who write it and those who apply it – each are 
conventionally assumed to be rational, or to look towards rationality as the aim.  
However, the rationality of those to whom it applies is neither presumed nor 
generally relevant.166 In order to ensure fairness and even treatment, the law must 
apply, and be applied, to all persons equally, whether rational or irrational. By that 
process, the law achieves consistency and validity. However, that exception does not 
apply to sentencing law.167 Sentencing law requires that those to whom it applies are 
also rational in order to achieve the purposive function of sentencing law (being the 
First and Second Aspects of Sentencing Law referred to in Chapter III). In other 
words, the efficacy of a sentence is predicated on the assumption that the punishment 
will have the effect intended by the sentence on the offender. That assumption is 
conditioned on a number of premises: 
 
(P1) that the law is rational; 
 
(P2) that those who write the law and those who apply it act rationally; 
 
(P3) that those to whom it applies act rationally; 
 
(C) that predictable consequences will follow from the application of the 
law because the law is rational and the actors act rationally.     
 
Because all assumptions are inherently unreliable (or arbitrary), and therefore 
logically unsound, it is necessary to examine each premise which is said to support 
the assumption. If those premises are sound (or non-arbitrary), then the assumption 
itself is a valid assumption.168 However, before embarking on that enquiry, I 
commence by examining the central concept of rationality.   
 
B What is Rationality? 
                                                
166 Exceptions apply to physically irrational people – such as mentally ill people. 
167 See, eg, R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269. This case is a good example of mitigating principles 
required in the event that a person is mentally sound. 
168 Peczenik applies this use of arbitrary and non-arbitrary premises to the process of legal reasoning 
specifically, however it applies with equal validity to assessing legal outcomes, because both 
reasoning and outcome must be justifiable in order to be called rational: see, eg, Aleksander Peczenik, 
‘On the Rational and Moral Basis of Legal Justification’ (1985) 71(2) Archives for Philosophy of Law 
and Social Philosophy 263; Aleksander Peczenik, ‘Rationality of Legal Justification’ (1982) 68(2) 
Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 137.	
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The function of rationalism in Western thought is undoubted. It is rationality which 
distinguishes humans from animals169 and is therefore the ‘crucial component of the 
self-image of the human species…[and] [u]nderstanding [it] brings deeper insight 
into our nature and into whatever special status we possess.’170 What constitutes 
rationality has been the subject of continuous debate, but it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to trace the development of those arguments. It is sufficient to note that 
strict theoretical rationalism says that understanding is – a priori – through the use of 
logic, and is thus independent of sensory experience, whereas strict theoretical 
empiricism holds that the source of knowledge is through experience – a posteriori – 
either through the external senses or through inner sensations. Rationalism is thus 
defined as a methodology ‘…in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but 
intellectual and deductive….’171 However, both rationality and empiricism are 
epistemologically useful – they provide a foundation for the holding of a belief, or its 
justification, and a method by which such beliefs can be tested.172 Accordingly, 
Alberto Ramos has defined rationality as a ‘social construction in which to describe 
and justify our understanding of the world around us.’173  
 
Thus, to be rational, ideas, beliefs or knowledge must withstand logical scrutiny (in 
the form of deductive or inductive reasoning) and accord with observable data or 
experimentation (in the form of empirical evidence).    
 
Sociologists and philosophers have proposed a number of taxonomic approaches to 
the theories of rationality.174 The most familiar, and perhaps comprehensive, theory 
is that advanced by Max Weber. Weber identifies four primary types of rationality: 
practical rationality, theoretical rationality, substantive rationality and formal 
rationality.175 He defines practical rationality (zweckrationalität) as ‘man’s capacity 
for means-end rational action’ through expectation about the behaviour of others and 
the calculated attainment of ends in accordance with those expectations.176 
Theoretical rationality, according to Weber is the ‘conscious mastery of reality 
through the construction of increasingly precise abstract concepts rather than through 
action’;177 substantive rationality is value-rational action (wertrationalität);178 and 
                                                
169 Ibid 9, citing Metafisica (Oxford University Press, 1957). 
170 Ibid 9, quoting Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton University Press, 1993) xii. 
171 Vernon J Bourke, ‘Rationalism’ in Dagobert D Runes (ed), Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Philosophical Library, 1962) 263. 
172 The theory of justification is a part of an epistemology that seeks to identify the justifications for 
propositions and beliefs. It identifies a number of categories into which such supporting arguments 
can be placed. There are a number of popular theories which identify the base from which justification 
can be properly said to arise, e.g. externalism, foundationalism, internalism, skepticism etc: see, eg, 
Paul K Moser (ed), The Oxford Handbooks of Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2002); Paul H 
Robinson and John M Darley, ‘Testing Competing Theories of Justification’ (1998) 76 North 
Carolina Law Review 1095. 
173 Curtis Ventriss, ‘The Need and Relevance for Public Rationality: Some Critical Reflections’ 
(2002) 24(2) Administrative Theory & Praxis 287, 287 citing Alberto Ramos, The New Science of 
Organizations (University of Toronto Press, 1981). 
174 Pierre Demeulenaere, ‘Are There Many Types of Rationality?’ (2014) 99(4) Papers: Revista de 
Sociologia 515. 
175 Stephen Kalberg, ‘Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of 
Rationalization Processes in History’ (1980) American Journal of Sociology 85(5) 1145, 1145. 
176 Ibid 1151-2. 
177 Ibid 1152. 
178 Ibid 1155. 
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formal rationality is the ‘structure of domination that acquired specific and delineated 
boundaries only with industrialization,’ such as in the case of bureaucracy.179 These 
typologies are useful insofar as they provide a framework in which to consider the 
desirability or utility of a specific mode of decision-making. In other words, it can be 
expected that law and legal decision-making should conform to the norms of one of 
these categorisations of rationality. Further, Weber uses the term ‘rationalisation’ to 
describe the social phenomenon of demystification or disenchantment: the narrowing 
of the religious or spiritual elements of the world, a defining feature of modernity, 
and an essential step towards a secularised society free from the effects of 
superstition and mystery.180 In addition, ‘failing to employ reason implies exercising 
non-rational processes, including blind faith, wishful thinking, guessing, or careless 
obedience to some kind of authority.’181 Of course value-rational action could still 
take into account these mystifying factors if they are part of the value system of the 
actor, but the means-end actor could find no place in a legitimately rationalising 
process. The form of rationality that most closely approximates to the sentencing 
discretion is practical rationality, because sentencing is a ‘means-end’ activity.  
Whether the objective of punishment is retributive (send a message) or 
consequentialist (create change) or both, the act of punishment in the form of 
sentencing is identically teleological.  
 
Rationality in sentencing law requires a logical relationship between the means and 
the ends, viz, the means are only justifiable if they are capable of achieving the ends. 
 
The brief analysis engaged in above suggests rationality transcends subjective 
factors. However, while reason and logic are necessary elements of rationality, they 
do not constitute the only elements. Absent from the dictionary definition of 
rationality are the inevitably human aspects of rationalisation: emotion,182 morality183 
and biological evolution. Rationality has been described as a ‘moral or prescriptive 
science and not merely a factual or descriptive one.’184 As Paton observes, if we 
assume ‘that all problems can be solved purely by logical deductions from actual 
rules in force, we are depriving the law of all power to develop, and the dead hand of 
the past will crush its growth.’185 The human elements of rationality cannot be 
disregarded since rationality can only be defined by human standards of reason and 
logic which are inevitably influenced by human factors.186 By inclusion of these 
additional elements, the concept of rationality is injected with a set of higher order 
values which inform the decision-making of most individuals.187 De Sousa identifies 
                                                
179 Ibid 1158-9. 
180 Max Webber, ‘Authority and Rationality – Max Weber’ in Kenneth Allan (ed), Explorations in 
Classical Sociological Theory: Seeing the Social World (Pine Forge Press, 2005) 143.  
181 Maria Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo (eds), Reason and Rationality (Ontos, 2013) 9-10. 
182 Daniel Epstein, ‘Rationality, Legitimacy & the Law’ (2014) 7(1) Washington University 
Jurisprudence Review 1, 13. 
183 Bernard Gert, ‘Acting Irrationally Versus Acting Contrary to What is Required by Reason’ (1999) 
30(3) Journal of Social Philosophy 379, 380. 
184 Carlo Cellucci, ‘Reason and Logic’ in Maria Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo (eds), Reason and 
Rationality (Ontos, 2013) 202 quoting R Hanna, Rationality and Logic (MIT Press, 2006) xxii.  
185 George Whitecross Paton, A Text-book of Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press) 151. 
186 Epstein, above n 182, 14-5. 
187 Questioning reason and rationality is a necessary exercise to attain ‘truth, liberty, egalitarianism 
and emancipation.’ Maria Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo (eds), Reason and Rationality (Ontos, 2013) 
15.	
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a limitation in the universal acceptance of a priori arguments, even by a strict 
rationalist:  
 
…whether I can or cannot accept the substantive conclusions of an a priori argument 
must depend on whether it is less implausible than the rejection of (the premises or 
of) the argument. And that, in turn, will depend on my circumstances and my 
history, which will determine what seems obviously true or false to me as I approach 
the argument.188 
 
Thus, identification of a form of universal reason admitting of only a single 
conclusion regardless of epistemic background is unlikely to be found. But what may 
be distilled from this excursus is a conception of the role of reasoning as a negative: 
that is, the purpose of reason is not to reveal truth, but to expose falsehood, or at 
least, rational unacceptability.189   
 
The concept of rationality outlined above provides a useful heuristic: rationality does 
not seek to prove that which must or does work, but rather, it seeks to reveal that 
which does not work. If evidence demonstrates that a law does not work, or is 
applied inconsistently190 such that the law becomes ‘a wilderness of single 
instances’,191 it is irrational. 
 
Further, having identified that which does not work, rationality also implies the 
willingness to recognise error and to correct behaviour to avoid future error. As de 
Sousa observes: 
 
For when faced with evidence that I would be more likely to reach a better 
conclusion if I proceeded differently, it would be, not reasonably stupid, but 
irrationally silly not to adopt the improved strategy.192 
 
The application of that observation to legal knowledge is nonetheless subject to some 
limitation, because corrective responsiveness is more problematic in law than in 
other areas of knowledge:   
 
[a] scientist is free to modify any theories which he finds inaccurate – his loyalty is 
to scientific truth and not to tradition. He is not bound to worship the golden idols of 
the past if they have feet of clay, but while a judge may not revere he is bound to 
follow such precedents as are binding upon him. The common law doctrine of 
binding precedent has prevented final courts from engaging in tentative experiments 
and from correcting the mistakes of the past.193 
 
                                                
188 Ronald de Sousa, ‘A Profession of Stupidity’ in Berit Brogaard and Barry Smith (eds), Rationality 
and Irrationality (OBV and HPT Publishers, 2001) 77, 91. 
189 Ibid 92.		
190 Bibi Sangha and Robert Moles, ‘MacCormick’s Theory of Law, Miscarriages of Justice and the 
Statutory Basis for Appeals in Australian Criminal Cases’ (2014) 37(1) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 243, 244. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Rationality in Law & Economics’ (1992) 
60(2) George Washington Law Review 293, 295 regarding the same standard of rationality in 
economics. 
191 Sangha and Moles, above n 190, quoting Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 
(Oxford University Press, 1978) 187. 
192 De Sousa, above n 188, 91. 
193 Paton, above n 185, 153. 
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Even accepting that limitation, making or applying laws which are known not to 
work would be illogical, as there can only be one logic for any given law, and 
applying a law known to be contrary to that logic would be, according to Frege, a 
‘type of madness.’194  
 
In the face of demonstrable failure or error, a rational system of law must be subject 
to correction – whether self-correction (by judges) or correction by external actors 
(by law-makers). 
 
Much of the philosophical discussion about the rationality of the law focuses on 
those who apply it, predominantly, magistrates and judges. The judicial decision 
process has been described as a social event, one involving ‘psychology, economics, 
and political theory, in addition to law.’195 Daniel Epstein accords rationality of the 
law with its ability to achieve logical and social legitimacy.196 Epstein suggests that 
striving for legitimacy of judicial reasoning and analysis as opposed to rationality of 
the black-letter rules eliminates the biases created by emotion rather than reason, and 
this in itself rationalises the law. Epstein endorses a functionalist approach to 
rationalism whereby the focus is on empirical validity of the decision-making 
process.197 Such an approach, according to Epstein, would yield ‘better, more 
accurate, and less arbitrary’ decisions, making the process more legitimate and 
rational.198 Although Epstein acknowledges that law is not a science, he recognises 
that the testing of theories ‘yields insight into the practice of jurisprudence.’199 In the 
end, the objectives that the law (including the law of sentencing) seeks to pursue are 
themselves theories, generally derived from the common law and generally untested. 
However, the testing process begins when judges apply the law to various factual 
scenarios and in this way society, emotion, morality, and reality enter into the 
decision making process. It is only then that we can determine the rationality and 
legitimacy of the law. This explains why the law itself ‘cannot exist without some 
theory of human rationality.’200   
 
Judges should perform their sentencing function in a way that demonstrates internal 
consistency (as between judges) and yields mostly predictable outcomes. This can be 
empirically tested.  
	
Even if a rational law is applied rationally by judges, an enquiry into the rationality 
of the result of such a law is incomplete without consideration of the final actor: the 
potential or actual offender. Broadly stated, the question is whether those to whom 
the law applies act rationally. Both the promulgation of a law by parliament and the 
exercise of the sentencing discretion by a judge presume that potential and actual 
offenders engage in a set of identifiable, and pre-determined logical steps before 
considering or actually committing an offence. In the General Deterrence Article we 
explicitly identified the series of premises underpinning sentencing law and that are, 
                                                
194 Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System (University of California 
Press, 1964) 13–4. 
195 Epstein, above n 182, 2. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid 25. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid 38. 
200 Hovenkamp, above n 190, 293. 
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so the theories assume, prefatory to offending.201 In that article, we observe that the 
empirical evidence contradicts that assumption. The data should demonstrate that 
harsher penalties lead to less crime: however, the data does not accord with that 
assertion. According to Nicholas Rescher:  
 
The rationality of our actions hinges critically both on the appropriateness of our 
ends and on the suitability of the means by which we pursue their cultivation. Both 
of these components… are alike essential to full-fledged rationality.202 
 
Rescher bases this idea on human diversity – that as humans we have multiple valid 
needs and that we act not only according to reason but also pursuant to ‘anxiety, 
cupidity, habit and impulse.’ According to this theory the evaluation of these needs is 
‘at the very heart and core of rationality.’203 If these needs are evaluated as 
inappropriate, all rationality would cease. This rests on the notion of cost-benefit 
analysis derived from economic rationality, whereby a person weighs up the costs 
and benefits associated with a particular end in order to determine its value and 
consequently the rationality in attempting to achieve that end.204 
 
The unspoken theory upon which sentencing law relies, and from which it claims 
legitimacy and efficacy, is the rational choice theory.205 Whilst the theory was first 
developed by neo-classical economists to explain microeconomic theory, its 
application to scholarly disciplines broadened beyond economics after the 1900s.206  
Siegel explains the theory in criminological terms, developed in response to the 
perceived failure of rehabilitative techniques and the increase in the officially 
recorded crime rates during the 1970s and 1980s, as follows: 
 
According to this view, law-violating behavior should be viewed as an event that 
occurs when an offender decides to risk violating the law after considering his or her 
own personal situation (need for money, personal values, learning experiences) and 
situational factors (how well a target is protected, how affluent the neighborhood is, 
how efficient the local police happen to be). Before choosing to commit a crime, the 
reasoning criminal evaluates the risk of apprehension, the seriousness of the 
expected punishment, the value of the criminal enterprise, and his or her immediate 
need for criminal gain.207 
 
                                                
201 Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘(Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work - and What it 
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and Littlefield, 2005) 156. See also Amoretti and Vassallo, above n 181, 13 citing Max Weber, The 
Methodology of the Social Sciences (Free Press, 1949) regarding axiological rationality where, if a 
creature’s ends are inappropriate, it would be difficult to consider such a creature a fully rational one. 
203 Rescher, above n 202. 
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205 James S Coleman and Thomas J Fararo, Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique (Sage 
Publications, 1992); Gary S Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 
Journal of Political Economy 169; R V G Clarke and Marcus Felson (eds) Routine Activity and 
Rational Choice: Advances in Criminological Theory (Transaction Publishers, 1993); S Gul, ‘An 
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Deviance and Social Control: A Sociological History (McGraw-Hill, 2nd ed, 1994).  
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The concept informed criminological theories of punishment for about twenty 
years.208 But as Leclerc and Wortley observe, it was ‘…one of the most influential 
and criticised criminological models to emerge in the latter quarter of the twentieth 
century….’209 Economists comprised the earliest vanguard of critics. Levin and 
Milgrom identify two basic flaws with the theory:  real-world choices often appear to 
be highly situational or context-dependent, and in reality, many choices are not 
considered.210 This criticism required either further refinement of the theory or 
development of a new theory which took into account the vicissitudes and vagaries 
of human behaviour.211 Blending behavioural science (a discipline within 
psychology) with economics promised to provide just such a theory: behavioural 
economics. The central tent of behavioural economics is that cognitive biases often 
prevent people from making rational decisions, despite their best efforts.212 This 
prescript has been adapted to the criminal actor construct. For example, Jolls, 
Sunstein and Thaler in A Behavioural Approach to Law and Economics, quote from 
a study specifically considering the effect of increased sentence lengths on the minds 
of offenders: 
 
Another interesting piece of empirical evidence concerns offenders’ views of 
sentences of different lengths. One study found that they view a five-year term of 
imprisonment as, on average, only twice as bad as a one-year term; the five-year 
term had a perceived severity of 200, compared to 100 for the one-year term. This 
alone is also consistent with a high discount rate—a rate of roughly 0.5. But with 
that discount rate, the difference between a five- and ten-year term should be quite 
small (approximately 6 on the severity measure); in fact, the difference was 300.213 
 
Thus, no overtly rational overlay could be identified for the dissonant perceptions of 
severity by offenders. The constellation of factors which might lead potential or 
actual offenders to view a five year sentence as only twice as bad as a one year 
sentence (rather than five times as bad) are not easily identifiable and certainly not 
easily factored into sentencing law generally or the sentencing calculus specifically.  
But Korobkin and Uren conclude that this does not deny that actual or potential 
offenders are still acting rationally: 
 
Our contention that traditional conceptions of rational choice theory are flawed in 
important ways does not suggest that we believe people are ‘irrational’. Most of the 
observed deviations from behavior predicted by rational choice theory are quite 
sensible and understandable, and many seem quite rational in a ‘global’ sense, 
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although they result in behavior that violates the predictions of rational choice theory 
on the more ‘local’ level on which legal scholarship generally operates.214 
 
The point is that acting rationally is not necessarily coextensive with acting in way 
that optimizes well-being, and yet such decision-making might still be termed 
rational. That is because behavioral science reveals that choices are made in the 
context of ‘…three important ‘bounds’ on human behavior, bounds that draw into 
question the central ideas of utility maximization, stable preferences, rational 
expectations, and optimal processing of information.’215 The conclusions which we 
reach regarding specific deterrence and rehabilitation in the Specific Deterrence and 
Rehabilitation Article are explained by this synthetic approach to law and 
behavioural science.   
 
The drivers of, and motivations for, human behaviour are so diverse that the rational 
choice model does not sufficiently accommodate them. Therefore, without empirical 
validation, the rational choice model is not a good predictor of behaviour and is an 
unreliable heuristic for determining the way in which potential or actual offenders 
will respond to punishment. Combining behavioural science and law provides a 
more robust platform for policy change. 
 
C Conclusion 
 
Rationality, in all its forms, is integral to a system of law that is functional and 
achieves just outcomes. As such, it must have both rational ends and rational means 
of achieving those ends if it is to be effective. This can be tested in an empirical 
manner to assess the rationality of existing law so that appropriate reform can be 
enacted. The law in this area has not been sufficiently responsive to the empirical and 
theoretical repudiation of rational choice theory. It is possible to identify the failure 
mode of the current law by reference to some essential integers of rationality. Those 
essential integers are: 
 
(a) that the law is capable of clear and consistent application; 
 
(b) the outcomes of individual cases are relatively predictable; 
 
(c) the law is designed to accord with known human behaviour; 
 
(d) the law is responsive to change when obviously required. 
 
In the next two chapters, I consider these rational prescripts and how general 
sentencing law and white-collar offending meet or fail to meet them in the context of 
the five articles.   
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CHAPTER V  
 
GENERAL PROBLEMS IN SENTENCING 
 
‘One is absolutely sickened, not by the crimes that the wicked have committed, but 
by the punishments that the good have inflicted; and a community is infinitely more 
brutalised by the habitual employment of punishment than it is by the occasional 
occurrence of crime.’ 
 
Oscar Wilde, The Soul of Man Under Socialism in Fortnightly Review, 1891 
 
 
A Introduction 
 
As is evident throughout the articles, there are two primary problems that are 
endemic to sentencing all types of offenders under the current sentencing regime in 
Australia. Firstly, the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing is opaque and 
therefore susceptible to inconsistency and, in turn, unfairness. Secondly, some of the 
objectives of sentencing such as incapacitation, deterrence and rehabilitation cannot 
reliably be achieved, and therefore should not be consistently employed to justify the 
imposition of a sentence. In this chapter, I consider the empirical and theoretical 
flaws that give rise to those problems, and provide an explanation that justifies 
reforming the sentencing model for all offenders. 
 
B Instinctive Synthesis: The Risk of Inconsistency 
 
As I outline in Chapter III, unlike the two-step approach adopted by the United States 
judiciary, Australian courts have steadfastly endorsed an instinctive synthesis 
approach of sentencing.216 This approach entails the judge instinctively reaching a 
determination on how a combination of variables and circumstances should impact a 
sentence.217 Thus, instinctive synthesis ostensibly allows for the requisite 
subjectivity218 of criminal cases to be appropriately considered to ensure 
‘individualised justice.’219  
 
The most significant criticism associated with this approach is that it has become 
used as a justification for inconsistent sentencing outcomes and application of 
principles.220 This criticism has been judicially acknowledged but then defended: 
‘instinctive synthesis produces outcomes upon which reasonable minds will 
differ’.221 The courts acknowledge the importance of consistency to a rational and 
fair system of law,222 yet they adhere to instinctive synthesis model, which is 
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inherently unstable. Not only can sentence outcomes become inconsistent,223 it is in 
principle difficult to imagine how a uniform application of sentencing principles 
could be achieved in this model.224 The reason is the inevitable interjection of the 
personal biases, prejudices, journeys, and interpretations of different judges225 – an 
unavoidable fact of human nature.226 Given that instinctive synthesis relies on an 
undisclosed and subjective application of generalised principles, the weight that a 
sentencing judge attributes to a particular sentencing factor ‘is almost always 
untestable.’227 In Markarian, Kirby J opined that ‘the thought that there descends 
upon a judicial officer, following appointment, a mystical ‘instinct’ or ‘intuition’ that 
ensures that he or she will get the sentence right ‘instinctively’’ was unrealistic.228 
While instinctive synthesis is lauded as an ‘exercise in which all relevant 
considerations are simultaneously unified, balanced, and weighed by the sentencing 
judge’229 it remains open to doubt as to whether it is anything more than a ‘gut feel.’ 
Justice Hulme has described the instinctive synthesis approach as akin to ‘plucking 
figures from the air’.230 This opacity is often highlighted during appellate review of a 
sentence. In R v Demaria the Victorian Court of Appeal said:  
 
Whether or not a sentence is manifestly excessive is often said as not admitting of 
much argument. The question raised is whether the sentence is outside the range of 
sentences available to his Honour in the exercise of sound discretionary judgement. 
Once the relevant circumstances are ascertained, the sentence appears plainly 
excessive or it does not.231 
 
Of course, what ‘appears plainly excessive’ to a court of appeal presumably would 
not be so readily apparent to a judge at first instance. The High Court has rejected 
these criticisms. In Hili, the Court said consistency in the sentencing realm is the 
uniform application of proper sentencing considerations, rather than numerical 
equivalence in the quantum and type of sentence.232 As the instinctive synthesis 
model is so deeply engrained in the Australian sentencing landscape, and has been 
endorsed repeatedly by the High Court, I have not proposed a move to two-step 
sentencing. However, the importance of the other reform proposals is magnified by 
the retention of this sentencing method. Professor Bagaric has observed that: ‘the 
instinctive synthesis approach undermines the need for jurisprudential rigour in the 
development and application of the law.’233 
 
 
 
                                                
223 Bagaric, ‘From Vagueness to Arbitrariness’, above n 218, 84, citing Australian Law Reform 
Commission, ‘Same Crime, Same Time’, above n 134; Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, 
Reoffending Following Sentencing in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria (2013), 58-9 (‘Reoffending’). 
224 Bagaric, ‘From Vagueness to Arbitrariness’, above n 218, 88. 
225 Ibid 105. 
226 Ibid 110. Bagaric thinks implicit bias may be reduced if a two-step process is adopted.  
227 DPP (Vic) v Terrick (2009) 24 VR 457, 459-60 [5]. 
228 Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25, 51 [130]. 
229 Sarah Krasnostein and Arie Freiberg, ‘Individualistic Sentencing Framework: If You Know Where 
You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got There?’ (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 265, 268.  
230 Markarian v R (2003) A Crim R 497, 505 [33]. 
231 [2008] VSCA 105 [18]. 
232 Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 526. 
233 Bagaric, ‘From Vagueness to Arbitrariness’, above n 218, 93. 
 48 
C Unattainable Sentencing Objectives 
	
It is unjustifiable to increase the severity of a punishment if the purpose is to achieve 
an outcome that cannot demonstrably be achieved.234 Of course, in theoretical terms, 
if the purpose of increasing the severity of punishment is simply for the sake of 
punishment itself, this problem does not arise. The General Deterrence Article and 
the Specific Deterrence and Rehabilitation Article consider this problem at length.  I 
consider these sentencing objectives further below. 
 
In penological terms, deterrence is divided into two broad types – general and 
specific deterrence – the former aims to deter the commission of crimes by quiescent 
offenders, and the latter aims to deter the commission of further crimes by the subject 
offender.  General deterrence is further divided into two sub-types: absolute general 
deterrence, being the deterrent effect of a criminal sanction in the context of a 
criminal justice system including policing and sanctions; and marginal general 
deterrence, being the effect of changes to the law such as increases in penalty 
(severity effects) or, less often, the risk of detection (certainty effects).235 Deterrence, 
both general and specific, is a classically utilitarian sentencing objective,236 often 
used to justify incapacitation and stricter punishment policies.237 However, the 
concept relies heavily on two assumptions: firstly, that people are in fact ‘deterrable’ 
and secondly, that potential offenders ‘know the certainty and severity of 
punishment’238 and weigh up the risk of detection and punishment against the 
possible proceeds of their crimes according to rational choice theory.239 The validity 
of these assumptions has been the subject of much research and discussion, primarily 
assessed against reimprisonment statistics. 
 
According to a 2010 ABS report on prisoner statistics, 56 per cent of the prison 
population in 2009 had been in prison before. Furthermore, two in five people in the 
1994–1997 cohort tested in the research had been reimprisoned within 10 years of 
their release.240 The ABS report linked reimprisonment with youth, Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islander descent, and being male.241 The latest 2016 ABS report 
recorded that at least half the prisoners in all states and territories, except for South 
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Australia, were recorded as having had prior adult imprisonment under sentence.242 
In Australia, 44.3 per cent of prisoners released during 2012–13 returned to prison 
within two years. Over the same period, 51.1 per cent of prisoners returned to 
corrective services (including prison sentences and community orders). In Victoria, 
the rate of return to prison (44.1%) was comparable with the Australian average 
(44.3%). The Northern Territory had the highest rate of people returning to prison at 
57.5 per cent.243 In terms of global trends, Seena Fazel and Achim Wolf from the 
University of Oxford attempted to conduct a systematic review of criminal 
recidivism rates worldwide; however they concluded that the available recidivism 
data is currently not valid for the purposes of international comparisons and 
recommended better reporting practices.244 
 
In relation to overall imprisonment rates, the 2016 ABS report found that 
imprisonment rates had reached their highest since 2005 in: Queensland (198 
prisoners per 100,000 adult population); South Australia (204 prisoners per 100,000 
adult population); Western Australia (278 prisoners per 100,000 adult population); 
the Northern Territory (885 prisoners per 100,000 adult population); and the 
Australian Capital Territory (131 prisoners per 100,000 adult population). 
 
These metrics suggest that neither specific deterrence (evidenced by the high 
reimprisonment rates) nor marginal general deterrence (evidenced by the increasing 
overall imprisonment rates) are achievable sentencing objectives: a conclusion that 
was echoed by the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (‘VSAC’) in 2013.245  
 
Some empirical support for these conclusions can be found in the academic 
literature. In a 2011 study, Cullen et al found that, along with there being ‘little 
evidence that prisons reduce recidivism,’ there was also ‘some evidence to suggest 
that [prisons] have a criminogenic effect …[by influencing] inmates’ attitudes 
toward crime and violence, peer networks, ties to the conventional order, and 
identity,’ and therefore a continued adherence to imprisonment as a deterrence tool is 
not only costly but also ultimately makes society less safe.246 In addition, the authors 
observed that imposing a custodial versus a non-custodial punishment had no 
discernible impact on recidivism rates.247 Cullen et al analogize imprisonment with 
hospitalization – imprisonment must be shown to make offenders ‘better’ or else it 
would be futile to imprison them, in the same way that it would be futile to send sick 
people to hospitals if they could otherwise be treated and made better in the 
community.248 The VSAC agreed with these findings, concluding that the empirical 
evidence showed that the ‘threat of imprisonment [generated] a small general 
deterrent effect…[and that] increases in the severity of penalties, such as increasing 
the length of terms of imprisonment, do not produce a corresponding increase in 
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deterrence.’249  As VSAC noted, if deterrence were successful, it should prevent the 
commission of crimes.250 However, from the discussion above, it appears that the 
evidence against deterrence is overwhelming,251 indicating that the assumptions on 
which this sentencing objective depends are incorrect. 
 
Accordingly, as we argue in the General Deterrence Article, the emphasis on 
deterrence by the legislature,252 and in judicial sentencing, is misconceived and the 
appeals to marginal general deterrence as a justification for increasing sentence 
length are unsustainable. 
 
D Ineffectiveness of Imprisonment 
	
In an article that I co-authored, but which is not part of this thesis,253 I considered the 
strong appetite expressed by legislatures for imprisonment as a form of punishment. 
As a cost effective means of community protection, and as a path to offender reform, 
the data suggest that it is a flawed mechanism. 
 
Imprisonment is the harshest form of incapacitation and involves rendering an 
offender incapable of committing further offences through geographical and physical 
restriction. It revolves around the ‘segregation of criminals from the rest of the 
society.’254 Imprisonment is employed where deterrence fails, as a mechanism to 
facilitate community protection. This method of apparent societal protection is only 
effective where it can be established, with some degree of certainty, that the subject 
offender would commit further crimes if he or she were not otherwise physically 
restrained, viz, if not imprisoned. Accordingly, imprisonment relies on a prediction of 
dangerousness. However, it has been noted that ‘dangerousness’ is highly 
subjective255 and that it is more likely that criminal tendencies fluctuate over time 
such that ‘even calm and peaceful people may, even if rarely, lapse into committing 
crimes.’256  
 
Notwithstanding the consensus that there can be no accurate method to determine the 
dangerousness of a human being, it is commonly held that first time offenders, 
remorseful offenders and provoked offenders are less dangerous than repeat, 
                                                
249 Ritchie, above n 236, 2.  
250 Ibid 11. 
251 Note there is some evidence to suggest that specific deterrence may be worthwhile in relation to 
drunk driving offenders: see, eg, Michael Weinrath and John Gartrell, ‘Specific Deterrence and 
Sentence Length’ (2001) 17(2) Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 105. 
252 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(j), the deterrent effect that any sentence or order under 
consideration may have on the person; s 16A(2)(ja), the deterrent effect that any sentence or order 
under consideration may have on other persons; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(b): to deter the 
offender or other persons from committing offences of the same or a similar character.  
253 Mirko Bagaric, Richard Edney and Theo Alexander, ‘(Particularly) Burdensome Prison Time 
Should Reduce Imprisonment Length – and not Merely in Theory’ (2014) 38(2) Melbourne University 
Law Review 409. 
254 Mungan, above n 238, 166. 
255 See, eg, Honor Figgis and Rachel Simpson, ‘Dangerous Offenders Legislation: An Overview’ 
(Research Paper No 14/97, NSW Parliamentary Library, Parliament of NSW, 1997) 3; Kathleen 
Auerhahn, Selective Incapacitation and Public Policy: Evaluating California’s Imprisonment Crisis 
(State University of New York Press, 2012) 76. 
256 Mungan, above n 238, 162-3. 
 51 
unremorseful and unprovoked offenders; thus justifying the mitigatory nature of 
good character, remorse and provocation respectively.257  
 
The efficacy of imprisonment can only be assessed with reference to reduced 
recidivism. Although it would seem that imprisonment could be said to be effective 
if it results in fewer offences being committed by the offender while they are 
incapacitated compared to if they were in the community, Cullen et al argue that ‘a 
more balanced question is whether more crime is saved through incapacitation versus 
placing offenders in high-quality community treatment programs.’258 Overall, this 
proposition is sound, because comparing the number of crimes an offender commits 
in the community during their period of incarceration unrealistically assumes that the 
offender has not been sanctioned in another way. 
 
Imprisonment has also been justified from an economic perspective: ‘an offender 
ought to be imprisoned if and only if his potential to cause harm, per unit of time 
free, exceeds the cost, per unit of time, of imprisonment.’259 The relevance of this 
economic analysis is crucial because, as set out above, imprisonment rates in 
Australia have increased in recent years.260 In particular, the number of prisoners in 
adult corrective services custody increased by 8% from 36,134 prisoners at 30 June 
2015 to 38,845 at 30 June 2016.  That increase results in significant costs: between 
2013 and 2014, the cost of keeping a prisoner in prison was assessed at $269.56 per 
day or $98,389.40 per year. By contrast, not imprisoning offenders results in 
significant savings: the cost of keeping an offender in the community (community 
corrections) was $26.97 per day or $9,844.05 per year.261 As set out above, the 2010 
and 2016 ABS reports tend to suggest that imprisonment has a recidivistic effect on 
almost half of all prisoners.262 Thus, if imprisonment results in increased recidivism 
(or does not deter recidivism), then this must be factored into the cost of harm/time 
in prison calculation. There is some contrary data nonetheless. In the United States, 
an increased use of imprisonment has coincided with a reduction in violent and 
property crimes.263 However, it is still essential to assess whether the usually minor 
reductions in crime rates attributable to imprisonment are in fact cost effective.264 
 
A further layer of complexity to the justifiability of imprisonment is whether the 
benefit it yields – community protection and potentially lower rates of crime –  
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outweigh the burden on offenders. Although the greatest burden which prison 
imposes on offenders is a deprivation of liberty, it also deprives offenders of goods 
and services, heterosexual relationships, security, autonomy and, to some extent, 
average life expectancy.265 The circumstances that justify this form of punishment 
have not been adequately examined or explained, and yet, in many if not most cases, 
imprisonment is said to be the only sentencing option for many white-collar crimes, 
such as serious tax fraud, in the absence of powerful mitigating circumstances.266 
 
Finally, focusing on incapacitation as a form of recidivism control or community 
protection might obscure consideration of the causes which potentially underlie the 
crime rates. In 2006, Bruce Western observed that a lack of education increased the 
likelihood of offending, regardless of race.267 Therefore it is likely that shifting the 
focus to addressing educational and financial inequality268 would be a more 
worthwhile endeavour than pursuing incapacitation. 
 
E Rehabilitation: No Clear Evidence Supporting its Application 
 
As discussed in the Specific Deterrence and Rehabilitation Article, although there is 
some evidence that rehabilitation may work, even in a custodial setting, ‘the current 
state of knowledge about the capacity to reform offenders is so rudimentary that it 
does not strongly support any change in the law or policy changes.’269  
Sentences are sometimes mitigated for the purpose of attitudinal reformation of an 
offender.270 Mungan notes that there is a ‘belief that criminals’ attitudes are hard to 
change through institutions.’271 This scepticism is not new and was expressed by 
Robert Martinson in his 1974 report,272 which later became referred to as ‘Nothing 
Works!’.273 The courts in Australia generally view rehabilitation to be more 
important than general deterrence in relation to youthful offenders in light of its 
potential to benefit both the offender and the community,274 but a secondary 
consideration for adult offenders. On the whole, there is consensus that Western 
criminal justice systems have become heavily geared towards punitive rather than 
rehabilitative ideals.275 According to a study in prison programs in the United States, 
‘rehabilitation has increasingly become equated with re-entry-related life skills 
programs’ as opposed to academic programs.276 However, Cullen and Gendreau are 
unconvinced by this wholesale rejection of the effectiveness of rehabilitation: ‘the 
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doctrine of nothing works is best seen as a socially constructed reality [rather than] 
an established scientific truth.’277 There is some evidence in support of restorative 
justice programs for non-violent offenders that involve victim participation.278 Doubt 
still remains about the capability of rehabilitative programs to reduce recidivism 
because these programs are generally based on deterrence, incapacitation and 
control.279 However, there has been more promising evidence relating to the efficacy 
of rehabilitation where it is based on education.280 
 
Thus, although rehabilitation is conventionally called in aid of an offender to 
mitigate or reduce the severity of a sentence, it is equally unjustifiable if there is no 
empirical evidence to support that approach. As we identify in the Specific 
Deterrence and Rehabilitation Article, there is some evidence that imprisonment 
may provide a means of effective reform for some offenders in some circumstances.  
However, the evidence is so scant that pursuing this objective is unjustifiable until 
clear data can provide guidance as to the effect of all forms of sanction, including 
imprisonment, on the general offender population.  
 
F Conclusion 
 
These factors – the opaque instinctive synthesis methodology and the unachievable 
objectives of sentencing – represent fundamental problems with the approach to 
sentencing in Australia.  It is essential to revisit the rationality of old ideas because 
‘virtually every moral [or political] belief becomes false and an incitement to 
injustice the moment it becomes unquestioned or unquestionable.’281 Whilst the 
instinctive synthesis model is unlikely to be superseded by any better approach to 
sentencing in the foreseeable future, the objectives which are pursued within that 
methodology should at least be re-cast in light of the data.282 Law reform should be 
enacted to ‘[cut] out the inconvenient relics of the past ... [which] are now for the 
benefit of none.’283 Whilst these general problems with sentencing law apply to all 
offenders, in the next chapter I turn to consider the specific problems that confront 
courts when sentencing white-collar offenders. 
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CHAPTER VI  
 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS 
 
 
‘For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil, and in their eagerness to be rich 
some have wandered away from the faith and pierced themselves with many pains’ 
 
Timothy 6:10 
 
 
A Introduction 
 
This chapter narrows consideration to the problems identified in relation to white-
collar offenders which appear throughout the five articles. A necessary preliminary 
step is to identify, with some particularity, the category of offenders who may be 
described as white-collar. In order to assess the adequacy or inadequacy of current 
sentencing practices, it is necessary to first understand what constitutes white-collar 
crime. In light of the distinctive features of white-collar crime (being offenders or 
offences depending upon the definitional approach adopted), I discuss the problems 
which, as I identify in the Rational Approach Article, makes white-collar crime stand 
apart from other criminal conduct.  
 
B Conceptual Development of White-collar Crime 
 
White-collar offences have existed since long before Edwin Sutherland coined the 
term ‘white-collar crime’ in his 1939 presidential address to the American 
Sociological Society entitled The White Collar Criminal.284   
 
The English common law in the late Middle Ages, if not earlier, included the 
offences of regrating, engrossing, and forestalling.285 Regrating involved acquiring 
and stockpiling market commodities in order to resell them at higher prices.  
Engrossing referred to buying entire supplies of goods with the intention of retailing 
them at monopoly prices.  Forestalling related to acquiring goods before they entered 
the public market, with the intention of selling them at higher prices.  The three 
market offences were punishable by discretionary fine and/or imprisonment, and 
were finally repealed in approximately 1772.286 Corresponding offences can now be 
found in competition law.  
 
In 1907, Edward Ross described the white-collar criminal without the modern label. 
To Ross, the white-collar criminal was ‘a social type who enjoys a public image as a 
pillar of the community and a paragon of virtue, but beneath the veneer of 
respectability [lies] a very different persona; one committed to personal gain [by] any 
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means necessary’.287 This is someone acting not on evil impulse, but moral 
insensibility; he or she prefers to prey on the anonymous public, while impersonating 
the good citizen.288 
 
Up until 1939 sociologists and criminologists had criticised what is now known as 
white-collar crime, however, they did not take it seriously.289 Rather, sociologists 
associated crime with poverty, lack of organised recreation, broken homes, slum 
neighbourhoods, intellectual inferiority, and emotional instability, among other 
things.290 They did not study crime committed by professionals and elites.  
Consequently, theories and public policies rarely dealt with white-collar offenders.291  
 
In his 1939 speech, Sutherland defined white-collar crime as ‘crime committed by a 
person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation’.292  He 
defines crime, without reference to mens rea or nature of punishment, as ‘behaviour 
which is prohibited by the State and against which the State may react, at least as a 
last resort, by punishment.’293  Earlier, in 1938, Sutherland gave a speech to students 
at DePauw University, Indiana, in which he stated that ‘white collar criminal’ refers 
to ‘a person in the upper socioeconomic class who violates the law designed to 
regulate his occupation ...’294 These speeches highlighted not only the existence of 
white-collar crime, but also its prevalence. Sutherland’s objective was to bring white-
collar crime into mainstream criminological thought, however it is still primarily 
considered a smaller category of crime, to be contrasted with common crime, which 
dominates criminological studies.295 
 
Sutherland’s various definitions are offender based definitions. This means the 
qualities of the offender determine whether the crime is a white-collar crime, rather 
than the qualities of the offence itself. In his book White Collar Crime, Sutherland 
says that his definition is not meant to be definitive, rather, it is aimed at bringing 
attention to crimes that are not usually considered within the scope of criminology.296 
 
It is interesting that Sutherland sought to debunk class-based understandings of 
crime, yet he included class in his definition of white-collar crime.297 The inclusion 
of class renders the definition forensically inadequate because notions such as 
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‘respectability’, ‘social status’ and ‘socio-economic status’ are too obscure to be 
meaningful.298  
 
Included within Sutherland’s concept of white-collar crime are offences committed 
by corporations and individuals, and offences punishable by civil penalty only.299  
Sutherland’s view was that offenders should be considered white-collar criminals 
because of what they had done, even if the criminal justice system did not label them 
as criminals. His analogy involved tuberculosis. Sutherland argued that tuberculosis 
is tuberculosis, whether it is treated with poultices and bloodletting, or with 
streptomycin.300 Similarly, a crime is a crime, whether treated civilly or criminally.  
Sutherland adopted a wide definition of crime, therefore he considered certain 
conduct criminal even where the legislature did not. 
 
C Expanding Definition of White-collar Crime 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, offence-based definitions of white-collar crime became more 
popular. Offence-based definitions included organisational or corporate crime, as 
well as individual crime.301 Herbert Edelhertz, a federal prosecutor from the US 
Department of Justice, argued that white-collar crime is democratic, and should be 
defined more broadly, by reference to the modus operandi and objectives of the 
offenders, rather than the characteristics of the individual offenders.302 Edelhertz 
posited that the definition must be broader because opportunities for white-collar 
crime offending were no longer confined to the elites and members of the upper 
middle classes.303 Rather, society had become much more vulnerable to abuses of 
trust through the increase in marketing, distribution and variety of media through 
which consumer needs were being created.304 
 
He defined white-collar crime in 1970 as ‘an illegal act or series of illegal acts 
committed by non-physical means and by concealment or guile to obtain money or 
property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or 
personal advantage.’305 As a starting point, Edelhertz identified four types of white-
collar crime: 
 
1. Personal crimes, which are committed by individuals on an individual basis 
(for example, credit card fraud, welfare fraud, and individual income tax 
violations); 
 
2. Abuses of trust, which are committed in the course an individual’s occupation 
and in breach of a duty or loyalty to an employer or client (for example, 
embezzlement by employees, insider trading, and bank violations by 
employees); 
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3. Business crimes, which are committed in furtherance of business operations, 
but not as the principal business pursuit (for example, competition law 
violations, tax violations, and food and drug violations); and 
 
4. Confidence games, which are committed as the principal business pursuit (for 
example, Ponzi schemes, charity and religious frauds, and personal 
improvement schemes).306 
 
However, Braithwaite contends that a definition limiting white-collar crime to ‘acts 
committed by non-physical means’ diverts attention away from white-collar crimes 
that cause physical harm.307 White-collar crimes that cause physical harm include 
unnecessary surgery, waste dumping, failure to label poisonous materials in the 
workplace, and the manufacture of faulty goods.308 Braithwaite also notes that 
Edelhertz’s definition does not require the criminal conduct to be committed in the 
course of the individual’s occupation. In relation to white-collar crime committed by 
individuals, Braithwaite argues that the definition should be neutral in terms of social 
standing, but include an occupational nexus309 which would ensure welfare and 
credit card frauds, or personal crimes as Edelhertz labels them, fall outside the 
definition.310   
 
Geis, who believed that Sutherland’s concept was too broad and would fall into 
disuse unless it was tightened, initially attempted to limit the scope of white-collar 
crime to offences by corporations, but later revised his definition to include crimes 
committed by individuals.311 He also agreed with Braithwaite, suggesting that the 
offender specific element of Sutherland’s definition should be retained, so that 
welfare cheats and credit card frauds would not be captured by the definition.312 
 
Geis points out that Edelhertz’s definition is not clear on whether an act can be a 
white-collar crime without formal adjudication as such.313 Given the legalistic nature 
of Edelhertz’s definition, pursuant to that definition, an act is only a white-collar 
crime if formally adjudicated as such. A divide therefore becomes apparent between 
legal scholars’ definitions of white-collar crime, and sociologists’ definitions. The 
former tend to be more formal, and the latter tend to be looser and more 
encompassing.  
 
In their book Criminal Behaviour Systems: A Typology, Clinard and Quinney suggest 
that white-collar crime can be separated into two categories; occupational crime, and 
organisational or corporate crime.314 Clinnard and Quinney point out that in the 
decades that followed Sutherland’s definition, the concept was gradually expanded to 
include offences occurring in the course of any occupation, regardless of social class. 
Following that trend, they defined occupational crime as crime committed by people 
at all socio-economic levels, involving ‘violation of the criminal law in the course of 
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activity in a legitimate occupation’.315 This subcategory would therefore catch a 
photocopy room employee who happens across inside information and breaches 
insider trading laws.  Organisational or corporate crime refers to corporate officers 
offending against their corporation, and also to offences committed by the 
corporation itself. 
 
The second subcategory addresses the perceived confusion in Sutherland’s definition 
in relation to corporations. Clinnard and Quinney complain that Sutherland 
condemned corporations for their crimes, but seemed to focus on the officials.    
Indeed, Geis also highlighted the confusion in Sutherland’s definition, and suggested 
that Sutherland’s solution to the difficulty in deciding which of the corporation and 
its officials is the criminal, was to say that the crimes of the corporation are the 
crimes of the executives and managers. 
 
Braithwaite endorses Clinard and Quinney’s approach of separating white-collar 
crime into occupational and corporate subcategories.316 He suggests that while the 
latter category is more homogenous than the former, and is conducive to a useful 
theory on crime, theories on the former category of white-collar crime could be as 
elusive as general theories of white-collar crime.317 
 
In the 1980s a bifurcated approach to defining white-collar crime developed. The 
first approach, espoused by Geis, focused on the ‘structural positions of white-collar 
offenders, their control over property and people, and the ways in which those 
positions allow some to carry out white-collar crimes’. 318 This approach does not 
look at prestige and status, which are mere perceptions in the community. The 
second approach focused on wrongdoing by corporations and/or by their officers 
acting in corporate capacities, and the harm caused to the environment and to 
individuals.319 In the same decade, the US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, conducted research into white-collar crime and defined it as: 
 
[n]onviolent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception by persons 
whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi professional and 
utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; also, nonviolent crime 
for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by anyone having special 
technical and professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of 
the person’s occupation.320   
 
This is an example of the first approach, where the focus is on the offender’s special 
occupational skills and opportunities, rather than their social status. It is also an 
example of a formalistic/legalistic definition. 
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In the early 1990s, the Yale White Collar Crime Project321 also used a similar 
definition to Edelhertz’s in that it removed the element of high social status, 
respectability and trust. This study suggested that the opportunities to commit white-
collar crime in Sutherland’s time were centralised in the hands of the elite. In modern 
times, with the advent of computers and the internet, increased access to education, 
and the growth in white-collar jobs, opportunities for white-collar criminality are 
widespread among the middle class. The authors wrote: 
 
Contrary to the portrait of white-collar crime generally presented by scholars and in 
the press, we find a world of offending and offenders that is very close to the 
everyday lives of typical Americans…the majority [of offenders] occupy positions 
in society that are neither far above nor far below the middle, and their crimes do not 
necessitate, nor do their defences rely upon, elite social status. Opportunities to 
commit these crimes are available to average Americans.322 
 
Accordingly, the study defined white-collar crime as ‘economic offenses committed 
through the use of some combination of fraud, deception or collusion’.323 This 
definition lacks a connection to occupation, and therefore expands the study 
catchment beyond the middle class. Indeed, the study analysed some offences which 
are likely to be committed by many lower socio-economic offenders, otherwise than 
in the course of their occupation. By removing offender characteristics from the 
definition of white-collar crime, the investigators were able to select eight offences 
that fell within the definition, then include in their study all convictions in relation to 
those offences, irrespective of whether the offender was a bank executive or an 
unemployed person. The eight federal offences studied were securities law 
violations, antitrust law violations, bribery, bank embezzlement, mail and wire fraud 
(offences where the postal service or other regulated communication systems are 
used to defraud individuals or organizations), tax fraud, false claims and statements, 
and credit or lending institutions fraud. 
 
Expanding the definition to include the middle class was an approach favoured by 
Weisburd, Waring and Chayet.324 They argue that most people who are convicted of 
white-collar offences belong to the middle class, and are not people of high status 
and respectability.325  A more useful study, they suggest, does not exclude the bulk of 
people who are prosecuted and convicted of white-collar crimes.326 Also in the 
1990s, Susan Shapiro sought to liberate the concept of white-collar crime from 
existing labels of ‘white-collar’, ‘organisational/corporate’, and ‘occupational’.327  
Such labels were said to focus on actors rather than acts, and not provide any 
guidance on the characteristics of the acts committed or norms violated: 
 
Sutherland created the white-collar crime concept in order to bring the offenses of 
the elite into criminological theory and thereby to enrich knowledge in the 
discipline. Ironically, his pathbreaking work has in part had the opposite effect, 
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segregating the rich and the poor and removing intensive inquiries about those of 
privilege from mainstream criminology ... After 50 years, it is time to integrate the 
‘white-collar’ offenders into mainstream scholarship by looking beyond the 
perpetrators’ wardrobe and social characteristics and exploring the modus operandi 
of their misdeeds and the ways in which they establish and exploit trust.328 
 
This approach resembles Geis’s focus on structural positions and opportunities to 
commit white-collar offences. 
 
After casting aside Sutherland’s traditional definition, Shapiro uses a less cited 
passage of his work as the foundation of her formulation: 
  
These varied types of white-collar crimes in business and the professions consist 
principally of violation of delegated or implied trust, and many of them can be 
reduced to two categories: (1) misrepresentation of asset values and (2) duplicity in 
the manipulation of power.  The first is approximately the same as fraud or 
swindling; the second is similar to the double-cross.329 
 
Shapiro therefore defines white-collar crime as the violation or abuse of trust.  Three 
possible violations or abuses of trust are offered; deception, self-interest and 
incompetence. The abuse of trust formulation of white-collar crime is not without its 
problems. Shapiro concedes that her definition does not completely divert attention 
away from actors. When analysing deception, self-interest and incompetence, one 
must consider offender knowledge, intent and variability of talent and other offender 
characteristics.330 Further, many deviant acts that fall within the rubric of white-
collar crime under other definitions, such as waste dumping and price fixing, will not 
amount to white-collar crime under the abuse of trust model. 
 
Other commentators have suggested that white-collar crime is just another form of 
criminal conduct which should not be treated differently from other criminal 
conduct, and that ‘any theory of crime that makes claim to generality should apply 
without difficulty to the crimes of the rich and powerful, crimes committed in the 
course of an occupation, crimes in which a position of power, influence or trust is 
used for the purpose of individual or organizational gain’.331 Hirschi and Gottfredson 
suggest that analysing white-collar crime separately from other forms of crime is 
useful for policy purposes, including the control of white-collar crime, however this 
does not mean it has different causes.332 
 
D A Working Definition of White-Collar Crime  
 
As we point out in the Rational Approach Article, a workable definition of white-
collar crime has proved elusive. However, a working definition of white-collar is 
crucial to the coherent analysis of existing jurisprudence, to the process of informed 
decision-making, and to the promulgation of any proposals for reform. 
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As seen above, there is no universally accepted definition of white-collar crime.  
Sutherland’s formulation has never been abandoned. It has merely been refined in 
various ways.  The various definitions that have succeeded Sutherland’s definition all 
intersect with each other in some way.333 For instance, definitions that focus on 
respectability or high status, definitions that deal with occupation, and definitions 
that speak of economic crime committed by non-physical means. People of higher 
status are more likely to be in white-collar occupations, and people in white-collar 
occupations are more likely to have the opportunity to commit economic crimes by 
non-physical means.334 There is a core group of white-collar criminals who would be 
labelled as such by all the major definitions.  It is notable that modern definitions of 
white-collar offenders do not focus on the classic formulation of characteristics – 
being respectability and high social status – but rather, focus on the structural 
position, power, influence and opportunities of the offender. 
 
The tension between offender-based and offence-based definitions is longstanding. 
Green notes that lawyers seek definitions that focus on conduct with criminal law 
like characteristics, while sociologists and criminologists are more concerned with 
patterns of behaviour and their causes.335 The emerging trend, however, is to define 
white-collar crime by reference to both the type of offence (being one which is 
archetypally a white-collar offence such as insider trading) and by reference to the 
type of offender (which may mean that a general offence takes on the attributions of 
a white-collar offence because of the characteristics of the offender who commits it). 
In this way, a working definition of white-collar crime and white-criminal coalesce, 
because the definitions of each include reference to both the offence type and the 
offender characteristics.  
 
Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, and the research I undertook, white-collar 
crimes sensu stricto and white-collar criminals exhibit the following features: 
 
• a nonviolent criminal act or omission (offence type); 
- committed in the course of an occupation (offence type and 
offender type); and 
- in pursuit of financial gain to the individual to the loss of 
another/others (offence type);  
 
• by an individual who is in a position of significant power, trust or 
influence (offender type).  
 
There are several items to note about this definition. 
 
First, in terms of Edelhertz’s four types of white-collar crime, the definition adopted 
by this paper encompasses abuses of trust, and business crimes. 
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Second, it only includes conduct that amounts to a crime under the law as it stands.  
This means that conduct punishable by civil penalty only is not included within the 
definition. 
 
Third, ‘nonviolent’ refers to the means by which the act or omission is 
committed/made. It does not refer to the harm caused by the act or omission.336  
 
Fourth, the requirement of significant power, trust or influence, excludes from the 
definition the photocopier who discovers inside information and breaches insider 
trading laws. 
 
Finally, it is conceded that white-collar crimes may be committed by corporations; 
however this definition is limited to individual offenders, due to the thesis’ focus on 
sentencing trends applicable to individuals.     
 
This definition of white-collar crime, which creates a distinction from common 
crime, naturally also creates a distinction between white-collar criminals and non-
white-collar criminals. Such sub-grouping is not unusual, but rather is a legitimate 
exercise observed in relation to numerous other subsets, such as young offenders or 
Aboriginal offenders. 
 
E Sequelae of the Distinction between White-collar Crime and  
Non-White-collar Crime 
 
The consequences of distinguishing white-collar crime from more general crime are 
mostly observed at the sentencing stage. These differences are said to facilitate, and 
justify, the differential treatment of mitigating or aggravating factors that may be 
raised for or against an individual offender. As alluded to the Rational Approach 
Article, there are nine main differences between the curial treatment of white-collar 
crime and other types of crime.337 These differences can be identified across a 
number of sentencing variables, namely: 
	
(i) good character; 
(ii) public opprobrium;  
(iii) reduction of employment or career prospects;  
(iv) large amount of money involved; 
(v) high level of planning and sophistication; 
(vi) high level of harm to victims; 
(vii) restitution; 
(viii) ancillary orders. 
 
These are the sentencing variables that were tested in the research I conducted, and 
which are considered in detail in Chapter VIII.   
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However, the distinction can also be observed more generally in the curial approach 
to sentencing white-collar offenders.  That approach has been the subject of criticism 
– in relation to five principal aspects – across the co-authored articles.   
 
F The problematic approach to aspects of sentencing White-collar Offenders 
 
In the Rational Approach Article, we argued that there are some problems in the 
approach taken by courts when sentencing white-collar offenders: 
 
1. That even though the principle of proportionality would suggest that 
offences against individuals are more serious, this is not observed in 
white-collar sentencing; 
 
2. That restitution is not afforded sufficient mitigatory weight in the 
sentencing exercise; 
 
3. That previous good character is often disregarded on the basis of its 
ubiquity;  
 
4. That extra-curial punishments are often disregarded on the basis that 
they are expected or are not exceptional – I argue that they should 
reduce penalty where they can be tangibly measured;  
 
5. That the courts continue to place a strong emphasis on general 
deterrence despite the evidence that it does not work. 
  
In relation to problems 1 to 4, each problem stems from the differential treatment of 
white-collar offenders: principally, whether that different treatment is justifiable or 
unjustifiable.  
 
Admittedly, as I demonstrate in Chapter I, there are meaningful differences between 
white-collar crime and other types of crime and, arguably, these differences can and 
should justify differential treatment for this subset; for example, sentencers should 
disfavour imprisonment given that these offenders do not pose any physical risk to 
the community.338  Similar differences already apply to the sanctions imposed on 
children or the mentally ill.  These are acceptable grounds for differentiation. 
 
However, the approach taken by sentencing courts is problematic in the ways 
identified in problems 1 to 4 because the differential treatment is not justified.  In 
relation to the different treatment, the justifications advanced in the case law and in 
the scholarship do not provide a doctrinally sound basis for the generally worse 
treatment received by white-collar offenders.  
 
Below, I re-consider these five problematic aspects in greater detail, and in light of 
the findings of the empirical research.  
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how and why certain sentencing factors have been, but should not be, treated 
differently when the offender falls within the identifiable class of white-collar 
offender.    
 
G Proportionality: offences against individuals are not treated more seriously 
 
The empirical research that I conducted (see Chapter VII) reveals that harm was 
inflicted on the public or financial institutions in approximately 30% of cases (19 out 
of 64 cases), while the remaining cases involved harm against individuals. In about 
75% of cases (49 out of 64 cases), a high level of harm was a relevant sentencing 
consideration.  
 
The principle of proportionality is dependent on objective seriousness of the 
wrongful conduct. In the white-collar context, assessment is often informed by 
factors such as level of harm, level of planning and sophistication, and amount of 
money involved, all of which proportionately increase objective seriousness. The 
level of harm and amount of money involved are features referable to the victim of 
the crime, thus identifying the victim of a white-collar offence is relevant in 
sentencing. As an example, Ormiston JA of the Victorian Court of Appeal pointed 
out in R v Liddell339 that while the Australian Taxation Office is the ostensible 
victim, serious tax fraud will inevitably have a flow on effect to the incidence of tax 
to the honest taxpayer. Most judicial comments identified in the research treat tax 
evasion as a crime against many victims – the community – as opposed to a single 
victim. This approach was echoed in Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Commonwealth) v Goldberg (‘Goldberg’), where Vincent JA of the Victorian 
Supreme Court (with whom Winneke P and Batt JA agreed) referred with apparent 
approval to the following observation by the sentencing judge in that case: 
 
Tax evasion is not a game, or a victimless crime. It is a form of corruption and is, 
therefore, insidious. In the face of brazen tax evasion, honest citizens begin to doubt 
their own values and are tempted to do what they see others do with apparent 
impunity. At the very least, they are left with a legitimate sense of grievance, which 
is itself divisive. Tax evasion is not simply a matter of failing to pay one’s debt to 
the government. It is theft and tax evaders are thieves... 340  
 
The sentiments expressed in Goldberg reflect a generally endorsed view that the 
harm caused to an institutional victim is of equivalent severity to the harm caused to 
an individual victim.341 There was no identifiable increase in punishment severity for 
offences against individuals compared to institutions evident in the research. In the 
Rational Approach Article, we contend that individual victims are less able to 
withstand the effects of white-collar crime (there is no diffusion or spreading of loss) 
and that measuring the harm suffered by institutional victims is almost impossible 
(even large frauds do not account for statistically significant loss of overall revenue), 
and therefore it is more cogent to punish crimes against individuals more harshly. 
Indeed, the empirical evidence reveals that the public perceive white-collar crime as 
less serious than violent crimes (which is necessarily committed on individuals).342 It 
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can be argued by analogy that the public perceive harm on individuals as more 
serious than any other type of harm, in particular, physical harm, but also 
presumably, financial harm.  If this constitutes an accurate rendition of current public 
perceptions, it is not reflected in the current extra-curial judicial or governmental 
attitude to white-collar offenders.343 There is currently no meaningful distinction in 
sentencing outcomes where the victim is an institution as opposed to an individual, 
despite the obvious additional burdens suffered by the individual victim. 
 
H Restitution not given enough weight 
 
In respect to the mitigatory impact of restitution, it has been said that placing too 
much emphasis on restitution risks permitting, or the perception of permitting, 
offenders to ‘buy their way out of prison.’344 However, from the 64 cases analysed in 
the research, it is difficult to determine the effect of this theory in practice. 
Restitution was not commonly cited, being raised in less than 35% of cases. Because 
of the instinctive synthesis approach adopted by sentencing judges, it was virtually 
impossible to determine the mitigating impact of restitution on the overall sentence.  
However, an impressionstic view of the sentencing decisions suggest that even where 
an offender made voluntary restitution, he or she was not automatically afforded a 
discount. No clear reason can be discerned from the judgements why no substantial 
discount was given. 
 
I Previous good character is sometimes disregarded 
 
In 8% of the cases analysed in the research, previous good character lost its 
mitigatory impact because it was perceived to have facilitated the offending 
behaviour. As I argued in the Rational Approach Article, this reasoning is flawed.345 
In order to maintain doctrinal coherency, all first-time offenders should receive the 
benefit of their prior good character, regardless of whether they are white-collar 
criminals or common criminals. It is only repeat offenders who should, to the extent 
of the progressive loss of mitigation theory, not receive the prior good character 
discount by virtue of their recidivism.346   
 
J Extra-curial punishments don't always mitigate 
 
In McDonald v The Queen (1994) 48 FCR, it was said that ‘the most serious 
consequences of a white-collar offender must be the loss of his own self-respect and 
the humiliation that accompanies’. However, this view has not resulted in lighter 
sentences. Australian courts must be satisfied that extra-curial punishment is either 
exceptional or extreme before allowing it to mitigate a sentence.347 In the research, I 
found that reduction of employment or career prospects to be more prevalent than 
public opprobrium as a mitigating factor in relation to white-collar offenders. This 
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may indicate the prevalent view that public shaming is futile as an alternative or 
ancillary form of punishment.348 However, where raised, both factors were treated as 
mitigatory approximately 70% of the time. The courts have not attempted to state 
what amounts to exceptional or extreme extra-curial punishment, but rather seem to 
assess this on a case-by-case basis. 
 
K Strong but Misplaced Emphasis on General Deterrence 
 
In seeking to ensure that proportionate sentences are imposed the courts have 
consistently emphasised that general deterrence is a particularly significant 
sentencing consideration in white-collar crime.349 This approach is not unique to 
Australia.350 In DPP v Gregory,351 the Victorian Court of Appeal set out the reason 
for this approach explicitly (citations omitted): 
 
Moreover, general deterrence is likely to have a more profound effect in the case of 
white collar criminals. White collar criminals are likely to be rational, profit seeking 
individuals who can weigh the benefits of committing a crime against the costs of 
being caught and punished. Further, white collar criminals are also more likely to be 
first time offenders who fear the prospect of incarceration. 
 
The strong endorsement of general deterrence as a particularly important 
consideration in relation to white-collar offences follows from two judicial 
assumptions: comparatively, such crimes are hard to detect and prosecute 
successfully;352 and, white-collar offenders see the prospect of imprisonment as 
particularly distasteful as they carefully weigh up the costs and benefits of crime 
before committing an offence. The first assumption remains open to further research, 
whereas the second assumption is demonstrably false given the discussion set out in 
Chapter IV.  
 
The primacy given to this flawed objective is clear in Australian Securities & 
Investments Commission v Soust [No 2] the Court said that:  
 
If one accepts, as I do, that general deterrence is the most important element 
of sentencing antitrust offenders, ‘the character of the offence, rather than 
that of the offender [is] the central determinant in the sentencing decision … 
the individual offender’s characteristics are irrelevant, they should be 
relegated in importance in light of the goal to be achieved, that goal being to 
deter future contraventions …353 
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Recently, Henning considered the role of deterrence in white-collar sentencing and 
noted the following: 
 
It is certainly questionable whether a punishment imposed on one white-collar 
criminal has an impact on others because the violations are usually the product of a 
unique set of circumstances that allowed the crime to occur … general deterrence is 
about sending out a message, but it is one that may not be heard by its intended 
audience.354 
 
According to Henning, the relevance of deterrence remains valid if it: 
 
… has value in the process of imposing punishment because it works to keep judges 
from succumbing to the impulse to see white-collar defendants in the warm light of a 
contrite individual who engaged in aberrational conduct but is unlikely to offend 
again.355 
 
Whatever light may properly be cast around white-collar offenders as opposed to 
other offenders is a matter of conjecture. The results of research conducted as long 
ago as 1995 by Weisburd et al clearly showed that prison does not have a strong 
deterrent effect on white-collar recidivism.356  Henning’s concern about the ‘warm 
light’ may or may not be apt, but it does not alter the conclusions from the data. 
 
By contrast, the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) carefully considered 
arguments underlying general deterrence when reviewing the sentencing objectives 
in the federal jurisdiction.  In a report which underpinned Part 1B of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth), the ALRC expressly disapproved of general deterrence as a sentencing 
consideration because it is unfair to impose a heavier sanction on a particular accused 
because of the effect it might have on the behaviour of others.357 The Report, 
relevantly, states at: 
 
Nor should general deterrence be invoked as a goal or objective by sentencers. To 
impose a punishment on one person by reference to a hypothetical crimes of another 
runs completely counter to the overriding principle that a punishment imposed on a 
person must be linked to the crime that he or she has committed.358   
 
However, this overt recognition of the moral and empirical failure of the objective 
has not deterred either the courts or the legislature from persisting with it. In DPP  
(Cth) v Said Khodor El Karhani (1990) 21 NSWLR 370, 377 (Kirby P, Campbell 
and Newman JJ), it was stated that its absence from the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) was a 
‘legislative slip’ rather than an act of Parliament, and therefore continued to apply it 
anyway in sentencing federal offenders.  In the same year as an appeal was heard in 
the Victorian Supreme Court challenging the application of El Karhani in 
Victoria,359 Federal Parliament amended s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to 
expressly include as an objective ‘the deterrent effect that any sentence or order 
                                                
354 Peter J Henning, ‘Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-collar Defendants? (2015) 61 Wayne 
Law Review 27, 31. 
355 Ibid, 32. 
356 David Weisburd, Elin Waring and Ellen Chayet, ‘Specific Deterrence in a Sample of Offenders 
Convicted of White Collar Crimes’ (1995) 33(4) Criminology 587, 598. 
357 ALRC, Sentencing, above n 120.  
358 Ibid 18. 
359 Aitchison v The Queen [2015] VSCA 348. 
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under consideration may have on other persons.’  The explanatory memorandum to 
the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Powers, Offences and Other Measures) Bill 
2015 addressed neither the moral acceptability nor the relative effectiveness of 
general deterrence nor the earlier ALRC report. Rather, the reason cited for the 
amendment was that while it did not appear in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), it was 
included in State and Territory legislation, and this lacuna was a cause for ‘judicial 
concern.’ In Victoria, sentencing courts have in fact tended towards imposing terms 
of imprisonment and longer sentences in the past two decades.360 
 
L Conclusion 
 
As a particular type of criminal subset, the sentencing of white-collar offenders also 
suffers from a particular set of problems.  These problems largely emanate from a 
type of criminological mythology that has developed around the white-collar 
offender and offence; a mythology which suggests that this subset engage in crime or 
respond to punishment in ways markedly differently from other subsets. This 
mythology persists even in the face of coherent argument and compelling evidence to 
the contrary.  It is used to justify the differential treatment of white-collar offenders 
where no such justification exists.  The evidence that demonstrates the existence of 
differential treatment is examined in Chapters VII, VIII and IX.   
                                                
360 See R v Nguyen & Phan [1997] 1 VR 386, 389 (Brooking JA with whom Winneke P and Callaway 
JA agreed). In that case, Brooking JA said: ‘The seriousness of the offence of defrauding the 
Commonwealth of a large sum of money by not declaring assessable income has in the past, perhaps, 
not always been sufficiently reflected in the sentence passed. Those who systematically defraud the 
Revenue of a large sum over a substantial period must in general expect a substantial custodial 
sentence. The deterrent and punitive effects of that sentence should not be unduly diminished by 
allowing release from custody at an unduly early stage’. 
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CHAPTER VII  
 
RESEARCH: METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 
“If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research, would it?” 
 
Albert Einstein, physicist, 1879 - 1955   
 
 
A Introduction 
 
In the five co-authored articles, two critical themes emerged. First, there is no 
standardised or consistent treatment of a number of aggravating and mitigating 
factors that inform the severity of a sentence for white-collar offenders. We 
hypothesized that because of a lack of jurisprudential certainty regarding these 
factors, that sentencing outcomes are unfair because those factors are applied 
inconsistently. If that hypothesis is correct, we suggested that it is indicative of the 
irrational state of sentencing law within the white-collar offender subset. Second, 
even if consistent treatment of certain aggravating and mitigating factors can be 
observed within the white-collar offender subset, any unjustifiably different 
treatment of the same sentencing factors between the white-collar offender subset 
and non-white-collar offender demonstrates inconsistency, and hence unfairness. We 
hypothesized that unjustifiable inconsistency in treatment of the same sentencing 
factors between subsets also indicates the irrational state of sentencing law.  
 
The second theme is considered in detail in the previous chapter; that is, I examined 
how and why certain sentencing factors have been, but should not be, treated 
differently when the offender falls within the identifiable class of white-collar 
offender.  To some extent, the argument regarding different treatment proceeded on 
the assumption that improper differentiation does occur, and relied on the analysis of 
case law across the five articles to justify that assumption.  The problem underlying 
this second theme is principally a problem of theory:  assuming that such different 
treatment occurs, is the different treatment justifiable?  This problem is not 
susceptible to empirics, but is a fundamentally normative claim reliant on the 
inherent differences between white-collar offenders and non-white-collar offenders.  
Hence, I did not research this second theme. 
 
The first theme however, could not be adequately considered except by reference to 
actual sentencing outcomes. The hypothesis emerging from the first theme is that 
there is no standardised or consistent treatment of certain aggravating and mitigating 
factors because of a state of jurisprudential uncertainty.  There are two premises 
within that hypothesis: that there is inconsistent treatment of sentencing factors and 
this inconsistency results from uncertainty.  The uncertainty relates to some key 
assumptions that appear to underpin sentencing practices in relation to white-collar 
offenders.  The first premise was capable of being examined empirically, by 
statistical analysis – a form of quantitative research.  The second premise required a 
more nuanced form of empirical research assessing judicial attitudes to the key 
assumptions – a form of qualitative research.  Thus, the research was best 
characterised as both quantitative and qualitative empirical research based on 
documentary analysis of the selected cases.  Having identified the nature of the 
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research, an appropriate methodological framework was developed in accordance 
with prevailing social science research theory.   
 
This chapter examines the methodology and limitations of the research designed to 
test the hypothesis that there is no standardised or consistent treatment of certain 
aggravating and mitigating factors because of jurisprudential uncertainty. 
 
B Research theory in the social sciences 
 
The research was designed to conform to the basic requirements of good scientific 
research: replicability, precision, falsifiability, and parsimony.361  Because the 
research was intended to test the theories that had emerged from the five articles, the 
research is in essence deductive – it “works from the ‘top down’, from a theory to 
hypotheses to data to add to or contradict the theory”.362 
 
The approach to developing and undertaking the research broadly conformed to the 
steps suggested by Simion:363 
 
1. Identify a research topic and problem 
2. Formulate the research question and hypothesis 
3. Choose a research methodology 
4. Define the significance of the research 
5. Find and use a theory 
6. Carry out a literature review 
 
In relation to these steps, step 3 (choice of research methodology) was of particular 
importance.  It was noted in the literature regarding the choice of research 
methodology that some apparent discord exists between the choice of quantitative 
and qualitative methods of deductive research.364 The literature indicated that:365 
 
The debate over the relative value of each research methodology has been ongoing 
since the start of the 20th century (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). The gap between 
the two methodologies may not be as great as we think. While quantitative research 
typically uses “numbers” to display data and qualitative methods use “words” to 
show data, the values could be expressed in other ways (Trochim, 2006). Trochim 
asserts that all qualitative data can be coded quantitatively. He believes “that 
anything that is qualitative can be assigned meaningful numerical values. These 
values can then be manipulated to help us achieve greater insight into the meaning of 
the data and to help us examine specific hypotheses.”    
 
                                                
361 Anol Bhaacherjee, Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices (PhD Thesis, 
University of South Florida Scholar Commons, 2012) 
<http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=oa_textbook>. 
362 John Creswell and Vicki Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. 
Thousand Oaks (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 2012). 
363 Kristina Simion, International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, ‘Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches to Rule of Law Research: A Practitioner’s Guide’ (2016).	
364 L Karen Soiferman, Compare and Contrast Inductive and Deductive Research Approaches, 
Discussion Paper (2010) <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED542066.pdf>. 
365 Ibid 19. 
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These observations were taken into account in determining the methodological 
processes I employed.  In particular, given that I intended to assess both the level of 
consistency in the application of the sentencing variables (a quantitative exercise) 
and the certainty with which a number of key assumptions were manifested in the 
sentencing reasons for the selected cases (a qualitative exercise), it appeared sensible 
to employ both methodologies.  As Trochim suggests, in order to perform good 
research, researchers need to make use of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods.366 The desirability of this approach was confirmed in the literature:367 
 
It appears that choosing one methodology over another severely limits the scope of 
any study. As Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) observe, one method alone cannot 
answer all the questions that will emerge in the course of researching a topic. In 
order to facilitate a more comprehensive study of a topic, researchers should have 
access to all available research tools. The dichotomy therefore should be 
reconsidered and researchers should become proficient in both methodologies. 
 
Despite the resolution of the appropriate research methodology, research theory in 
the area of legal research revealed its own set of epistemological problems. 
Chynoweth identifies a divergence between legal research (or scholarship) which 
most often employs an ‘interpretive, qualitative analysis required by doctrinal 
research’, and scientific research, in both the natural and social sciences, which 
‘relies on the collection of empirical data, either as a basis for its theories, or as a 
means of testing them.’368  As a result of this distinction, Chynoweth argues that 
‘…the process is one of analysis rather than data collection, no purpose would be 
served by including a methodology section within a doctrinal research publication 
and one is never likely to find one.’369  Somewhat uniquely then, this research does 
include a methodology section, because the research draws on the scientific tradition 
of quantitative assessment, as well as the legal scholarship tradition of qualitative 
doctrinal analysis.  The qualitative analysis was performed in accordance with 
techniques set out by Lisa Webley, Professor of Empirical Legal Studies at the 
University of Westminster, recognising that ‘[w]ell-compiled qualitative research 
enhances comprehensibility of social phenomenon.370 
 
C Application of the research theory 
 
As an anterior step to developing the research methodology, I distilled two 
preliminary questions that the research would embrace: 
 
(a) Who is the white-collar offender?  
 
(b) How is consistency or inconsistency in relation to the sentencing variables to 
be tested?  
 
                                                
366 William Trochim, Research Methods Knowledge Base (25 January 2010) Web Center for Social 
Research Methods <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net>. 
367 Soiferman, above n 364, 21. 
368 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley, 2008) 30. 
369 Ibid 37. 
370 Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’, in Peter Cane and Herbert 
Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook to Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010).	
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These preliminary questions informed my approach to the research methodology and 
conformed to the overall approach taken in the five articles.  
 
We discussed the inadequacies of the current definitions of ‘white-collar offender’ in 
the Rational Approach Article, and proposed a working definition that better 
captured the unique features of the white-collar offender. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I adopted that definition. The definitional difficulties associated with the term 
‘white-collar crime’ are discussed in Chapter VI. I further consider the definition, 
which informs the case selection, below. 
 
As set out in the Introduction to this chapter, I quantitatively assessed the treatment 
of eight selected sentencing variables that I argue are unique to white-collar 
offenders. Some of these sentencing variables are discussed in the Rational 
Approach Article.  During the process of analysis, I also performed in a qualitative 
assessment – by attempting to identify the reasons for the particular treatment of the 
sentencing variables in each case.  In this way, the data served to inform the question 
of (in)consistency, but also illuminate some of the conceptual reasoning behind the 
particular treatment of the variables in each case.  As far as I can discover, it is the 
first of its kind in Australia on the subject of white-collar crime. 
 
D Who is the White-collar offender? 
 
As discussed at length in Chapter VI, several definitions of white-collar crime have 
been proposed over the years. However, each of these definitions has proven 
inadequate on the basis that they fail to acknowledge the broad scope of the term and 
often are too dependent on occupational transgressions. The approach I have taken 
surmounts that difficulty by adopting the combined or blended definition set out in 
Chapter VI. 
 
So, in the research, a white-collar offender is a person who: 
 
• commits a nonviolent criminal act or omission; 
• without legal justification; 
• in the course of an occupation; 
• whilst in a position of significant power, trust or influence;  
• for the pursuit of financial gain to the individual to the loss of 
another/others.   
 
However, in order to search for cases that meet the overarching definition of white-
collar crime, it was necessary to once again unpack the constituent parts of the 
definition in order to search the case law for white-collar criminals amongst the 
general offender population who commit general crimes.  Specifically, the research 
approached the identification of relevant cases by looking at offence type and 
offender characteristics.  
 
1 Offence type 
 
These are offences which involve the taking of money or property (such as shares) or 
the avoidance of a legal obligation (such as tax liability) without legal justification by 
an individual who is in a position of substantial influence in relation to the relevant 
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transaction. These offences are classically considered to be white-collar offences 
because the actus reus of these offences occur in a white-collar setting. 
 
Therefore, white-collar offences can potentially include:  
 
• theft of company assets by company directors and employees (such as 
bankers); 
• theft of client money by lawyers and accountants;  
• insider trading and other market manipulation by people employed in 
industries associated with the financial markets;  
• complex tax fraud;  
• corruption; and 
• money laundering. 
 
The statutory prohibitions on this type of conduct are found in a number of contexts: 
Criminal Code (Cth), Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), Australian Securities and Investments 
Act 2001 (Cth) etc. 
 
2 Offender characteristics 
 
A white-collar crime occurs even though a crime is charged as a generic offence, but 
is committed by a white-collar offender or occurs in a specifically white-collar 
context.  In this instance, the charge itself is not indicative of the nature of the 
offending, but rather the characteristics of the offender.  For example, the offence of 
obtaining property by deception (Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 81) may be committed in 
various contexts, including in migration371 and burglary372 matters. However, where 
the offender commits such a crime during the course of their employment or by 
virtue of their employment, and relies on a high degree of deception and breach of 
trust, it falls within the overarching definition of white-collar crime.373 Other 
examples of general offences that may be committed by a white-collar offender or in 
a white-collar context include: 
 
• theft; 
• obtaining property belonging to a Commonwealth entity by deception; 
• obtaining financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity by deception; 
• conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth;  
• false accounting; and, 
• obtaining financial advantage by deception. 
 
E How is (in)consistency in relation to the sentencing variables to be tested? 
 
Along with certainty of outcomes in sentencing, consistency across outcomes has 
been specifically identified by Australian courts as an important goal.374 The pursuit 
of consistency is justified by the dangers of inconsistency. Such dangers include the 
violation of the rule of law or the principle of legality, the devaluation of the right to 
                                                
371 Frugtniet v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2015] AATA 554. 
372 Gladigau v The Queen [2015] VSCA 204. 
373 R v Linacre [2014] VSC 615. 
374 R v Griffıths (1977) 137 CLR 293, 327. 
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equality amongst offenders, the loss of public confidence in the justice system and 
‘costly resource implications.’375 However, as discussed in Chapter V, current 
sentencing orthodoxy involves Australian sentencing courts employing an instinctive 
synthesis approach – a doctrine described as highly complex376 and one that cannot 
yield a ‘single correct sentence.’377 Nevertheless, consistency in sentencing is not 
novel and is observed, with (almost) mathematical accuracy, in the consistently 
mitigatory treatment of guilty pleas and assistance to authorities, which carry 
discounts of up to 25 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.378 This type of 
consistency is justified on account of its administrative benefits – reducing the 
expense to the criminal justice system, reducing court delays, avoiding 
inconvenience to witnesses and preventing the misallocation of monetary 
resources.379 
 
Consistency in sentencing conceptually connotes that ‘similar offenders who commit 
similar offences in similar circumstances would be expected to receive similar 
sentencing outcomes.’380 Therefore, the imposition of varied sentences can be rightly 
justified by factual dissimilarity. However, distinguishing facts do not necessarily 
justify inconsistent treatment of relevant sentencing variables. This is discussed 
further in Chapter III. 
 
Finally, it is arguable that truly consistent treatment of the variables requires the 
same treatment across cases 100% of the time. However, given the nature of the 
sentencing discretion, I allowed a margin of tolerance to account for human error and 
exceptional factual circumstances.  Thus, consistent means 90% of the time.  Where 
treatment is the same between 80-89% of the time, I consider this means that it 
remained fairly consistent. Treatment that is the same less than 80% of the time I 
consider to be inconsistent. These descriptors are used in the analysis in Chapter 
VIII. 
 
F Two types of cases: Type A and Type B 
 
It follows from the approach to the definition of white-collar crime set out above – 
that there are both archetypal white-collar offences as well as general crimes 
committed by white-collar offenders – that the research was divided into two 
categories: Type A and Type B.  
 
Cases sorted by reference to offence type are identified as Type A cases.  
 
Cases sorted by reference to offender characteristics are identified as Type B cases. 
 
                                                
375 Sarah Krasnostein and Arie Freiberg, ‘Pursuing Consistency in an Individualistic Sentencing 
Framework: If You Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got There?’  
(2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 265, 265 (‘Individualistic Sentencing Framework’). 
376 Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 612 [77]. 
377 Freeman v The Queen [2011] VSCA 214 [6]. 
378 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘Totality’, above n 101. 
379 Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339, 73-4. 
380 Krasnostein and Freiberg, ‘Individualistic Sentencing Framework’, above n 375, 265 citing UK 
Sentencing Council, Analytical Note: The Resource Effects of Increased Consistency in Sentencing 
3.1 (2011). 
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Cases that fit both the Type A and B categories were recorded under Type A cases.381 
 
G Description of relevant sentencing variables 
 
In general, a sentencing court will consider factors such as age, mental health, 
general health, assistance to authorities, guilty pleas, addiction, remorse, delay in 
prosecution and potential to reoffend. These sentencing variables are universal to all 
criminal offenders and are not unique to white-collar offenders. 
 
The unique factors which distinguish white-collar offenders from other offenders (set 
out in Chapter VI) form the basis for the eight sentencing variables I assessed.   
 
They are:  
 
(i) good character; 
(ii) public opprobrium;  
(iii) reduction of employment or career prospects;  
(iv) large amount of money involved; 
(v) high level of planning and sophistication; 
(vi) high level of harm to victims; 
(vii) restitution; 
(viii) ancillary orders. 
 
The meaning of these variables is explained in Table 3 below.  
 
 Variable Explanation 
1 Good 
character 
This variable is concerned with the ‘character’ of the offender. 
Character is defined in s 6 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) to 
include: 
 
the number, seriousness, date, relevance and nature of any previous 
findings of guilty or convictions of the offender; the general 
reputation of the offender; and any significant contributions made by 
the offender to the community. 
 
In assessing character, the sentencing court may consider support 
by family, friends and professional colleagues (which may be 
evidenced through testimonials). 
2 Public 
opprobrium 
This variable deals with shame or embarrassment in a professional 
or social context which may arise as a result of the offending. The 
law is not settled on whether this variable should carry any weight 
in the sentencing calculus.382 
3 Reduction of 
employment 
or career 
prospects 
This variable is particularly important to white-collar offenders as 
often they are able to commit such offences because of their 
influential careers. An example is automatic disqualification of 
offenders as company directors in accordance with s 206B of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
                                                
381 Cases that satisfied the criteria for both Type A and Type B were included under Type A as a 
matter of expedience.  No principled reason exists for including these cases in either Type A or Type 
B in particular.  
382 See Ryan v The Queen [2001] HCA 21. Cf R v Bunning [2007] VSCA 205. 
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4 Large amount 
of money 
involved 
This is particularly important in white-collar offences as they are 
largely motivated by financial gain. Where the amount of money is 
high and identifiable, it is usually treated as aggravating. I do not 
define ‘high’ using monetary parameters but rather look to the 
remarks of the sentencing judge or where it is very clear that this is 
so. 
5 High level of 
planning or 
sophistication 
Generally this attracts a higher penalty.383 This is because offenders 
who commit well-planned crimes are treated as rational and 
calculating agents who deliberately engage in criminal behaviour 
for significant illicit benefits.384 This does not include knowledge of 
wrongdoing, given that many of these offences are committed by 
educated people and in specific contravention to policies which they 
were aware of (such as company share trading policies). 
6 High level of 
harm to 
victim 
This includes hardship to third parties. These are generally 
evidenced by victim impact statements.385 This is highly dependent 
on the facts of the case in question. In respect to property offences, 
the harm considered by the court may be in two forms – financial 
loss to the victim and/or damage to institutional integrity and 
investor confidence.386 This does not include hardship to family 
members. 
7 Restitution This is the voluntary return of property or money illegally taken 
from the victim. Where what was taken cannot be returned, the 
return of the value of the property or sale proceeds sufficed. Central 
to this variable is the voluntariness and degree of sacrifice made by 
the offender.387 Contentiously it has been argued that treating this 
particular variable as mitigating results in offenders having the 
option to buy their way out of deserved sentences.388 It may impact 
upon moral culpability or  remorse. 
8 Ancillary 
orders 
These are mandatory orders to restitute or disgorge funds which 
may be made in addition to (or in substitution for) the sentence 
imposed by the court. By way of example, in Victoria389 ancillary 
orders include compensation orders, forfeiture and confiscation 
orders,390 restitution orders,391 unexplained wealth orders,392 literary 
proceeds orders393 and reparation orders.394No impact on moral 
culpability or remorse applies. 
 
Note: Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s 320 which provides that 
a pecuniary penalty order is not to be taken into account by the 
sentencing judge except in so far as it indicates an intention to 
facilitate the course of justice (which is accepted to have a 
mitigating effect). 
                                                
383 R v Yildiz (2006); DPP v Bulfin. 
384 See Ritchie, above n 236.  
385 See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 95A–H.   
386 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘Capacity of Criminal Sanctions’ above n 8, 337. 
387 Subramanian v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 159. 
388 Williams v Tasmania [2014] TASCCA 2. 
389 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 5(2A), 5(2B). 
390 Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic). 
391 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 84. 
392 Justice Legislation Amendment (Confiscation and Other Matters) Act 2014 (Vic). 
393 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) ss 151-179. 
394 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 21B. 
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H Assessing the aggravating or mitigating effect of variables for consistency 
 
In order to achieve consistency, each variable should be treated in the same way 
regardless of the context of offending.  For example: previous good character, 
restitution, and the imposition of ancillary orders should always be treated as 
mitigating factors because they represent a meaningful burden resulting from 
punishment. Likewise, public opprobrium and reduced employment or career 
prospects should always be regarded mitigating, because they are a form of extra-
curial punishment.  By contrast, where there is a large amount of money involved, a 
high level of planning and sophistication, or a high level of harm to the victim(s), 
there should be an aggravating effect on the overall sentence. Where these variables 
are present but observed at low levels, they should either be mitigating, or perhaps 
treated as being neutral.  In the research, I only included the variables of money, 
planning and harm if the amounts or levels were significant, such that the expected 
result would be an aggravating effect on the overall sentence only in those 
circumstances. The expected mitigating or aggravating effect of each specific 
variable to indicate consistency is set out in in Table 4 below. 
 
Variable Expected Result if Consistent  
Good character Should mitigate 90% of the time 
Public opprobrium Should mitigate 90% of the time 
Reduction of employment/career prospects Should mitigate 90% of the time 
Large amount of money involved Should aggravate 90% of the time 
High level of planning and sophistication Should aggravate 90% of the time 
High level of harm to victim Should aggravate 90% of the time 
Restitution  Should mitigate 90% of the time 
Ancillary orders  Should mitigate 90% of the time 
 
F Process 
 
I now explain the process by which the relevant sentencing decisions were identified 
from the existing case law for analysis. In essence, the process was: 
 
Identification of all possible cases. I identified a list of offences or breaches 
(prohibited by a specific statutory provision) I considered qualified as either 
archetypally white-collar (Type A) or possibly committed by white-collar offenders 
(Type B) from six Victorian or Federal Acts. This was a subjective process. The list 
of offences is set out in Table 5 below: 
 
Act Provision 
  TYPE A OFFENCES  
Corporations 
Act 2001 
(Cth) 
Director using position dishonestly to gain advantage (s 184) 
Privy to fraudulent altering of books of the company (s 590) 
Inducement to be appointed liquidator etc. of company (s 595) 
Frauds by officers (s 596) 
Anti-avoidance (s 601VCC) 
Prohibition on certain acquisitions of relevant interests in voting shares (s 
606) 
Bidder not to dispose of securities during the bid period (s 654A 
Offence to contravene panel order (s 657F) 
Offence of giving a disclosure document or statement knowing it to be 
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defective (s 952D, F) 
Obligation to keep financial records (s 988A) 
Prohibition on hawking of certain financial products (s 992A) 
Prohibition on hawking of managed investment products (s 992AA 
Failing to pay client money into an account as required (s 993B, C, D) 
Prohibition on advertising personal offers covered by s 1012E (s 1018B) 
Market manipulation (s 1041A) 
False trading (s 1041B) 
Market rigging (s 1041C) 
Dissemination of information about illegal transactions (s 1041D) 
Disseminate false information likely to induce persons to dispose of 
financial products (s 1041E) 
Inducing persons to deal in financial products (s 1041F) 
Dishonest conduct (s 1041G) 
Insider trading (s 1043A) 
Falsification of records (s 1101F) 
Falsification of books (s 1307) 
False or misleading statements (s 1308); and 
False information (s 1309) 
Competition 
and Consumer 
Act 2010 
(Cth) 
Making a contract containing a cartel provision (s 44ZZRF) 
 
Giving effect to a cartel provision (s 44ZZRH) 
 
Criminal 
Code 1995 
(Cth): 
Abuse of public office (s 142.2) 
Money laundering (s 400.3(1)) 
Bribery of foreign public officials (s 70.2) 
Bribery a commonwealth public official (s 141.1) 
Corrupting benefits given to, or received by a Commonwealth public 
official (s 142.1) 
Abuse of public office (s 142.2) 
Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic) 
False statements made by company directors (s 85) 
Fraudulently inducing persons to invest money (s 191) 
Making false statements concerning contamination of goods with intent to 
cause, or being reckless as to whether It would cause economic loss (s 251)  
Legal 
Practice Act 
1996 (Cth) & 
Legal 
Profession Act 
2004 (Vic) 
Trust account deficiency (s 188 and s 3.3.21 respectively) 
 
 TYPE B OFFENCES  
Criminal 
Code 1995 
(Cth) 
theft (s 131.1) 
dishonest taking or retention of property (s 132.8) 
obtaining property belonging to a Commonwealth entity by deception (s 
134.1) 
obtaining financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity by deception (s 
134.2) 
general dishonesty (s 135.1) 
obtaining financial advantage (s 135.2) 
conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth (s 135.4) 
false or misleading information (s 137.1) or documents (s 137.2) 
Crimes Act theft (s 74) 
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1958 (Vic) obtaining property by deception (s 81) 
theft (s 74) 
obtaining financial advantage by deception (s 82) 
false accounting (s 83) 
false accounting (s 83A) 
 
Refinement of cases.  Each statutory provision was then typed into the search box of 
a legal database: Westlaw (http://westlawinternational.com). The search included the 
following search parameters:  
 
• offender must be an individual, not a corporation; 
• must be in one of the nine Australian jurisdictions; 
• must be decided in the previous 10 years (2005-2015); 
• can be either a reported or unreported decision; 
• must be either a sentencing decision, or where applicable, an appeal 
decision;  
• in relation to Type B cases an individual must fit within the 
definition of white-collar offender set out above. 
 
The selection of these parameters was subjective, but I provide an explanation for 
choosing these below. 
 
Criteria  Explanation 
Offender must not be 
a corporation 
Cases (either Type A or Type B) involving offending 
corporations were excluded from the research. Although 
corporations are capable of committing white-collar crimes, they 
are merely legal entities as opposed to people. Therefore, 
sentencing considerations such as good character and reduction 
of employment prospects will be irrelevant. In addition, 
corporations cannot be sentenced in the same way as people, that 
is, they cannot not be subjected to punishment in the form of 
imprisonment. Accordingly, corporations were not considered in 
this research. 
Offender must be 
recorded individually 
(even if co-offender) 
Multiple defendants were analysed separately, even if sentenced 
by the same judge, because this research intended to test the  
sentencing of individuals. Accordingly, the sentencing of each 
individual is illustrated in a separate table. 
Must be in one of the 
nine Australian 
jurisdictions. 
Commonwealth decisions are included alongside State and 
Territory decisions because there are few State and Territory 
white-collar offences in Australia. In addition, the similarities 
between State and Commonwealth offences are significant. 
Must be decided in 
the last 10 years 
(2005-2015) 
This time restriction was chosen because the majority of the 
state and territory specific sentencing legislation came into effect 
in the late 1990s with the latest coming into effect in 2005 
(ACT). Excluding cases before 2005 allows for patterns in the 
approach taken by sentencing courts to be more easily identified. 
In addition, sentencing trends change over time. The last 10 
years can show a meaningful trend for the purposes of this 
research whereas earlier cases are arguably from a different 
social/sentencing era and would therefore be unlikely to produce 
meaningful results. 
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Can be either a 
reported or 
unreported decision 
Both types of decision were included because there was no 
meaningful distinction between the two types of decision for the 
purposes of the research. 
Must be either a 
sentencing decision, 
and where 
applicable, an appeal 
decision.  
 
Decisions and appeals on procedural matters and questions of 
law were not included. Whether or not an appeal decision was 
considered in this research was dependent on the subject of the 
appeal. If the appeal was allowed on account of a finding of 
error with respect to the treatment of one or more sentencing 
variable, it was included in the research. Such appeals 
effectively amend the decision at first instance. By considering 
an appeal decision on this basis, the treatment of each of the 
eight variables is analysed only once, hence avoiding any 
overlap.  Where the appeal was dismissed, or was allowed on 
alternative grounds, it was excluded from the research on the 
basis of irrelevance. 
 
Decisions which only involved a pecuniary penalty and no 
sentence were excluded. 
In relation to Type B 
cases an individual 
offender must satisfy 
the definition of 
white collar offender 
The offender type criteria in the definition of white-collar crime 
were used to identify Type B cases, specifically: 
- the offender’s crime must involve the taking of money or 
property or the avoidance of a legal obligation; and 
- the offender must be a person in a position of substantial 
influence. 
 
Table 6: This table lists the research criteria and explains the reasons for its inclusion in this research.  
 
Collection and analysis of cases. The cases that were remaining after this search, 
were then printed, tabularised and analysed in accordance with an analysis rubric. 
There were 36 Type A cases and 28 Type B cases making 64 cases overall.  The 
analysis rubric is set out below. 
 
Step  Reason 
Short form 
identification of case 
for easy reference  
All the cases have been labelled by number and type, so that 
type A cases are labelled 1A, 2A, 3A and type B cases are 
labelled 1B, 2B, 3B.  
Recording of basic 
case details 
Each of the cases was read and the following information was 
tabulated: 
• case name;  
• sentence; 
• whether the sentence was appealed; 
• major offences; 
• offender status; 
• offence description; and 
• treatment of the sentencing variables including relevant 
judicial remarks. 
 
In relation to type B cases the following information was 
additionally tabulated: 
• whether the crime involved the taking of money, 
property or avoiding a legal obligation; and 
• whether the offender was in a position of substantial 
influence. 
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Selection of type of 
treatment: 
aggravating, 
mitigating or neutral 
A sentencing variable is said to be mitigating if the court makes 
statements such as ‘it is mitigating’ or other statements to that 
effect. Treatment will be mitigating if it carries weight in the 
sentencing calculus and ultimately reduces the overall sentence. 
 
A sentencing variable is said to be aggravating if the court 
makes statements such as ‘it is negative’ or ‘I find it detrimental’ 
or other statements to that effect. Treatment will be aggravating 
if it carries weight in the sentencing calculus and ultimately 
increases the overall sentence. 
 
A sentencing variable is said to be neutral in one of three 
situations: 
 
1. It was treated neither positively nor negatively; 
 
2. Its treatment was not discernible and thus could not 
accurately be said to have carried any significant weight 
in the sentencing calculus; 
 
3. The absence of it has been discussed by the sentencing 
court (for example, where a court considers the lack of 
restitution by the offender). 
 
Where a sentencing variable was not raised by counsel or the 
sentencing judge, it is simply listed as ‘not raised.’  
 
Importantly, criteria did not assess the weight such 
considerations hold in the sentencing calculus as this could not 
be accurately determined. 
 
Table 7: This table lists the research criteria and explains the reasons for its inclusion in this research.  
 
Recording of results. After each case was analysed, the results for each variable was 
then translated into a pie chart, with a brief description of discussion of the result and 
any anomalies.  The results are set out below. 
 
 
G Not all variables identifiable in every case 
 
It must be noted that some of the variables were not raised, or at least not referred to, 
in every sentencing decision.  Therefore, not every case yielded sufficient data to 
permit analysis of the treatment of all variables.  It may be that this absence itself 
illuminates the view taken by the sentencing court as to the importance or relevance 
of the variable.  However, because it is not possible to compare the matters that were 
put by counsel at the plea (because transcripts are unavailable) with those that 
appeared in the sentencing decision (reflected in the case report), it is not possible to 
determine with certainty whether the variable was not referred to in the sentencing 
decision or not raised in the sentencing hearing. For economy, I use the term ‘not 
raised’ to denote both these concepts in the results.  I set out the percentages when 
this occurred across the cases below. 
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Graph 1: The above bar graph compares the percentage of cases in which each variable was or was not raised. 
 
 
H Limitations 
 
Subjective analysis. The major limitation with this research was the subjectivity of 
the analysis required to discern the treatment of the specific variables.  Even though 
this was a quantitative exercise, there was, as the research literature suggested, an 
inevitable element of qualitative subjectivity to the assessment required to perform 
the task of categorisation into aggravating, mitigating or neutral.   
 
Often judges do not expressly state whether they have taken a particular sentencing 
variable to have a mitigating or aggravating effect in the sentencing calculus. Rather, 
a common phrase in the majority of the judgments is ‘I take this into account.’ On its 
own, this statement is highly ambiguous. However, when read in context, the 
treatment often became clearer.  For example, the following statement, although not 
afforded significant weight, still has a mitigating flavour:  
 
[p]ublic humiliation which no doubt will reach its peak in tomorrow morning's press. 
Whilst this is a factor I am entitled to take into account as a punishment already 
suffered, I do not consider it ought be accorded significant weight.395 
 
On the other hand, the following statement such would be considered neutral because 
it is clear that it has not been treated in a mitigating or aggravating fashion:  
 
Whilst I take into account in a general sense the media attention in relation to the 
Hanlong Mining offences (including photographs) and that the Offender has greatly 
suffered from the public disgrace, shame and humiliation as a result, adverse 
publicity may only be considered to amount to extra-curial punishment in what may 
                                                
395 Director of Public Prosecutions v John Francis O’Reilly [2010] VSC 138. 
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be classed as exceptional or extreme cases. I have concluded that the evidence does 
not establish that this case rises to that level.396  
 
The subjectivity of the analysis is especially demonstrated in relation to the treatment 
of ancillary orders, which are often ordered without a specific sentencing remark 
indicating treatment. Although it could be argued that any hardship imposed on an 
offender (other than those excluded by operation of the State or Federal sentencing 
Acts) would be treated in a mitigating manner, in the absence of a specific remark, 
the imposition of an ancillary order has been treated as neutral in this research, unless 
specifically stated otherwise.  
 
Search limitations. A further limitation resulted from the search tools and the fact 
that several cases located were appeal cases. The first instance decisions could not be 
located without added expense and therefore were not considered in this research. I 
do not consider that this alters the significance of the research because the manner of 
treatment of the relevant variables was always indicated in the appeal decision, 
which was all that was required for the purposes of the quantitative aspect of the 
research.  
 
Multiple offenders.  Finally, in some instances, where the sentencing judge was 
required to sentence multiple offenders for the same offending, these sentences have 
been analysed as separate instances of sentencing.397  While it is correct to assume 
that the sentencer would treat the same variables consistently (because it is the same 
person sentencing), this potential repetition or results bias only occurred in 7 of 64 
cases (or 10.9%) of the case samples.  The effect of such a bias may be to improperly 
increase the consistency or inconsistency of treatment result, however, that in turn 
depends on any similarities or differences which exist in relation to the variables as 
between co-offenders.  This minor limitation must be taken into account when 
considering the results for the individual variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
396 R v Bo Shi Zhu [2013] NSWSC 127 [218]. 
397 See Table 6, namely the criteria ‘Offender must be recorded individually (even if co-offender)’. 
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CHAPTER VIII  
 
RESEARCH: RESULTS 
 
“Research is formalized curiosity.  It is poking and prying with a purpose.” 
 
Zora Neale Hurston, African-American novelist and anthropologist, 1891 - 1960 
 
 
A Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I set out the results of the empirical research.  As discussed above, the 
research focussed on eight sentencing variables, and the quantitative results of the 
analysis were tabulated under the heading of each variable.  Within each table, I 
recorded some notes. These notes record judicial remarks about – and hence provide 
qualitative explanation for – the treatment of each variable. This is included in the 
results specifically for use in the discussion set out in the next chapter.  Within each 
table is a statistical summary of the major findings. 
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B Results 
 
1 Good character 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Treatment of good character in 64 recent white-collar cases 
 
• Good character was raised in 62 out of 64 cases.  
• In 50 out of 64 cases it was treated as mitigating. 
• In 12 out of 64 cases it was treated as neutral. 
 
The reasons for the neutral treatment of good character included: 
• That it was the offender’s good character which enabled them to 
engage in criminal conduct (See 10A & 11A, 4B, 18B, 19B and 
20B). 
• That previous civil proceedings (although not aggravating because 
not relevant to sentencing) were part of the offender’s character and 
antecedents (See 20A). 
• That previous good character meant the offender ought to have 
known that the conduct was entirely wrong (see 33A). 
• That prior unrelated offences demonstrated that the offender was a 
dishonest person (See 6B). 
• That good character should be given little weight in the context of 
breach of trust by a solicitor (See 17B). 
• Acknowledged but no discernible effect (See 22A and 13B). 
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2 Public Opprobrium  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2: Treatment of public opprobrium in 64 recent white-collar cases 
 
• Public opprobrium was raised in 30 out of 64 cases.  
• In 21 out of 30 cases it was treated as mitigating. 
• In 9 out of 30 cases it was treated as neutral. 
 
The reasons for the neutral treatment of public opprobrium included: 
• That it did not amount to an exceptional or extreme case and 
therefore did not constitute extra-curial punishment (See 8A, 9A, 
16A, and 21A). 
• That it was essentially offset by the judge sentencing the offender as a 
thief (See 5B). 
• Acknowledged but no discernible effect (See 6A, 1B, 13B, and 15B). 
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3 Reduction of Employment or Career Prospects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chart 3: Analysis of reduction in employment/career prospects in 64 recent white-collar 
cases 
 
• Reduction of employment or career prospects was raised in 48 out of 
64 cases.  
• In 33 out of 48 cases it was treated as mitigating. 
• In 15 out of 48 cases it was treated as neutral. 
 
The reasons for the neutral treatment of public opprobrium included: 
• That it did not amount to an exceptional or extreme case and 
therefore did not constitute extra-curial punishment (See 16A and 
21A) 
• Acknowledged but no discernible effect (See 6A, 19A, 20A, 22A, 
25A, 30A, 31A and 35A) 
• That it was essentially offset by the judge sentencing the offender as a 
thief (See 5B) 
• Raised but the offender ultimately had quite good job prospects (See 
9B) 
• That the offender did not intend to practice as a lawyer after 
offending (See 21B) 
• Acknowledged but regarded as of very little importance to sentencing 
(See 28B). 
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4 Large Amount of Money Involved  
 
Chart 4: Analysis of involvement of large amounts of money in 64 recent white-collar cases 
 
• The involvement of a large amount of money was raised in 56 out of 
64 cases.  
• In 33 out of 56 cases it was treated as aggravating. 
• In 23 out of 56 cases it was treated as neutral. 
 
In the following cases the amount of money involved was specifically 
identified as being substantial, large or significant and was therefore treated 
as aggravating by the sentencing court: 
● See 1A, 5A, 6A, 7A, 11A, 18A, 20A, 28A, and 33A. 
● See 4B, 5B, 6B, 8B, 9B, 10B, 11B, 12B, 13B, 14B, 15B, 16B, 18B, 
19B, 20B, 21B, 22B, 23B, 24B, 25B, 26B, 27B, and 28B. 
 
The reasons for which the amount of money involved was treated as neutral 
included: 
• That the profit derived was a modest sum but could not be interpreted 
as mitigating (See 2A, 19A, and 22A) 
• That there was no personal financial gain (See 21A, 30A, and 32A) 
• That it was acknowledged as being less in comparison to that of the 
co-offender but no clear overall effect (See 10A and 31A) 
• Acknowledged but no discernible effect. See the following cases: 
• 4A (involved $1.9m profit); 
• 9A (involved approximately $800,000); 
• 12A (involved $30,000); 
• 13A (involved approximately $180,000); 
• 14A (involved over $95,000); 
• 15A; 
• 17A (involved $1.4m); 
• 35A (involved over $1m); 
• 36A (involved over $1m); 
• 2B (involved over $2m); 
• 3B (involved over $2m); and 
• 7B. 
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• That the offender did not profit from the offending and therefore no 
pecuniary penalty was imposed (See 16A) 
• That the offender did not receive any personal financial gain and 
therefore was released on recognisance (See 24A) 
• That the offender did not profit from the offending (See 34A) 
 
4 out of 64 of the cases analysed were labelled as not raised because the 
amount of money involved was specifically identified by the court as being 
low: 
• 3A (the amount was a modest sum and fell into the bottom range of 
offences of that sort);  
• 23A (it was identified by the judge as being one of the least serious 
cases (although the amount of involved was over $180,000));  
• 1B (considerably less in comparison to that of the co-offender); and 
• 17B (that the amount ($327,700) falls short in comparison to other 
cases involving solicitors). 
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5 High Level of Planning/Sophistication  
 
Chart 5: Analysis of involvement of high levels of planning/sophistication in 64 recent 
white-collar cases 
 
• The involvement of a high level of planning or sophistication was raised 
in 42 out of 64 cases.  
• In 39 out of 42 cases it was treated as aggravating. 
• In 3 out of 42 cases it was treated as neutral. 
 
The reasons for which a high level of planning and sophistication was treated as 
being aggravating included: 
• That the planning and/or sophistication was undoubtedly of a high level 
(See 5A, 7A, 11A, 14A, 15A, 24A, 27A, 30A, 33A, 34A, 1B, 2B, 3B, 
5B, 9B, 10B, 11B, 12B, 13B, 17B, 18B, 19B, 20B, 22B, 26B, 27B, and 
28B). 
• That it was protracted and prolonged (See 1A, 35A, 6B, and 15B). 
• That it was systematic (See 4A and 28A). 
• That it involving the deliberate procurement of others to offend (See 
8A). 
• That it was deliberate although the offender knew well that he should not 
(See 20A). 
• That it was difficult to detect (despite low level sophistication) (See 
17A). 
• That it was of a high level on some counts and more spontaneous on 
other counts (See 21B). 
• That the lack of sophistication of meticulous bookkeeping was offset by 
the deceit and period of offending (See 23B). 
 
The reasons for which a high level of planning and sophistication was treated as 
being neutral included: 
• Acknowledged as being deliberate but was out of character (See 3A and 
32A). 
• No discernible effect (See 16A). 
 
In one case it was not raised because the level of planning and sophistication 
was low: 
• That because of a lack of subterfuge and sophistication it was easier to 
detect but the overall effect could not be said to be mitigating (See 19A). 
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6 High Level of Harm to Victim  
 
Chart 6: Analysis of the involvement of high level of harm to victim in 64 recent white-
collar cases  
 
• The involvement of a high level of harm to the victim(s) was raised in 
49 out of 64 cases.  
• In 36 out of 49 cases it was treated as aggravating. 
• In 13 out of 49 cases it was treated as neutral. 
 
The reasons for which a high level of harm to the victim was treated as being 
aggravating in included: 
• That the level of harm was clearly high (See 10A, 11A, 14A, 15A, 
18A, 20A, 24A, 25A, 26A, 28A, 4B, 5B, 6B, 8B, 11B, 12B, 13B, 
15B, 16B, 17B, 22B, 26B, 27B, and 28B). 
• That the offending was not victimless and/or the to the public and/or 
market was high (especially where the victims were unidentifiable) 
(See 2A, 4A, 7A, 8A, 33A, 34A, 2B, and 3B). 
• That there were multiple victim companies (See 6A). 
• That the level of harm was increased because it involved a breach of 
trust (See 12A). 
• That there was a high cost to the community and public at large (See 
9B). 
• That although the victims were unidentifiable, the offending is likely 
to have affected many (See 10B). 
• That there were flow-on effects to the community related to the 
people who had obtained loans from the offender being marijuana 
cultivators (See 14B). 
 
The reasons for which a high level of harm to the victim was treated as being 
neutral included: 
• Acknowledged the victim was the community at large but no clear 
overall effect (See 5A). 
• Raised by counsel but not discernible effect by judge (See 16A, 17A, 
and 19A). 
• Unidentifiable victims and/or effect (See 21A). 
• Acknowledged but no discernible effect (See 35A, 36A, 21B, 23B, 
24B, and 25B). 
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7 Restitution  
 
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
  
In one case the court explicitly stated that the level of harm to the victim was 
low. This was labelled as not raised, since the variable we are looking at is 
specifically high level of harm to the victim (See 13A).   
 
Overall the recognition of the public being a victim (in addition to an 
individual in some cases) was observed in the following cases: 2A, 4A, 5A, 
7A, 8A, 11A, 14A, 15A, 17A, 19A, 33A, 34A, 2B, 3B, 9B, 10B, 16B, 24B, 
25B. 
 
 
 
Chart 7: Analysis of whether restitution was raised in 64 recent white-collar cases  
 
• Restitution was raised in 22 out of 64 cases.  
• In 14 out of 22 cases it was treated as mitigating. 
• In 8 out of 22 cases it was treated as neutral. 
 
The reasons for which a restitution was treated as being neutral included: 
• That despite the offender’s willingness to make reparation, it would 
be too difficult to draft a reparation order because the victims were 
unidentifiable (See 3A). 
• That there was no evidence to show that reparation had been made 
in relation to these offences (acknowledged that reparation made in 
relation to civil proceedings with ASIC) (See 32A). 
• That some measure of restitution made to victims but not regarded 
as a mitigating factor (See 17B). 
• Acknowledged but no discernible effect (See 33A, 1B, 5B, 9B and 
21B) 
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8 Ancillary Orders   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 8: Analysis of whether ancillary orders were raised in 64 recent white-collar cases  
 
• Ancillary orders were raised in 18 out of 64 cases.  
• In 11 out of 18 cases it was treated as mitigating. 
• In 7 out of 18 cases it was treated as neutral. 
 
The reasons for the mitigating treatment in type B cases included: 
• That it evidenced remorse and/or contrition (See 1A, 5A, 6A, 7A, 8A, 
13A, 31A and 1B); 
• Offender forfeited not only profit but also initial stake (See 2A); 
• Forfeiting of personal assets (11A). 
 
The reasons for the neutral treatment in type B cases included: 
• That a lower compensation order was imposed so as not to hamper 
rehabilitation by a harsh order, however the overall effect could not be 
said to be mitigating (See 27B); 
• Acknowledged but no discernible effect (See 3A, 9A, 19A, 34A, 5B, 
10B). 
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C Conclusion 
 
The above research seeks to answer the overarching question: are white-collar 
offenders sentenced consistently or consistently in relation to eight sentencing 
variables? The research further enables consideration of some of the qualitative 
assertions made in the five articles, and facilitates a closer consideration of the 
veracity of those assertions, at least to the extent of the results revealed by the 64 
analysed cases. Despite the relatively small number of cases (considering the time 
parameter spanned ten years), the sample size is sufficient to obtain a relatively 
objective view of sentencing trends and to facilitate discussion of the current 
approach to sentencing white-collar offenders across the eight sentencing variables.  
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CHAPTER IX  
 
RESEARCH: DISCUSSION 
 
‘There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact.’ 
 
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes (1891) 
	
	
A Introduction 
 
In this chapter I discuss the results of the empirical research. The primary purpose of 
the research was to examine one aspect relating to rationality: the question of 
consistency or inconsistency of the judicial treatment of the variables. This was the 
quantitative aspect of the research. However, it was also possible to engage in some 
qualitative assessment given that each of the 64 cases was read and considered in 
depth. Specifically, I examined whether white-collar offending does in fact possess a 
unique set of features and whether the assertions which underpinned the arguments 
advanced in the articles were valid.  
 
B Preliminary Observations 
 
Within the definition of white-collar crime set out in Chapter VI (and applied in the 
research methodology), I identified in total 64 cases over the 10-year sample period. 
Accordingly, the results indicate that white-collar crime is, at present, either not 
prevalent, not detected or not prosecuted in Australia as often as expected. This is in 
comparison to the United States, which saw over 400 white-collar crime prosecutions 
in November 2015 alone.398 In terms of offender make-up, of the 64 cases analysed, 
58 involved male offenders and 6 involved female offenders (that is, approximately 
90% and 10% respectively). 
 
C Quantitative Assessment: Consistency of Treatment of the Sentencing Variables 
 
As set out in Chapter VII, the main purpose of the research was to test whether courts 
in Australia are treating the sentencing variables relevant to white-collar offenders 
consistently or inconsistently.  
 
From Table 8 below, the sentencing remarks suggest that the there is inconsistent 
treatment of the majority of sentencing variables in the context of white-collar 
offending, with the exception of the treatment of good character and high level of 
planning and sophistication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
398 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse University, White Collar Crime 
Prosecutions for November 2015 (20 January 2016) TRAC Reports 
<http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/white_collar_crime/monthlynov15/fil/>. 
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Table 8: This table compares the expected and observed treatment of each of the sentencing variables. 
 
The percentages suggest that the levels of consistency that are achieved across the 
variables are relatively proportionate to the judicial certainty regarding the role of the 
individual variable in the sentencing calculus. 
 
• In relation to planning or sophistication, the high level of consistency (93%) 
was unsurprising, given that the greater the level of planning, the higher the 
criminality involved in the commission of the offence. 
 
• In relation to good character, given the prevailing view that good character 
should not mitigate because it usually facilitates the commission of white-
collar offences, the fairly consistent treatment (82%) was unexpected. 
 
• In relation to harm to victim, a higher degree of consistency (73%) was 
expected because the aggravating aspect of this variable seems uncontentious. 
 
• In relation to public opprobrium (70%) and reduction of career prospects 
(71%), the judicial uncertainty surrounding the sentencing value of these 
variables makes the inconsistent results expected. 
 
• In relation to restitution (64%) and ancillary orders (67%), the low 
consistency rate was unexpected because the prevailing orthodoxy is that 
neither restitution nor ancillary orders should mitigate very much at all, and 
so I expected there to be an even lower consistency rate.  This suggests that 
judges do take restitution into account in some cases. 
 
Sentencing 
Variable 
Expected Result Observed result Determination as to 
consistency 
Good 
character 
Should be mitigating 
90% of the time 
Mitigating 82% of the 
time 
Fairly consistent  
Public 
opprobrium 
Should be mitigating 
90% of the time 
Mitigating 70% of the 
time 
Inconsistent 
Reduction of 
employment 
or career 
prospects 
Should be mitigating 
90% of the time 
Mitigating 71% of the 
time 
Inconsistent 
Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Should be 
aggravating 90% of 
the time 
Aggravating 59% of 
the time 
Inconsistent 
High level of 
planning or 
sophistication 
Should be 
aggravating 90% of 
the time 
Aggravating 93% of 
the time 
Consistent 
High level of 
harm to 
victim 
Should be 
aggravating 90% of 
the time 
Aggravating 73% of 
the time 
Inconsistent 
Restitution Should be mitigating 
90% of the time 
Mitigating 64% of the 
time 
Inconsistent 
Ancillary 
orders  
Should be mitigating 
90% of the time 
Mitigating 67% of the 
time 
Inconsistent 
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• In relation to amount of money involved, the very low consistency rate (59%) 
was very unexpected, because there is little doubt that the larger the amount 
of money, the more serious the offending. 
 
Thus, the results were a combination of expected and very unexpected variables.  
 
D Qualitative Assessment: Distinctive Features of White-collar Offenders 
 
In the Rational Approach Article, we identified certain features which we argued 
distinguished white-collar offenders from other offenders.  
 
The features we identified were: 
 
• white-collar offenders are not normally from socially-deprived backgrounds; 
 
• white-collar offenders often do not have prior convictions; 
 
• white-collar offences often involve a breach of trust or violation of some 
other moral virtue, such as loyalty; 
 
• the offences are normally well planned or may continue over a long period of 
time; 
 
• it is often possible to fully remedy the resulting tangible harm through 
monetary restitution; 
 
• there is no limit to the maximum benefit derived from the crime; 
 
• the harm caused by the offence often goes beyond that inflicted on 
individuals and is assumed to extend to financial institutions and markets; 
 
• there are often non-criminal sequels to the conduct in question; and 
 
• there is often a range of incidental sanctions which are suffered by white-
collar offenders, including loss of reputation, reduction of future career 
prospects and public opprobrium. 
 
The research revealed that these features apply in many, but not all, instances of 
white-collar offending.  The assumptions made about background, good character 
and a high level of planning were borne out by the research. However, the incidence 
of extra-curial punishment was not as common as expected, especially with respect 
to public opprobrium, which was raised in less than half the cases analysed. 
Restitution was raised in just over 30% of the cases analysed, which may suggest that 
either many offenders were unable to make restitution, or the curial attitude toward 
restitution resulted in a reluctance to make it or to raise it. Table 9 below summarises 
the results. 
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Distinguishing factor Observations 
White-collar offenders are 
not normally from socially-
deprived backgrounds 
This is true and was observed in 91% of cases. 
 
All the type A cases involved offenders who had a tertiary 
education and/or good careers. 
 
Only 9% of all cases analysed involved offenders who are 
not necessarily highly educated and/or have good careers. 
White-collar offenders often 
do not have prior convictions 
This is correct and was observed in almost 97% of cases 
analysed. 
White-collar offences often 
involve a breach of trust or 
violation of some other moral 
virtue, such as loyalty 
This was true in the following cases: 8A, 12A, 5B, 10B, 
13B, 15B, 17B, 18B, 19B, 20B, 21B, 27B, 28B – that is, 
20.3% of all cases analysed.   
The offences are normally 
well planned or may continue 
over a long period of time 
This was true in 65.6% of cases analysed.  
It is often possible to fully 
remedy the resulting tangible 
harm through monetary 
restitution 
 
This was raised in 34.4% of the cases analysed. In others 
it was presumably not raised because the offender did not 
have the means to make full restitution. Hence, this 
premise seems to be at least partially validated.  In one 
case the victims were unidentifiable and therefore 
although the offender was willing to make reparation, it 
was impossible (3A). 
There is no limit to the 
maximum benefit derived 
from the crime 
Not measureable in this research however the varying 
sums obtained tend to suggest this is accurate. 
The harm caused by the 
offence often goes beyond 
that inflicted on individuals 
and extends to financial 
institutions and markets 
This statement was made in 38.8% of the cases in which 
high level of harm was raised (and 29.7% of all cases 
analysed).  
There are often non-criminal 
sequels to the conduct in 
question 
Not observable in this research. 
There is often a range of 
incidental sanctions which 
are suffered by white-collar 
offenders, including loss of 
reputation and reduction of 
future career prospects 
Public opprobrium was only raised in 46.9% of cases and 
reduction in employment or career prospects was raised in 
75% of cases. 
 
Therefore, on average, there is approximately a 60% 
chance that incidental sanctions will be suffered by white-
collar offenders.  
 
Table 9: This table lists the factors which distinguish white-collar criminals from common criminals and 
examines whether they can be evidenced by the research. 
 
E Qualitative Assessment: Assertions About Sentencing Variables as Applied to 
White-collar Offenders 
 
Several specific assertions were made in relation to the eight sentencing variables in 
the Rational Approach Article. These assertions are examined in Table 10 below.  
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Sentencing 
Variable 
Assertion Observation 
Good 
character 
Recognised but 
regarded as 
facilitative and 
therefore given little 
mitigating weight due 
to the importance of 
general deterrence. 
Raised in over 96% of cases so it is 
characteristic of white-collar offenders. It may 
not have been raised in other cases because it 
was self-evident or assumed not to be relevant 
to sentence. 
 
Generally mitigating, but often qualified by the 
fact that it was not of high importance   (82%). 
 
Although research did not assess weight given 
to this factor, where it was treated as being 
neutral, it was largely due to the belief that the 
good character facilitated the offending (45% of 
neutral cases and 8% of total cases where good 
character was raised). 
Public 
opprobrium 
Common non-curial 
hardship stemming 
from white-collar 
offending. 
Raised in almost 47% of cases. Therefore, this 
is a reasonably common occurrence in white-
collar crime cases.   
 
Mitigating in 70% of those cases. 
 
In 44% of the cases where it received neutral 
treatment (and 13% of all cases where it was 
raised) the reason was that it did not amount to 
an exceptional or extreme case and therefore 
did not constitute extra-curial punishment . 
Reduction of 
employment 
or career 
prospects 
No generally agreed 
approach as to 
relevance to sentence. 
Strongest argument 
against employment 
deprivations being 
mitigating is that it 
creates a separation of 
classes. 
Raised in 75% of cases. 
 
Mitigating in 71% of those cases. 
 
In 14% of the cases where it received neutral 
treatment (and 4% of all cases where it was 
raised) the reason was that it did not amount to 
an exceptional or extreme case and therefore 
did not constitute extra-curial punishment . 
 
In 57% of cases where it received neutral 
treatment (and 16% of all cases where it was 
raised) it was acknowledged but there was no 
discernible effect as to treatment.  
 
This establishes  that courts have not adopted a 
consistent approach as to treatment of this 
variable.  
Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Key consideration in 
determining offence 
severity for white-
collar crimes is 
amount of money or 
value of property 
involved. 
Raised in 87.5% of cases. 
 
Aggravating in 59% of those cases (where the 
amount was substantial).  
 
In at least 39% of the cases where it received 
neutral treatment no discernible treatment could 
be determined from the court’s judgement 
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despite the fact that the majority of those cases 
concerned amounts of more than $1m (that is 
16% of the cases where a large amount of 
money was raised). 
 
In the remaining cases neutral treatment was 
given where there was little or no profit from 
the offending (39% of neutral cases; 16% of all 
cases where large amount of money was raised). 
High level of 
planning or 
sophistication 
Crimes that are well-
planned and 
committed over a 
long period of time 
are often punished 
more heavily. 
Raised in 65.6% of cases. 
 
Aggravating in 93% of those cases.  
 
The main reason for neutral treatment was that 
although the conduct was deliberate it was out 
of character (66% of neutral cases; 4.8% of all 
cases where raised). 
 
Harshness of penalty both generally and in 
comparison between high level and low level 
planning was not assessed in this research. 
Notably, only one case involved low level 
planning (See 19A).  
High level of 
harm to 
victim 
Crimes committed 
against individuals, 
especially those who 
are financially 
vulnerable or fragile, 
cause more direct and 
much greater harm 
than crimes 
committed against the 
revenue or large 
corporations. 
Raised in 76.6% of cases.  
 
Aggravating in 73% of those cases.  
 
In 30.6% of the cases which received 
aggravating treatment, the harm was in relation 
to the public and/or market at large (that is 
22.4% of all the cases where high level of harm 
was raised). 
 
This research did not compare the level of harm 
between crimes committed against the revenue 
and crimes committed against individuals. The 
level of harm was deemed high based on 
assessment by the court.  
Restitution Voluntary restitution 
by offender is 
consistently regarded 
as important but does 
not automatically 
result in a significant 
discount because of 
the perception that an 
offender is buying his 
or her way out of 
prison.  
 
Restitution in context 
of property offences 
is a mitigating 
consideration but is 
Raised in 34.4% of cases indicating that it is not 
necessarily common. 
 
Mitigating in 64% of those cases. 
 
In 62.5% of cases where it received neutral 
treatment (and 22.7% of all cases where it was 
raised) it was acknowledged but there was no 
discernible effect as to treatment . This indicates 
that mitigation is in fact not automatic. 
 
No evidence that courts are actually applying 
the idea that treating restitution as mitigating 
would enable offenders to buy their way out of 
prison thereby causing class separation.  
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not necessarily a 
weighty factor.  
 
Only in 
circumstances where 
restitution constitutes 
a demonstrable 
hardship to offender 
will it provide a 
significant mitigation 
of penalty. 
Although this research did not assess the weight 
of mitigation (this could not be done given the 
instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing), 
asserting that more mitigation is afforded to the 
offender where restitution caused demonstrable 
hardship may be incorrect as this was not one of 
the reasons for neutral treatment in any of the 
cases. 
Ancillary 
orders  
Confiscation orders 
which reclaim 
property do not 
mitigate but orders 
which further strip 
offender of assets do 
mitigate. 
Commonwealth 
legislation does not 
allow such orders to 
be mitigating per se 
but it does allow it to 
inform the level of 
remorse and 
contrition.  
Only raised in 28.1% of cases indicated courts 
are not making very much use of these orders in 
relation to white-collar offenders. 
 
Mitigating in 61% of those cases. 
 
In 44.4% of the cases in which this variable was 
raised, the reason for mitigatory treatment was 
that it informed remorse and/or contrition. 
 
In only one of the cases analysed had the 
offender been stripped of personal assets as well 
as assets derived from the offending, and in that 
case the treatment was mitigating (See 11A). 
 
In 85.7% of cases where it received neutral 
treatment (and 33.3% of all cases where it was 
raised) it was acknowledged but there was no 
discernible effect as to treatment . 
 
Table 10: This table tests the accuracy of the assertions made in A Rational Approach to Sentencing White-collar 
Offenders in Australia with respect to each of the sentencing variables based on the research results. 
 
Disregarding the assertions made in relation to weight of mitigation and penalty 
harshness, which were not assessed in this research, the assertions made in relation to 
good character, reduction of employment and/or career prospects, large amount of 
money involved, and ancillary orders were generally correct. The assertions made in 
relation to public opprobrium and restitution may need clarification and elaboration. 
The assertions made in relation to high level of planning and high level of harm 
could not be assessed because this research did not specifically test the harshness of 
penalty or compare in detail the level of harm between individuals and the public. 
 
Notably, despite the emphasis on matching harm to victim with harshness of sanction 
(proportionality), the level of harm caused to the victim was identified in only 78% 
of cases (including the case where the level of harm was identified to be of a low 
level). This finding suggests that, in 22% of white-collar sentences, judges are not 
adequately articulating the principal basis by which the nature and severity of the 
sanctions for an offence is to be determined. While there may be other explanations, 
(including the opaqueness of the instinctive synthesis method), failure to identify and 
assess the level of harm in 22% of cases may indicate that in at least 1 in every 5 
cases, the sentence is not properly informed by the proportionality principle.  
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F Conclusion 
 
In Chapter IV, I identified the four integers of a rational approach to sentencing law.  
The data above illuminates at least two of those integers, namely, whether sentencing 
law as currently applied is capable of clear and consistent application, and whether 
the outcomes of individual cases are relatively predictable. The ineluctable 
conclusion from the data is that in neither instance is the law able to claim to be 
rational. Further, to the extent that the five articles rely on assumptions about the 
features of sentencing law, these assumptions are borne out by the research. Finally, 
the Rational Approach Article made a series of assertions regarding the treatment of 
variables by courts – effectively criticisms about the way we understood the courts to 
be applying the eight variables. The qualitative assessment of the 64 cases tended to 
support these assertions, and thus, the critiques that followed. Given those 
conclusions, two important questions remain before turning to consider the reform 
proposals in detail: does sentencing law accord with known human behaviour and is 
the law responsive to change if required? I commence Chapter IX with those 
questions in mind.   
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CHAPTER X 
 
 TOWARDS A RATIONAL APPROACH: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
Social reform is not to be secured by noise and shouting; by complaints and 
denunciation; by the formation of parties, or the making of revolutions; but by the 
awakening of thought and the progress of ideas. Until there be correct thought, there 
cannot be right action; and when there is correct thought, right action will follow.  
 
Henry George, Social Problems, 1946 
 
 
A Introduction 
 
As I explained in Chapter I, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the major 
weaknesses of the present sentencing model, which I refer to as ‘failure mode’, and 
to create a platform for change through reform. The failure mode has been examined 
and elucidated in Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII. In Chapter V, such problems 
inherent in the sentencing calculus as the opacity of the instinctive synthesis method 
and the failure of some of the objectives of sentencing were demonstrated. As 
became evident when considering the problems specific to white-collar crime in 
Chapter VI – commencing with the semantic challenge of establishing a fixed or at 
least circumscribed meaning for white-collar crime – a meaningful jurisprudence can 
only be developed by identifying the base causes of the currently irrational approach 
to sentencing. Identifying and responding to these causes is essential to the process 
of reform.   
 
There are two key assumptions underlying a rational approach to sentencing. The 
first is that criminal actors respond rationally to punishment, in other words, that the 
law accords with known human behaviour. The second is that courts, by imposing 
punishment, can modify the behaviour of criminal actors and where it does not, the 
law will adapt and respond in order to achieve that result. But neither of those key 
assumptions is reflected in the current approach to sentencing white-collar offenders. 
The problem that we identify in the articles is that there is no empirical evidence to 
support the relationship between the impact of sentencing and modifying criminal 
behaviour, whether as a general or specific deterrent, or to rehabilitate. Much work 
needs to be done by legal scholars and by experts outside of the law, to ascertain the 
cause and effect relationships that sentencing law requires to act as an effective 
instrument of social change. Further, where it is evident that the law is not achieving 
the purpose which justifies its existence, it must change. In Chapter VI, I 
demonstrated the obstinate commitment by the judiciary to failed paradigms and 
manifestly false premises; reform of the law will be impossible as long as the 
evidence is ignored. 
 
Paradoxically, the same judiciary which clings on to the fuzzy logic,399 clearly 
understand what is at stake in this area of the law: 
                                                
399 In the mathematical sciences, ‘fuzzy logic’ is employed to deal with a concept of a partial truth 
where a value might be any value between 0 and 1 and is thus considered to be ‘fuzzy’ whereas in 
Boolean truth may only be ‘crisp’ values of 0 or 1. Fuzzy logic is therefore a system of logic in which 
a statement can be true or false or on a continuum. I use this term to describe the feature of judges 
which permit them to apply assumptions to sentencing law, which are not necessarily true or false. 
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It is difficult to overstate the importance of sentencing in the administration of any 
system of criminal justice. In a very real sense it is where the 'the rubber meets the 
road'. The exercise of the power to administer punishment is one of the two critical 
components of any system for the administration of criminal justice - the other being 
the determination of guilt or innocence. The manner in which the power to impose 
punishment is exercised is one of the two critical determinants of the quality and 
calibre of justice provided in any jurisdiction. Any system which imposes 
punishments which are cruel, harsh or arbitrary cannot be described as a just system. 
The extent to which 'the punishment fits the crime', and the offender, provides a 
tangible measure of justice.400 
 
In order to better provide a tangible measure of justice, and thereby to achieve a 
more rational approach to sentencing white-collar offenders, below I make some 
proposals for the reform of the law in this area. 
 
At the highest level of abstraction, the High Court has relatively recently sought to 
justify the current approach to sentencing in Munda v Western Australia: 
 
... there are three points to be made in response. First, the proper role of the criminal 
law is not limited to the utilitarian value of general deterrence. The criminal law is 
more than a mode of social engineering which operates by providing disincentives 
directed to reducing unacceptably deviant behaviour within the community. To view 
the criminal law exclusively, or even principally, as a mechanism for the regulation 
of the risks of deviant behaviour is to fail to recognise the long-standing obligation 
of the state to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the 
community’s disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be 
afforded by the state to the vulnerable against repetition of violence …401 
 
The criminal law is principally about crime reduction and failing to acknowledge that 
objective will only perpetuate useless, expensive and misguided action; punishment 
clearly has a part to play in crime reduction. The objectives identified by the 
Victorian and Federal legislatures – deterrence, denunciation, community protection, 
rehabilitation – are important objectives; and sentencers would be assisted by the 
legislature listing and ranking them. In this way, sentences will no longer reflect the 
unobtainable but will give proper weight to the desirable. If research reveals that 
there are other objectives that can or should be achieved, then the list should be 
revisited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
400 Wayne Martin, ‘The Art of Sentencing - An Appellate Court Perspective’ (Paper presented at 
Singapore Academy of Law & State Courts of Singapore Sentencing Conference 2014, Singapore, 9 
October 2014) <http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_files/The%20Art%20of%20Sentencing%20-
%20an%20Appellate%20Court%20Perspective%20Martin%20CJ%2014%20Oct%202014.pdf>. 
401 87 ALJR 1035 [54].	
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B Proposals for reform: conclusions from the thesis 
 
Proposal 1:   
 
Legislative reform of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) to 
rank the general sentencing objectives. The recommended order (in descending 
priority) is:  
1. Just punishment 
2. Community protection 
3. Rehabilitation 
4. Absolute general deterrence 
 
The current legislative sentencing objectives have not been prioritised.402 The 
rationale behind prioritising the objectives is that it distinguishes the objectives from 
the more general factors which must be taken into account in the sentencing process, 
such as, good character, remorse, age, and restitution. In addition, it reiterates the 
importance of fairness by emphasising equality amongst the larger category of 
criminal offenders, thus diminishing the stereotypical class bias criticism that arises 
when categorising offenders. 
 
By prioritising just and proportional punishment the courts satisfy the retributive 
element of punishment and minimise the opportunity for private acts of vengeance. 
Of almost equal importance is community protection which would justify the harsh 
and lengthy punishment of dangerous offenders, particularly violent offenders and 
sex offenders. The third objective of punishment should be rehabilitation thus 
satisfying the utilitarian aspect of punishment and minimising costs associated with 
recidivism and reimprisonment. The final objective for punishment should be 
absolute general deterrence given that there is minimal research to prove that this 
objective is either achievable or attainable.403 
 
Proposal 2: 
 
More empirical research (preferably specific to Australian offenders) is required to 
assess the efficacy of pursuing the sentencing objectives. 
 
The justification for the above recommendations is the pursuit of a more rational and 
more efficient sentencing process. The most logical and cost effective way of 
achieving this goal is by looking to existing (and conducting further) empirical 
research. Importantly, the objectives of punishment should be the same for all 
offenders irrespective of categorisation and should be supported by evidence where 
possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
402 Crimes Act 1914 s 16A(2): the goals of punishment are combined with all the general factors to be 
considered by the sentence and are unprioritised. Cf s 5(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) where the 
goals are separated in an individual provision but are also unprioritised. 
403 Bagaric, Alexander and Pathinayake, above n 28; Bagaric and Alexander, above n 8. 
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Proposal 3: 
 
Legislative amendment of provisions which require the consideration of general 
deterrence to be the consideration of absolute general deterrence only. This is 
relevant to white-collar crime as well as other types of crime. 
The rationale behind this recommendation is that the objectives of imposing 
punishment should be supported by empirical research in order to be rational. Where 
such objectives have been expressly disproved by empirical research, there remains 
no logical or moral justification for attempting to achieve them. 
 
Proposal 4: 
 
Insert provision in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) 
requiring judges to clearly state how they treat each of the sentencing factors they 
consider and how the sentence imposed satisfies the objectives for punishment. 
 
The rationale behind this recommendation is that by requiring judges to provide 
specific reasons and general methodology about how they consider each sentencing 
factor, whether mitigating, aggravating or neutral, courts will promote clarity and 
consistency. I do not propose that judges ought to provide numerical figures as to the 
weight each factor plays in the sentencing exercise as this would defeat the purpose 
of instinctive synthesis and would be impossible to achieve.404 The only way to 
implement this recommendation is by legislative action. Unless this recommendation 
is implemented, inconsistency will remain and continue to jeopardise the rule of law, 
the right to equality amongst offenders, public confidence in the justice system, 
while increasing the price of justice.405 
 
Proposal 5: 
 
Imprisonment (particularly lengthy terms) should not be the preferred penalty for 
white-collar criminals.  It should be a penalty of last resort.  Instead, re-allocate 
funding to increase invesigtation, detection, compliance and policing. 
 
The rationale for this recommendation is that although white-collar crime is ‘serious’ 
it is not in the same category of seriousness as arson, violent, sex and drug offences. 
The white-collar criminal as an individual does not physically harm another person 
and therefore need not be physically incapacitated.406 
 
Further, the expense to the community does not justify imprisonment for economic 
crimes.  There are other punishments that better respond to such crimes, such as 
economic sanctions (life-time economic bans on earning or ownership of property), 
professional disqualification, and systematic tracing and confiscation of assets. 
Moreover, despite the public perception that white-collar offenders are treated more 
leniently because of their perceived social status, this has not been proven – the 
reason for the perception more likely being the highly individualised nature of the 
                                                
404 Except where there is a statutory discount e.g. guilty pleas: see, eg, Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 
6AAA. 
405 Krasnostein and Freiberg, ‘Individualistic Sentencing Framework’, above n 375, 265. 
406 For an expansion of this justification, see: Bagaric, Alexander and Pathinayake, above n 1. 
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sentencing process.407 Appropriate outcomes should not be dictated by 
misperceptions.  
 
Proposal 6: 
 
Legislative amendment requiring judges to provide reasons as to why an ancillary 
order was not imposed (where it could have been) before considering imprisonment. 
 
The rationale behind this recommendation is two-fold: first, the reinforcement of 
existing legislative provisions which require sentencers to first consider other forms 
of punishment; second, to promote the imposition of ancillary orders which 
effectively provide a primary punishment in the form of disgorgement, 
compensation, or occupational disablement.  Legislative provisions already exist in 
Victorian and Commonwealth sentencing law which could be better utilised by 
requiring reasons for not imposing such punishments. 
 
Proposal 7: 
 
Legal and/or criminological should academics should reconsider the role of rational 
choice theory as it applies to sentencing decision making to develop a new 
empirically valid paradigm for legislatures and sentencing courts.  
 
This recommendation is potentially only aspirational. However, this recommendation 
could find pragmatic application if either State or Federal legislatures convene a 
commission of inquiry into the theoretical and practical difficulties in achieving 
sentencing outcomes and means for reform. This would entail an examination of the 
flaws with rational choice theory and utility of behavioural economic theories being 
applied to sentencing. 
 
C Proposals for Reform: review of previous recommendations 
 
The proposals for reform set out above resulted from the research and discussion 
undertaken as part of the preparation of this thesis.  However, prior to these reform 
proposals, throughout the five articles, a series of recommendations were made 
which considered how sentencing law may respond to the critiques of the various 
facets. Given the extent of the further research and more detailed consideration of the 
subject matter of the articles, it is timely to reconsider whether those earlier 
recommendations should be maintained or amended. 
 
# Article Recommendation Comments Conclusion 
1  (Marginal) 
General 
Deterrence 
Doesn’t Work 
– and What It 
Means for 
Courts should no 
longer increase 
sentences to pursue 
the objective of 
marginal general 
deterrence408  
The empirical research 
contained in ‘General 
Deterrence’ demonstrated 
that marginal general 
deterrence does not work, as 
did the Victorian Sentencing 
Maintain 
                                                
407 Arie Freiberg, ‘Sentencing White-Collar Criminals’ (Paper presented at the Fraud Prevention and 
Control Conference, Australian Institution of Criminology, Surfers Paradise, 24-5 August 2000). 
408 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘General Deterrence’, above n 201, 270. 
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Sentencing Advisory Council.409 Bearing 
in mind the discussion about 
the requirement for 
rationality in law (see 
Chapter 4) the 
recommendation contained in 
the article remains sound 
because it is, as we argued, 
unjustifiable to pursue a 
sentencing objective which 
demonstrably does not work.  
 
 
There should 
follow a general 
reduction of 
penalty severity to 
the extent that 
marginal general 
deterrence currently 
drives sentencing 
outcomes (ie, a 
reduction in tariff 
for revenue and 
drug offences)410  
This recommendation is a 
corollary of the conclusion 
that marginal general 
deterrence does not work. It 
would thus be necessary to 
reduce penalty severity 
which is otherwise increased 
due to this reason. This does 
not mean that sentences must 
necessarily be reduced 
overall but rather a different 
basis for maintaining 
sentence severity must be 
identified. 
Maintain  
 
 
These reforms can 
be achieved by 
judicial 
reassessment of the 
meaning and role of 
general deterrence 
in the sentencing 
process. General 
deterrence should 
be confined to 
absolute general 
deterrence.411 
As absolute general 
deterrence does work, it 
should be retained. However, 
as the research reveals, 
methods of reform which 
require judicial intervention 
are undesirable for their 
inconsistency and possible 
lack of basis in principle. 
Enacting systemic change is 
the province of parliament 
and rather than a shift in 
judicial approach, a change 
in the law, including 
amendments to the 
Sentencing Act, will be 
preferable. I note however 
the experience of DPP v 
Walters412 where the court 
held that parliament’s 
intended median sentence 
could not be achieved 
because the legislation lacked 
any mechanism with which 
to do it. 
Amend  
                                                
409 Ritchie, above n 236, 2. 
410 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘General Deterrence’, above n 201, 283. 
411 Ibid. 
412 [2015] VSCA 303. 
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2 Rehabilitating 
Totality in 
Sentencing: 
From 
Obscurity to 
Principle 
The principles of 
mercy should not 
underpin the 
application of 
totality.413 
 
Mercy is too vague both 
conceptually and in practice 
to support the use of totality 
in sentencing. To continue to 
use this as the basis of the 
doctrine would be irrational 
because it cannot be an 
effective foundation of 
totality (see Chapter V). 
Mercy introduces 
subjectivity, inconsistency 
and irrationality to the 
sentencing process. 
Maintain  
 
 
Totality should be 
applied but be 
based the objective 
of rehabilitation 
and possibly 
proportionality.414 
Totality may still be useful in 
sentencing if it can be 
supported on a rational basis. 
As was argued in the article, 
it is logically sound to afford 
some discount to an offender 
who has not yet had the 
benefit of rehabilitation for 
earlier offences and so 
totality should be maintained 
in sentencing. This is 
particularly relevant for 
white-collar offenders who, 
so the research reveals, often 
commit a number of offences 
over a period of time. 
Further, more extensive 
research into the nature of 
proportionalism could 
potentially provide some 
support for the concept.  
Maintain  
 
 
Totality should be 
given only modest 
weight in the 
sentencing 
decision.415  
As was outlined in the 
article, given that the effect 
of rehabilitation is 
speculative and difficult to 
support with clarity based on 
the empirical evidence it 
should only be afforded 
modest weight. 
Maintain  
3 The Capacity 
of Criminal 
Sanctions to 
Shape the 
Behaviour of 
Offenders: 
Specific 
Deterrence 
Doesn’t Work, 
Legislature should 
abolish specific 
deterrence as a 
sentencing 
objective on the 
basis of studies 
which have found 
no link between 
increased legal 
This recommendation is 
sound. In fact, the empirical 
evidence supports a 
conclusion that recidivism 
rates are high despite more 
punitive punishments. 
Instead, it is more effective 
to pursue specific 
rehabilitative programs 
Maintain  
                                                
413 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘Totality’, above n 101, 139, 167. 
414 Ibid 167. 
415 Ibid. 
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Rehabilitation 
Might and the 
Implications 
for Sentencing  
compliance and 
experience in jail 
and the length of 
the jail term.416  
directed specifically towards 
prisoners and offending 
reduction, such as the Defy 
Ventures program.417  
 
 
Where judges 
would have 
increased a 
sentence where 
specific deterrence 
would have been a 
weighty 
consideration in the 
sentencing 
determination (i.e. 
considerable 
criminal history) 
judges should 
impose more 
lenient sentences 
because they no 
longer should 
pursue specific 
deterrence.418  
This recommendation is 
consistent with the approach 
taken in this thesis, that is, a 
demonstrably unattainable 
objective cannot be pursued. 
Maintain  
 
 
Given that at this 
point in time, there 
is no firm evidence 
the rehabilitative 
measures imposed 
by sentencing 
courts, especially, 
in relation to white 
collar offences are 
generally effective, 
the objective of 
rehabilitation 
should not play a 
meaningful role in 
the sentencing 
calculus.419  
As per the recommendation. Maintain  
4 A Rational 
Approach to 
Sentencing 
White-collar 
Offenders in 
Australia  
Provide a 
numerical and large 
discount for 
restitution.420  
The empirical research 
reveals that restitution is 
underutilised (raised in only 
34.4% of cases), and 
therefore it should be 
encouraged in order to do 
justice to victims. The 
argument that restitution 
Maintain  
                                                
416 Bagaric and Alexander, Capacity of Criminal Sanctions’, above n 8, 172. 
417 See Kris Frieswick, ‘Ex-cons Relaunching Lives as Entrepreneurs’, Inc Magazine (online) 29 May 
2012 <http://www.inc.com/magazine/201206/kris-frieswick/catherine-rohr-defy-ventures-story-of-
redemption.html>. 
418 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘Totality’, above n 101, 172. 
419 Ibid. 
420 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘A Rational Approach’, above n 13, 349. 
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allows offenders to buy their 
way out of gaol is 
outweighed by the good that 
comes from restoration for 
victims. Furthermore, like the 
discount for an early guilty 
plea,421 recognising the 
utilitarian benefit of 
restitution and offering an 
incentive for its use is sound. 
 
 
Abolish the pursuit 
of general 
deterrence and the 
increase in 
sentences which 
follow.422  
As in ‘(Marginal) General 
Deterrence Doesn’t Work – 
and What It Means for 
Sentencing’, above, it is clear 
that general deterrence is 
ineffective and it is therefore 
irrational to increase 
penalties on this basis. 
Maintain  
 
 
Provide a greater 
discount for 
previous good 
character, 
consistent with 
other areas of 
sentencing.423  
Although good character was 
found to be generally 
mitigating in the empirical 
research, its unique treatment 
in the case of white-collar 
offenders, where it is usually 
afforded less weight, has a 
questionable logical basis 
and, in any case, should be 
abandoned in order to 
achieve consistency in 
sentencing principles. 
Maintain 
 
 
Provide a greater 
discount for non-
curial harm in the 
form of 
employment 
deprivations.424  
The empirical research 
reveals that this factor is not 
treated consistently and so it 
is desirable to adopt a 
uniform approach. 
Employment deprivation 
should be mitigating as this 
better reflects the true effect 
of the sentence and finding of 
guilt, and it does not 
meaningfully create a 
separation between the 
treatment of offenders from 
different classes. 
Maintain  
 
 
Place more 
emphasis on the 
harm caused by the 
offence to guide the 
sentence: crimes 
against individuals 
Focussing on harm better 
reflects the proportionality 
principle and, as outlined in 
the article, greater harm is 
done to individuals than to 
government or institutional 
Maintain  
                                                
421 DPP (Cth) v Thomas [2016] VSCA 237. 
422 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘A Rational Approach’, above n 13. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid. 
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should be treated 
more seriously than 
those against the 
revenue or large 
corporations.425  
victims in terms of the 
offence’s impact on the 
victim. Contrary to the 
popular assumptions, there is 
little evidence that white-
collar crime undermines 
confidence in institutions or 
markets. 
5 First-time 
Offender, 
Productive 
Offender, 
Offender with 
Dependents: 
Why the 
Profile of 
Offenders 
(Sometimes) 
Matters in 
Sentencing 
Good criminal 
history should have 
a considerable 
impact on 
sentencing – first 
time offenders 
reoffend at lower 
rates than repeat 
offenders, and 
hence, are less of a 
danger to the 
community. 
Sentencing 
discount of 25% for 
first time offenders 
is appropriate.426 
This recommendation is 
sound. The mitigating nature 
of good criminal history is 
supported by the research but 
its weight cannot be assessed. 
To give a defined discount is 
possible427 and appropriate to 
serve utilitarian ends,428 
given there is less need for 
community protection. 
Maintain  
 
 
Past good acts 
should not receive a 
discount beyond 
that associated with 
a good criminal 
history (assuming 
that, in fact, they 
have not previously 
committed an 
offence).429  
Although the research reveals 
that past good character such 
as contribution to 
community, etc is often 
recognised, realistically, it is 
almost impossible to assess 
with accuracy and therefore 
it does not form a rational 
basis for mitigation of 
sentence. 
Maintain  
 
 
Offenders who 
have physical or 
financial 
dependents should 
have a penalty 
reduction of 
25%.430 
This recommendation 
recognizes the specific 
hardship to offenders who 
are carers of others. The 
recommendation does not 
provide license to people in 
that position to commit 
offences, but recognizes the 
relationship between the 
offender and the requirement 
for care by another person. 
This is in accordance with 
Maintain  
                                                
425 Ibid. 
426 Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘First-time Offender, Productive Offender, Offender with 
Dependents: Why the Profile of Offenders (Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing’ (2015) 78(2) Albany 
Law Review 397, 445. 
427 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘Totality’, above n 101, 340 citing Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520. 
428 See, eg, DPP (Cth) v Thomas [2016] VSCA 237 regarding the discount for a guilty plea. 
429 Bagaric and Alexander, ‘A Rational Approach’, above n 13. 
430 Ibid 446. 
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the common law principles 
Markovic.431 
 
Table 11: This table summarises the recommendations in each of the articles which form the basis for 
this thesis and whether they should be kept, amended or discarded. 
 
 
D Conclusion 
 
Sentencing and the imposition of penalties on white-collar offenders is largely 
without evidence-based justification or rational explanation. The corollary is that 
scarce community resources are wasted or misdirected and the high order purpose of 
sentencing law – the reduction of crime – is not achieved. What is required is to align 
sentencing practice with evidence-based reality. Penological and criminological 
studies should guide sentencing outcomes – not intuitive hunches and demonstrably 
false propositions. 
 
The research quantitatively demonstrates that there are two identifiable failures in the 
sentencing of white-collar offenders. 
 
First, there is inconsistency within the treatment of at least six of eight sentencing 
variables (and further research may reveal yet others) when sentencing courts are 
required to determine the aggravating or mitigating effect of those variables.  This is 
indicative of judicial uncertainty regarding their proper treatment.  This failure is a 
breach of an integer of a rational system of sentencing law as set out in Chapter IV: 
the outcomes of individual cases are relatively predictable. 
 
Second, there is inconsistency in the treatment of the sentencing variables between 
white-collar offenders and non-white-collar offenders.  This disparate treatment – 
particularly in relation to prior good character and restitution –is unjustifiable where 
the underlying reasons for such treatment in relation to an offender remain constant, 
whether or not the offender is part of the white-collar subset. This failure is a breach 
of another integer of a rational system of sentencing law:  that the law is capable of 
clear and consistent application 
 
Further, the research qualitatively demonstrates that white-collar sentencing is 
irrational in so far as it pursues sentencing objectives – such as general deterrence – 
which are demonstrably unachievable and which are based on a demonstrably 
unsatisfactory paradigm: the rational choice theory.  These failures breach another 
integer of a rational system of sentencing law: that the law is designed to accord with 
known human behaviour. 
 
The results of the research conform, in the main, to the contentions set out in the five 
co-authored articles. 
 
Despite the failures, there is still a way forward – but only if the causes and effects of 
these failure modes are translated into action.  The reform proposals set out above 
provide a model agenda for what might be done to correct the small but many 
systemic errors which are responsible for the irrational state of the law.  The law 
                                                
431 Markovic v The Queen (2010) 30 VR 589. 
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must be responsive to change when obviously required.  The courts will serve the 
interests of the community, of the victim and of the offender by replacing rhetoric 
with rationality. 
 
 
D Postscript 
 
I note with some optimism, that during the latter part of the preparation of this thesis, 
on 25 November 2015, the Australian Senate referred an inquiry into 
the inconsistencies and inadequacies of current criminal, civil and administrative 
penalties for corporate and financial misconduct or white-collar crime to the Senate 
Economics References Committee for inquiry and report by 27 July 2016.  The 
closing date for submissions was 30 March 2016 and evidence was called before the 
Committee in the latter part of 2016.   
 
I, along with Professor Bagaric and Ms Jenny Awad, made a submission to, and 
appeared before, the Committee.  We gave evidence in accordance with the broad 
proposals for reform that have been set out in this thesis.  A number of other 
academics, institutional bodies and individuals also made submissions and gave 
evidence. 
 
At the time of submission of this thesis, the Committee had not yet made a final 
report to the Senate.   
 
It is hoped that the sentencing of white-collar offenders, and perhaps all offenders, 
will benefit from the modest contribution made by this thesis, and the work of the 
Committee.  
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH 
 
A Type A Case Analysis 
 
Case 1A R v McKay [2007] NSWSC 275  
Sentence Three fixed terms amounting in all to 15 months periodic 
detention   
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1043A(1) and 1311(1)(a)  
Offence 
description  
 
– Procuring mother to acquire 8,000 shares  
– Procuring son to acquire 8,000 shares  
– Procuring mother, son and a friend to acquire 7,650 shares  
Offender 
status 
 
56 year old female, educated and member of associations [8]  
Worked as a consultant – held several roles [9] established a 
business providing consulting services to victim company [11] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  ‘All these testimonials paint a picture of a person of 
the highest integrity. All assert that her actions in 
breaching the insider-trading provisions of the 
Corporations Act 2001 were totally out of 
character. They also confirm the fact that she has 
expressed, on numerous occasions, deep regret and 
genuine heartfelt remorse for her lapse of 
judgment.’ [43] 
‘As to the fact that the offender has no prior 
convictions and has led an unblemished life both 
professionally and personally, it has been said that 
good character is not as significant a mitigating 
factor in sentencing for white-collar crimes as it is 
for other offences (R v El Rashid unreported Court 
of Criminal Appeal 7 April 1995). Although this is 
undoubtedly the case, it does not mean that the 
Court should lose sight of the good character of an 
offender, which nevertheless, remains a relevant 
factor in the sentencing process.’ [64] 
‘There is no need to impose a fine in the present 
matter. Indeed, the Crown does not suggest that a 
fine be imposed. In view of the offender’s good 
record and her undoubted rehabilitation, there is no 
need to make a Recognisance Release Order.’ [70] 
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2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating ‘At a personal level, as might be expected, she has 
experienced considerable shame and loss of 
face…considerable stress and uncertainty as to her 
future.’ [45]  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating ‘It is clear that the disgrace and adverse publicity 
associated with the public revelation of the offences 
has had a very substantial effect on the offender 
both professionally and personally. It has really 
meant the end of her career as a company 
consultant, at least for the time being.’ [45] 
 
‘There are a number of other matters to be briefly 
noted… the exposure and adverse publicity have 
had a very substantial effect on her financial 
position, her ability to resume her work in the 
business world and on her health.’  [52] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating  ‘…three points do not however, significantly 
mitigate the objective seriousness of the offences. 
First, the amount ventured in the transactions was 
approximately $150,000. This could hardly be 
described as an insignificant investment.’ [55] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating ‘The three offences must be regarded as serious… 
The offending took place over a period of two and a 
half months, involving three offences and the 
procuring of five share purchases… must be 
accepted, in these circumstances, that the offender 
acted with deliberation knowing, in each case, that 
the information was not generally available and was 
material.’ [56] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim  
Not raised  
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating ‘I have also made reference to the fact that the 
offender has paid $77,428 following an order made 
pursuant to the Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002. This 
is an appropriate case to find that the making of the 
consent order and the payment of the penalty show 
a further willingness to facilitate the course of 
justice in a matter connected to the offence. In 
addition, the payment may be seen to be further 
evidence of contrition and co- operation.’ [67] 
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Case 2A DPP v John Francis O’Reilly [2010] VSC 138  
Sentence 1. 10 months imprisonment, immediate recognisance order in 
the sum of $500 requiring good behaviour for 18 months. 
2. Fine - $30,000 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1043A(1)  
Offence 
description  
 
Insider trading with information which could materially effect the 
market price of shares in Indophil Resources, of which he was a 
director. 
Offender 
status 
65 year old male; metallurgist; worked in international mining 
industry for 40 years; great career.  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  ‘I accept that you are devoted to your 
family…numerous testimonials have been tendered 
on your behalf and oral character evidence has been 
called. All speak of your drive, your competence 
and your integrity… I do accept, however, that your 
misconduct was an aberration and that you almost 
certainly will not re-offend in this or any other 
way.’    
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating ‘public humiliation which no doubt will reach its 
peak in tomorrow morning's press. Whilst this is a 
factor I am entitled to take into account as a 
punishment already suffered, I do not consider it 
ought be accorded significant weight.’ 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating ‘You will be disqualified from holding corporate 
office, which is a penalty in itself, see Rich v ASIC 
(2004) 220 CLR 129, and at the age of 65 this is 
effectively a disqualification for life.’ 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral ‘I do not regard the nature of the trade, the amount 
invested or the anticipated profit as falling into a 
particularly grave or serious category…your actual 
profit derived from the average of sales of all your 
Indophil shares in June and July 2008 was $29,045, 
a figure whilst larger, I still regard as modest.’ 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
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6. High level 
of harm to 
victim  
Aggravating ‘In insider trading cases I consider there are at least 
two victims; the seller or sellers of the stock at the 
lower price and the public, whose confidence in the 
integrity of the market must be diminished. The 
impact upon public confidence in the market is an 
important factor. The securities markets could not 
survive and flourish without the confidence of those 
who elect to invest in it.’  
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating ‘You have consented to the payment of a pecuniary 
penalty order, thus forfeiting not only your profit 
but also your initial stake…These are all matters 
that operate significantly to mitigate the sentence 
that I must pass.’ 
   
Case 3A R v Stephenson [2010] NSWSC 779 
Sentence Release without passing sentence on your own recognisance and 
without security, on the following conditions: 
1. good behaviour (12 months); and  
2. pecuniary penalty of $20,000 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1043A  
Offence 
description  
 
 
- Disposing of 4514 shares; 
- Awareness of insider trading conduct in conversation with 
broker; [41] and 
- Share trading (information passed to him from a friend 
who was a company executive)  
Offender 
status 
57 year old male; career spanning 41 years, generally in the 
wholesale food distribution industry, worked as a managing 
director and a consultant. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating ‘I am satisfied that in the circumstances of this case 
that Mr Stephenson’s good character should be 
afforded weight.’ [61] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
Not raised  
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career 
prospects 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Not raised  ‘I accept it is an offence towards the bottom of the 
range of offences of its kind when his lack of 
knowledge is taken into consideration, coupled with 
the relatively modest sum involved.’ [67] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Neutral ‘For sentencing purposes, I accept the offending 
constituted by his deliberate use of price sensitive 
information was out of character.’ [61]   
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Not raised  
7. Restitution Neutral ‘In fixing the penalty, I take into account that the 
funds generated from the trade have since been 
released from the broker’s suspense account, and 
that while Mr Stephenson remains willing to make 
reparation to sellers who were financially 
disadvantaged by his conduct, it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to craft a reparation order under s 
20(1)(a) to give effect to his intention, given that 
over five years have passed since committing the 
offence and when many, if not most sellers, are 
likely to be difficult to identify or locate.’ [68] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Neutral Pecuniary penalty of $20,000  
Acknowledged but no discernible effect. 
   
Case 4A R v Hartman [2010] NSWSC 1422  
Sentence Original total sentence: 4.5 years (non-parole 3 years) 
Sentence quashed on appeal: New sentence (2.5 years, 2 years + 
18 months and 16 months) with a single pre-release period of 15 
months. Upon expiry of 15 months imprisonment, to be released 
upon recognisance in the sum of $1,000 (conditions apply). 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – Hartman v R [2011] NSWCCA 261 (appeal concerned the 
weight given to assistance to authorities, psychiatric condition and 
gambling)  
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
- s 1043A(1) - 19 counts  
- s 1043A(2) - 6 counts 
Offence 
description  
Front running – 25 counts 
Offender 
status 
25 year old male; tertiary education, worked at Orion as an 
equities dealer. 
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Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating ‘The offender has not previously come to the notice 
of the authorities and he is entitled to the benefit of 
his good character.’ [52]   
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral  ‘The evidence which I accept indicates that the 
insider trading charges alone made him a total profit 
in excess of $1.9 million.’   [45] 
 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating ‘The offender set about systematically trading in 
breach of the law for the sole purpose of enhancing 
his personal wealth at the expense of others.’ [45] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim  
Aggravating ‘It must be remembered that his crimes were not 
victimless. Each illegal transaction was likely to 
have a cost to someone, who either traded or held 
their position, without the benefit of the knowledge 
available to the offender.’ [45] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 5A R v O’Brien [2011] NSWSCS 1553 
Sentence 2 years imprisonment served by way of intensive correction order 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1043A(1) and 1311(1)(a)  
Offence 
description  
4 counts of insider trading in a senior position of director in 
company over 6.5 months. 
Offender 
status 
41 year old male, tertiary education, worked in financial services 
industry [5]. Senior position of director until terminated for serious 
and wilful misconduct.  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
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1. Good 
character 
Mitigating ‘The offender has no prior convictions. As already 
indicated, however, in 'white collar offences' good 
character is not as significant a mitigating factor in 
sentencing as it is for other offences.’ [58] 
 
‘The offender has a very strong subjective case. He 
is a man of previous good character and this is his 
first occasion of offending. His co-operation with 
the authorities was immediate and substantial and is 
indicative of genuine contrition and remorse. I am 
satisfied that he will not offend in this way again 
and that his prospects of rehabilitation are 
excellent.’ [73] 
 
Note: Appears mitigating, even if only slightly 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating ‘the charges against him have attracted substantial 
media publicity… While these matters do not 
constitute 'exceptional circumstances' for 
sentencing purposes and are a natural consequence 
of this kind of offending, they remain relevant and 
important considerations in the sentencing process.’ 
[75] 
 
Acknowledged but no discernible effect.  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating ‘As a result of being convicted for these offences, 
the offender will be automatically disqualified from 
managing a corporation for a period of five years. 
In Rich v ASIC [2004] HCA 42, (2004) 220 CLR 
129 the plurality held that disqualification from 
holding such office was a penalty.’ [63] 
 
‘Even without the intervention of this Court, he has 
already been punished for his offending. He has lost 
his job, he is most unlikely to ever again be 
employed in the financial industry and his prospects 
of obtaining employment generally must be 
regarded as problematic.’ [74] 
 
‘It is clear that this offending has resulted in the 
offender suffering irreparable damage to his 
professional reputation and to his professional 
relationships. While these matters do not constitute 
'exceptional circumstances' for sentencing purposes 
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and are a natural consequence of this kind of 
offending, they remain relevant and important 
considerations in the sentencing process.’ [75] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating ‘Yielding a gross profit of $54,748.68… While the 
offender did not personally benefit from the 
transactions, they still involved serious criminality.’ 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating ‘The offender was part of the Georgeson coverage 
team dealing with Project Delorean and was a 
contact point for WDC and was intimately involved 
in the planning, preparation and provision of 
services to facilitate this transaction.’ [22] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim  
Neutral ‘The 'victim' in such offences is the investing 
community at large.’ [52] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating ‘On 8 September 2011 the CDPP provided the 
offender with a proposed pecuniary penalty order 
requiring him to pay the amount of $54,748.68 (the 
PPO). On 22 September 2011 the PPO was made 
by the Supreme Court of NSW by consent. On 20 
October 2011 the offender sent a cheque in the 
amount of $54,748.68 to the CDPP for payment of 
the PPO in full.’ [37] 
 
‘Pursuant to s320(b) of the POC Act, the Court in 
passing sentence must not have regard to any 
pecuniary penalty order that relates to the offences. 
However, pursuant to s320(a), the Court 'may have 
regard to any co-operation by the [offender] in 
resolving any action taken against' him under the 
Act. As previously indicated, the extent of the co-
operation by the offender was significant and 
demonstrated a willingness to facilitate the course 
of justice in relation to the offences.’ [65] 
   
Case 6A R v Glynatsis [2012] NSWSC 1551  
Sentence Original sentence: Concurrent 2 year sentence, served by way of 
intensive community correction order  
Quashed on appeal: 15 months and 12 months imprisonment, to be 
released on recognisance after 12 months and payment of $1000. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – R v Glynatsis [2003] NSWCCA 131   
Court noted ‘the criminality of insider trading offences is best 
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indicated by the amount of money invested as opposed to the 
profit that was made. Although the sentencing judge erred by 
placing more importance on the profit, that error did not 
significantly influence the exercise of the sentencing discretion.’  
Appeal allowed on the basis that ‘…that the mode of serving those 
sentences by way of an ICO does not adequately meet the 
principle of general deterrence, given the nature of the criminality 
and its seriousness in this case. 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1043(a) and 1311(1)(a)  
Offence 
description  
 
 
9 counts insider trading between November 2009 to November 
2010. Placing orders over the internet through account in his own 
name or trading accounts of his relatives (with their permission – 
but received no benefits from relative’s trading accounts) [16], 
[25]. 
Offender 
status 
 
27-8 year old at time of offending – now 29 year old, male, tertiary 
education, graduate consultant at PwC in the tax & legal 
department; senior consultant at PwC (resigned in June 2001) [19] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  ‘The Offender is entitled to appropriate credit for 
his prior good character.’ [150] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Neutral Acknowledged but no discernible effect 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Neutral Acknowledged but no discernible effect 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating  ‘In each instance, the securities were sold yielding 
total gross profits of $50,826.00 or an overall gross 
benefit of $45,706.00. Of that amount, the Offender 
derived, on his own account, a gross profit of 
$23,840.00, and his relatives derived a profit of 
$26,386.00.’ [158] 
 
‘It is necessary to keep in mind that the total 
amount invested was $371,507.00. This is an 
important indication of the gravity of the offences: 
R v Doff at [31] (NSWSC).’ [159] 
 
‘I have concluded that no sentence other than a term 
of imprisonment is appropriate in the circumstances 
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of the case. To impose a lesser sentence would not 
reflect the seriousness of the Offender's crimes, or 
give proper effect to applicable sentencing 
principles to which I have made reference.’ [184] 
 
On appeal it was decided that is was more 
important to consider the amount invested to 
indicate criminality – but no apparent influence on 
error in decision. [55] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim   
Aggravating ‘In R v O'Brien, the offender traded exclusively to 
the benefit of his elderly mother's superannuation 
fund, which he managed and which had lost value. 
The present Offender traded on his own behalf and 
on behalf of his relatives, although the 
circumstances prevailing in 2010 were as I have 
already described. The Offender's conduct involved 
eight companies, whereas four companies were 
involved in R v O'Brien.’ [172] 
 
‘The point is reached where comparisons of this 
type cannot progress the exercise of sentencing 
discretion in the present case. The task of a 
sentencing Judge is to attempt to apply 
individualised justice in all the circumstances, many 
and varied as they are, of the particular case.’ [173] 
 
‘I have concluded that no sentence other than a term 
of imprisonment is appropriate in the circumstances 
of the case. To impose a lesser sentence would not 
reflect the seriousness of the Offender's crimes, or 
give proper effect to applicable sentencing 
principles to which I have made reference.’ [184] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating  ‘On 15 May 2012, with the consent of the Offender, 
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
obtained a pecuniary penalty order under s.116 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) in the sum of 
$50,826.00, representing the total gross profits 
derived from the offences committed by the 
Offender. This amount was paid on 4 June 2012.’ 
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[146] 
 
‘I have regard to the Offender's payment of the 
pecuniary penalty order as evidencing his co-
operation in resolving action taken against him: 
s.320(a) Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth).’ [147] 
   
Case 7A R v Fysh (No 4) [2012] NSWSC 1587  
Sentence 2 years aggregate [82]  
Concurrent sentence, minimum of 12 months on recognisance of 
good behaviour and $1,000 surety [83]-[85] 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1043A(1)(c) and 1311(1)(a)  
Offence 
description  
2 counts of insider trading committed over 2 days. Purchase of 
250,000 shares whilst in possession of inside information [3] 
Offender 
status 
51 year old male, held a very senior position at a large 
international company which conducts business in the energy 
sector.  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  ‘The prior good character of the offender cannot be 
doubted. Apart from his having no prior 
convictions, he tendered a very large number of 
what can only be described as glowing character 
references from work colleagues, family members 
and friends…All of the referees state that his 
convictions for insider trading are completely out of 
character with his professional and personal morals. 
I am satisfied, on the strength of that material, that 
apart from the present offences, the offender is 
otherwise a person of good character and strong 
morals.’ [62] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating ‘The offender's evidence established that there has 
been considerable media attention to this case. I 
accept that the attendant impact upon his 
professional reputation will affect him 
professionally, economically and personally. He has 
lost highly remunerative employment, having 
earned in excess of $1.3 million per annum before 
his employment with BG came to an end.’ [72] 
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3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating ‘I accept that the attendant impact upon his 
professional reputation will affect him 
professionally, economically and personally. He has 
lost highly remunerative employment, having 
earned in excess of $1.3 million per annum before 
his employment with BG came to an end.’ [72] 
 
‘It was submitted that the offender is now 
unemployable. I doubt whether that is so, having 
regard to his evident intelligence and range of 
abilities. Nonetheless I accept that his perception to 
that effect is a burden for him.’ [73] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating ‘…the amount invested was substantial. That is an 
important indicator of criminality. With respect to 
the first parcel of 240,000 shares, the offender paid 
$764,142.82 (an average of $3.18 per share) plus 
brokerage of $7641.36. With respect to the second 
parcel of 10,000 shares, the offender paid 
$32500.00 (an average of $3.25 a share) plus 
brokerage of $32,5.00. The total amount paid was 
$804,609.18.’ [44] 
 
‘It is also relevant to consider the benefit derived 
from the offences. Upon sale of the shares, the 
offender received $1,437,500.00 less brokerage of 
$7,187.50 attributable to those shares, amounting to 
a total of $1,430,312.40, giving a net profit of 
$626,703.32.’ [45] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating ‘Accordingly, the seriousness of the offences must 
be considered on the basis that their planning was 
well considered.’ [50] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim  
Aggravating ‘It is well-established that insider trading is not to 
be viewed as a victimless crime. As stated by the 
Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Rivkin [2004] 184 
FLR 365 at [412], the victim of such an offence is 
the investing community at large; the injury, the 
loss of confidence in the efficacy and integrity of 
the market in financial products. It is to be regarded 
as a form of cheating, or fraud: Hartman v R [2011] 
NSWCCA 261; (2011) 87 ACSR 52 at [94].’ [51] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating  ‘It is relevant in that context to consider the 
offender's response to the Commissioner's 
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application for a pecuniary penalty order under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act.’ [52] 
 
‘In accordance with that provision, the offender's 
cooperation in resolving the Commissioner's claim 
may properly be taken into account as a mitigating 
factor.’ [53] 
   
Case 8A R v Bo Shi Zhu [2013] NSWSC 127 
Sentence 6 months, 3 months and 2 years imprisonment 
Total effective sentence: 15 months prison pre-release 
Recognisance: good behaviour and surety of $1,000)  
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No  
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1043A(1)(d) and 1311(1)(a)  
Offence 
description  
 
 
3 rolled up counts of insider trading (re: takeovers) – over 3 
separate periods of employment with 3 different employers over 
4.5 years – offending occurred in breach of company policies 
[44][89][131] 
 
Trading in leveraged products since 2004 then used CFDs for all 
securities trading since 2006  
Offender 
status 
 
35 year old male [69], intelligent young man who was educated in 
Australia [80]. Held 3 positions at 3 corporations, as an executive 
[5], associate [5], and Vice president [5] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  ‘Also to be weighed in his favour is the evidence 
concerning his prior good character at the time of 
the commission of the relevant offences.’ [204] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Neutral ‘Whilst I take into account in a general sense the 
media attention in relation to the Hanlong Mining 
offences (including photographs) and that the 
Offender has greatly suffered from the public 
disgrace, shame and humiliation as a result, adverse 
publicity may only be considered to amount to 
extra-curial punishment in what may be classed as 
exceptional or extreme cases. I have concluded that 
the evidence does not establish that this case rises to 
that level.’ [218] 
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3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating ‘I also take into account the fact that his guilty pleas 
to these offences may well effectively mean that he 
has no re-employment prospects in the finance 
industry and may otherwise impact adversely on his 
future employment prospects.’ [219] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating ‘The total profit derived from the Caliburn 
offending was $81,483.60 (less costs) of which the 
Offender's share was $55,814.50.’ [58]  
 
‘I consider that the objective gravity of the 
offending conduct in relation to the Caliburn 
matters to be significant, although, not at the high 
end of the range for offences of this kind.’ [84] 
 
‘In relation to the Funtastic shares, the offending 
involved, as I have indicated, the avoidance of loss 
of $6,900 and a profit of $3559.50.’ [108] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating ‘However, accepting that the Offender did not 
appreciate the criminality of his trading, there is no 
doubt that he was fully aware of the fact that he was 
breaching company policy and was acting 
dishonestly. In utilising Ms Chen's First IG Markets 
Account, he consistently took steps to disguise or 
conceal his trading. In this respect, I rely upon the 
Statement of Facts and the candid admissions made 
by the Offender both in his affidavit and in the 
course of his oral evidence.’ [81]  
 
‘The seriousness of his activities was increased by 
his procuring others to trade for their own profit.’ 
[82] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating ‘In relation to the Caliburn, Credit Suisse and 
Hanlong Mining offences, I accept the Crown's 
submission that in this case there were at least three 
classes of victim, namely:  
 
(i) The market, including in particular the investing 
community at large; 
 
(ii) The employers, by reason of the breach of trust 
that had been bestowed by each of the Offender's 
three employers. In addition, in the case of the 
Caliburn and Credit Suisse counts, the Offender 
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misappropriated client's price sensitive information; 
 
(iii) Individuals being the class of persons who 
trade with an Offender without having access to that 
inside information. In particular, in this case the 
Offender procured transactions prior to market 
announcements with counter-parties ignorant of the 
insider information about to be released to the 
public. As the Crown observed, while the Offender 
sought to maximise profit through the use of CFDs, 
those on the other side of the transactions faced the 
potential for increased losses.’ [203] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating ‘I take into account, as evidence of co-operation, 
the fact that the Offender, in relation to an 
application made under the Proceeds of Crime Act, 
consented to an order under that Act in the sum of 
$371,348.20 and has paid that amount under the 
order.’ [232] 
   
Case 9A R v John Gay (unreported, Tas Sup Ct, Porter J, 30 August 2013) 
Sentence Convicted of 1 count of insider trading and fined $50,000 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes  
- Re Gay [2014] TASSC 22: application for leave to manage 
a corporation following automatic disqualification 
(granted) [40] and confirmed good character in favour of 
appeal [28], and 
- CDPP v Gay [2015] TASSC 15: questions of law not 
sentencing  
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1043A(1)(d) and 1311(1)(a)  
Offence 
description  
Selling shares – insider trading by a true insider (Chairman) but 
sale of shares was not prompted by inside information (conduct 
contrary to public policy) [14] 
Offender 
status 
70 year old male; no formal education qualification, chairman of 
Gunns Ltd (previously a top 100 ASX company) 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating ‘I am satisfied that the offender is of 
exemplary character, a man respected 
and admired by many, with a reputation 
of honesty and integrity’ 
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2. Public 
opprobrium 
Neutral ‘No doubt that has been intrusive at times.   
However  there  is nothing before  me to suggest 
that these proceedings themselves have  been 
responsible for such  a level of derision  or 
humiliation, so as to amount  to an extra-curial  
punishment.’ 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating ‘Upon conviction, s 206B(1)(b)of the 
Corporations Act will operate to 
disqualify the offender from managing 
corporations.  This in itself is a penalty: 
Rich v ASIC (2004) 220 CLR 129 at 
[37].’ 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral No discernible effect 
 
The total of the suggested avoided loss is 
$798,798.54. 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim  
Neutral 
 
No discernible effect 
 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Neutral $50,000 fine  
Acknowledged but no discernible effect. 
   
Case 10A CDPP v Hill [2015] VSC 86  
Sentence 3 years and 3 months imprisonment (2 years non-parole) [99] 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
 
Abuse of public office – 4 counts 
Insider trading (analysed here) – 1 count 
Identity theft – 1 count 
Offence 
description  
 
Use of MEIs provided by Hill to make gross profit of more than $8 
million and a net profit of more than $7 million – less than 
$200,000 obtained in accordance with Hill & Kamay agreement. 
Hill received less than $20,000 from these trading activities. 
Offender 
status 
Analyst at ABS [11], commonwealth public official [12] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good Neutral ‘Neither of you has ever been in trouble with the 
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character police before. That is not uncommon in the case of 
white collar offenders; indeed, it is often their 
previous good character that enables the white 
collar offender to be in a trusted position in the first 
place.’ [82] 
 
‘You have both provided references from a range of 
former teachers, employers, family and friends. 
Your referees all speak very highly of you, and 
have expressed their shock and disbelief at 
discovering that you had committed these offences. 
They all regard these offences as being totally out 
of character for you.’ [83] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating ‘I have no doubt that your actions have brought 
considerable shame and embarrassment to 
yourselves and your families.’ [83] 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating ‘You both did well at university, and went on to 
obtain good jobs after graduation You were hard-
working, focused, driven, and eager to succeed. 
You have both been involved in voluntary activities 
in the community. You both had promising 
professional careers ahead of you, which you have 
almost certainly thrown away by your own actions.’ 
[78] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral ‘Mr Hill, the insider trading offence in which you 
engaged with Mr Kamay was less serious than the 
three offences engaged in by Mr Kamay on his 
own. Less than $200,000 of the $8 million gross 
profit made by Mr Kamay was attributable to your 
agreement, which was always intended to be limited 
in size and duration.’ [58] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim  
Aggravating  ‘The ABS has provided a victim impact statement, 
which sets out in some detail the effect your actions 
have had on the ABS and its staff. Confidentiality 
of the information provided to, and held by, the 
ABS is critical to its proper functioning. Conduct 
such as yours can be very damaging to an agency 
like the ABS, particularly to its public reputation. 
Your actions have caused the ABS to spend 
considerable time and money reviewing the 
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integrity of its computer systems, and undertaking 
further staff training. The ABS also arranged 
counselling for those members of staff who were 
having trouble dealing with the nature and 
seriousness of your betrayal of trust.’ [40] 
‘I would not describe any of the offences as less 
serious, on the basis that they were simply 
opportunistic.’ [41] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 11A CDPP v Kamay [2015] VSC 86 
Sentence 7 years and 3 months (4 years and 6 months non-parole) [109] 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
 
Insider trading – 4 counts 
Money laundering – 1 count 
Identity theft – 2 counts 
Offence 
description  
Use of MEIs provided by Hill to make gross profit of more than $8 
m and a net profit of more than $7 m – less than $200,000 
obtained in accordance with agreement with Hill & Kamay  
Offender 
status 
Associate director at NAB [10] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral ‘Neither of you has ever been in trouble with the 
police before. That is not uncommon in the case of 
white collar offenders; indeed, it is often their 
previous good character that enables the white 
collar offender to be in a trusted position in the first 
place.’ [82] 
 
‘You have both provided references from a range of 
former teachers, employers, family and friends. 
Your referees all speak very highly of you, and 
have expressed their shock and disbelief at 
discovering that you had committed these offences. 
They all regard these offences as being totally out 
of character for you.’ [83] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating ‘I have no doubt that your actions have brought 
considerable shame and embarrassment to 
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yourselves and your families.’ [83] 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating ‘You both did well at university, and went on to 
obtain good jobs after graduation You were hard-
working, focused, driven, and eager to succeed. 
You have both been involved in voluntary activities 
in the community. You both had promising 
professional careers ahead of you, which you have 
almost certainly thrown away by your own actions.’ 
[78] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating ‘The gross profit that you made (more than $8 
million) is, by a very considerable margin, the 
largest insider trading profit to come before an 
Australian court.’ [56]  
 
Re money laundering – ‘The essence of this offence 
is that you dealt with money that was, and that you 
believed to be, the proceeds of crime, in an amount 
greater than $100,000.’   [72] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating ‘…you were the person who first floated the idea of 
engaging in insider trading.’ [14]  
 
‘Mr Kamay, you used the inside information to 
engage in 45 separate transactions, over a period of 
some eight months. Your offending was   carefully 
planned and premeditated. You deliberately 
interspersed gains with some losses, to try to 
conceal what you were doing. You opened separate 
accounts, with different FX contract providers. You 
also took steps to conceal what you were doing by 
using phone services obtained in other people’s 
names. The inside information provided to you was 
of very high quality and value.’ [52] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating  'The ABS has provided a victim impact statement, 
which sets out in some detail the effect your actions 
have had on the ABS and its staff. Confidentiality 
of the information provided to, and held by, the 
ABS is critical to its proper functioning. Conduct 
such as yours can be very damaging to an agency 
like the ABS, particularly to its public reputation. 
Your actions have caused the ABS to spend 
considerable time and money reviewing the 
integrity of its computer systems, and undertaking 
further staff training. The ABS also arranged 
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counselling for those members of staff who were 
having trouble dealing with the nature and 
seriousness of your betrayal of trust.' [40] 
 
'While it may not be possible to point to any 
particular loss made by an identifiable victim, 
insider trading is not a victimless crime. Apart from 
harm to the market and public confidence, in this 
case there were counter- parties to each of your 
trades; they themselves had to enter into other 
transactions to try to cover their own positions.' [47] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating 'By virtue of the operation of the federal 
confiscation laws, you were liable to pay a 
pecuniary penalty of around $8 million, 
representing the gross profits of your offending. 
Because you had only retained the net profits, that 
would have left you owing almost $1 million. You 
reached a settlement with the Commonwealth in 
which you agreed to forfeit all of your assets, 
including your equity (of about $160,000) in some 
property that was not tainted by your offending. In 
sentencing you, I have had regard to the fact that 
you have forfeited that non-tainted property, and 
that you have co-operated in the resolution of this 
forfeiture issue. The latter is further evidence of 
contrition.' [89] 
   
Case 12A R v Joffe [2015] NSWSC 741  
Sentence Convicted: 
- Count 1: 1 year, 3 months imprisonment from 12 June 
2015. 
- Count 2 (accounting for the offence on the s 16BA Form): 
1 year 9 months imprisonment from 12 December 2015. 
Recognisance upon giving security without surety of $1000, 
requiring good behaviour for 2 years and 3 months from 12 June 
2015 [128]. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No  
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1043A(1)(d) and 1311(1)  
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Offence 
description  
 
 
- 2 counts of procuring Stromer to acquire relevant securities 
whilst in possession of inside information. [1] 
- Joffe procuring Stromer in August 2006 to acquire 29,580 
shares in Auckland International Airport Limited whilst in 
possession of inside information. [5] 
- Procurement by Joffe of Stromer in November 2006 to 
acquire 962,000 Contracts for Difference ('CFDs') in Alinta 
Infrastructure Holdings whilst in possession of inside 
information. [6] 
- Offending contrary to corporation securities trading policy 
[10] 
Offender 
status 
Associate analyst at Moody’s Investor Service Pty Ltd [10]  
Joffe is aged 38, male, tertiary education (law & commerce) [77] - 
[78] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'There are a number of mitigating factors to be 
taken into account and most of them are common to 
each offender…Aside from their offending 
behaviour, they are persons of good character 
(which is not uncommon in a matter such as this).' 
[114]-[115]  
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating 'There are a number of mitigating factors to be 
taken into account and most of them are common to 
each offender… Joffe has not been employed for 
quite some years …They are unlikely to find 
employment in the commercial or legal world for 
the foreseeable future.' [114]-[118] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral 'Although Joffe did not make any investment 
himself and did not stand to make any profit, I have 
earlier mentioned my acceptance of the Crown's 
contention that he intended to contribute $30,000 to 
the amount invested by Stromer in the Alinta 
Infrastructure matter.'  [104] 
 
No discernible effect 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
Aggravating  'Joffe's offences are more serious than Stromer's 
because of the breach of trust factor.'  [113]  
 136 
victim 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 13A R v Stromer [2015] NSWSC 741 
Sentence Convicted: 
- Count 3: 1 year, 3 months imprisonment from 12 June 
2015, and 
- Count 4: 1 year, 6 months imprisonment from 12 
December 2015. 
Recognisance upon giving security without surety of $1000, 
requiring good behaviour for 2 years from 12 June 2015 [129]. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No  
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1043A(1)(c) & 1311(1) – 2 counts 
Offence 
description  
Stromer pleaded guilty to two counts of acquiring the relevant 
securities whilst in possession of inside information. 
Offender 
status 
 
36 year old male, first class education (including tertiary in 
commerce and law), worked in a major law firm then as a 
consultant and then employed in his father's business which was 
involved with property development and aged care - Investing and 
trading in securities was an interest he shared with his father.[58] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'There are a number of mitigating factors to be 
taken into account and most of them are common to 
each offender…Aside from their offending 
behaviour, they are persons of good character 
(which is not uncommon in a matter such as this).' 
[114] [115] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating  'He has struggled to obtain employment since being 
charged.' [59]  
'There are a number of mitigating factors to be 
taken into account and most of them are common to 
each offender… Stromer had only managed to find 
work in recent years as a call centre salesperson. 
…They are unlikely to find employment in the 
commercial or legal world for the foreseeable 
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future.' [114] [118] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral 'In the case of Alinta Infrastructure, Stromer 
invested $94,757 and was required to deposit a 
margin requirement equal to 10 per cent of the total 
exposure. According to the agreed facts, his likely 
maximum exposure was $179,457.' [103] 
 
No discernible effect 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Not raised   'The circumstances in which offences of this nature 
can be committed vary widely and there are a 
number of matters to be considered in an 
assessment of their objective seriousness… They 
are not offences that are anywhere near the upper 
range of seriousness for these types of matters; the 
Auckland Airport offences are below the midrange 
of seriousness and the Alinta Infrastructure offences 
are just within that range. Joffe's offences are more 
serious than Stromer's because of the breach of trust 
factor.' [113]  
 
This case involved a low level of harm. 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating  'Another mitigating feature to be taken into account 
in Stromer's case is that he co-operated in the 
making of a pecuniary penalty order under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) in the sum of 
$222,349.87: see s 320(a) of that Act.' [119] 
   
Case 14A R v Newton Chan [2010] VSC 312 
Sentence Total effective sentence of 20 months imprisonment 
(recognisance: $500 and 20 months) (p. 11)   
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041A – 8 counts of market 
manipulation (and 1 count of providing false & misleading 
information in an ASIC examination) 
Offence 
description  
Offending occurred over 22 months and involved 344 bids – 
protracted and persistent  
Offender 46 year old male, tertiary education, securities trader employed in 
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status the Financial Services Group of Macquarie Equities Limited (then 
Division Director), high income (> $500,000) (p. 2) 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'You have no prior convictions and are entitled to 
some benefit for this.' (p. 8) 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating 'Upon conviction you will be disqualified from 
managing a corporation…from holding corporate 
office. This is a penalty in itself and I am entitled to 
and do take it into account. You are now, I am told, 
a bankrupt and your career is in ruins. It is, I 
consider, highly unlikely that you will ever be able 
to return to the financial services industry – the only 
area of occupation you have ever known.' (p. 8-9) 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral Of the shares you purchased in your name, the total 
profit to you was $95,128.65…additionally you 
received total commissions on the impugned trading 
of $34,182.62 as before tax income…' (p. 7) 
 
Acknowledged but no discernible effect. It was 
mentioned only in so far as relating to motive for 
offending. 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'Your conduct in facilitating the efforts of Hal and 
Ian Christiansen to artificially inflate the closing 
price of Bill Express securities therefore must be 
viewed seriously.' (p. 9) 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating 'The impact of your conduct is not felt merely by 
those tempted to purchase Bill Express shares in an 
artificial market or the banks who otherwise would 
be entitled to a margin call from exposed 
shareholders; it is felt by the entire securities 
market, a market that you understood intimately.' 
(p. 9) 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 15A R v Mervyn Jacobson [2014] VSC 592  
Sentence Imprisonment in custody for a period of 12 months. Upon release, 
good behaviour is required for 20 months. [99] 
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Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Market manipulation - s 1041A Corporations Act 2001  
Offence 
description  
33 counts of taking part, and 2 counts of conspiracy to take part, 
while working as CEO and principal shareholder of company 
(GTG). [1]-[3] 
Offender 
status 
72 year old male, tertiary education, worked as a doctor then an 
entrepreneur, senior position in company, majority shareholder, 
made significant contributions to medicine and technology. [48]  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'I have referred to the evidence, relating to your 
character and to your philanthropic works, in some 
detail, because, it demonstrates that, apart from 
your offending in this case, you are a person who 
comes before the court with an exceptionally good 
character…' [67]  
 
'In summary, then, I accept that you are a person 
who, apart from your offending in this case, has 
been of exceptionally good character… You have 
no previous convictions...' [73]  
 
'… evidence as to your good character and your 
health, to which I have referred, are relevant and 
valid mitigating circumstances, which must be 
given appropriate weight...'   [75] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'I also accept that, for a person such as yourself, 
your conviction has involved a dramatic fall from 
grace for you, as a result of which you suffer from 
genuine feelings of humiliation and embarrassment. 
The shame attaching to your offending is a not 
insignificant penalty to you.'   [82] 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating 'As a result of your convictions in this case, you 
will be automatically disqualified from managing a 
corporation for a period of five years. You have 
spent the better part of four decades of your 
working life as the driving force of a number of 
different enterprises involved in the 
commercialisation of medical and genetic 
technologies. Your disqualification from managing 
any corporation will be a significant penalty to you. 
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It will disable you from pursuing work, to which 
you have been dedicated, and which you have been 
particularly passionate about. By the time that the 
period of disqualification is completed, you will be 
more than 77 years of age. It will be most unlikely 
that, at that stage, you would be able to regenerate 
your working career.' [81]  
 
'… I am satisfied that there are substantial 
mitigating circumstances in your case … In 
addition, your automatic disqualification from 
managing a corporation for a period of five years 
will be a significant penalty on you, as it will be 
particularly difficult for you to resurrect your 
career, in a meaningful way, at the completion of 
that term of disqualification...' [89] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral No discernible effect. 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'Your offending involved a number of serious 
features. It extended over a period of more than five 
months. Your conduct was deliberate and 
calculated, designed to serve your own financial 
purposes, and, in particular, to avoid or limit your 
exposure to further margin calls, and to protect the 
value of your principal investment. Through your 
involvement in national and international 
commerce, you had gained a sophisticated 
understanding of the commercial world, and you 
had significant experience in business affairs. Your 
offending could not be excused on the basis that 
you were in any way naïve or unwitting.'  [42]  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating 'The offences, for which you have been convicted, 
are serious. The express objective of s 1041A of the 
Corporations Act is to promote a fair, orderly and 
transparent market for registered securities. As part 
of that objective, s1041A is directed to ensuring 
that the market price for registered securities truly 
reflects the genuine interaction of the forces of 
supply and demand for those securities on a free 
market. The conduct, in which you indulged, and to 
which you were a party, was calculated to 
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undermine that objective. In that way, your conduct 
had the capacity to erode the integrity of, and public 
confidence in, the securities market, and thereby to 
cause damage to members of the community, who 
have invested their savings in that market.'   [41]  
 
'Your offending involved a number of serious 
features. …Those offences involved the purchase of 
a substantial number of GTG shares, which had a 
significant effect on the market for those shares in 
the manner described by Mr Dent…' [44] 
 
'It is possible that investors, or potential investors, 
made decisions about purchasing, or retaining, GTG 
shares, based on the market price of the shares 
which you had artificially inflated. However, during 
the period covered by the charges of which you 
have been found guilty, the GTG shares were not 
heavily traded. Thus, the risk of any such potential 
loss to investors, or potential investors, was quite 
limited.'  [47] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 16A R v Dalzell [2011] NSWSC 454  
Sentence 2 years imprisonment served by way of intensive community 
correction order.  
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No  
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1311(1)(a), 1043A 
Offence 
description  
Used inside information to influence his decision to acquire 
stocks.  Bought stocks in a client which was acquiring another 
company.  The information was found not to be high-grade 
information. 
Offender 
status 
49 year old; male; Senior manager of KPMG Transaction Services 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'Reliance was also placed upon the character 
references which were tendered in evidence. They 
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were said to be ‘exceptional references in several 
respects’ in particular as to the offender’s character 
and demonstrates that his offending was out of 
character.' [150] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Neutral '…the charge brought against him attracted media 
publicity…I accept the Crown’s submissions to 
which I have earlier referred that such matters do 
not, in this case, constitute ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ for sentencing purposes.' [139] 
[141] 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Neutral '…has been unemployed since August 
2009…recruitment consultants who he has made 
contact with had not returned his calls in 
2010…offence will prevent him working in the 
financial services industry again…I accept the 
Crown’s submissions to which I have earlier 
referred that such matters do not, in this case, 
constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’ for 
sentencing purposes.' [139] [140] [141] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral 'I accept that this case, though involving serious 
criminality, nonetheless takes its place towards the 
lower end of the range of insider trading offences.' 
[154] 
 
'…offender did not profit by the charged transaction 
and, in fact, incurred a small loss….I have 
determined that it is not appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case to impose an order of that 
kind.' [156]  
 
Neutral because the focus is on the offender not 
profiting not the amount of money specifically 
involved. 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Neutral Raised by Crown but no discernible effect as to 
treatment by sentencing judge. 
 '…deliberate, planned and executed over a period 
of time, rather than being spur of the moment.' 
[102] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Neutral  Raised by Crown but no discernible effect as to 
treatment by sentencing judge. 
'The Crown referred to a number of authorities that 
identify the nature of 'victims' of offences of the 
kind in question. Those authorities identify both the 
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seller or sellers of the stock at the lower price and 
as well the public.' [109] 
7. Restitution Not raised   
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
   
Case 17A R v De Silva [2011] NSWSC 243  
Sentence 2 years, 6 months imprisonment, released after 1.5 years with a 
good behaviour bond for the remainder of the sentence. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Insider trading – 12 separate transactions – front running  
Offence 
description  
Through his position, the offender gained knowledge that 
Macquarie intended to acquire large volumes of securities on the 
Singapore stock exchange.  Offender acquired securities and CFDs 
in the same companies.  Offender disposed of the securities and 
CFDs shortly after Macquarie made its acquisitions, and 
consequently he made a profit. 
Offender 
status 
37 year old, male, tertiary education, portfolio manager with 
Macquarie Funds Management Group. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  'Also to be weighed in the offender's favour is the 
evidence concerning his prior good character at the 
time he committed the present offence.' [63]   
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating  'I have also taken into account the fact that the 
offender has received adverse publicity as a result 
of his offending behaviour and that he has had a 
significant fall from grace…' [65] 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Not raised   
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4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral '…gross profit made by the offender …to 
$1,412,975 Australian dollars (rounded to the 
nearest dollar). It is common ground that the net 
profit made by the offender would have been 
marginally less on account of brokers' fees and 
interest costs. None of that money has been 
recovered.' [32] 
No discernible effect. 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating Crown submissions:  
'The offence was only detected by reason of 
international cooperation and assistance, which 
demonstrates the degree of planning involved in the 
offender's conduct and the difficulty of detecting 
it…' [60] 
'I accept the general thrust of those submissions. I 
accept that although the offender's conduct revealed 
no great measure of sophistication or subterfuge, it 
was nonetheless difficult to detect…' [61] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Neutral Referred to sentencing principles from previous 
cases – that this is not a 'victimless crime.' [52] [56] 
But otherwise no discernible effect.  
7. Restitution Not raised   
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
   
Case 18A R v Rodney Stephen Adler [2005] NSWSC 274  
Sentence 4 years, 6 months imprisonment (non-parole period 2 years, 6 
months) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes in Adler v R [2006] NSWCCA 158, however the appeal was 
dismissed. 
Major 
offence/s 
Disseminating false information to induce the purchase of shares 
(s 1041E), intentionally dishonest conduct and failing to discharge 
duties as director in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company (s 184(1)(b)). 
Offence 
description  
The offender disseminated information that he knew to be false, 
namely that he had purchased shares in HIH with his own money, 
when he had actually used money sourced from HIH.  The 
offender intended this to induce people to purchase HIH shares, 
and thereby raise the share price.  The offender also procured HIH 
to invest $2m into a company in which the offender was 
interested, BTS, by misleading the HIH board.  
Offender 46 year old male, tertiary education, member of Institute of 
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status Chartered Accountants, non-executive director and shareholder of 
HIH. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'Away from his business activities a somewhat 
different character emerges. He is described in a 
number of testimonials as a good and committed 
husband and father, who has given generously to 
charity and assisted persons in difficult 
circumstances, both financially and with personal 
support and encouragement.' [41] 
'At the time of the commission of the offences in 
counts 1 and 2, the offender had no prior 
convictions and must be regarded as a person of 
good character; but at the time of the commission of 
the BTS offences, he had committed the offences 
the subject of counts 1 and 2 and also suffered the 
civil penalty proceedings hereafter referred to, and 
therefore cannot be regarded as a person of prior 
good character, at least in the business sense. 
Furthermore, it has been held that prior good 
character is of lesser significance in the case of 
white collar crimes because normally it is that 
factor which places the offender in a position where 
he or she is able to commit such crime: R v Rivkin 
[2004] NSWCCA 7 at [410] citing R v El Rashid 
(CCA – 7 April 1995); Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Bulfin above.' [51] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'Since the collapse of HIH … He and his wife and 
children have also been subjected to an excessive 
amount of unreasonable and intrusive publicity by 
the media relating to their private lives, causing him 
and them additional distress.' [44]  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating '…some regard must be had to the order for 
disqualification to avoid any element of double 
punishment, but only to a very minor degree.' [56] 
 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating 'In relation to the misrepresentations the subject of 
the third count, the offender described them 'in a 
broad sense' as 'stupid errors of judgment' in an 
effort to cut corners (T 44). They were not stupid 
errors of judgment but deliberate lies, criminal and 
in breach of his fiduciary duties to HIH as a 
director. The amount of money fraudulently 
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obtained from the company ($2m) was large.' [40] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating 'The offences are serious…the statement 'I am 
putting my money up which shows I believe in the 
industry' coming as it did from a director of the 
company with a reputation for shrewd investment, 
would have induced people, particularly small 
investors, to purchase HIH shares. Many, if not all, 
of such people would have lost their money when 
the company collapsed.' [38] 
7. Restitution Mitigating 'After the collapse of HIH, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) took civil 
proceedings against the offender and others in 
relation to the payment of the $10m to PEE and the 
subsequent investments by that company with such 
money: Re HIH Insurance Limited (in prov liq) and 
anor: Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Adler and Ors [2002] NSWSC 171, 
41 ACSR 72. It was held in such proceedings that 
the offender and others had acted in breach of their 
duties as directors and orders for a pecuniary 
penalty and compensation orders totalling 
$8,886,402 were made against the offender and 
Adler Corporation. He was also disqualified from 
managing a corporation for 20 years: [2002] 
NSWSC 483, 42 ACSR 80.' [52]-[53] 
'The offender has paid the whole amount of the 
penalty and compensation by instalments, the last 
payment being received on 18 December 2002.'[55] 
'It is to his credit that he paid the fine and 
compensation rather than avoiding it as he probably 
could have done by transferring assets or declaring 
himself bankrupt.' [56] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
   
Case 19A R v Bateson [2011] NSWSC 643  
Sentence 2 years’ imprisonment, served by way of intensive correction 
order, and fined $70,000. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
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Major 
offence/s 
Insider trading  
Offence 
description  
Offender and his wife were trustees and equal beneficiaries of a 
super fund.  The fund had a share trading account.  The fund 
owned shares in WHL.  The offender was privy to information 
concerning a potential gas project, and attended the board meeting 
at which it was resolved to conduct due diligence and prepare a 
letter of intent.  WHL also entered into a memorandum of 
understanding with the other companies involved in the project.  
The offender instructed the fund’s broker to acquire shares in 
WHL under a nominee name, expecting the price of the shares to 
rise after the project was announced to the market.  
Offender 
status 
58 year old, male, tertiary educated, non-executive director of 
WHL. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'Also to be weighed in the offender's favour is the 
evidence concerning his prior good character. That 
is not a matter which should be overlooked or given 
only cursory consideration.'    
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'The adverse publicity which the offender has 
received has no doubt added to his sense of shame 
and humiliation. The material before the court 
strongly suggests that, as a result of these 
proceedings, the offender has withdrawn from the 
circles in which he used to mix and that he has 
become somewhat reclusive.' [10] 
'I have also taken into account the fact that the 
offender has received adverse publicity as a result 
of his offending behaviour and that he will not, in 
practical terms, be able to return to the corporate 
world…I also accept that the offender has lost his 
reputation and had a significant fall from 
grace…'[in the context of extra-curial punishment] 
[39] 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Neutral 'Unlikely to be able to work again in the corporate 
sector. The offender has of his own volition 
resigned from the two non-executive 
directorships…as a direct consequence of the 
charge having been laid against him in April 2010.' 
[11] 
 
This was a submission made by counsel – no 
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discernible effect by the sentencing judge.  
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral  '… it was submitted that the extent of the offender's 
criminal venture was relatively modest given the 
amount of money that had been invested and the 
number of shares which had been purchased.' [22] 
Sentencing judge acknowledged that this was the 
Crown’s submission but no discernible effect as to 
treatment.  
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
 
 
Not raised  
 
 
 
 
'…it was submitted, was that the offender's 
connection to his superannuation account with that 
broker was readily traceable. The lack of subterfuge 
and sophistication meant, so it was submitted, that 
the offence was easier to detect than others of its 
kind.' [22] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Neutral Referred to R v Rivkin – not a 'victimless crime.' 
[15]  
 
No further consideration regarding this variable, 
therefore no discernible effect. 
7. Restitution Not raised   
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Neutral Fine of $70,000 
Acknowledged but no discernible effect. 
   
Case 20A R v Hall [No 2] [2005] NSWSC 890  
Sentence 2 years, 1 month imprisonment, released after 12 months with a 
good behaviour bond for the remainder of the sentence, upon a 
$5000 security without surety. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No - R v Hall [2005] NSWSC 889 concerned an application to 
withdraw a plea of guilty in relation to count 1 in the indictment. 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – s 1043A(1) - Insider trading 
Offence 
description  
The offender procured a company, Leisuremark, to sell shares in 
Clifford Corporation while in possession of inside information. 
The inside information was a letter from Clifford’s auditors.  The 
letter highlighted possible breaches of the Corporations Law, and 
urged the directors to seek legal advice.  It also suggested that 
Clifford may not be able to continue as a going concern, and that 
profits had been overstated by $15m.  The letter reminded the 
directors of their obligations in relation to price sensitive 
information. 
Offender 59 years old (offending) & 66 years old (sentencing); tertiary 
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status education, mature and intelligent, director of Clifford Corporation 
(publicly listed company) 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral 'He has no relevant criminal convictions. Ordinarily 
that would demonstrate good character, which 
ought to receive some favourable recognition in 
sentencing. However, ASIC brought civil penalty 
proceedings against Mr Hall in 2004. The matter 
proceeded before Bergin J. Her Honour made a 
number of declarations that Mr Hall had acted 
dishonestly in the exercise of his powers and the 
discharge of his duties as a director of companies in 
the Clifford group. They are not findings made 
beyond reasonable doubt. They are not criminal 
convictions. They are not, for the purposes of 
sentencing, a matter of aggravation (Weininger v 
The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629 at 638). They are, 
nonetheless, an aspect of Mr Hall's character and 
antecedents which show that the offence now being 
dealt with is not an aberration (cf s16A(2)(m)). 
Even were it the case that Mr Hall had good 
character, that fact would not be a significant 
mitigating factor in the context of 'white collar' 
offences such as insider trading (R v El Rashid 
(unreported, NSW CCA, 7.4.95) per Gleeson CJ).' 
[101] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'Further, it was suggested that, to some degree, Mr 
Hall and members of his family had been subjected 
to the shame and humiliation of publicity arising 
from these charges, which is a form of extra curial 
punishment. I accept that … such punishment 
should be taken into account in the complex 
synthesis relevant to the ultimate sentence.' [117] 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Neutral 'I should also refer to … other matters…As a result 
of the orders made by Bergin J [civil penalty in 
2004], he has been banned from managing any 
corporation for 14 years.' [118] 
No discernible effect. 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating ‘Instead, as a consequence of Mr Hall’s actions, the 
investing public lost more than $200,000.' [99] 
 
'Some 850,000 shares, yielding over $215,000, were 
sold…' [124] 
5. High level Aggravating  'There was no reason for covert action. Had the 
company somehow survived, the share dealing by 
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of planning/ 
sophistication 
Mr Hall may never have become known. The 
dealings became known because of the collapse.' 
[91] 
 
'Mr Hall, knowing that he had inside information, 
that is, information that was not generally available, 
and knowing that information was price sensitive, 
deliberately traded shares, when he well knew he 
should not do so.' [92] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating 'Instead, as a consequence of Mr Hall’s actions, the 
investing public lost more than $200,000.' [99] 
'Here, the Crown submits, and I accept, that the 
criminality on the part of Mr Hall was very 
significant. In many cases of insider trading, the 
offender seeks to profit from information that 
comes into his possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, 
the profit is confiscated once the crime has been 
detected. Such cases involve no monetary loss to an 
individual. There is, nonetheless, damage to the 
investing public's confidence in the integrity of the 
market. Such damage is serious enough. Here, it 
was worse. Here it can be inferred that, in addition, 
many people or institutions who bought shares in 
Clifford from Leisuremark in good faith lost their 
money (s16A(2)(e)). Some 850,000 shares, yielding 
over $215,000, were sold on the instructions of Mr 
Hall, those instructions being given on six separate 
occasions.' [124] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
   
Case 21A R v Cassidy [2005] NSWSC 410  
Sentence State offence – 9 months imprisonment 
Commonwealth offence – 12 months imprisonment (released on 
recognisance after 7 months ($2,500)) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 184(1) – 1 count  
Crimes Act 1990 (NSW) s 178BB(1) – 2 counts  
Offence 
description  
 Recklessly signing documents even though he suspected he had 
been given the wrong advice – resulted in value of the available 
assets being overstated by $129 million, effectively turning a 
deficiency of $111,861,000 into an apparent surplus of 
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$17,139,000 
Offender 
status 
56 year old; male; tertiary education; managing director 
(Australia) at HIH Insurance Group  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating '…no prior convictions.' [4] [37] 
'although good character is not quite as significant 
as a mitigating factor in relation to white collar 
crime…it still has a relevance…' [39] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Neutral 'Although the imposition of a sentence of 
imprisonment upon a corporate executive, with an 
extended history of otherwise blameless conduct is 
likely to have a severe impact upon him, and also 
upon his family, it cannot be said that there is, in 
this case, anything of an exceptional nature that 
would justify some amelioration of sentence.' [62] 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Neutral 'Although the imposition of a sentence of 
imprisonment upon a corporate executive, with an 
extended history of otherwise blameless conduct is 
likely to have a severe impact upon him, and also 
upon his family, it cannot be said that there is, in 
this case, anything of an exceptional nature that 
would justify some amelioration of sentence.' [62]  
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral  '…did not personally enrich the offender.' [35] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised '…not involving any form of deliberate deceit.' [19] 
Therefore there was no planning here  
However judge acknowledged that conduct re: Cth 
offence –'…knowingly signed minutes' 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Neutral  '…precise effect of the offences on individual 
victims is unascertainable, since the ultimate 
collapse of the HIH group was multifactorial and 
related to long standing and serious 
mismanagement by a wide group of persons.' [47] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 22A R v Huy Anh Le [2008] VSC 624 
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Sentence 12 months imprisonment wholly suspended for 2 years  
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No  
Major 
offence/s 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 74 - 1 count of theft, s 81 - 1 count of 
obtaining financial advantage by deception (‘OFAD’). 
Legal Practice Act 1996 s 188 - 1 count of deficiency in a trust 
account.  
Offence 
description  
Solicitor stealing from clients in property settlements and from 
trust account. 
Offender 
status 
39 year old, male, migrant, tertiary education, solicitor 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral 'You…have no prior convictions and no subsequent 
offending.' [25] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Neutral 'You were reprimanded by the tribunal and it was 
ordered that you be suspended from pracitce for 
three years from that date, effectively meaning that 
you were suspended from practise until at least 31 
May 2009.' [19]  
No further reduction from employment raised. No 
discernible effect. 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral 
 
'In terms of your offending, the amounts involved 
are at the lower end of the scale of offending.' [50] 
No discernible effect 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Not raised  
7. Restitution Mitigating 'I do take into account that full restitution will be 
made.' [47] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
   
Case 23A DPP v Nguyen [2010] VSC 182 
Sentence 36 months imprisonment wholly suspended for 3 years. 
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Sentence 
Appealed? 
No  
Major 
offence/s 
Crimes Act 1958 s 74 - 7 counts of theft, s 83 - 6 counts of false 
accounting. 
Legal Practice Act 1996 s 188 - 5 counts of deficiency in trust 
account. 
Offence 
description  
Offence committed in capacity as a solicitor – taking from clients  
Offender 
status 
37 year old, male, tertiary education, migrant, solicitor (sole 
practitioner) 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating '…you have no prior convictions and have been of 
good behaviour otherwise…I have taken [this] 
matter into account on your behalf.'  
 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating 'I do take into account the fact that these offences 
are now relatively old and that you have not 
practised in the meantime.' 
'I accept that your career in law is finished. I think 
that it is unlikely that you will be able to 
significantly pursue your alternative career as a 
migration agent.' 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Not raised  'The total of the deficiencies in your trust account 
was $180,262.75.' 
'I do, however, regard this case as one of the least 
serious of its kind to come before this Court, as is 
indicated by the net proceeds in your favour.' 
This involved a low amount of money according the 
court not a large amount of money. 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  Not applicable 
'…your crimes are largely those of a thoroughly 
disorganized person, rather than an outright 
dishonest one.'  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Not raised  
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
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Case 24A R v Moylan [2014] NSWSC 944  
Sentence 1 year, 8 months imprisonment (released on recognisance $1000 – 
good behaviour for 2 years) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No  
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041E - Disseminate false 
information likely to induce persons to dispose of financial 
products.  
Offence 
description  
Offender publishes hoax media release purportedly by ANZ 
Banking Group announcing withdrawal of facility to mining 
company. Share price in mining company drops & investors lose 
money 
Offender 
status 
26 year old, male, intelligent, tertiary education 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Not raised Offender was not of prior good character in this 
case. [88] 
Noted that offender has not previously been 
convicted of a serious offence [105] however this is 
not the variable we are testing.  
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral '…present offence did not involve personal 
financial gain…' [59] 
Resulted in offender being released on 
recognisance. (see [105]) 
 
Neutral because the focus is on the offender not 
profiting not the amount of money specifically 
involved. 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating Detailed - 'Specific planning concerning the 
offence' [11]-[27] 
 
'I accept here, that after the initial deception there 
was no attempt to conceal the crime. Indeed, it was 
always going to be straightforward to ascertain who 
the perpetrator was. The point of the offence was to 
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be discovered after a short period of time.' [57] 
 
'The Offender is undoubtedly an intelligent person. 
The offence was effected by reasonably careful and 
thorough planning so that at least in the short term 
the recipients of the false media release would 
believe the truth of what was contained within it.' 
[65] 
 
'As I have said, the offending was attended with a 
considerable degree of planning and pre-meditation, 
albeit over a fairly short timeframe of a few days. 
The use of the logo, the examination of previous 
media releases by the ANZ, the purchase and use of 
the domain name, as well as the name of an actual 
employee of the Bank on the media release and in 
the recorded message on the phone, and the number 
of recipients of the email, especially the numerous 
media outlets, all attest to the level of the planning 
for the offence.' [76] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating '…the actual damage was considerable, as is made 
clear by the level of trading in Whitehaven's shares 
and the significant sudden drop in the share price. I 
note that the share price recovered within a 
relatively short period of time, although that is not 
to ignore the damage done to individual investors 
who lost money by acting on the basis of the false 
statements.' [75] 
'Here, the market was manipulated, vast amounts of 
shares were unnecessarily traded and some 
investors lost money or their investment in 
Whitehaven entirely. These were not just 'day 
traders and speculators' as the Offender said to Mr 
Duffy - superannuation funds and ordinary 
investors suffered damage. It was intended that 
ANZ at least be embarrassed and that Whitehaven 
should be damaged or threatened, even if there was 
no intention to hurt shareholders and investors as 
such.' [103]   
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 25A R v Lirim Emini [2011] VSC 336 
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Sentence 24 months imprisonment, released on recognisance after 12 
months ($5,000). 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 184 - 3 counts of using position as 
a director dishonestly with intention of gaining an advantage. 
Offence 
description  
Transfer of shares and stocks despite position as director.  
Offender 
status 
48 years of age, male, career in finance, CEO.  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating '…previously unblemished record and character. A 
number of references were tendered on your behalf 
which spoke to your good character. I have been 
particularly impressed as to the detail and glowing 
nature of these references.' [37] 
'You are both entitled to have previous good 
character taken into account in the sentencing 
process.' [50] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating '… your prospects of future employment will 
undoubtedly be affected by convictions for the 
offences for which you have pleaded guilty.' [40]  
 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Not raised  
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating 'In sentencing both of you, it is relevant to consider 
any injury, loss or damage resulting from your 
offences.    The Crown does not allege any specific 
loss. The Crown notes that the securities transferred 
by you, Mr Emini, in July 2006 were returned, and 
then submits that, as a result of the settlement to 
which I have just referred, it is difficult to quantify 
any actual loss to OPSL’s creditors as a result of the 
criminal conduct of each of you.'  [34] 
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'Whilst the collapse of Opes Prime is part of the 
background and circumstances to your offending, it 
must be remembered that each of you falls to be 
sentenced for the offending to which you have 
pleaded guilty, rather than for some broad and 
uncharged allegation that you each engaged in 
fraudulent conduct which caused Opes Prime to 
collapse. I turn now to consider your personal 
circumstances.' [35] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 26A R v Anthony Charles Blumberg [2011] VSC 336  
Sentence 12 months imprisonment (released on recognisance after 6 months, 
$5,000) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 184 – 1 count of using position as a 
director dishonestly with intention of gaining an advantage. 
Offence 
description  
Transfer of shares & stocks despite position as director. 
Offender 
status 
43 years of age, male, director. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating '…person of unblemished character and 
reputation…I have been impressed by the detail and 
high regard in which you have been held as 
described in the references tendered on your behalf.' 
[43] 
 
'You are both entitled to have previous good 
character taken into account in the sentencing 
process.' [50] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating 'Your career in the finance and business sector 
commenced in 1992. From that time until the 
collapse of Opes Prime, you were largely engaged 
full-time in this sector. Since the collapse of Opes 
Prime, you have engaged in such employment as 
you could. Recently, and until the plea hearing, you 
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were working as a forklift driver.' [42] 
'…your prospects of future employment will 
undoubtedly be affected by a conviction for the 
offence for which you have pleaded guilty.' [46] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Not raised  
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating 'In sentencing both of you, it is relevant to consider 
any injury, loss or damage resulting from your 
offences.3 The Crown does not allege any specific 
loss. The Crown notes that the securities transferred 
by you, Mr Emini, in July 2006 were returned, and 
then submits that, as a result of the settlement to 
which I have just referred, it is difficult to quantify 
any actual loss to OPSL’s creditors as a result of the 
criminal conduct of each of you.'  [34] 
'Whilst the collapse of Opes Prime is part of the 
background and circumstances to your offending, it 
must be remembered that each of you falls to be 
sentenced for the offending to which you have 
pleaded guilty, rather than for some broad and 
uncharged allegation that you each engaged in 
fraudulent conduct which caused Opes Prime to 
collapse. I turn now to consider your personal 
circumstances.' [35] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 27A R v Lo [2007] NSWSC 105  
Sentence 9 months imprisonment  
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Crimes Act 1958 s 82 - 3 counts of OFAD. 
Offence 
description  
Gave significant assistance to authorities. 
Offender 57 year old, male, tertiary education, audit manager and company 
 159 
status secretary. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'The offender’s solicitor, colleagues, friends and 
family provided character references. They attest to 
his integrity and honest. They also indicate that the 
offences were out of character…' [27]  
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised   
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Not raised   
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Not raised   
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating '… continued concealment of the breach by FAI of 
the undertaking to maintain group shareholders’ 
funds above A$200 million enabled FAI to avoid 
the risk of the noteholders acting on the occurrence 
of an Event of Default and presenting their notes to 
Westpac.' [19] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Not raised   
7. Restitution Not raised   
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
   
Case 28A R v Shawn Darrell Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 
Sentence - 3 years and 9 months imprisonment (to be released on 
recognisance after 2 years and 6 months) 
- 2.5 years’ imprisonment, then 15 months’ good behaviour 
bond after release. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041E - False or misleading 
statements; s 1041G - dishonest conduct. 
Offence 
description  
Offender dishonestly operating the business in a way that was 
designed to, and had the effect of, diverting sums invested in 
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superannuation funds in Australia, into overseas funds located in 
tax havens.  The overseas funds were of questionable value and 
were inappropriate superannuation investments.  Misleading 
statements included product disclosure statements, designed to 
induce Australians to apply for financial products. 
Offending committed over 4 years.  
Offender 
status 
36 years old; male; did not complete tertiary education; director of 
Astarra Asset Management (AAM). 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'He has not committed any previous criminal 
offences. The Crown accepts, as do I, that prior to 
his involvement with the Trio Capital Group, he 
was a man of good character…[this] does not 
deserve much weight.' [116] [118] 
'The evidence satisfies me, as is often the case in 
white-collar crimes, that Mr Richard is unlikely to 
offend again. That is for a number of reasons 
including, but not limited to… the fact that he was 
of prior good character…' [94]   
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating '…he also entered into an Enforceable Undertaking 
with the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (Ex C) in which he undertook, in 
accordance with the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001, not to provide 
financial services in Australia permanently.'  [4] 
'The evidence satisfies me, as is often the case in 
white-collar crimes, that Mr Richard is unlikely to 
offend again. That is for a number of reasons 
including, but not limited to, the enforceable 
undertaking…'  [94] 
 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating 'I am satisfied that the losses involved in the 
offences amounted to $26.2m. This is a very large 
sum of money.' [77] 
 
'…he received over $1m personally, which was a 
very significant personal benefit.' [122] 
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5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating  '…engaged in conduct amounting to systematic 
deception in order to conceal the receipt of funds by 
him, including using private email accounts and 
overseas bank accounts to facilitate the concealment 
of the receipt of his personal benefit.' [65] 
'…carefully considered and planned…' [122] 
 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating $26.6m lost.  Loss of superannuation funds, which 
are intended to provide a secure retirement fund.  
The government announced a financial assistance 
package to victims of the fallen super fund, 
however not all investors were covered by the 
package.  Given lack of details of victims, the court 
was unable to make any findings about the personal 
circumstances of any victims of the offences. [68]-
[76] 
7. Restitution Not raised None of the $26.6m has been recovered. No weight 
expressed to be given to this factor → no restitution 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 29A R v Ashraf Kamha [2008] NSWSC 765 
Sentence 6 months imprisonment (fully suspended) (recognisance release 
order – 12 months good behaviour) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 590(1)(c)(iii) - Being privy to the 
fraudulent altering of the books of the company ( 
Offence 
description  
The offender was privy to the fraudulent alteration of FAI General 
Insurance’s books.  Claims estimates in the company’s database 
were reduced, which then flowed into publication by the company 
of a proclaimed trading profit of over $3m. Actually, there should 
have been a loss of just under $8m.  The decision to reduce claims 
was made while the offender was on leave, however he received a 
phone call from a superior, asking him to ensure that the person 
responsible for the reductions made the reductions in time for the 
half yearly accounts.  The offender passed on that instruction. 
Offender 
status 
Male; director of FAI General Insurance. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good Mitigating 'You have no prior convictions have previously led 
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character an unblemished life. The testimonials bear witness 
to this which is beyond the simple observation of an 
absence of prior conviction.' [10] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised   
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Not raised  
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Not raised  
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 30A R v Boulden [2006] NSWSC 1274  
Sentence 12 months’ imprisonment, to be served by way of periodic 
detention. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 590(1)(c)(iii) - Being privy to 
fraudulent alteration of accounts. 
Offence 
description  
The offender was privy to the fraudulent alteration of FAI General 
Insurance’s books.  Claims estimates in the company’s database 
were reduced, which then flowed into publication by the company 
of a proclaimed trading profit of over $3m. Actually, there should 
have been a loss of about $8m.  The offender requested the 
improper reductions to be carried out. 
Offender 
status 
42 years old; male; tertiary education; financial controller of FAI 
General Insurance New Zealand (Financial Controller of the 
Corporate and Professional Insurance Division at the time of 
offending). 
Sentencing Treatment Remarks 
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Variables 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'Prior to this matter he had no criminal record.' [11] 
'…number of testimonials before me which attest to 
the offender’s good character and his record of 
community involvement…' [12] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'At the present time he lives in Queensland and, as I 
understand it, his move to that State was in part 
related to the personal and professional difficulties 
he faced as a consequence of the subject offence 
and its publicity in the aftermath of the HIH 
catastrophe.' [11] 
'The testimonials also speak of the offender’s shame 
and embarrassment as a result of the commission of 
the offence…' [15] 
'I see no reason to refrain from taking into account 
the expressions of remorse he has made to his 
friends and business acquaintances, as evidenced in 
the testimonials presented on his behalf.' [48]  
Appears mitigating to the extent that it 
demonstrates remorse. 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Neutral 'In all other respects, the testimonials reflect the fact 
that, partly as a consequence of the commission of 
this offence, the offender has been virtually forced 
out of the insurance business. He has had to find, 
with some difficulty, other avenues for earning an 
income to support himself and his family.' [15] 
No other comment by judge – therefore, no 
discernible effect 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral '… it is clear that, apart from 'hanging on' to his 
own position with its well paid salary, the offender 
did not stand to gain personally in a financial 
manner from the creation of the fraudulent 
document.' [17] 
'The offender knew and intended that the false entry 
in the ledger that he caused to be made would 
directly lead to a false reduction of FAIG’s 
underwriting loss for the year ended 31 December 
1997 of about $5.5 million. The offender also knew 
and intended that, when consolidated with the 
accounts of FAI Insurance Limited, this would 
directly lead to a false increase in FAI’s profit of 
about $5.5 million, thereby converting what would 
have been an overall loss for that period into a small 
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profit.' [18]  
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'Objective criminality…The fraudulent nature of the 
exercise is illustrated by the fact that on 23 January 
1998, he again e-mailed Mr Gross and lied to him 
about the reason for the alteration to the journals.' 
Counsel submission -  '…[offender] played a role in 
planning, and a significant role in implementing the 
alterations.' [19] – no specific comment on this by 
judge. 
'…offender knew that the alteration he directed 
would be likely to be reflected in false profit figures 
released to the market.' [33] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim  
Not raised  
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 31A R v Robert Bart Doff [2005] NSWSC 50 
Sentence 350 hours’ community service work and a fine of $30,000. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes - R v Doff [2005] NSWCCA 119, but appeal dismissed. 
Major 
offence/s 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1043A(1) - Insider trading. 
Offence 
description  
The offender learnt through a meeting with the CEO of Impulse 
Airlines, that there was a deal for the merging of Impulse’s 
business with Qantas and that ACCC approval was still 
outstanding.  Within about 3 hours of learning the inside 
information, the offender instructed his stockbroker to purchase 
20,000 Qantas shares, in the name of the offender’s company.  
Due to the similarity with Rivkin’s case, which was heard before 
this case, the sentencing judge paid close attention to Rivkin’s 
sentence.  The sentencing was a comparison exercise. 
Offender 
status 
Mature and intelligent man, proprietor of a large and apparently 
successful real estate agency (Rene Rivkin’s real estate agent, 
acting on the sale of Rivkin’s property to the CEO of Impulse 
Airlines). 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
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1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'The offender is a man of prior good character. He 
is well regarded in the community. I accept without 
reservation the evidence of those who spoke about 
his integrity and reputation before the events of 
April 2001. He has worked for and given to 
charities. Of course, in offences of this kind, which 
are likely to be committed by persons of good 
character and call specially for deterrent sentences, 
good character must be given limited weight in 
sentencing.' [42]  
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Neutral 'I take into account that by the Corporations Act the 
offender is automatically disqualified by his 
conviction from managing a corporation. As things 
stood, he was a director of and presumably 
managed two companies as well as Jetoten. I take 
into account the possibility that the New South 
Wales Director of Fair Trading may bring an action 
asserting that because of this offence the offender is 
not a fit and proper person to be involved in the 
conduct of the business of a real estate licensee.' 
No discernible effect 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral  
 
'The offender invested $55,855.00 in the purchase 
of 20,000 shares…gross profit of $11,800.00.' [30] 
'…amount invested is a more important indicator of 
criminality than the amount ultimately realized 
from the criminal activity concerned.' [31] 
Comments made when comparing criminality of 
offender to that of Rivkin – '…offender’s 
criminality was significantly less than Mr Rivkin’s.' 
[31]  
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised   
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Not raised   
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating Pecuniary penalty order of $30,000 [45] 
Mitigating in so far as it shows co-operation with 
authorities.  
   
Case 32A R v Williams [2005] NSWSC 315 
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Sentence 4 years and 6 months (non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
False statements or omissions in company documents. 
Offence 
description  
The offender authorised the issue of a prospectus in relation to 
securities in HIH, from which prospectus there was a material 
omission.  The offender also authorised a statement in the HIH 
Annual Report which he knew to be misleading.  The offender was 
also reckless and failed to exercise his powers and discharge his 
duties for a proper purpose, in that he signed a letter to 
Noteholders which contained a misleading statement. 
Offender 
status 
68 years old; male; CEO of HIH. 
 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'Apart from the matters, which bring him before this 
Court, he has led an exemplary life, in the course of 
which he has made an exceedingly valuable 
contribution to the community. He has no criminal 
antecedents and was the recipient of an award in the 
Order of Australia.' [49] 
'…exceedingly generous donor to a wide variety of 
charities… has given up much of his personal time 
to hands on involvement in the activities [of the 
community]… These donations it was accepted 
were his personal donations, although they were 
sourced from the income stream that he received as 
Chief Executive Officer of HIH.' [51]-[52] 
'A considerable body of evidence has been placed 
before me either through written references, or oral 
testimony as to his integrity and good character, and 
as to the high regard with which he had been 
viewed in the business community and in the 
general community.' [55] 
'Upon any view the evidence as to his character and 
community contribution is prodigious, and he must 
be given some credit for it, although as Bray CJ 
observed in R v Thompson (1975) 11 SASR 217 at 
[222], where the need for general deterrence is 
strong, the courts generally give less weight to good 
character.' [60] 
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2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating Counsel submitted – 'the public vilification which 
has been attracted to him as a result of the collapse 
of HIH, including the very considerable and 
somewhat hostile media coverage in which he has 
been categorised as a 'corporate crook'. It has left 
him with a permanently damaged reputation and 
loss of standing in the community, and it has also 
led to the removal of his name from the title of the 
'Ray Williams Institute of Paediatric 
Endocrinology, Diabetes and Metabolism' from the 
Medical Research Unit at the Childrens’ Hospital at 
Westmead that he had endowed and supported for 
many years…' [69]    
'It is true that some weight needs to be given to 
these consequences, in so far as the current 
convictions carry with them the public opprobrium 
which attaches to that circumstance…' [70] 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating Counsel submitted – '…the 10 year disqualification, 
under s 206C of the Corporations Act, which 
followed upon the declarations of contravention of 
ss 180 and 182 of that Act made in the last 
mentioned proceedings. Together with his present 
age of 68 years, and the two matters next identified, 
this has left him unemployed and unemployable 
without any hope of resuming any form of 
commercial activity…' [69] 
'It is true that some weight needs to be given to 
these consequences… in so far as they would of 
themselves result in a 5 year period of 
disqualification from corporate governance.' [70] 
 
The offender received a 10 year disqualification. 
 
The offender is unemployed, unemployable and 
without any hope of resuming any form of 
commercial activity. 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral '…it is not contended that the Defendant 
[committed the three offences] …for the immediate 
purpose of generating some personal gain for 
himself.' [41] 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Neutral 
 
'…the offences span the last three years of HIH, and 
I accept the Crown submission that they were likely 
to have contributed, to some degree, to the 
prolongation of its life, by facilitating the raising of 
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further capital and by misrepresenting the group’s 
financial position.' [39] 
'…it is not contended that the Defendant was the 
architect of, or solely responsible for, any of the 
three offences…' [41]  
'the three offences in this case were objectively 
serious, and they effectively extended over a 
somewhat lengthy period.' [43] 
Appears to be low level planning in this case but no 
discernible effect. 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Not raised  
7. Restitution Neutral 'While the Defendant has demonstrated personal 
remorse and contrition, faces potential civil 
litigation which may result in orders for the 
repayment of monies or for the payment of 
damages, has paid a pecuniary penalty to ASIC and 
may have to give contribution in relation to the 
transaction which involved Mr Adler, nothing has 
been placed before me to show that he has, to this 
point, made any material reparation in relation to 
these offences.' [71] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 33A R v Milne [No 6] [2010] NSWSC 1467 
Sentence 8.5 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years 9 
months. 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Criminal Code 1995 s 135.1(1) - dishonestly obtaining a gain from 
the Commonwealth, s 400.3(1) - money laundering. 
Offence 
description  
55 years old, male, successful businessman, sole director and 
shareholder of Barat Advisory. 
Offender 
status 
The offender caused a company, Barat Advisory, to lodge a tax 
return that contained false information.  Barat Advisory acquired 
part of a debt owed by Admerex to Clairmont Holdings.  Barat 
Advisory was meant to pay Clairmont Holdings consideration for 
the partial sale of the debt, but it did not.  In repayment of the debt 
now owed to Barat Advisory, Admerex issued shares to Barat 
Advisory.  The shares were valued at $2,236,459.  Barat Advisory 
transferred the shares to offshore ‘stitching’ companies, but the 
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offender intended Barat Advisory to retain its beneficial interest in 
the shares. None of Barat Advisory’s financial documents record 
any payment by the stitching companies for the transfer of the 
shares, or any debt owed by the stitching companies.  The transfer 
was of legal title only.  There were various sales of the shares 
through international entities, and money was deposited into Barat 
Advisory’s Australian accounts.  The offender misled his 
accountants, and caused false tax returns to be lodged. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'He has no prior convictions.' [199] 
 
'All testimonials refer to the Offender’s successful 
career in business over many years, in 
circumstances which are described as being honest 
and honourable. The evidence reveals the Offender 
to be a hard-working man who has provided well 
for his family.' [202] 
 
'I accept that the offender is a man of good 
character.' [204] 
 
'I will give weight to his good character on 
sentence.' [221] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Mitigating 'I accept the submission for the Offender that the 
convictions will make it more difficult for him to 
operate commercially, to obtain employment and to 
visit overseas for the purpose of employment and I 
take this into account on sentence.' [229] 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Aggravating 'There was a substantial loss to the revenue as a 
result of the offences, with the Commonwealth 
being deprived of capital gains tax in a sum of at 
least $1,964,727.00.' [210] 
'The amount of capital gains tax evaded was very 
substantial, exceeding $1.9 million.' [249] 
'…necessary to have regard to the total value of the 
money or property involved. In this case, the 48 
Million Admerex shares, which the offender dealt 
with, intending that they would become an 
instrument of crime, were valued at between $8.4 
million and $9.12 million.' [258] 
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5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating '…serious example of …offence…involving the 
establishment and misuse of a sophisticated 
offshore structure for the specific purpose of 
avoiding the payment by Barat Advisory of a 
substantial amount of tax.' [208] 
 
'..significant degree of planning and deceit.' [260] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating '…in the circumstances of this case, that serious tax 
fraud of this type affects the whole community in a 
detrimental way.' [251] 
 
'In this case, the amount of tax which was not paid, 
but which ought to have been paid, was no less than 
$1,964,727.00.' [261] 
7. Restitution Neutral 'A number of assets of the Offender are subject to a 
forfeiture application under the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 (Cth).' [216] 
No further comments on this. No discernible effect. 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 34A DPP v Peter John Couper [2012] VCC 875  
Sentence At first instance - 21 months suspended for 3 years, and fined 
$10,000 
On appeal - 1 year and 10 months imprisonment, fine of $10,000 
(recognisance after 60 days imprisonment - $1,000) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – DPP v Couper [2013] VSCA 72 – appeal allowed  
Major 
offence/s 
- Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1307(1) - falsification of 
books – 2 counts  
- Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1309(1) – false information 
– 1 count 
- Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 
s 64 – False information - 1 count  
Offence 
description  
'In very short compass, in 2007, as Chief Financial Officer of the 
On Q Group, the parent company of Bill Express (BXP), you 
arranged for the false documentation in BXP company books of a 
non existent purchase of stock, and then its sale for considerable 
profits to two other entities, when in fact, that sale never took 
place.' [4]    
Offender 
status 
 58 years old; male; certificate of business studies; chief financial 
officer of large, public, high-tech company with a staff of over 
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3,000; accountant (paid employee not director nor shareholder in 
company) 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral '…no prior convictions.' [10] 
'…engaged in a great deal of community service 
over the years.' [15] 
'I am satisfied, demonstrated a genuine commitment 
to community welfare, as evidenced by your 
involvement in the various organisations, to which I 
have referred, on a voluntary basis.' [38]   
'My concern is that you have been presented to me 
as a man of otherwise impeccable morals who 
under a particular situation of pressure abandoned 
those principles and engaged in behaviour which 
had the potential to deceive large numbers of 
persons in the community, that is actual or potential 
investors in a public company, that is BXP. In one 
sense your previous honest and good character tells 
against you insofar as this offending is concerned. 
You would have known very well that what you did 
was entirely wrong.' [41] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  FIRST INSTANCE – Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Not raised  FIRST INSTANCE – Not raised ('The directors at 
APN are apparently aware of your legal situation, 
are supportive of you and wish you to continue 
employment with them.' [20] → Therefore not 
applicable.) 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral  'Most significantly, as I have said, you received no 
gain from your activities which, in my view, from 
the authorities that I was referred to, has particular 
weight in the sentencing exercise.' [45] 
Also mentioned in the prosecution opening but not 
referred to by the judge in the sentencing decision.  
'On 29 February 2008, the financial statements of 
BXP for the half-year ended 31 December 2007 
were approved. The financial statements showed a 
net loss before tax ('NLBT') for the half-year of 
$3.041 million for the BXP consolidated entities. 
Without the recorded profit on the sale of Simix 
stock of $3.525 million, the loss for the half-year 
would have been more than double than that 
recorded for the BXP consolidated entities for the 
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period, amounting to a loss of $6,566,000' (p. 33) 
Neutral because the focus is on the offender not 
profiting not the amount of money specifically 
involved. 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating  FIRST INSTANCE – Not raised  
ON APPEAL – 'To my mind, the moral culpability 
exhibited by the respondent’s offending and the 
need for general deterrence justify the imposition of 
an immediate custodial sentence. I base that 
conclusion, in particular, upon the fact that the 
respondent’s conduct involved repeated instances of 
dishonesty over a protracted period of time. It is 
significant that the respondent had to instruct 
innocent employees of BXP to record transactions 
that the respondent knew had not taken place 
because the transactions related to non-existent 
stock. Those employees were placed in a position of 
carrying out what they took to be their 
responsibilities in good faith and, while believing in 
the respondent’s honesty, followed his instructions 
and thereby, indirectly and unintentionally misled 
the market.' [110] 
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Aggravating First Instance – Not raised  
ON APPEAL – 'While the particular individuals 
who were harmed in this case from the respondent’s 
recording of false entries in company journals and 
the resulting artificial increase in the price of BXP 
shares may not be identifiable, there is a harm that 
lies in the erosion of confidence in the market as a 
whole. The offending had the potential to impair the 
efficacy and integrity of the market in public 
securities.' [108] 
7. Restitution Not raised   
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Neutral Fined $10,000.  
Acknowledged but no discernible effect. 
   
Case 35A DPP v Kenneth Edward Hampson [2006] VSC 229 
Sentence 5 years imprisonment (2 years and 6 months non-parole). 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major 
offence/s 
Legal Practice Act 1996 (Cth) s 188 – deficiency in a trust account 
of over $600,000  
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Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 74 - 18 counts of theft  
Offence 
description  
The offender stole money from 18 clients’ trust accounts.  
Sometimes the stolen monies were applied to the offender’s own 
benefit, and other times to the benefit of other clients. 
Offender 
status 
61 year old (at time of sentence); male; tertiary education; solicitor 
and principal of a sole practice. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'There are many other mitigating factors for which I 
must allow…you have no prior convictions.' 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'There are many other mitigating factors for which I 
must allow…you have suffered, and will continue 
to suffer, enormous shame and humiliation.' 
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Neutral The offender has found it difficult to find 
employment, and was prepared to engage in manual 
labour.  
Raised but no discernible effect. 
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral The trust account deficiency was $623,862.03.  The 
total amount of money stolen exceeded $1m. 
Raised but no discernible effect. 
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating '…you aggravated the situation by covering up for 
many years. Indeed, you preserved the veneer of 
respectability for nearly nine years.'  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim 
Neutral '…testator prepared a victim impact statement. It 
refers to her perception of you as a man whom her 
father trusted, in whom he felt safe and secure, as 
well as being a friend of the family, and in whom 
she too felt safe. She spoke of the hurt and anger 
she felt about having to lodge a Fidelity Fund 
claim…' 
Reference made to victim impact statements but no 
discernible effect as to treatment. 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 36A DPP v Gabriel Werden [2006] VSC 397 
Sentence 5 years and 10 months imprisonment (3 years and 4 months non-
parole) 
Sentence No 
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Appealed? 
Major 
offence/s 
Legal Practice Act 1996 (Cth) s 188 – deficiency in a trust account  
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 74 - 9 counts of theft, s82 – 3 counts of 
OFAD.  
Offence 
description  
The offender stole money from 9 clients’ trust accounts, and 
applied the money to his own benefit, including for gambling 
purposes. 
Offender 
status 
40 year old, male, tertiary education, solicitor and principal of a 
sole practice. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Not raised Not applicable – in this case the offender was not of 
good character.  
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction 
of 
employment/
career 
prospects 
Not raised   
4. Large 
amount of 
money 
involved 
Neutral  The deficiency in the trust account was 
$1,104,729.11.  
Raised but no discernible effect as to the treatment 
of this variable.  
5. High level 
of planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level 
of harm to 
victim  
Neutral '…victims whom you misled and deceived.'  
No further mention of this.  
7. Restitution Not raised   
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
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B Type B Case Analysis 
 
Case 1B R v Gregory [2010] VSC 121  
Sentence 2 years imprisonment to be released on recognisance after 12 
months ($5,000) [56] 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – DPP (Cth) v Gregory [2011] VSCA 145 – appeal 
dismissed  
Major offence/s Criminal Code 1995 s 135.4(5) - Conspiring to dishonestly 
cause a risk of loss to the Cth. 
Offence 
description  
Assisted Wheatley in an attempt to evade Australian income 
tax by remitting funds overseas to a company based in 
Switzerland  
Offender status  61 year old male, highly successful, solicitor. [33] 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes – avoiding legal obligation [27] 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes  
- '…your position and role as a solicitor is itself an 
aggravating feature of the offence.' [34] 
- 'Your conduct involved blatant dishonesty and the 
exploitation of your position as a solicitor…' [43] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'You practised as a solicitor for over 39 years. 
Over this period, you achieved a great deal. You 
rose to positions of great responsibility and you 
earned the respect and regard of your clients and 
your colleagues. On your plea, a remarkable 
series of testimonials were tendered concerning 
your professional activities and your activities in 
the community. They reveal you to be a person 
who has been, and with many continues to be, 
held in the highest regard. It is truly tragic that 
such a career, built upon such hard work and 
dedication, is blighted by this offence.' [33]  
'Indeed, the offence of which you have been 
convicted is a type of offence commonly 
committed by people of otherwise good 
character. In these circumstances, good character 
does not carry the same weight as it otherwise 
would.' [39]  
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'I have already referred to the testimonials 
tendered on your plea concerning your 
professional and community activities. I have 
also had regard to those testimonials concerning 
your personal characteristics. Honesty, diligence 
and generosity are common themes. Evidence to 
a similar effect was given on your trial. I am sure 
that the thought of defrauding some person or 
company, other than in a tax context, is one 
which you would have never countenanced and 
would, indeed, have found quite abhorrent. I can 
only conclude that you have, as have many other 
otherwise honest people, adopted a different set 
of values where the objective is taxation 
minimisation. The authorities make it clear that 
no such distinction is to be drawn.' [38] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Neutral 'You have both been subjected to public 
humiliation.' [45] 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'It is truly tragic that such a career, built upon 
such hard work and dedication, is blighted by 
this offence.' [33]  
'The loss you have suffered in relation to your 
profession is more significant than that suffered 
by Mr Wheatley. The submission made on your 
behalf that your career in the law is finished 
seems to me to be well-founded.' [53] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Not raised  'I am satisfied that $22,000 was your agreed 
share of the 11% 'tax.' This sum is considerably 
less than Mr Wheatley’s benefit of almost 
$200,000.' [51] 
This involved a low amount of money not a 
large amount of money. 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravatin
g 
'…calculated [and] elaborate deception…' [19] 
[22] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Not raised   
7. Restitution Neutral 'You have both made reparation in relation to 
your gains.' [45]  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating 'You consented to a pecuniary penalty order in 
the sum of $27,441.57, which I made on 26 
March 2010. I have taken into account your 
consent to that order on the basis that it 
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constitutes co-operation for the purposes of s 
320 of the Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 (Cth).' 
[27] 
  
Case 2B R v Hargraves [2010] QSC 188  (79 ATR 406) 
Sentence 6.5 years imprisonment (3 years and 9 months non-parole) 
However, set aside on appeal and ordered 5 years imprisonment  
(2 years and 6 months non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – R v Hargraves [2010] QCA 328 – allowed on the basis 
of evidence & erroneous judge directions 
Major offence/s Criminal Code Act 1995 s 135.4 - Conspiracy to defraud the 
Commonwealth (ATO) 
Offence 
description  
Set up tax avoidance scheme (p. 406) 
Offender status  Between 31-34 years old at time of offending, male. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes – taking money and avoiding tax obligation 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Directors & shareholders – respected and trusted co-director 
but appellants did not abuse a position of trust [223] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'The prisoners’ good character, generosity and 
charity are factors in their favour.' [44] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Neutral 'The total amount of tax which would 
eventually have been paid had the conspiracy 
not taken place would therefore have been 
about $2,228,770.' [20] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'I shall sentence on the basis that the prisoners 
entered into an elaborate scheme, but did so 
initially without dishonesty… That said, the 
prisoners persisted in dishonest conduct for 
more than 3 years until they were caught.' [34] 
  
'… offences … particularly difficult to 
 178 
detect…The prisoners caused Phone 
Directories to send money to a London bank 
account owned by a company incorporated in 
the British Virgin Islands, purportedly for the 
provision of electronic services. The money 
was then laundered in a way which ordinarily 
would have been completely opaque to the 
Australian Taxation Office and in places 
(Jersey and Switzerland) beyond its jurisdiction 
to investigate. Much of it was repatriated 
anonymously in cash by the use of debit cards 
in machines which required no signature. 
Hargraves investigated investing some of it in 
Europe and he may have made investments. 
The scheme was discovered only by chance, 
through the carelessness ... These features 
place the case in a class above ordinary tax 
fraud. It is necessary to deter such conduct 'by 
the imposition of penalties that those minded to 
defraud governmental departments will find an 
unacceptable risk.' [38] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'Tax evasion is not a game, or a victimless 
crime. It is a form of corruption and is, 
therefore, insidious.' [41] 
7. Restitution Mitigating 'I accept the submission on behalf of the 
prisoners that it is relevant to take these penalty 
payments into account in assessing the 
sentence to be imposed.' [23]  
'I have referred above to the large amounts of 
money assessed by and paid to the ATO in 
respect of the years covered by the scheme.22 
To the extent that this money is comprised of 
tax properly payable and interest for late 
payment, I disregard it.' [42]  
'The payment of penalty tax is a form of 
punishment that has been imposed upon the 
offender in addition to that which the Court 
imposes by way of sentence.'  [223] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 3B R v Stoten [2010] QSC 188 
Sentence 6.5 years imprisonment (3 years and 9 months non-parole) 
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However, set aside on appeal, ordering 5 years imprisonment 
(2 years and 6 months non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes - R v Stoten [2010] QSA 328 
Major offence/s Criminal Code Act 1995 s 135.4 - Conspiracy to defraud the 
Commonwealth (ATO) 
Offence 
description  
Set up tax avoidance scheme (p. 406) 
Offender status  30-33 years old at time of offending, male, solicitor. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes - taking money and avoiding tax obligation 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Directors & shareholders – respected and trusted co-director 
but appellants did not abuse a position of trust [223] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'The prisoners’ good character, generosity and 
charity are factors in their favour.' [44] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Neutral 'The total amount of tax which would 
eventually have been paid had the conspiracy 
not taken place would therefore have been 
about $2,228,770.' [20] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'I shall sentence on the basis that the prisoners 
entered into an elaborate scheme, but did so 
initially without dishonesty… That said, the 
prisoners persisted in dishonest conduct for 
more than 3 years until they were caught.' [34] 
  
'… offences … particularly difficult to 
detect…The prisoners caused Phone 
Directories to send money to a London bank 
account owned by a company incorporated in 
the British Virgin Islands, purportedly for the 
provision of electronic services. The money 
was then laundered in a way which ordinarily 
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would have been completely opaque to the 
Australian Taxation Office and in places 
(Jersey and Switzerland) beyond its jurisdiction 
to investigate. Much of it was repatriated 
anonymously in cash by the use of debit cards 
in machines which required no signature. 
Hargraves investigated investing some of it in 
Europe and he may have made investments. 
The scheme was discovered only by chance, 
through the carelessness ... These features 
place the case in a class above ordinary tax 
fraud. It is necessary to deter such conduct 'by 
the imposition of penalties that those minded to 
defraud governmental departments will find an 
unacceptable risk.' [38] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'Tax evasion is not a game, or a victimless 
crime. It is a form of corruption and is, 
therefore, insidious.' [41] 
7. Restitution Mitigating 'I accept the submission on behalf of the 
prisoners that it is relevant to take these penalty 
payments into account in assessing the 
sentence to be imposed.' [23]  
'I have referred above to the large amounts of 
money assessed by and paid to the ATO in 
respect of the years covered by the scheme.22 
To the extent that this money is comprised of 
tax properly payable and interest for late 
payment, I disregard it.' [42]  
'The payment of penalty tax is a form of 
punishment that has been imposed upon the 
offender in addition to that which the Court 
imposes by way of sentence.'  [223] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
  
Case 4B The Queen v Julie Anne Laird [2005] VSC 185  
Sentence 7 years imprisonment (3 years and 6 months non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s 
 
Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 188 - 5 counts of deficiencies 
in solicitors trust account 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 81 – 12 counts of obtaining property 
by deception (‘OPD’); s 74 – 2 counts of theft 
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Offence 
description  
19 counts involving $2,875,000 
Offender status  48 year old, female, educated at RMIT & did articled clerk’s 
course, solicitor at her own practice. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Each of these offences took place in grave breach of your trust 
as a solicitor 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral 'You have no prior convictions and although 
you did not seek to call before me witnesses as 
to your character, I accept that you were a 
person of previous good reputation. However, 
at the same time it must be remembered that 
your good reputation enabled you to persuade 
your clients that you were acting in their best 
interests.'  
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'You have been dealt with by the legal 
profession tribunal and orders have been made 
prohibiting you from applying for a practising 
certificate for 20 years. It can be anticipated 
you will never practise again. You have now 
lost your reputation as a member of an 
honourable profession. These matters in 
themselves are a punishment of some weight.' 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating '…apparent that substantial amounts of money 
were applied to the trust accounts of clients 
from whom you stole so as to hide your crime, 
it is also apparent that there are substantial 
sums of money which have been taken and for 
which there is no explanation as to how such 
sums have been applied.' 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating '…you engaged in a systematic course of 
conduct involving false accounting, trust 
account deficiencies, and, ultimately 35 trust 
account defalcations.’  
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6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'The victim impact statements filed before me 
demonstrate movingly the effect of your 
criminal conduct upon some of your victims.'  
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 5B The Queen v Maurice Bernstein [2008] VSC 254  
Sentence Suspended sentence – 3 years imprisonment and fine of 240 
penalty units 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s 
 
Crimes Act 1958 s 74 – 4 counts of theft; 1 count of OPD 
Legal Practices Act 1996 s 188 - 1 count of deficiency in trust 
account  
Offence 
description  
 
Drawing trust cheques & falsely describing it in a file memo – 
used to repay personal debts. Telling clients he would invest 
money but actually kept it ($100,000) (p. 2) 
Falsified entries in trust accounts and created false memoranda 
and records to hide fraud (p. 9) 
Offender status  60 year old, male, tertiary education, solicitor  
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Gross breach of trust of your oath and obligations as a solicitor  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'You are without any prior convictions and a 
number of witnesses gave evidence as to your 
reputation for good character and competence 
and efficiency as a solicitor. Some of them also 
spoke of your willingness to assist other 
practitioners. Mention was made too of the 
substantial contribution which you have made 
outside the law through your work on behalf of 
the North Eastern Jewish Community.' (p. 10, 
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11) 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Neutral 'I have taken into account the shame and loss of 
profession which you have suffered. They are 
no doubt a significant punishment for your 
betrayal of the trust of the profession. But other 
things being equal, I would imprison you now 
for being the thief that you are.' (p. 18) 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Neutral 'I have taken into account the shame and loss of 
profession which you have suffered. They are 
no doubt a significant punishment for your 
betrayal of the trust of the profession. But other 
things being equal, I would imprison you now 
for being the thief that you are.' (p. 18) 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating '…increasingly serious in terms of the amounts 
involved on each occasion…' (p. 7) 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'Offending was repeated and protracted over a 
substantial period of time… aggravated by the 
cunning and deceit with which you concealed 
your fraud from your partners and your 
clients… it was planned and premeditated.' (p. 
7) 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating  'According… to Ms Kayser’s victim impact 
statement, the Estate of Elizabeth Freshman 
has suffered a loss of interest as a result of your 
offending which is estimated at between 
$55,000 and $65,000. Ms Kayser also speaks in 
her victim impact statement of her loss of trust 
in you and of the depressing effect upon her of 
you having let her down as you did…' (p. 10) 
7. Restitution Neutral 'You have repaid all the moneys which you 
misappropriated, although you have not paid 
any interest on them.' (p. 10) 
No discernible effect  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Neutral Fine of 240 penalty units. No discernible effect 
  
Case 6B The Queen v Omar Jihad Yusuf [2008] VSC 575 
Sentence 12 years imprisonment (9 years non-parole). 
Appeal court affirmed sentence. [39] 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – Yusuf v The Queen [2010] VSCA 266 
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Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 s 81 - 107 counts of OPD; s 82 - 19 counts of 
OFAD 
Offence 
description  
 
Fraudulent obtaining of loans for the purported purpose of 
purchase of trucks – total sum $7,297,400 – raising capital from 
public through investing schemes.  
Offender status  40 year old male, migrant, completed Year 10, sole director of 
several companies  
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes – done in the course of conducting business with 109 
members of the public – encouraged investments with formal 
documentation.  
Also 'totally unscrupulous…came' 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral 'You have one prior conviction in respect of a 
false report made to police concerning a traffic 
incident. I do not regard it as of significance in 
the present context, although it is entirely 
consistent with the pervasive dishonesty which 
characterises the conduct which has brought 
you before this Court.'  
Treatment confirmed on appeal [25] [26] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised   
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'Not only is the scale of your offending a 
matter bearing on the culpability of your 
conduct, but its extent, rapacity and monetary 
significance raises substantial issues of general 
deterrence and of individual deterrence. It also 
in my view raises a serious question of 
protection of the public.'  
 
 Treatment confirmed on appeal [25] [26] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating '…your deception was deliberate and was 
pursued relentlessly for personal gain.' 
'The penalties I impose must reflect…the 
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significant period of offending…' 
 Treatment confirmed on appeal [30] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating Net loss suffered by them of $5,568,752.  
'The victim impact statements that have been 
filed on behalf of individual investors 
demonstrate that the effect of your actions was 
for many of them the total destruction of their 
accumulated savings. You have inflicted 
serious financial loss on a large number of 
individuals each of whom trusted you.' 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 7B The Queen v Ian Stuart Rau [2010] VSC 370  
Sentence 18 months imprisonment then released on recognisance ($500) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s 
 
Charge 1 - Carrying on a financial services business without 
holding an Australian Financial Services Licence (s 911A 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)).  
Charge 2-5 - Engaging in dishonest conduct in carrying on a 
financial services business contrary to s 1041G Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth).  
Charge 6- Making a false document contrary to s 83A (1) of the 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).  
Charge 7 - Using a false document contrary to s 83A (2) of the 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).  
Charge 8 - Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 81(1) - OPD 
Offence 
description  
 
Dishonest conduct whilst carrying on financial services 
business without a licence  
Ponzi scheme with Hoy 
Offender status  
 
Male, failed year 12 then trained as a radio technician; little 
formal/informal education to prepare for a career in managing 
other people’s money. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes 
Position of 
substantial 
Misleading investors with false promises – highly dishonest. 
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influence? 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'There are a number of matters that can be stated 
in your favour on the issue of sentence….You 
have no prior convictions. It is often stated that 
in 'white collar' cases that fact has a lesser 
significance than in other types of cases. That is 
because it is this type of offenders’ good 
character that allows him or her to be the 
repository of the very trust that they have 
breached. Whilst it is of lesser weight than 
otherwise it would be, prior good character 
remains a relevant sentencing consideration. It 
informs aspects of personal deterrence, 
rehabilitation and the concept of adequate 
punishment.' (p. 9, 11) 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'There are a number of matters that can be stated 
in your favour on the issue of sentence….I 
accept that you have suffered significant 
punishment already…your humiliation has been 
widely publicised…' (p. 9, 11) 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'There are a number of matters that can be stated 
in your favour on the issue of sentence….I 
accept that you have suffered significant 
punishment already. You will be disqualified 
from holding corporate office (s 206B 
Corporations Act).' (p. 9, 11) 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Neutral Money lost as a result of investors relying on 
advice. 
 
No discernible effect. 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Not raised  
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
  
Case 8B The Queen v Graeme Ronald Hoy [2011] VSC 95  
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Sentence 13 years and 9 months imprisonment (9 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Hoy v The Queen [2012] VSCA 49 – appeal dismissed 
Major offence/s 
 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 
s 82(1) - 34 charges of OFAD, s81(1) - 10 charges of OPD  
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
Carrying on a financial services business without a licence 
(s.911A(1)) engaging in dishonest conduct in carrying on a 
financial services business (s.1041G(1)) and dishonestly 
making improper use of your position as a director with an 
intent to gain an advantage (s.184(2)(a)). [4] 
Offence 
description  
Ponzi scheme [8]  
Offender status  58 year old male, tertiary education [28]-[29] 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Used your position as director dishonestly by executing a 
guarantee on behalf of Chartwell in respect of this loan. [23] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  'You have no prior convictions, save for minor 
traffic infringements. As I have observed, you 
have been an admirable husband and 
stepfather. Prior good character in cases 
involving white-collar crime is of lesser 
significance than in other types of crime. That 
good character is often the reason why an 
offender is positioned so as to effect the crime 
and it is often also a reason why the offender is 
the repository of the very trust he has breached. 
That said, it is not completely irrelevant – it 
informs aspects of rehabilitation and the 
genuineness of any asserted remorse – and I 
will give it some weight in the sentencing mix.' 
[36] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised   
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3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'You will be disqualified from holding office 
under the Corporations Act 2001 (s.206B 
Corporations Act 2001). This itself is a 
punishment which I am obliged to take into 
account. Given the circumstances of your 
offending and the need for general deterrence, 
this disqualification is not one, however, that 
weighs heavily in your favour.' [38] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'The bald figures that can be calculated from 
your offending are breathtaking. Over a period 
of 15 months the deceptions you practised 
upon the public garnered Chartwell nearly 
$16m of investor funds. During that period, 
and also as a result of your dishonesty, you 
procured for Chartwell credit from the 
Commonwealth Bank in the sum of $5.83m. 
Those figures alone give some indication as to 
the scale of your dishonest conduct but say 
little about the lives that you have diminished 
in the process.' [7] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised This is clearly planned offending but no 
specific reference to planning. 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating  ‘Those figures alone give some indication as to 
the scale of your dishonest conduct but say 
little about the lives that you have diminished 
in the process.’  [7] 
 
'the victims of your offending were largely 
small investors, often investing their 
superannuation. In addition to their witness 
statements, five Victim Impact Statements have 
been tendered. They make for depressing 
reading. One man, Mr E, still with young 
children to bring up, has been all but 
bankrupted; his wife has been bankrupted. 
Their friends whom they introduced to 
Chartwell are gone. His marriage is under 'huge 
stress'. You explained to him how he could 
achieve a better interest rate if his investment 
were larger and his erstwhile friends pooled 
their money with him.' [15]  
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‘It is unnecessary to recite the current or past 
circumstances of all the people you preyed 
upon. You have diminished the lives of all of 
them. You have stolen from them and you have 
humiliated them, and for that you must be held 
to account.’ [19] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 9B The Queen v Marc Di Cioccio [2012] VSC 15  
Sentence 30 months imprisonment (14 months non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s 
 
Crimes Act 1958 s 82 - 3 counts of OFAD, s 194(4) - 1 count of 
negligently dealing with proceeds of crime. 
Offence 
description  
 
Created invoices from computer business at which he worked 
purporting to record the sale of computer equipment valued at 
$294,318 and then $65,000. 
Sham invoices 
Offender status  
 
32 year old, male, tertiary education. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
‘total of $359,318 paid into business accounts’ [9]'…you did 
receive some direct financial benefit.’ [22] 
 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Undermine trust – person in business responsible for invoicing  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'You have no prior convictions…' [41]  
 
'without prior convictions and, having had the 
benefit of good education, ultimately with quite 
good job prospects. A number of people who 
have worked with you in the past, including a 
former delicatessen manager at the Coles 
Supermarket who worked with you for nine 
years, have remarked in testimonials that you 
are a quiet and gentle person by nature, hard 
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working, and willing to help others. It is said 
that your behaviour in the commission of these 
offences is out of character.'  [46]  
 
'I nevertheless consider that your background 
and character suggests you have reasonable 
prospects of rehabilitation. Those prospects 
should be encouraged.' [47]  
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Neutral '…ultimately quite good job prospects…' [46] 
 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'The amounts involved which I have already 
listed are very significant sums of money.' [14] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'In short, the crimes involved planned and 
coordinated implementation and were 
somewhat brazen in nature.' [16] 
 
'The invoices needed to be convincing and thus 
the generation involved some effort and 
attention. They were, in substance, the 
centrepiece of the deception and you created 
them dishonestly knowing the purpose for 
which they were to be employed.' [20] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'Whilst the overall picture is a little opaque, it 
is clear that the ultimate losses to lenders as a 
result of your criminal activity runs to the tens 
of thousands of dollars if not hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.' [31] 
'The cost caused to commerce, and to the 
community generally, by those like you who 
undermine that trust so that additional checks 
and balances must be put in place, or losses 
simply suffered, is significant.'  [44] 
7. Restitution Neutral Some monies have been repaid [29] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
  
Case 10B The Queen v Andre Vincent Di Cioccio [2012] VSC 28 
Sentence 7 years and 6 months imprisonment (5 years and 6 months non-
parole) 
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Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes - Di Cioccio v The Queen  [2013] VSCA 74 – appeal 
dismissed 
Major offence/s 
 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 3.3.21 – 8 counts of causing 
deficiency in a legal trust account without reasonable excuse 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 82 – 5 counts of OFAD [1] 
Offence 
description  
Criminal enterprise offences, offending over 2.5 years [48] 
Offender status  34 year old, male, tertiary education, solicitor. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes – as a solicitor – breach of trust [52] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  Under heading ‘Personal circumstances and 
mitigating’  
 
'You have no prior convictions.'  [78] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating Under heading ‘Personal circumstances and 
mitigating’ 
 
'you have been publicly and personally 
shamed…' [75] 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating Under heading ‘Personal circumstances and 
mitigating’  
 
'you will be stripped of your right to practise as 
a lawyer; you have or will be disqualified from 
acting as company director…[75] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'The offences which I have summarised 
involved very substantial amounts of money, 
both individually and in aggregate. Ten of the 
offences involved individual amounts each 
over $100,000 all but one ran into at least tens 
of thousands of dollars. As I have said the 
aggregate amount exceeded $2.6M. These 
sums place you in the category of a serious 
offender.' [49] 
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5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'Many of the offences, particularly those of 
obtaining financial advantage by deception, 
involved a real degree of sophistication and 
were clearly well planned. I refer to those 
which involved the careful crafting of false 
invoices; the forging of loan applications on 
behalf of clients, in one case using his identity 
documents; and preparing false income and 
wage documents for your wife. Not only that, 
some of them involved brazen personal 
attendances by you upon offices of financial 
institutions to make the relevant loan 
application and to sign documentation.' [50] 
 
'there were instances when you obtained money 
by deception in order to ‘cure’ trust account 
deficiencies caused by you having used trust 
monies for personal purposes. You were using 
the proceeds of one crime to cover up another.' 
[53] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'The precise status of the losses caused by your 
conduct and the ultimate impact on victims of 
your offending is difficult to discern... 
Accordingly it is likely that both institutions 
and individuals will have substantially suffered 
as a consequence of your offending.' [60]-[62] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Neutral Compensation orders: 
(against Andre and Marc Di Cioccio) in favour 
of Circuit Finance Australia Pty Ltd for 
$26,248.73 and (against Andre only) in favour 
of Macquarie Leasing Pty Ltd for $138,900 and 
in favour of the Legal Services Board of 
Victoria for $172,429.35 [91] 
 
No discernible effect. 
   
Case 11B The Queen v Linacre [2014] VSC 615 
Sentence 12 years imprisonment (8 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No  
Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 s 81 - 21 counts of OPD.  
Legal Practices Act 1996 s 188 - 5 counts of deficiency in trust 
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account 
Offence 
description  
Deceived numerous clients to hand over $12 million [2] 
Ponzi scheme [8]  
Offender status  62 year old male, educated, solicitor since 1977, principal of 
his own firm [3]-[4] 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes – they placed complete trust in you….preyed on those who 
trusted you  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'I also observe that you have no prior 
convictions.'  [49] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'It was submitted by your counsel that your 
conduct and subsequent court hearing has 
brought you great shame and embarrassment.' 
[51] 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'You have been struck off the roll of lawyers 
and will likely never practise again. Your 
counsel submitted that this was a loss that you 
would keenly feel. He noted that you were 
someone who relished being a lawyer, 
someone who enjoyed reading cases and 
talking about the law with friends and 
colleagues. I recognise that the loss of your 
ability to practise has had a deleterious effect 
on you.' [50] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'A major aggravating factor is the significant 
amounts of money you stole or illegally 
disbursed out of your trust fund.' [35] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'This was not a momentary lapse of judgment. 
It was prolonged and calculated to extract 
significant amounts of money from your 
victims. Over this lengthy period you had 
ample opportunity to reflect and think about 
what you had done and were doing. However, 
you kept going, deceiving more and more 
clients.' [36] 
6. High level of Aggravating 'The Crown tendered a bundle of nine victim 
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harm to victim impact statements. I have read them all 
carefully and they make for alarming reading. 
Regardless of the sheer amount of money you 
stole, the impact on the victims has been 
debilitating… Many of your victims have 
suffered and continue to suffer ill-health 
because of your criminality.' [37] [41] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
  
Case 12B The Queen v Brian Francis Maloney [2014] VSC 641  
Sentence 5 years imprisonment (3 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s 
 
Multiple counts obtaining financial advantage by deception, 
theft, deficiency in trust account, failing to deliver trust money, 
continuing criminal enterprise  
Offence 
description  
 
Lawyer misappropriated over $1 million of clients’ money 
Offender status  
 
59 year old male, tertiary education worked in public service 
then developed suburban practice [2] 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Breached a position of special trust & responsibility (as a 
solicitor) 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  (under heading of 'Factors in mitigation') 
'You have, until this offending, had an 
unblemished record including professionally. 
You have been a good family man and 
community member, including in the 
application of your legal skills to help others.' 
[40] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating (under heading of 'Factors in mitigation') 
'you are much affected by deep shame and 
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remorse, not only for yourself and what you 
have done but for the pain you have caused 
others.' [38] 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating (under heading of 'Factors in mitigation') 
'The loss of your status as a lawyer is painful 
given your enjoyment of your standing and the 
hard work you put in to achieve your 
qualifications and your reputation.' [46]  
 
'You have lost everything you worked for 
during 25 years of practice.' [48] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating (under heading of 'Factors in aggravation') 
'You have admitted the offending and the 
matters alleged by the Crown. In total you 
misappropriated $1,758,300 from Mr Gatt and 
repaid $1,099,824. Therefore the total amount 
lost by Mr Gatt was $651,375.' [25] 
 
'I must take into account the gravity of the 
offence and the significant amount of money 
you misappropriated.' [50] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating (under heading of 'Factors in aggravation') 
'…this was not a momentary lapse of 
judgment, it was a prolonged scheme to 
misappropriate Mr Gatt’s funds. Your actions 
were perpetrated over a period of six years. 
You had ample time to see the errors of your 
way and reverse your course. Instead you 
continued to deceive Mr Gatt.' [51] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating (under heading of 'Factors in aggravation') 
'Mr Gatt has lost a substantial amount of 
money. He described in his victim impact 
statement how he trusted and respected you 
and the feeling that you took advantage of his 
position. Mr Gatt explained in his statement 
how he worked hard to make his money which 
you then encouraged him to invest in bogus 
transactions. Furthermore, Mr Gatt has suffered 
additional loss in that he was unable to finance 
his own personal borrowing for a house 
because he was awaiting funds from your firm.' 
[28] 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'Quite understandably, Mr Gatt has had his 
faith in the legal profession shaken. He notes, 
and I will speak about this further in a moment, 
that lawyers should be capable of being trusted 
as they are supposed to uphold the law and not 
use it for their own benefit.' [29]  
'your actions have impacted greatly on your 
victim.' [52] 
7. Restitution Mitigating (under heading of 'Factors in mitigation') 
'You have admitted the offending and the 
matters alleged by the Crown. In total you 
misappropriated $1,758,300 from Mr Gatt and 
repaid $1,099,824. Therefore the total amount 
lost by Mr Gatt was $651,375.' [25] 
'You have repaid a large part of the monies 
defrauded, although a significant loss remains 
suffered by your victim, Mr Gatt.' [41] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Mitigating Pay compensation to Mr Gatt in amount of 
$651,375. [70] 
 
Indicative of remorse. 
   
Case 13B DPP v Porcaro [2015] VCC 658  
Sentence 8.5 years imprisonment (5.5 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – Porcaro v The Queen [2015] VSCA 244 – appeal did not 
amend treatment of variables but did amend the classification 
of one of the charges. 
Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 s 81 - 35 counts of OPD, s 82 - 9 counts of 
OFAD, s 74 - 3 counts of theft. 
Offence 
description  
 
Ponzi scheme over almost 7 years – over $4.7 million of which 
$3.6 million not recovered,  
Continuing criminal enterprise offending [11] [12]. 
Offender status  53 year old, male, completed Year 12, worked as an in-house 
law clerk then worked in a solicitor’s practice [28], [30]. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Director [14] Legal executive – managed investors, encouraged 
investments [15] breach of trust. 
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Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral  'No one in your family has ever been in trouble 
with the law before.' [28] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Neutral 'As a result of this offending, you told Mr 
Cummins you rarely socialise, as a number of 
your friends and relatives were victims of your 
offending.' [32] 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'You have not worked again. You have lost 
everything as a result of this offending…' [31] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'Your offending in the charges on the deception 
indictment was at a high level for this kind of 
offending…involved substantial amounts of 
money…'[19] 
 
'…normally attracts a significant sentence of 
imprisonment.' [38] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'Your offending in the charges on the deception 
indictment was at a high level for this kind of 
offending. It was sophisticated, planned and 
prolonged …'[19] 
 
'…normally attracts a significant sentence of 
imprisonment.' [38] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'It involved deceiving many people into 
handing over money or financial securities, 
which they had put away for later life and your 
offending involved breach of trust…That is 
why your offending is of a high level.' [19] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
  
Case 14B The Queen v Linh Ngoc Nguyen [2011] VSC 529 
Sentence 5 years and 6 months imprisonment (3 years non-parole)  
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s 18 counts - OFAD (s 82 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)) [1] 
Offence 
description  
 
Continuing criminal enterprise offender  
58 loan applications all containing fraudulent documents 
submitted to 3 financial institutions (total loans obtained = 
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$14.7 million) [4] 
Offender status  
 
37 year old, male, TAFE education, accredited mortgage broker 
[42] 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes – accredited mortgage broker [6] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating '…you have a number of significant matters 
that must be taken into account in your 
favour… you have no prior or subsequent 
convictions of any note…' [40] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised   
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'However it still remains that this is serious 
offending. The amount of money imperilled 
was substantial. The amount of money gained 
by you in the form of commissions was 
significant.' [39] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'The offending is serious. It is persistent and 
even though I am not prepared to find as a fact 
that you were aware of the purpose, it was also 
enabling for those wanting to set up crop 
houses, that being at least 20 of these 
applications. The flow-on consequence to the 
community from you obtaining these loans for 
those people are that marijuana crops have 
been grown, harvested and distributed. Whilst 
you are not the person behind that activity, if 
you had not applied for the loans and provided 
fraudulent details these persons would not have 
 199 
been able to acquire the properties for that 
purpose. It demonstrates some of the serious 
consequences that flow from your offending. 
You, of course, are not to be sentenced for the 
trafficking or cultivation of that cannabis, and I 
shall ensure that I will not do that, but it does 
tend to highlight the seriousness of offences of 
this nature.' [49] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 15B DPP v Penny [2012] VSC 25  
Sentence 6 years imprisonment (4 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – DPP v Penny [2012] VSCA 203 – appeal dismissed  
Major offence/s 
 
8 counts theft, 2 counts false accounting, 9 counts OFAD – 
continuing criminal enterprise offences  
Offence 
description  
 
Lengthy time (1997-2009). Advanced large sums of money 
often using false entities/real companies/clients but with slight 
changes to their names/details – all unauthorized  
Also drawing cheques and recording falsely, false loan 
agreements    [9] 
Offender status  62 year old, male, completed Year 11 then went on to get a 
degree in business (dux), accountant, partner at accounting 
firm. [2] 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Position of trust [54] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'glowing references and describe you as a 
devoted community member…some of the 
most impressive character reports I have ever 
seen.' [56]  
 
'I will take into in your favour, that not only are 
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you a person without prior convictions but, that 
you are a positively a person of good character 
who has made a significant contribution to the 
community in which you and your family have 
resided all these years.'[58]  
 
'I have given you great benefit for your 
previous exemplary life as a citizen of this 
community.' [61] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Neutral You were considered an important and 
responsible citizen, that has been exposed as 
false and I have no doubt you have been the 
subject of unpleasant remarks and gossip. You 
feel ostracized by many members of the 
Mildura community…' [46]  
 
'You have expressed shame, embarrassment…' 
[53] 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'I doubt anyone will ever trust you with any 
funds in the future. I do not believe you will be 
able to practice in any way as an accountant, 
and any credibility that you had, in the 
community of Mildura is well and truly 
gone.'[52] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
 
 
Aggravating 
 
 
 
 
'Over a period of time you advanced to him 
very large sums of money…All of these were 
unauthorised and resulted in the eight charges 
of theft for which you will be dealt with.' [9] 
'…vast sums of money involved…' [61] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'This offending was persistent, lengthy, 
fraudulent and done in a manner to try and 
cover your tracks. You commenced your 
offending at least back in 1995, although you 
are not charged with any offence prior to 1997, 
and you will not be punished for any offending 
not on the indictment, that has a relevance to 
which I shall subsequently refer.' [38] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'There are two victim impact statements in this 
matter. Each of them, unsurprisingly, talk 
about the shock, anger and dismay they feel at 
the betrayal of a trusted family friend. They 
refer to the loss that they have each suffered, 
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which is substantial, in terms of loss of their 
inheritance, the destruction of what their father 
had worked so hard to do and build, and the 
amount of time, effort and money, that has had 
to go into uncovering your fraudulent 
activity…' [39] 
 
'…the consequences upon the victims of that 
offending, the level of breach of trust 
involved…' [59] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
  
Case 16B DPP v Loukia Bariamis [2013] VSC 457 
Sentence 6 years imprisonment (4 years non-parole) [44] 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No  
Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 82(1) - 3 counts OFAD. 
Offence 
description  
 
Each offence was more than $50,000, continuing criminal 
enterprise offence. 
Obtained for the group the financial advantage of lending 
facilities totaling $12,150,000 [15]  
Using fraudulent overstatements  
Offender status  51 year old, male, tertiary education, provided significant 
assistance to authorities, already serving sentence for Cth 
offences 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes – 'you obtained GST and PAYG tax refunds in the sum of 
$1,820,939.' [8] 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
'you abused the trust which you had as a registered tax agent.' 
[8] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'an exceptionally strong constellation of 
mitigatory factors justify a sentence in the 
order of half of that which would otherwise be 
appropriate. I have spoken of those factors 
already. The most important are … your good 
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character to date …' [37]  
 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating  'you obtained for the group the financial 
advantage of lending facilities totalling 
$12,150,000.' [15]  
 
In determining what the sentences of 
imprisonment should be, I take into account the 
gravity of your offending, which was very 
great…very great sum of money was never 
recovered…' [36] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'Because the Viking group went into 
liquidation, the loan moneys owing to the bank 
were never recovered. The bank lost a total of 
$48,630,000 under the facilities left owing by 
the Viking group. Of that amount, $33,550,000 
is attributable to the extended fraudulent 
facilities which were obtained by your 
deception.' [18] 
 
'It is true that there was no individual victim 
suffering personal hardship. That potentially 
aggravating consideration is not present. But 
white-collar crime is not a victimless crime in 
the sense that there are direct adverse 
consequences for the bank as an institution and 
potential indirect consequences for it 
customers, shareholders and others. Your 
crimes are very serious examples of the 
offences charged, among the worst in the 
history of the State for crimes of this kind.' [36] 
7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
 203 
Case 17B R v Coleman [2013] VSC 548 
Sentence 5 years imprisonment (3 years non-parole) [50] 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – Coleman v The Queen [2014] VSCA 228 – appeal 
dismissed  
Major offence/s 
 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 3.3.21 – 1 count of 
deficiency in your trust account 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 74(1) -  1 count of theft, s 82(1) 12 
counts of OFAD. 
Offence 
description  
Conduct including purchasing properties using fictitious 
identities and establishing false accounts  
Offender status  
 
47 year old, male, well educated, lawyer. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Conduct facilitated by your position as a solicitor  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral 'I accept that you are a person of previous good 
character. You have no prior 
convictions….Whilst your previous good 
character has some broad relevance, it is of 
little weight when dealing with a breach of 
trust by a solicitor who is an officer of the 
court.'  [32] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'You have lost your career, effectively on the 
appointment of receivers to your legal practice 
in July 2012. The fact that you will lose your 
right to practise your profession, though 
relevant, is of little significance when the 
offence itself constitutes a breach of trust by a 
solicitor.' [34] 
 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Not raised  '…the total amount you received, 
approximately $327,700, falls well short of 
some massive defalcations committed by other 
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dishonest solicitors…' [23] 
This amount was specifically identified as 
being low and is therefore not relevant.  
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating The degree of planning and calculation 
involved in this repeated conduct demonstrates 
significant culpability… Acting in your 
capacity as a solicitor, you falsified the 
electoral register to create false identities. You 
deliberately falsified public land title records in 
order to perpetrate your frauds… your 
nefarious activities remained concealed for 
almost a decade after you first crossed the 
line…' [23]  
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'Your crimes may have gone undetected but for 
your appropriation of Ms Nugent’s identity. In 
her victim impact statement she has explained 
the anguish and the distress that she suffered 
when, after finally purchasing a property in her 
own name, her first home owner’s grant 
application was declined, leaving her with 
inadequate funds but committed to a contract 
of sale. Her statement explains that as well as 
direct financial loss she has suffered depression 
and anxiety. She was distressed that you had 
appropriated not only her tax refund, but also 
her identity, when she was suffering significant 
ill health.'  
 [24] 
7. Restitution Neutral  '…some measure of restitution to your victims.. 
I do not regard it as a mitigating factor.' [35] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
  
Case 18B DPP v Robert Gianello [2014] VCC    
Sentence 4 years imprisonment (2 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – Gianello v The Queen [2015] VSCA 205 – appeal 
dismissed  
Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 s 82 - 3 counts of OFAD. 
Offence 
description  
 
Of $6 million, Gianello received just under $680,000 
False invoicing scheme – continuing criminal enterprise 
offender. [2]-[3] 
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Offender status  60 year old, male, well educated doctor, highly successful. [86] 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes [45] breach of trust  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral  'Each of you are persons otherwise of good 
character.' [44]  
 
'Good reputation counts for less when 
sentencing for offences such as this, as it is 
your good reputations and your standing in the 
community generally, and with Phosphagenics 
in particular, which allowed each of you to put 
yourselves in the positions you did to commit 
these offences.' [49] 
 
'A very impressive array of character evidence, 
in testimonials and oral evidence, was 
presented on the plea…All attest to the shock 
they experienced to discover the man they 
knew had been committing these frauds, that 
you had engaged in such large-scale fraud over 
such a protracted period. Their evidence, both 
written and oral, all showed the struggle to 
reconcile this with the man they knew and 
valued.' [90] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'I accept that for each of you the effect of the 
revelation of the fraud and your participation in 
it has had significant personal and professional 
repercussions. Each of you are shamed, 
personally and professionally.' [61] 
 
'you are now 60 years of age, and find yourself, 
instead of enjoying the reputational and 
financial rewards of a career dedicated to 
scientific research at the highest of levels, 
disgraced, bankrupt and struggling to find any 
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form of gainful work in your chosen field.' [86]  
 
'The effect for you too has been devastating, 
personally and professionally. You have lost 
your employment... At 60, you are left with no 
assets and limited employment prospects.' [94] 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating '…dismissed from his employment at 
Phosphagenics as a result.' [54]  
 
'…effect for you too has been devastating, 
personally and professionally. You have lost 
your employment…and limited employment 
prospects.' [94] 
 
'I accept that for each of you the effect of the 
revelation of the fraud and your participation in 
it has had significant … professional 
repercussions' [61] 
 
'…struggling to find any form of gainful work 
in your chosen field.' [86] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'Your offending too is properly characterised as 
grave.... you benefited to the amount of about 
$100,000 yourself.' [101] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'It is clear that this is long-term, persistent, 
barefaced, commercial, fraudulent activity.' 
[37] 
 
'your role in facilitating it cannot be ignored, 
and this too must be seen as a measure of your 
moral and legal culpability.' [93] 
 
'Your offending too is properly characterised as 
grave…your role in the defrauding involved 
the creation of numerous false invoices over 
the extended period of your involvement, and 
is properly to be regarded as a sophisticated 
and sustained scheme.'  [101] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Not raised  
7. Restitution Mitigating 'After unsuccessful negotiations over the terms 
of a deed of settlement, Phosphagenics issued 
proceedings against Dr Gianello, his wife, as a 
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co- director of Bynex, and Bynex in the 
Supreme Court in late October 2013, and 
judgment was entered against him in December 
2013 for the full amount claimed, namely, 
$6,053,722, together with interest and costs. He 
too entered into a deed with Phosphagenics in 
relation to the directing of any future 
entitlement to benefits flowing from the sale of 
PMP-Vic’s intellectual property in the 
development of cPMP to Alexion.' [54] 
 
'…partial restitution has already been made by 
each of you and recovery efforts are 
continuing.'  [58] 
 
'In respect of each of you, I accept this conduct 
counts in your favour as evidence of 
remorse…evidence of restitution…' [60] 
 
'Your family home and all of your assets have 
gone in restitution.' [94] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 19B DPP v Woei-Jia Jiang [2014] VCC    
Sentence 2 years and 6 months imprisonment (12 months non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 s 82 – 3 counts of OFAD. 
Offence 
description  
 
Of $6m, Jiang received just over $1.1 million 
False invoicing scheme – continuing criminal enterprise 
offender [2]-[3] 
Offender status  51 year old, male, well educated, doctor. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes [45] breach of trust  
Sentencing Treatment Remarks 
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Variables 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral  'Each of you are persons otherwise of good 
character.' [44]  
 
'Good reputation counts for less when 
sentencing for offences such as this, as it is 
your good reputations and your standing in the 
community generally, and with Phosphagenics 
in particular, which allowed each of you to put 
yourselves in the positions you did to commit 
these offences.' [49] 
 
'I accept on the powerful character evidence 
that was placed before me in the testimonials 
and from the oral evidence of your wife that 
this is seen for you, as it was for Dr Gianello, 
as inexplicable, out-of- character conduct.' 
[112] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating  'I accept that for each of you the effect of the 
revelation of the fraud and your participation in 
it has had significant personal and professional 
repercussions. Each of you are shamed, 
personally and professionally.' [61] 
 
'…high personal reputation have been badly 
damaged by your participation in this 
fraudulent operation.'  [110] 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating  'I accept that for each of you the effect of the 
revelation of the fraud and your participation in 
it has had significant … professional 
repercussions' [61] 
 
'… significant scientific and professional 
achievements and high personal reputation 
have been badly damaged by your participation 
in this fraudulent operation.'  [110] 
 
'Your professional reputation and career path 
are clearly affected significantly by this. 
Although your skills and expertise are such that 
you are likely to be able to gain employment, 
your career path in managing or being a 
director of a company, or being entrusted with 
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other people’s money, is obviously clearly 
blighted.' [121] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'For you too, this is grave offending. Your 
personal benefit was in excess of million 
dollars, of approximately $4 million was 
obtained by the device that you lent yourself 
to.' [122] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating  'It is clear that this is long-term, persistent, 
barefaced, commercial, fraudulent activity.' 
[37]  
 
'For you too, this is grave offending. …you too 
took part in what can properly be characterised 
as a sophisticated and sustained fraud using 
false documents.'  [122] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Not raised   
7. Restitution Mitigating  'Dr Jiang, at this stage of acknowledging his 
involvement to Mr James, indicated then that 
he intended to make full restitution…'  [56] 
 
'So far as Dr Jiang is concerned, he has sold his 
house, his other assets and his car, signed over 
his term deposit and emptied out the contents 
of his bank account. An amount about 
$100,000 in excess of the amount that he 
personally benefitted has been recovered.'    
[58] 
 
'In respect of each of you, I accept this conduct 
counts in your favour as evidence of 
remorse…evidence of restitution…' [60] 
 
'You signed the deed of agreement 
acknowledging your responsibility for payment 
of all moneys of which Phosphagenics was 
defrauded by your conduct, and you have 
actively cooperated in the realisation of your 
assets in order to honour that agreement. The 
amount of restitution made by you is about 
$100,000 in excess of the amount of personal 
benefit you derived. And you are bound, as are 
the others, to continue to make restitution to 
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Phosphagenics, both by a nominated 
percentage of any future earnings as well as the 
handing over of any future assets that come 
your way.'   [118] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
  
Case 20B DPP v Esra Ogru [2014] VCC    
Sentence 6 years imprisonment (2 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 s 82 – 7 counts of OFAD. 
Offence 
description  
 
Of $6m, Ogru received just under $4 million 
False invoicing scheme – continuing criminal enterprise 
offender [2]-[3] 
Offender status  
 
39 year old, female, well educated, doctor, highly successful, 
made significant contribution to genetics after her daughter was 
born with a rare but serious abnormality 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes – [45] breach of trust; breach of fiduciary duty  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Neutral 'Each of you are persons otherwise of good 
character.' [44]  
 
'Good reputation counts for less when 
sentencing for offences such as this, as it is 
your good reputations and your standing in the 
community generally, and with Phosphagenics 
in particular, which allowed each of you to put 
yourselves in the positions you did to commit 
these offences.' [49] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Mitigating 'I accept that for each of you the effect of the 
revelation of the fraud and your participation in 
it has had significant personal and professional 
repercussions. Each of you are shamed, 
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personally and professionally.' [61] 
 
'The gravity of the offending also bears on the 
severity of the consequences for you of its 
discovery. You are publicly and privately 
shamed. Your reputation is tarnished. You 
resigned from Phosphagenics in 
disgrace.'  [78] 
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'I accept that for each of you the effect of the 
revelation of the fraud and your participation in 
it has had significant … professional 
repercussions' [61] 
 
'You resigned from Phosphagenics in 
disgrace... had to relinquish your position on 
the various prestigious government advisory 
committees and boards to which you had been 
appointed. You will be disqualified from 
holding a position as a director or managing a 
corporation for a period. Whilst you have 
secured a well-paid international consultancy 
position advising, somewhat ironically, on 
investment in biotechnology and healthcare 
stocks, your career opportunities are likely to 
be diminished.' [78] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating '…this is grave offending. The total moneys 
fraudulently diverted from Phosphagenics and 
the amount you personally received are very 
high, in the order of $6 million and $4 million 
respectively.' [75] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'It is clear that this is long-term, persistent, 
barefaced, commercial, fraudulent activity.' 
[37]  
 
'…this is grave offending. Your offending 
spanned a period of nearly nine years…It was 
sophisticated fraud involving many lawyers of 
concealment…' [75] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Not raised   
7. Restitution Mitigating  'She also entered into a deed with 
Phosphagenics in relation to the accounting to 
it of any future benefits flowing from the sale 
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of PMP-Vic’s intellectual property in the 
development of cPMP to Alexion.'  [53]  
 
'In respect of each of you, I accept this conduct 
counts in your favour as evidence of 
remorse…evidence of restitution…' [60] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
   
Case 21B The Queen v Stephen Michael Grant [2006] VSC 235  
Sentence 3 years imprisonment - suspended sentence  
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s 
 
Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 188(1)(a) – 6 counts of having 
a deficiency in your trust account as a solicitor. 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 82(1) - 3 counts of OFAD, s 83(1)(b) - 
1 count of dishonestly producing an accounting document 
knowing it to be false. 
Offence 
description  
Short period – 2 Dec 2003 to 30 Jun 2004  
Conduct included drawing trust cheques, forging signatures etc. 
Offender status  47 year old, male, tertiary education, solicitor, partner at firm.  
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes – solicitor is person in position of trust (p. 10) 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'You have no prior convictions and before the 
occurrence of these offences you were 
obviously a person of good character. The 
testimonials from your family and friends were 
extremely impressive. They have provided you 
with remarkable support. I therefore consider 
the importance of specific deterrence to be 
extremely low.' (p. 11) 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised   
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3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Neutral 'On 8 March 2005 you voluntarily surrendered 
your practising certificate. You then made a 
complete disclosure both to the Law Institute 
and later to the police. In March of this year, 
the relevant arm of the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal ('VCAT') disqualified 
you from holding a practising certificate for a 
period of five years and ordered that for a 
further period of five years you can only hold 
an employee certificate with no access to a 
trust account. You were ordered to pay costs of 
$6,180, with a stay of six months. Mr Lasry 
told me that you do not intend to seek to 
practise as a lawyer in the future.' (p. 8-9) 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'The total loss suffered by your clients as a 
result of the ten offences was $275,071.78.' (p. 
6)  
'…it seems to me that count 6 and counts 2 and 
3 require the heaviest sentences … they 
involve by far the greatest amounts of 
money…' (p. 13) 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating  '…it seems to me that count 6 and counts 2 
and 3 require the heaviest sentences … display 
the greatest degree of planning and calculation 
and the greatest degree of moral culpability.' 
(p. 6) 
 
'…conduct involved some degree of planning 
and calculation, the offending demonstrated 
more a spontaneous and simplistic reaction to 
an urgent crisis rather than a carefully planned 
crime.' (p. 13) 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Neutral  'I was told that none of the clients remain out 
of pocket as they have been reimbursed by the 
Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund ('the Fidelity 
Fund').' (p. 6) 
 
Note: This is not restitution made by the 
accused 
7. Restitution Neutral No discernible effect  
 
'Even though the amounts were in some cases 
very small, the breach of trust on your part was 
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still significant. I was told that none of the 
clients remain out of pocket as they have been 
reimbursed by the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity 
Fund ('the Fidelity Fund').' (p. 6) 
 
'I accept that you are genuine in your desire to 
do everything possible, within the constraints 
imposed by other demands, to ensure that the 
debt owed to the Fidelity Fund is eventually 
repaid.'  (p. 9) 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
  
Case 22B The Queen v Russell Andrew Johnson [2014] VSC 175  
Sentence 6 years imprisonment (3.5 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes – Johnson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 286 – appeal 
dismissed 
Major offence/s 
 
Crimes Act 1958 s 83 – 3 counts of false accounting, s 74 - 2 
counts of theft, s 81 - 1 count of OFAD.  
Corporations Act 2001 - 1 count of submitting false document 
to ASIC 
Offence 
description  
Continuing criminal enterprise offender  
Conduct over 2.5 years 
Offender status  41 year old, male, sole director [4], post graduate education, 
worked trading in derivative financial products [13] 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Director 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating  'Other than the behaviour which brings you 
before the court, you are undoubtedly a person 
of good character. You have no previous 
criminal convictions. Many witnesses testified, 
and I accept, that you have been a person of 
good reputation, strong values and a person 
who has cared for others. For those reasons, I 
am quite confident that you are highly unlikely 
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ever to reoffend. In your case, rehabilitation is 
not a significant sentencing consideration. Nor 
is specific deterrence.' [127] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating  'An effect of your conviction for the count 
charged under the Corporations Act is that you 
will automatically be disqualified from 
managing a corporation for a period of 5 years. 
Of itself that is a penalty which I take into 
account in sentencing you in respect of it.' 
[128] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating '…the deficiency was of a very high order.' [8]  
 
'As reflected by the maximum penalties 
available for them, the crimes of which you 
have been convicted are serious crimes. The 
Crown submits that the conduct in which you 
engaged is a serious example of those serious 
offences. I agree… Self-evidently, they 
involved massive sums of money 
causing...'  [90] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'As reflected by the maximum penalties 
available for them, the crimes of which you 
have been convicted are serious crimes. The 
Crown submits that the conduct in which you 
engaged is a serious example of those serious 
offences. I agree. You committed the offences 
over a period of 30 months. Your crimes were 
committed with a sophisticated degree of 
orchestration and planning…'  [90] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'As reflected by the maximum penalties 
available for them, the crimes of which you 
have been convicted are serious crimes. The 
Crown submits that the conduct in which you 
engaged is a serious example of those serious 
offences. I agree…a loss spread over 4,500 
investors of something in the order of $47 
million. It may be regarded as fortunate that 
those investors can expect a recovery of 
something in the order of 69 cents in the dollar. 
Nevertheless, the global loss is still very high 
indeed.'  [90] 
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7. Restitution Not raised  
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 23B R v Ida Ronen [2005] NSWSC 991 
Sentence 8.5 years’ imprisonment (4 years and 6 months non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes - R v Ronen [2006] NSWCCA 123 – appeal dismissed 
Major offence/s Criminal Code Act 1995 s 135.4 - Defrauding the 
Commonwealth (the ATO). 
Offence 
description  
 
The offenders operated a highly successful clothing business 
that traded under the name of Dolina.  The 3 offenders 
conspired to defraud the Commonwealth of income tax by 
concealing substantial proportions of cash income from the 
takings of Dolina’s stores.  Ida would arrange for the shops’ 
takings to be brought to her house, where she would set aside a 
substantial proportion of the cash, which was not banked in the 
ordinary course of business.  Ida split the cash between herself 
and her two sons, Nitzan and Izhar.  Large amounts of this 
distributed cash were remitted overseas so as to make it 
undetectable to authorities.  After the introduction of GST, the 
scheme became more complicated and involved the making of 
false till rolls. The unbanked cash was not declared as income. 
Offender status  72 year old, female, migrant, successful business woman, 
director and shareholders of companies trading under the 
Dolina name. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes – avoiding tax obligation 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes - Directors and shareholders of companies trading under 
the Dolina name. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'There was a considerable body of references 
placed before the court relating to Mrs Ronen. 
These references attest to her qualities as a 
mother, grandmother and a loyal friend. In 
addition, she is praised for her charitable works 
particularly in relation to a number of Jewish 
organisations and especially in relation to the 
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assistance she has provided to Bulgarian 
immigrants coming to Australia. She was 
described in one as an ‘‘angel of mercy’’. It 
appears that she has provided both practical 
and moral support for persons arriving in the 
country who may be lacking facility in the 
English language; and who lack financial well-
being and employment.' (p. 81) 
'Each offender is a person of previous 
unblemished good character. Each has worked 
very hard in the establishment and continuance 
of a highly successful business. Each offender 
is well regarded in the community especially in 
the Jewish community where they have 
practiced philanthropy at a high level.' (p. 82) 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised   
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'But whether the amount concealed is closer to 
$16,000,000 than to $17,000,000, it is quite 
apparent that the dimension of the conspiracy 
was that of a fraud on a very large scale.' (p. 
69)  
'…no suggestion that there is any point of real 
distinction between the offenders in terms of 
the level of criminality displayed…The overall 
cash skimmed throughout the entire period of 
the conspiracy was, as I have found, 
somewhere between $15,000,000 and 
$17,000,000. The tax payable on this amount 
was in excess of $8,000,000.' (p. 78) 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'Although the cash skim itself was simple and 
straightforward, Mrs Ronen herself was a most 
meticulous bookkeeper. She recorded the 
actual takings of each of the shops and the 
subsequent distribution of cash in a set of 
books kept at her home.' (p. 70) 
'took additional steps in relation to the 
concealment of cash…' (p. 71) 
'…method of bookkeeping utilized by Mrs 
Ronen, although meticulous, was by no means 
sophisticated… on the other 
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hand…simplicity…offset by the deceptive 
system of creating false till rolls and false 
records when the GST was introduced.' (p. 78-
9) 
'conspiracy in the present offences and its 
manner of implementation over 9 or so years 
must be regarded as a situation where the 
offences fall into the worse category of 
offences of this type.' (p. 79) 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Neutral '…loss to the revenue…calculated to be $12.77 
million (approximately although of course it 
does not cover the entire period of the 
conspiracy).' (p. 85) 
No further remarks therefore no discernible 
effect. 
7. Restitution Mitigating 'In the same way [that is in favour of the 
offenders], I take into account, in general 
terms, the terms of settlement reached between 
the offenders and the Commissioner of 
Taxation…recognition of the amount of the 
penalty which has been agreed to be paid 
namely, $7,180,508.'(p. 83) 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 24B R v Izhar Ronen [2005] NSWSC 991 
Sentence 8.5 years imprisonment (5 years and 6 months non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes - R v Ronen [2006] NSWCCA 123 – appeal dismissed 
Major offence/s Criminal Code Act 1995 s 135.4 - Defrauding the 
Commonwealth (the ATO). 
Offence 
description  
 
The offenders operated a highly successful clothing business 
that traded under the name of Dolina.  The 3 offenders 
conspired to defraud the Commonwealth of income tax by 
concealing substantial proportions of cash income from the 
takings of Dolina’s stores.  Ida would arrange for the shops’ 
takings to be brought to her house, where she would set aside a 
substantial proportion of the cash, which was not banked in the 
ordinary course of business.  Ida split the cash between herself 
and her two sons, Nitzan and Izhar.  Large amounts of this 
distributed cash were remitted overseas so as to make it 
undetectable to authorities.  After the introduction of GST, the 
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scheme became more complicated and involved the making of 
false till rolls. The unbanked cash was not declared as income. 
Offender status  46 year old, male, incomplete tertiary education, director and 
shareholders of companies trading under the Dolina name. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes – avoiding tax obligation 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes - Directors and shareholders of companies trading under 
the Dolina name. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating '…references that attest to the generosity and 
philanthropy of Izhar…very hard working 
person who has prospered because of his 
industry.' (p. 82) 
 
'Each offender is a person of previous 
unblemished good character. Each has worked 
very hard in the establishment and continuance 
of a highly successful business. Each offender 
is well regarded in the community especially in 
the Jewish community where they have 
practiced philanthropy at a high level.' (p. 82) 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised   
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'But whether the amount concealed is closer to 
$16,000,000 than to $17,000,000, it is quite 
apparent that the dimension of the conspiracy 
was that of a fraud on a very large scale.' (p. 
69)  
'…no suggestion that there is any point of real 
distinction between the offenders in terms of 
the level of criminality displayed…The overall 
cash skimmed throughout the entire period of 
the conspiracy was, as I have found, 
somewhere between $15,000,000 and 
$17,000,000. The tax payable on this amount 
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was in excess of $8,000,000.' (p. 78) 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
 
 
 
Neutral '…loss to the revenue…calculated to be $12.77 
million (approximately although of course it 
does not cover the entire period of the 
conspiracy).' (p. 85) 
No further remarks therefore no discernible 
effect. 
7. Restitution Mitigating 'In the same way [that is in favour of the 
offenders], I take into account, in general 
terms, the terms of settlement reached between 
the offenders and the Commissioner of 
Taxation…recognition of the amount of the 
penalty which has been agreed to be paid 
namely, $7,180,508.' (p. 83) 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
  
Case 25B R v Nitzan Ronen [2005] NSWSC 991 
Sentence 8.5 years imprisonment (5 years & 6 months non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
Yes - R v Ronen [2006] NSWCCA 123 – appeal dismissed 
Major offence/s Criminal Code Act 1995 s 135.4 - Defrauding the 
Commonwealth (the ATO). 
Offence 
description  
 
The offenders operated a highly successful clothing business 
that traded under the name of Dolina.  The 3 offenders 
conspired to defraud the Commonwealth of income tax by 
concealing substantial proportions of cash income from the 
takings of Dolina’s stores.  Ida would arrange for the shops’ 
takings to be brought to her house, where she would set aside a 
substantial proportion of the cash, which was not banked in the 
ordinary course of business.  Ida split the cash between herself 
and her two sons, Nitzan and Izhar.  Large amounts of this 
distributed cash were remitted overseas so as to make it 
undetectable to authorities.  After the introduction of GST, the 
scheme became more complicated and involved the making of 
false till rolls. The unbanked cash was not declared as income. 
Offender status  47 year old, male, migrant, incomplete tertiary education, 
director and shareholders of companies trading under the 
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Dolina name. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes – avoiding tax obligation 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes - Directors and shareholders of companies trading under 
the Dolina name. 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating '… generosity and benevolence …supported a 
number of Jewish organisations…philanthropic 
man…hard and industrious worker…' (p. 82)  
'Each offender is a person of previous 
unblemished good character. Each has worked 
very hard in the establishment and continuance 
of a highly successful business. Each offender 
is well regarded in the community especially in 
the Jewish community where they have 
practiced philanthropy at a high level.' (p. 82) 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Not raised  
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'But whether the amount concealed is closer to 
$16,000,000 than to $17,000,000, it is quite 
apparent that the dimension of the conspiracy 
was that of a fraud on a very large scale.' (p. 
69)  
'…no suggestion that there is any point of real 
distinction between the offenders in terms of 
the level of criminality displayed…The overall 
cash skimmed throughout the entire period of 
the conspiracy was, as I have found, 
somewhere between $15,000,000 and 
$17,000,000. The tax payable on this amount 
was in excess of $8,000,000.' (p. 78) 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Not raised  
6. High level of Neutral '…loss to the revenue…calculated to be $12.77 
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harm to victim million (approximately although of course it 
does not cover the entire period of the 
conspiracy).' (p. 85) 
No further remarks therefore no discernible 
effect. 
7. Restitution Mitigating 'In the same way [that is in favour of the 
offenders], I take into account, in general 
terms, the terms of settlement reached between 
the offenders and the Commissioner of 
Taxation…recognition of the amount of the 
penalty which has been agreed to be paid 
namely, $7,180,508.'(p. 83) 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
   
Case 26B The Queen v Sonya Denise Causer [2010] VSC 341 
Sentence 8 years imprisonment (5 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 s 74 - 24 counts of theft  
Offence 
description  
Misappropriated over $19 million from employer (Clive 
Peeters)  
$16 million recovered  
Offender status  39 year old, female, tertiary education; accountant. 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes - duties with Clive Peeters were expanded, giving offender 
responsibility for the payroll system, which included 
authorization of salary payments to employees, payment of 
superannuation contributions and the remittance of group tax 
and payroll tax to the ATO and SRO – grossly abused the trust 
of employer  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'There are many mitigating factors in your 
favour…You have no prior convictions and are 
of good character.' 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2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'There are many mitigating factors in your 
favour…I take into account that your 
reputation and career as an accountant is ruined 
and any future employment will almost 
certainly be in a very different sphere.'    
 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'The magnitude of the theft. This is one of the 
largest, if not the largest, thefts perpetrated by a 
person in a position of trust in the history of 
this State. Notwithstanding the fact that a 
significant amount has been repaid, the scale of 
your embezzlement is significant.' 
'Notwithstanding the mitigating factors I have 
mentioned, it is nevertheless necessary to send 
a message to all those in a position of trust and 
handling large (or for that matter small) sums 
of money that dishonest dealings with those 
funds must result in significant punishment. 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating 'Not only was it perpetrated month by month 
over a period of two years, but it was 
calculated and required a degree of 
sophistication.'  
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'The effect of the loss of the funds on Clive 
Peeters’ financial position – the absence of that 
amount of cash, whilst a the triggering cause, 
must have played a part in its ultimate 
collapse.'   
 
7. Restitution Mitigating  'There are many mitigating factors in your 
favour…You have provided restitution to the 
company of over $16 million, leaving a 
shortfall of some $3 million. Your 
reimbursement to the company includes a small 
contribution of personal funds. This has 
resulted in your matrimonial home being sold 
and you living in sparse rental accommodation, 
a situation that is likely to continue upon your 
release.' 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised   
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Case 27B The Queen v David Tansey [2012] VSC 221 
Sentence 4 years imprisonment (2 years & 6 months non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 s 74 - 25 charges of theft   
Offence 
description  
Theft by a solicitor from clients – 44 separate transactions and 
a total amount of $1,990,081.21 stolen from 11 separate clients 
over a period of 4.5 year. Restored $674,877. 
Continuing criminal enterprise  
Offender status  Aged between 46-50 years old; male; tertiary education.  
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes 
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes – barrister & solicitor  
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'I accept that you are a person of previous good 
character…However, as the Court of Appeal 
said in R v Coukoulis, although the fact that 
you have had no prior convictions is of 
importance, it must be recognised that your 
reputation as a legal practitioner enabled you to 
obtain the money you stole. Whilst your 
previous good character has some broad 
relevance, it is of little weight when dealing 
with a breach of trust by a solicitor who is an 
officer of the court.' [57] 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised  
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Mitigating 'I note that you have been unemployed since 
ceasing your employment as a storeman on 30 
November 2011…' [63] 
'By the time you are eligible for parole, you 
will be aged in your early sixties and it may be 
difficult to obtain employment.' [64] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'In total, you stole $1,990,081.21 from 11 
separate clients. You restored $674,877, 
leaving an amount of $1,315.203.36 
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outstanding.' [36] 
'All of the offences involved misappropriation 
of funds from SESI accounts in the names of 
the various clients. Though the method used 
was essentially the same in each case, the 
amounts stolen varied and I have broadly taken 
the approach that the larger the amount stolen 
the more serious the offence.' [68] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating '…offences are equally serious…necessarily 
carefully premeditated offences and involved 
concealment of earlier offences…' [65] 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Aggravating 'There were nine victim impact statements in 
evidence before me, the tenor of which was 
similar. Though the Legal Practitioners Fidelity 
Fund compensated most of the victims for their 
financial losses, the misappropriations 
nevertheless caused the victims stress and 
trauma. Your conduct was described as ‘a 
grave betrayal of trust’ and ‘reprehensible’. 
One victim was shocked that a lawyer could 
use funds belonging to a client for his personal 
use. Yet others were distressed that you 
brought disrepute upon a formerly respected 
legal firm under whose name you carried on 
your legal practice. One of your victims has 
suffered great emotional stress and states that 
she ‘now questions everything and distrusts 
everyone’.' [37]   
7. Restitution Mitigating 'I also note that you voluntarily made partial 
restitution of $674,877 which must be 
acknowledged as a mitigating factor.' [63] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Neutral '…in order to ensure that your rehabilitation is 
not hampered by the imposition of an overly 
severe compensation order, I order you to pay 
compensation to the Legal Services Board of 
$318,047.57 which is half the amount sought.' 
[64] 
No discernible effect. 
  
Case 28B The Queen v Wendy Hope Jobson [2013] VSC 214 
Sentence 8 years imprisonment (5 years non-parole) 
Sentence 
Appealed? 
No 
Major offence/s Crimes Act 1958 s 74 – Theft, 6 rolled up charges  
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Offence 
description  
Theft by employee from employer totalling over $7.8 million – 
over 6 years – 1478 separate transactions 
Offender status  50 year old, female, TAFE education; administrative manager 
Crime involving 
taking 
money/property/
avoiding a legal 
obligation 
Yes  
Position of 
substantial 
influence? 
Yes – administrative manager – had access to group’s accounts 
with the NAB [7] 
Sentencing 
Variables 
Treatment Remarks 
1. Good 
character 
Mitigating 'I am prepared to accept that, apart from your 
persistent dishonesty over a period of six years, 
for most of your 50 years you have been of 
good character.' [14] 
 
2. Public 
opprobrium 
Not raised   
3. Reduction of 
employment/ 
career prospects 
Neutral  'It is also unlikely that upon your release you 
will ever be able to follow the same kind of 
employment that you have pursued since you 
were 17 years of age. I regard your… loss of 
employment…as being of very limited 
importance in fixing sentence.'  [17] 
4. Large amount 
of money 
involved 
Aggravating 'The amounts covered by each charge are 
substantial…' [4] 
 
'…you stole $7,818,893.66, little of which has 
been recovered and most of which is unlikely 
ever to be recovered.' [21] 
5. High level of 
planning/ 
sophistication 
Aggravating '… the objective facts surrounding your 
offences suggest a calculated and protracted 
course of deliberately dishonest conduct.' [9] 
 
6. High level of 
harm to victim 
Neutral  'Your offending was extremely grave, and 
represents a gross breach of trust. In his victim 
impact statement, Mr Mitchell Koroneos 
describes you as a trusted friend and 
worker…The fact that there is a single victim is 
in no way, of course, a mitigating feature; but it 
is the absence of an aggravating factor often 
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encountered in these cases.' [10] [11] 
'I received a victim impact statement from 
Mitchell Koroneos, which speaks of the impact 
the offences have had on him, his family and 
his business. I take that victim impact 
statement into account when fixing sentence.' 
[21] 
7. Restitution Mitigating 'You remitted $195,849.98…following the sale 
of your matrimonial home, and I take that into 
account in your favour.' [21] 
8. Ancillary 
orders 
Not raised  
  
 228 
APPENDIX B - AUTHORSHIP STATEMENTS 
A GENERAL DETERRENCE ARTICLE 
1.  Details of publication and executive author 
Title of Publication Publication details 
(Marginal) general deterrence doesn't work - and what it 
means for sentencing 
 
(2011) 35 Crim LJ 269 
Name of executive author School/Institute/Division if 
based at Deakin; Organisation 
and address if non-Deakin 
Email or phone 
Mirko Bagaric  Faculty of Business & Law mirko.bagaric@deakin.edu.au 
2.  Inclusion of publication in a thesis 
Is it intended to include this publication in 
a higher degree by research (HDR) thesis? 
Yes 
 
 
If Yes, please complete Section 3 
If No, go straight to Section 4. 
3.  HDR thesis author’s declaration 
Name of HDR thesis 
author if different from 
above. (If the same, write 
“as above”) 
School/Institute/Division if based at 
Deakin 
Thesis title 
Theodosios Raymond 
Alexander 
 
Faculty of Business & Law 
 
A Rational Approach to 
Sentencing White Collar 
Offenders 
If there are multiple authors, give a full description of HDR thesis author’s contribution to the 
publication (for example, how much did you contribute to the conception of the project, the design 
of methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, drafting the manuscript, 
revising it critically for important intellectual content, etc.) 
Mirko and I’s mutual interest in sentencing led to our ongoing collaboration on academic 
publications regarding the law of sentencing. Mirko developed the broad parameters of this article 
in terms of examining the available literature to ascertain the validity of general deterrence theory. 
We then split the workload evenly. We both engaged in research, drafting, and editing. After we 
collated the relevant research and data, I attempted the first round of drafting, and we went back 
and forth until the final draft was ready.  
 
I declare that the above is an accurate description 
of my contribution to this paper, and the 
contributions of other authors are as described 
below. 
Signature 
and date 
 
 
Theo Alexander 
 
11/10/2016 
4.  Description of all author contributions 
Name and affiliation of 
author  
Contribution(s) (for example,  conception of the project, design of 
methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, 
drafting the manuscript, revising it critically for important intellectual 
content, etc.) 
Mirko Bagaric 
 
 
See above, mutual and equal contribution to the project. Mirko 
successfully submitted our article to the Criminal Law Journal. 
 
 229 
5.  Author Declarations 
I agree to be named as one of the authors of this work, and confirm:  
i. that I have met the authorship criteria set out in the Deakin University Research 
Conduct Policy, 
ii. that there are no other authors according to these criteria, 
iii. that the description in Section 4 of my contribution(s) to this publication is accurate,  
iv. that the data on which these findings are based are stored as set out in Section 7 below. 
If this work is to form part of an HDR thesis as described in Sections 2 and 3, I further  
v. consent to the incorporation of the publication into the candidate’s HDR thesis 
submitted to Deakin University and, if the higher degree is awarded, the subsequent 
publication of the thesis by the university (subject to relevant Copyright provisions).   
 
Name of author Signature* Date 
 Mirko Bagaric 
 
Mirko Bagaric  14/12/2016 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
6.  Other contributor declarations 
I agree to be named as a non-author contributor to this work. 
Name and affiliation of 
contributor 
Contribution Signature* and date 
 
 
  
 
 
  
* If an author or contributor is unavailable or otherwise unable to sign the statement of authorship, the 
Head of Academic Unit may sign on their behalf, noting the reason for their unavailability, provided 
there is no evidence to suggest that the person would object to being named as author 
7.  Data storage 
The original data for this project are stored in the following locations. (The locations must be within 
an appropriate institutional setting. If the executive author is a Deakin staff member and data are 
stored outside Deakin University, permission for this must be given by the Head of Academic Unit 
within which the executive author is based.) 
 
Data format Storage Location Date lodged Name of custodian if other 
than the executive author 
N/A    
    
This form must be retained by the executive author, within the school or institute in which they 
are based. 
If the publication is to be included as part of an HDR thesis, a copy of this form must be 
included in the thesis with the publication. 
 
 230 
B SPECIFIC DETERRENCE AND REHABILITATION ARTICLE 
1.  Details of publication and executive author 
Title of Publication Publication details 
The capacity of criminal sanctions to shape the behaviour of 
offenders: specific deterrence doesn’t work, rehabilitation 
might and the implications for sentencing 
(2012) 36 Criminal Law Journal 
159 
Name of executive author School/Institute/Division if 
based at Deakin; Organisation 
and address if non-Deakin 
Email or phone 
Mirko Bagaric  Faculty of Business & Law mirko.bagaric@deakin.edu.au 
2.  Inclusion of publication in a thesis 
Is it intended to include this publication in 
a higher degree by research (HDR) thesis? 
Yes 
 
 
If Yes, please complete Section 3 
If No, go straight to Section 4. 
3.  HDR thesis author’s declaration 
Name of HDR thesis 
author if different from 
above. (If the same, write 
“as above”) 
School/Institute/Division if based at 
Deakin 
Thesis title 
Theodosios Raymond 
Alexander 
 
Faculty of Business & Law 
 
A Rational Approach to 
Sentencing White Collar 
Offenders 
If there are multiple authors, give a full description of HDR thesis author’s contribution to the 
publication (for example, how much did you contribute to the conception of the project, the design 
of methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, drafting the manuscript, 
revising it critically for important intellectual content, etc.) 
This article was further to our previous articles focusing on sentencing. After looking at recent 
sentencing decisions and debating their effectivness, we decided to analyse the efficacy of state-
imposed sanctions to realise sentencing principles. This article built on our work from the first 
article associated with this thesis. This was a collaborative effort, and we would continuously add 
to and edit the aritcle until completion. We divided the research load equally. I focused on drafting 
from ‘Australian study invovling matched pairs of offenders’, however I was still heavily involved 
with the other areas, in terms of research, interpretation of the research, editing and making 
necessary changes. I, along with Mirko, engaged in numerous rounds of editing and ensuring our 
intellectual content was of a high standard.  
I declare that the above is an accurate description 
of my contribution to this paper, and the 
contributions of other authors are as described 
below. 
Signature 
and date 
Theo Alexander 
 
11/10/2016 
4.  Description of all author contributions 
Name and affiliation of 
author  
Contribution(s) (for example,  conception of the project, design of 
methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, 
drafting the manuscript, revising it critically for important intellectual 
content, etc.) 
Mirko Bagaric 
 
 
As indicated above, Mirko and I shared the equal burden of 
researching, drafting and editing the article. His drafting efforts centred 
on the first half of the article, up to ‘Australian study invovling 
marched pairs of offenders’. However, he was as equally engaged in 
the other sections, particularly through research and ensuring the 
content was intellectually sound. 
 231 
 
5.  Author Declarations 
I agree to be named as one of the authors of this work, and confirm:  
vi. that I have met the authorship criteria set out in the Deakin University Research 
Conduct Policy, 
vii. that there are no other authors according to these criteria, 
viii. that the description in Section 4 of my contribution(s) to this publication is accurate,  
ix. that the data on which these findings are based are stored as set out in Section 7 below. 
If this work is to form part of an HDR thesis as described in Sections 2 and 3, I further  
x. consent to the incorporation of the publication into the candidate’s HDR thesis 
submitted to Deakin University and, if the higher degree is awarded, the subsequent 
publication of the thesis by the university (subject to relevant Copyright provisions).   
 
Name of author Signature* Date 
 Mirko Bagaric 
 
Mirko Bagaric  14/12/2016 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
6.  Other contributor declarations 
I agree to be named as a non-author contributor to this work. 
Name and affiliation of 
contributor 
Contribution Signature* and date 
 
 
  
 
 
  
* If an author or contributor is unavailable or otherwise unable to sign the statement of authorship, the 
Head of Academic Unit may sign on their behalf, noting the reason for their unavailability, provided 
there is no evidence to suggest that the person would object to being named as author 
7.  Data storage 
The original data for this project are stored in the following locations. (The locations must be within 
an appropriate institutional setting. If the executive author is a Deakin staff member and data are 
stored outside Deakin University, permission for this must be given by the Head of Academic Unit 
within which the executive author is based.) 
 
Data format Storage Location Date lodged Name of custodian if other 
than the executive author 
N/A    
    
This form must be retained by the executive author, within the school or institute in which they 
are based. 
If the publication is to be included as part of an HDR thesis, a copy of this form must be 
included in the thesis with the publication. 
 
 232 
C TOTALITY ARTICLE 
1.  Details of publication and executive author 
Title of Publication Publication details 
Rehabilitating Totality in Sentencing: From Obscurity to 
Principle 
 
(2013) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal Volume 36(1) 
139 
Name of executive author School/Institute/Division if 
based at Deakin; Organisation 
and address if non-Deakin 
Email or phone 
Mirko Bagaric  Faculty of Business & Law mirko.bagaric@deakin.edu.au 
2.  Inclusion of publication in a thesis 
Is it intended to include this publication in 
a higher degree by research (HDR) thesis? 
Yes 
 
 
If Yes, please complete Section 3 
If No, go straight to Section 4. 
3.  HDR thesis author’s declaration 
Name of HDR thesis 
author if different from 
above. (If the same, write 
“as above”) 
School/Institute/Division if based at 
Deakin 
Thesis title 
Theodosios Raymond 
Alexander 
 
Faculty of Business & Law 
 
A Rational Approach to 
Sentencing White Collar 
Offenders 
If there are multiple authors, give a full description of HDR thesis author’s contribution to the 
publication (for example, how much did you contribute to the conception of the project, the design 
of methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, drafting the manuscript, 
revising it critically for important intellectual content, etc.) 
As per our previous collaborations, Mirko and I shared the responsibilities of the publication 
equally. This article follows on from previous sentencing research we have explored. The broad 
concept for the article was developed by Mirko and I then became the co-author after it became 
evident that the principle of totality is especially apposite in relation to white-collar offending. I 
substantially contributed to the research of all the areas explored in the article. Mirko and I divided 
up the sections of the article and each drafted the allocated parts. We then edited and improved 
each other’s draft manuscripts, incorporating or changing parts were appropriate. I proof read the 
article numerous times, and ensured the article was compliant with AGLC3 referencing guide. 
I declare that the above is an accurate description 
of my contribution to this paper, and the 
contributions of other authors are as described 
below. 
Signature 
and date 
Theo Alexander 
 
11/10/2016 
4.  Description of all author contributions 
Name and affiliation of 
author  
Contribution(s) (for example,  conception of the project, design of 
methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, 
drafting the manuscript, revising it critically for important intellectual 
content, etc.) 
Mirko Bagaric 
 
 
As indicated above, Mirko contributed equally throughout the duration 
of the publication. He too substantially researched the principle of 
totality, drafted different parts of the manuscript and had several 
attempts at editing and refining the article, until it was ready for 
submission to the UNSW Law Journal. 
 
 233 
5.  Author Declarations 
I agree to be named as one of the authors of this work, and confirm:  
xi. that I have met the authorship criteria set out in the Deakin University Research 
Conduct Policy, 
xii. that there are no other authors according to these criteria, 
xiii. that the description in Section 4 of my contribution(s) to this publication is accurate,  
xiv. that the data on which these findings are based are stored as set out in Section 7 below. 
If this work is to form part of an HDR thesis as described in Sections 2 and 3, I further  
xv. consent to the incorporation of the publication into the candidate’s HDR thesis 
submitted to Deakin University and, if the higher degree is awarded, the subsequent 
publication of the thesis by the university (subject to relevant Copyright provisions).   
 
Name of author Signature* Date 
 Mirko Bagaric 
 
Mirko Bagaric  14/12/2016 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
6.  Other contributor declarations 
I agree to be named as a non-author contributor to this work. 
Name and affiliation of 
contributor 
Contribution Signature* and date 
 
 
  
 
 
  
* If an author or contributor is unavailable or otherwise unable to sign the statement of authorship, the 
Head of Academic Unit may sign on their behalf, noting the reason for their unavailability, provided 
there is no evidence to suggest that the person would object to being named as author 
7.  Data storage 
The original data for this project are stored in the following locations. (The locations must be within 
an appropriate institutional setting. If the executive author is a Deakin staff member and data are 
stored outside Deakin University, permission for this must be given by the Head of Academic Unit 
within which the executive author is based.) 
 
Data format Storage Location Date lodged Name of custodian if other 
than the executive author 
N/A    
    
This form must be retained by the executive author, within the school or institute in which they 
are based. 
If the publication is to be included as part of an HDR thesis, a copy of this form must be 
included in the thesis with the publication. 
 
 
 234 
D FIRST-TIME OFFENDER ARTICLE 
1.  Details of publication and executive author 
Title of Publication Publication details 
First-Time Offender, Productive Offender, Offender with 
Dependents: Why the profile of Offenders (sometimes) 
matters in sentencing  
(2015) Albany Law Review Vol 
78.2, 397 
Name of executive author School/Institute/Division if 
based at Deakin; Organisation 
and address if non-Deakin 
Email or phone 
Mirko Bagaric  Faculty of Business & Law mirko.bagaric@deakin.edu.au 
2.  Inclusion of publication in a thesis 
Is it intended to include this publication in 
a higher degree by research (HDR) thesis? 
Yes 
 
 
If Yes, please complete Section 3 
If No, go straight to Section 4. 
3.  HDR thesis author’s declaration 
Name of HDR thesis 
author if different from 
above. (If the same, write 
“as above”) 
School/Institute/Division if based at 
Deakin 
Thesis title 
Theodosios Raymond 
Alexander 
 
Faculty of Business & Law 
 
A Rational Approach to 
Sentencing White Collar 
Offenders 
If there are multiple authors, give a full description of HDR thesis author’s contribution to the 
publication (for example, how much did you contribute to the conception of the project, the design 
of methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, drafting the manuscript, 
revising it critically for important intellectual content, etc.) 
In pursuit to add to our previous research on contemporary sentencing issues, Mirko and I mutually 
decided on this articles hypothesis. We divided the workload equally between us, with each 
contributing to the research, analysis and editing. After we pooled together our research and data 
collection, I drafted the ‘introduction’, ‘the current state of the law’ and ‘the absence of prior 
convictions should mitigate’ sections. Mirko focused on the other potentially mitigating factors. 
We would then swap our drafted sections and make appropriate changes or additions. We both 
engaged in the final edit and review of the article, before it was ready for submission.   
I declare that the above is an accurate description 
of my contribution to this paper, and the 
contributions of other authors are as described 
below. 
Signature 
and date 
Theo Alexander 
 
11/10/2016 
4.  Description of all author contributions 
Name and affiliation of 
author  
Contribution(s) (for example,  conception of the project, design of 
methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, drafting 
the manuscript, revising it critically for important intellectual content, 
etc.) 
Mirko Bagaric 
 
 
As indicated above, Mirko and I have a equal partnership, and 
contributed to the publication proportionately. Mirko focused on drafting 
the following sections: ‘abstract’, ‘good acts should not mitigate 
penalty’, ‘offenders with physical of financial dependants receive a 
reduced dependence’, ‘first-offender and dependents discounts will not 
undermine other valid sentencing objectives’ and ‘conclusion ‘. 
 
 235 
5.  Author Declarations 
I agree to be named as one of the authors of this work, and confirm:  
xvi. that I have met the authorship criteria set out in the Deakin University Research 
Conduct Policy, 
xvii. that there are no other authors according to these criteria, 
xviii. that the description in Section 4 of my contribution(s) to this publication is accurate,  
xix. that the data on which these findings are based are stored as set out in Section 7 below. 
If this work is to form part of an HDR thesis as described in Sections 2 and 3, I further  
xx. consent to the incorporation of the publication into the candidate’s HDR thesis 
submitted to Deakin University and, if the higher degree is awarded, the subsequent 
publication of the thesis by the university (subject to relevant Copyright provisions).   
 
Name of author Signature* Date 
 Mirko Bagaric 
 
Mirko Bagaric  14/12/2016 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
6.  Other contributor declarations 
I agree to be named as a non-author contributor to this work. 
Name and affiliation of 
contributor 
Contribution Signature* and date 
 
 
  
 
 
  
* If an author or contributor is unavailable or otherwise unable to sign the statement of authorship, the 
Head of Academic Unit may sign on their behalf, noting the reason for their unavailability, provided 
there is no evidence to suggest that the person would object to being named as author 
7.  Data storage 
The original data for this project are stored in the following locations. (The locations must be within 
an appropriate institutional setting. If the executive author is a Deakin staff member and data are 
stored outside Deakin University, permission for this must be given by the Head of Academic Unit 
within which the executive author is based.) 
 
Data format Storage Location Date lodged Name of custodian if other 
than the executive author 
N/A    
    
This form must be retained by the executive author, within the school or institute in which they 
are based. 
If the publication is to be included as part of an HDR thesis, a copy of this form must be 
included in the thesis with the publication. 
 
 
 236 
E RATIONAL APPROACH ARTICLE 
1.  Details of publication and executive author 
Title of Publication Publication details 
A Rational Approach to Sentencing White-Collar Offenders 
in Australia 
(2014) 34 Adelaide Law Review  
317 
Name of executive author School/Institute/Division if 
based at Deakin; Organisation 
and address if non-Deakin 
Email or phone 
Mirko Bagaric  Faculty of Business & Law mirko.bagaric@deakin.edu.au 
2.  Inclusion of publication in a thesis 
Is it intended to include this publication in 
a higher degree by research (HDR) thesis? 
Yes 
 
 
If Yes, please complete Section 3 
If No, go straight to Section 4. 
3.  HDR thesis author’s declaration 
Name of HDR thesis 
author if different from 
above. (If the same, write 
“as above”) 
School/Institute/Division if based at 
Deakin 
Thesis title 
Theodosios Raymond 
Alexander 
 
Faculty of Business & Law 
 
A Rational Approach to 
Sentencing White Collar 
Offenders 
If there are multiple authors, give a full description of HDR thesis author’s contribution to the 
publication (for example, how much did you contribute to the conception of the project, the design 
of methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, drafting the manuscript, 
revising it critically for important intellectual content, etc.) 
I developed the concept for the article, as this area of law lacks settled principles and requires 
significant reform. I undertook half of the data collection, analysis and drafting. We each proof 
read and edited the article numerous times. I wrote approximately 65% of this article.   
I declare that the above is an accurate description 
of my contribution to this paper, and the 
contributions of other authors are as described 
below. 
Signature 
and date 
Theo Alexander 
 
11/10/2016 
4.  Description of all author contributions 
Name and affiliation of 
author  
Contribution(s) (for example,  conception of the project, design of 
methodology or experimental protocol, data collection, analysis, drafting 
the manuscript, revising it critically for important intellectual content, 
etc.) 
Mirko Bagaric 
 
 
See above, Mirko wrote about 35% of this article – his focus was mainly 
on general principles of sentencing. I then adapted these to the specific 
cases of white-collar offences. 
 
5.  Author Declarations 
I agree to be named as one of the authors of this work, and confirm:  
xxi. that I have met the authorship criteria set out in the Deakin University Research 
Conduct Policy, 
xxii. that there are no other authors according to these criteria, 
xxiii. that the description in Section 4 of my contribution(s) to this publication is accurate,  
xxiv. that the data on which these findings are based are stored as set out in Section 7 below. 
 237 
If this work is to form part of an HDR thesis as described in Sections 2 and 3, I further  
xxv. consent to the incorporation of the publication into the candidate’s HDR thesis 
submitted to Deakin University and, if the higher degree is awarded, the subsequent 
publication of the thesis by the university (subject to relevant Copyright provisions).   
 
Name of author Signature* Date 
 Mirko Bagaric 
 
Mirko Bagaric  14/12/2016 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
6.  Other contributor declarations 
I agree to be named as a non-author contributor to this work. 
Name and affiliation of 
contributor 
Contribution Signature* and date 
 
 
  
 
 
  
* If an author or contributor is unavailable or otherwise unable to sign the statement of authorship, the 
Head of Academic Unit may sign on their behalf, noting the reason for their unavailability, provided 
there is no evidence to suggest that the person would object to being named as author 
7.  Data storage 
The original data for this project are stored in the following locations. (The locations must be within 
an appropriate institutional setting. If the executive author is a Deakin staff member and data are 
stored outside Deakin University, permission for this must be given by the Head of Academic Unit 
within which the executive author is based.) 
 
Data format Storage Location Date lodged Name of custodian if other 
than the executive author 
N/A    
    
This form must be retained by the executive author, within the school or institute in which they 
are based. 
If the publication is to be included as part of an HDR thesis, a copy of this form must be 
included in the thesis with the publication. 
 
  
 238 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
A Articles/Books/Reports 
 
 
Amoretti, Maria and Nicla Vassallo (eds), Reason and Rationality (Ontos, 2013) 15 
 
Andrew, D.A. and James Bonta, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct (Routledge, 
2010) 
 
Ashworth, Andrew, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 
 
Ashworth, Andrew, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study (Oxford, 2nd ed, 
1998) 
 
Auerhahn, Kathleen, Selective Incapacitation and Public Policy: Evaluating 
California’s Imprisonment Crisis (State University of New York Press, 2012) 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Same Crime, Same Time: Sentencing of 
Federal Offenders, Report No 103 (2006) 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 
 
Bagaric, Mirko, ‘Proportionality in Sentencing: its Justification, Meaning and Role’ 
(2000) 12(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 145 
 
Bagaric, Mirko, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (Cavendish, 
2001) 
 
Bagaric, Mirko, Theo Alexander and Athula Pathinayake, ‘The Fallacy of General 
Deterrence and the Futility of Imprisoning Offenders For Tax Fraud’ (2011) 26(3) 
Australian Tax Forum 511 
 
Bagaric, Mirko and Theo Alexander, ‘The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to Shape 
the Behaviour of Offenders: Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might and the 
Implications for Sentencing’ (2012) 36 Criminal Law Journal 159 
 
Bagaric, Mirko and Theo Alexander, ‘The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to Shape 
the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might 
and the Implications for Sentencing’ (2012) 36(3) Criminal Law Journal 159 
 
Bagaric, Mirko and Theo Alexander, ‘A Rational Approach to Sentencing White-
collar Offenders in Australia’ (2014) 34 Adelaide Law Review 317 
 
 239 
Bagaric, Mirko, ‘From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: Reducing the Rate 
of Imprisonment and Crime While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars’ (2014) 19 
Michigan Journal of Race and Law 349 
 
Bagaric, Mirko, ‘Sentencing: from Vagueness to Arbitrariness: The Need to Abolish 
the Stain that is the Instinctive Synthesis’ (2015) 38(1) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 76 
 
Bagaric, Mirko and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia, (Thomson Reuters, 2nd 
ed, 2015) 
 
Bagaric, Mirko and Theo Alexander, ‘Rehabilitating Totality in Sentencing: from 
Obscurity to Principle’ (2013) 36(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
139 
 
Bagaric, Mirko and Theo Alexander, ‘First-time Offender, Productive Offender, 
Offender with Dependents: Why the Profile of Offenders (Sometimes) Matters in 
Sentencing’ (2015) 78(2) Albany Law Review 397 
 
Bastian, Brock, Thomas Denson and Nick Haslan, ‘The Roles of Dehumanization 
and Moral Outrage in Retributive Justice’ (2013) 8(4) PLoS One 1 
 
Beccaria, Cesare, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings (Aaron Thomas 
and Jeremy Parzen, University of Toronto Press, 2008) 26 [trans of: Dei delitti e 
delle pene (first published 1764)]. 
 
Becker, Gary S, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 Journal 
of Political Economy 169 
 
Benson, Michael L and Sally S Simpson, White-Collar Crime: An Opportunity 
Perspective (Routledge, 2009) 
 
Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(Oxford Clarendon Press, 1789) 
 
Bessler, John, ‘Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death 
Penalty, and the Abolition Movement’ (2009) 4(2) Northwestern Journal of Law and 
Social Policy 195 
 
Bourke, Vernon J, ‘Rationalism’ in Dagobert D Runes (ed), Dictionary of 
Philosophy (Philosophical Library, 1962) 263 
 
Braithwaite, John, ‘White Collar Crime’ (1985) 11 Annual Review of Sociology 1 
 
 240 
Brown, Stephen E, Finn-Aage Esbensen and Gilbert Geis, Criminology: Explaining 
Crime and Its Context (Anderson Publishing, 7th ed, 2010) 
 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, Dictionary of 
Criminal Justice Data Terminology (2nd ed, 1981) 
 
Carlsmith, Kevin, John Darley and Paul Robinson, ‘Why Do We Punish? Deterrence 
and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment’ (2002) 83(2) Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 284 
 
Carveth, Donald, ‘The Unconscious Need for Punishment: Expression or Evasion of 
the Sense of Guilt?’ (2001) 3(1) Psychoanalytic Studies 9 
 
Cavadino, Michael and James Dignan, The Penal System: An Introduction (Sage, 3rd 
ed, 2002) 
 
Cellucci, Carlo, ‘Reason and Logic’ in Maria Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo (eds), 
Reason and Rationality (Ontos, 2013) 
 
Christopher, Russell, ‘Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of ‘Just’ Punishment’ 
(2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 843 
 
Clarke, R V G and Marcus Felson (eds) Routine Activity and Rational Choice: 
Advances in Criminological Theory (Transaction Publishers, 1993) 
 
Clinard, Marshall Barron and Richard Quinney, Criminal Behaviour Systems: A 
Typology (Holt Rinehart and Winston, 2nd ed, 1973) 
 
Coleman, James S and Thomas J Fararo, Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and 
Critique (Sage Publications, 1992) 
 
Cornish, Derek B and Ronald V Clarke (eds), The Reasoning Criminal: Rational 
Choice Perspectives on Offending (Springer-Verlag, 1986) 
 
Corns, Christopher, ‘Destructuring Sentencing Decision-making in Victoria’ (1990) 
23 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 145 
 
Cottingham, John, ‘Varieties of Retribution’ (1979) 29 Philosophical Quarterly 238 
 
Creswell, John and Vicki Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods 
Research. Thousand Oaks (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 2012) 
 
 241 
Cullen, Francis and Paul Gendreau, ‘The Effectiveness of Correctional 
Rehabilitation’ in Goodstein and MacKenzie (eds), The American Prison: Issues in 
Research Policy (Plenum Press, 1989) 
 
Cullen, Francis T, Cheryl Lero Jonson and Daniel S. Nagin, ‘Prisons Do Not Reduce 
Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science,’ (2011) 91(3) The Prison Journal 
48S 
 
Daly, Kathleen, ‘Aims of the Criminal Justice System’ in Marinella Marmo, Willem 
de Link and Darren Palmer (eds), Crime and Justice: A Guide to Criminology 
(Lawbook, 4th ed, 2012). 
 
De Quervain, Dominique et al, ‘The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment (2004) 
305 Science 1254 
 
DeGirolami, M O, ‘Against Theories of Punishment: The Thought of Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen’ (2012) 9 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 699 
 
Demeulenaere, Pierre, ‘Are There Many Types of Rationality?’ (2014) 99(4) Papers: 
Revista de Sociologia 515 
 
Demleitner, Nora et al., Sentencing Law and Policy: Cases, Statutes and Guidelines 
(Wolters Kluwer, 3rd ed, 2003) 
 
Dolinko, David, ‘Three Mistakes of Retributivism’ (1992) 39 University of 
California Los Angeles Law Review 1623 
 
Dörner, Dietrich, The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex 
Situations (Metropolitan Books, 1996) 
 
Douglas, Roger, ‘Rationalising Sentencing? The Victorian Sentencing Committee’s 
Report’ (1988) 12 Criminal Law Journal 327 
 
Edelhertz, Herbert, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White-Collar Crime 
(1970) 
 
Edney, Richard, ‘In Spite of Itself? The High Court and the Development of 
Australian Sentencing Principles’ (2005) 2 University of New England Law Journal 
1 
 
Edney, Richard, ‘Just deserts in Post-Colonial Society: Problems in the Punishment 
of Indigenous Offenders’ (2005) 9 Southern Cross University Law Review 73 
 
 242 
Edward Alsworth Ross, Sin and Society: An Analysis of Latter-Day Iniquity 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1907) 
 
Elffers, H and Jan de Keijser (2007) ‘Different perspectives, different gaps: Does the 
general public demand a more responsive judge’ in Kury H (ed) Fear of Crime – 
Punitivity: New Developments in Theory and Research (Bocum, Universtatsverlag, 
2007) 
 
Epstein, Daniel, ‘Rationality, Legitimacy & the Law’ (2014) 7(1) Washington 
University Jurisprudence Review 1 
 
Fazel, Seena and Achim Wolf, A Systematic Review of Criminal Recidivism Rates 
Worldwide: Current Difficulties and Recommendations for Best Practice (2015) 
10(6) PLoS ONE 1 
 
Figgis, Honor and Rachel Simpson, ‘Dangerous Offenders Legislation: An 
Overview’ (Research Paper No 14/97, NSW Parliamentary Library, Parliament of 
NSW, 1997) 
 
Fox, Richard and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1999) 
 
Frege, Gottlob, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System (University 
of California Press, 1964) 
 
Freiberg, Arie and Felicity Stewart, Provocation in Sentencing (Sentencing Advisory 
Council, 2nd ed, 2009) 
 
Fisher, Geogg, VSAC, ‘Reoffending Following Sentence in Victoria: A Statistical 
Overview’ (2015)  
 
Gächter, Simon, Elke Runner and Martin Sefton, ‘The Long-Run Benefits of 
Punishment’ (2008) 322 Science 1510 
 
Geis, Gilbert, ‘White Collar and Corporate Crimes’ in Robert F. Meier (ed), Major 
Forms of Crime (Sage, 1984) 137 
 
Geis, Gilbert, ‘From Deuteronomy to Deniability: A Historical Perlustration on 
White Collar Crime’ (1988) 5(1) Justice Quarterly 7 
 
Geis, Gilbert, ‘White-Collar Crime – What Is It?’ (1991) 3(1) Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 9 
 
 243 
Geis, Gilbert, White-Collar and Corporate Crime: A Documentary and Reference 
Guide (Greenwood, 2011) 
 
Gert, Bernard, ‘Acting Irrationally Versus Acting Contrary to What is Required by 
Reason’ (1999) 30(3) Journal of Social Philosophy 379 
 
Grabosky, Peter, John Braithwaite and Paul Wilson, ‘The Myth of Community 
Tolerance Toward White-Collar Crime’ (1987) Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Criminology 20 
 
Green, Stuart, Lying, Cheating and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 18 
 
Green, Stuart, ‘The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory’ (2004) 
8(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 1 
 
Gul, S, ‘An Evaluation of Rational Choice Theory in Criminology’ (2009) 4(8) 
Sociology and Applied Science 36 
 
Haist, Matthew, ‘Deterrence in a Sea of Just Deserts: Are Utilitarian Goals 
Achievable in a World of Limiting Retributivism’ (2009) 99 Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 789 
 
Hall, Lori L, ‘Correctional Education and Recidivism: Toward a Tool for Reduction’ 
(2015) 66(2) The Journal of Correctional Education 4 
 
Henning, Peter J, ‘Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-collar Defendants? 
(2015) 61 Wayne Law Review 27 
 
Henrich, Joseph et al, ‘Costly Punishment Across Human Societies’ (2006) 312 
Science 1767 
 
Hewton, Terry, ‘Instinctive Synthesis, Structured Reasoning, and Punishment 
Guidelines: Judicial Discretion in the Modern Sentencing Process’ (2010) 31 
Adelaide Law Review 79 
 
Hirschi, Travis and Michael Gottfredson, ‘Causes of White-Collar Crime’ (1987) 
25(4) Criminology 949 
 
Holtfreters, Kristy et al, ‘Public Perceptions of White-Collar Crime and Punishment’ 
(2008) 36 Journal of Criminal Justice 50 
 
Hovenkamp, Herbert, ‘Rationality in Law & Economics’ (1992) 60(2) George 
Washington Law Review 293	
 244 
	
Hudson, Barbara, Penal Policy and Social Justice (Macmillan, 1993) 
 
Hutton, Neil, ‘Sentencing, Rationality, and Computer Technology’ (1995) 22(4) 
Journal of Law and Society 549 
 
Kalberg, Stephen, ‘Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis 
of Rationalization Processes in History’ (1980) American Journal of Sociology 85(5) 
1145 
 
Kant, Immanuel, Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 1991) 
 
Kateb, George, ‘Punishment and the Spirit of Democracy’ (2007) 74(2) Social 
Research 269 
 
Koppl, Roher and Douglas Glen Whitman, Rational-Choice Hermeneutics (2004) 
55(3) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 194 
 
Kostelnik, James, ‘Sentencing white-collar criminals: when is shaming viable?’ 
(2012) 13(3) Global Crime, 141 
 
Krasnostein, Sarah and Arie Freiberg, ‘Individualistic Sentencing Framework: If You 
Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got There?’ (2013) 
76 Law and Contemporary Problems 265 
 
Larsson, Daniel and Tage Alalehto, ‘The Reaction Towards White Collar Crime: 
When White Collar Crime Matters’ (2013) The Open Criminology Journal 6 
 
Lauritsen, Janet L. and Maribeth L. Rezey, U.S. Department of Justice, Measuring 
the Prevalence of Crime with the National Crime Victimization Survey (2013) 
 
Leclerc, Benoit and Richard Wortley, ‘The Reasoning Criminal: Twenty-five years 
on’ in Benoit Leclerc and Richard Wortley (eds), Cognition and Crime: Offender 
Decision Making and Script Analyses (Routledge, 2013) 1 
 
Lewis, Roy V, White Collar Crime and Offenders – A 20 Year Longitudinal Cohort 
Study (Writers Club Press, 2002) 
 
MacKenzie, Doris L, ‘First Do No Harm: A Look at Correctional Policies and 
Programs Today’ (2013) 9(1) Journal of Experimental Criminology 1 
 
Marcus, Michael, ‘Archaic Sentencing Liturgy Sacrifices Public Safety: What’s 
Wrong and How We Can Fix it’ (2003) 16(1) Federal Sentencing Reporter 76 
 
 245 
Martinson, Robert, ‘What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform’ 
(1974) 35 The Public Interest 22 
 
Mason, Anthony, ‘The Courts and Public Opinion’ (Speech delivered at the National 
Institute of Government and Law Inaugural Public Lecture, Parliament House 
Canberra, 20 March 2002) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/NSWBarAssocNews/2002/11.pdf> 
 
Mason, Brett, ‘A Not So Rational Philosophy: A Critique of the Penalties and 
Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)’ (1995) 11 Queensland University of Technology Law and 
Justice Journal 67 
 
Materni, Mike, ‘Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice’ (2013) 2 British 
Journal of American Legal Studies 263 
 
Materni, Mike, ‘Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice’ (2013) 2 British 
Journal of American Legal Studies 263 
 
Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty (London: Longman, Roberts, & Green Co., 4th ed, 
1869) 
 
Minkes, John, and Leonard Minkes (eds), Corporate and White-Collar Crime (Sage, 
2008) 
 
Moore, Michael S, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press, 1997) 
 
Morgan, Jamie (ed) 'What is Neoclassical Economics? Debating the Origins, 
Meaning and Significance' (Routledge, 2016) 
 
Morris, Herbert, ‘Persons and Punishment’ (1968) 52(4) The Monist 475 
 
Mungan, Murat C, ‘The Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies and 
Incapacitation’ (2012) 72 Maryland Law Review 156, 172 
 
Paton, George Whitecross, A Text-book of Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press) 
 
Peczenik, Aleksander, ‘Rationality of Legal Justification’ (1982) 68(2) Archives for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 137 
 
Peczenik, Aleksander, ‘On the Rational and Moral Basis of Legal Justification’ 
(1985) 71(2) Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 263 
 
Pfohl, Stephan, Images of Deviance and Social Control: A Sociological History 
(McGraw-Hill, 2nd ed, 1994) 
 246 
 
Phelps, Michelle S, ‘Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap between Rhetoric 
and Reality in U.S Prison Programs’ (2011) 45(1) Law and Society Review 33 
 
Pontell, Henry N, and Gilbert Geis (eds), International handbook on White-Collar 
Crime and Corporate Crime (Springer, 2006) 83 
 
Pratt, John, ‘Penal History in Colonial Society: New Issues in the Sociology of 
Punishment’ (1995) 11 Australian Journal of Law and Society 3 
 
Primoratz, Igor, Justifying Legal Punishment (Oxford, 1989) 
 
Quinney, Richard, ‘The Study of White-Collar Crime: Toward a Reorientation in 
Theory and Research’, in Gilbert Geis and Robert F Meier (eds), White-Collar Crime 
(Free Press, 1977)  
 
Rausand, Marvin and Arnljot Høylan, System Reliability Theory: Models, Statistical 
Methods, and Applications (Wiley, 2nd ed, 2004) 
 
Reiss, Albert and Albert Biderman, U.S. Department of Justice, Data Sources on 
White-Collar Law-Breaking (1980) 4 
 
Rescher, Nicholas, Reason and Reality: Realism and Idealism in Pragmatic 
Perspective (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005) 
 
Roberts, Julian, ‘Public Opinion and Sentencing Policy’ in Sue Rex and Michael 
Tonry (eds), Reform and Punishment: The Future of Sentencing (Routledge, 2002) 
 
Roberts, Julian and Jan W de Keijser, ‘Democratising punishment: Sentencing, 
community views and values’ (2014) 16(4) Punishment and Society 474 
 
Roberts, Julian V, Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) 
 
Robb, George, White-Collar Crime in Modern England: Financial Fraud and 
Business Morality 1845-1929 (Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
 
Rodder, Dennis, White-Collar Crime (Grin, 2009)  
 
Ross, Edward Alsworth, ‘The Criminaloid’ (1907) Atlantic Monthly 44 
 
Sangha, Bibi and Robert Moles, ‘MacCormick’s Theory of Law, Miscarriages of 
Justice and the Statutory Basis for Appeals in Australian Criminal Cases’ (2014) 
37(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 243 
 247 
 
Sanson, Ann et al, ‘Punishment and Behaviour Change: An Australian Psychology 
Society Position Paper’ (1996) 31(3) Australian Psychologist 157 
 
Seery, John, George Kateb: Dignity, Morality and Individuality (Routledge, 2015) 
 
Shapiro, Susan, ‘Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept 
of White-Collar Crime’ (1990) 5 American Sociological Review 346 
 
Siegel, Larry, Criminology (West Publishing, 4th ed, 1992) 
 
Singer, Barry ‘Psychological Studies of Punishment’ (1970) 58(2) California Law 
Review 405 
 
Slapper, Gary and Steve Tombs, Corporate Crime (Pearson Longman, 1999) 
Smith, James M, ‘Punishment: A Conceptual Map and a Normative Claim’ (1965) 
75(4) University of Chicago Press 285 
 
Stalley, R F, ‘Punishment in Plato’s ‘Protagoras’’ (1995) 40(1) Phronesis 1  
 
Stearns, A Warren, ‘Evolution of Punishment’ (1936) 27(2) Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 219 
 
Strader, J Kelly, Understanding White Collar Crime (LexisNexis, 2002) 
 
Sunstein, Cass, ‘On the Psychology of Punishment’ (2003) 11 Supreme Court 
Economic Review 171 
 
Sutherland, Edwin, ‘White-Collar Criminality’ (1940) 5(1) American Sociological 
Review 1 
 
Sutherland, Edwin, White-Collar Crime (Dryden Press, 1949) 
 
Sutherland, Edwin, White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version (Yale University Press, 
1983) 
 
Sykes, Gresham, The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison 
(Princeton University Press, 1958) 
 
Thomas, David, Principles of Sentencing (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 
 
Thornton, Margaret, ‘The Development of Feminist Jurisprudence’ (1998) 9(2) Legal 
Education Review 171 
 
 248 
Ventriss, Curtis, ‘The Need and Relevance for Public Rationality: Some Critical 
Reflections’ (2002) 24(2) Administrative Theory & Praxis 287 
 
Victorian Attorney-General’s Department, Victorian Sentencing Committee, 
Sentencing: Report of the Victorian Sentencing Committee (1988) 
 
Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, Reoffending Following Sentencing in the 
Magistrates’ Court of Victoria (2013) 
 
Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, Does Imprisonment Deter? A Review of the 
Evidence (2011) 
 
Von Hirsch, Andrew, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments: Report of the 
Committee for the Study of Incarceration (Will and Hang, 1976) 
 
Wakelam, Spencer, ‘Corporate and White-collar Crime: Defining the Risk’ (2015) 
25(2) Risk Management Today 26 
 
Weatherburn, Don, Jiuzhao Hua and Steve Moffatt, ‘How Much Crime Does Prison 
Stop? The Incapacitation Effect of Prison on Burglary’ (2006) 93 Crime and Justice 
Bulletin 1 
 
Webber, Max, ‘Authority and Rationality – Max Weber’ in Kenneth Allan (ed), 
Explorations in Classical Sociological Theory: Seeing the Social World (Pine Forge 
Press, 2005) 143 
 
Webley, Lisa, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’, in Peter Cane 
and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook to Empirical Legal Research 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 
 
Weinrath, Michael and John Gartrell, ‘Specific Deterrence and Sentence Length’ 
(2001) 17(2) Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 105 
 
Weisburd, David et al, Crimes of the Middle Class: White-Collar Offenders in the 
Federal Courts (Yale University Press, 1991) 
 
Weisburd, David, Elin Waring and Ellen Chayet, ‘Specific Deterrence in a Sample of 
Offenders Convicted of White Collar Crimes’ (1995) 33(4) Criminology 587 
 
Weisburd, David, Elin Waring and Ellen F. Chayet, White-Collar Crime and 
Criminal Careers (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
 
Weisberg, Robert, ‘Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment’ (2012) 95 
Marquette Law Review 1203 
 249 
 
Wenzel, Michael and Ines Thielmann, ‘Why We Punish in the Name of Justice: Just 
Desert versus Value Restoration and the Role of Social Identity’ (2006) 19(4) Social 
Justice Research 450 
 
Western, Bruce, Punishment and Inequality in America (Russell Sage, 2006) 
 
Wheeler, Stanton, ‘Sentencing the white-collar offender’ (1980) 17 American 
Criminal Law Review 480 
 
Wheeler, Stanton, Kenneth Mann and  Austin Sarat, Sitting in Judgement: The 
Sentencing of White-Collar Criminals (Yale University Press, 1988) 
 
Zimring, Franklin, and Gordon Hawkins, The Scale of Imprisonment (University of 
Chicago Press, 1991) 
 
B Cases 
 
AB v The Queen [1999] HCA 46 
Aitchison v The Queen [2015] VSCA 348  
Attorney-General v Krone [1979] VSC 257 
Australian Securities & Investment Commission v Soust [No 2][2010] FCA 388 
Boulton v The Queen; Clements v The Queen; Fitzgerald v The Queen [2014] VSCA 
342 
Bugmy v R (2013) 249 CLR 571 
CDPP v Hill [2015] VSC 86  
CDPP v Kamay [2015] VSC 86 
Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 
Chester v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 611 
DPP v Esra Ogru [2014] VCC  
DPP v Gabriel Werden [2006] VSC 397 
DPP v Kenneth Edward Hampson [2006] VSC 229 
DPP v Loukia Bariamis [2013] VSC 457 
DPP v John Francis O’Reilly [2010] VSC 138 
DPP v Nguyen [2010] VSC 182 
DPP v Penny [2012] VSC 25 
DPP v Peter John Couper [2012] VCC 875 
DPP v Porcaro [2015] VCC 658 
 250 
DPP v Robert Gianello [2014] VCC 
DPP (Vic) v Terrick (2009) 24 VR 457    
DPP (Cth) v Thomas [2016] VSCA 237 
DPP v Walters [2015] VSCA 303 
DPP v Weidlich [2008] VSCA 203 
DPP v Woei-Jia Jiang [2014] VCC    
Elias v The Queen (2013) 248 CLR 483 
Green v The Queen [2011] VSCA 311 
Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520 
Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348 
Jabaltjari v Hammersley (1977) 15 ALR 94 
Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606 
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 
Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 
Morissette v United States 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) 
Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120 
R v Ashraf Kamha [2008] NSWSC 765 
R v Anderson [1981] VR 155 
R v Andre Vincent Di Cioccio [2012] VSC 28 
R v Anthony Charles Blumberg [2011] VSC 336 
R v Bateson [2011] NSWSC 643 
R v Bo Shi Zhu [2013] NSWSC 127 
R v Boulden [2006] NSWSC 1274 
R v Brewster [1998] 1 Cr App R 220 
R v Brian Francis Maloney [2014] VSC 641 
R v Bunning [2007] VSCA 205 
R v Casey [1977] Qd R 132 
R v Cassidy [2005] NSWSC 410 
R v Ceissman (2001) NSWCCA 73 
R v Coleman [2013] VSC 548 
R v Cooke (1955) 72 (NSW) 132 
R v Dalzell [2011] NSWSC 454 
R v David Tansey [2012] VSC 221 
R v De Silva [2011] NSWSC 243 
 251 
R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 
R v Fuller-Cust [2002] VSCA 168 
R v Fysh (No 4) [2012] NSWSC 1587 
R v Glynatsis [2012] NSWSC 1551 
R v Goodrich (1952) 70 WN (NSW) 42 
R v Graeme Ronald Hoy [2011] VSC 95 
R v Gregory [2010] VSC 121 
R v Hall [No 2] [2005] NSWSC 890 
R v Hargraves [2010] QSC 188  (79 ATR 406) 
R v Hartman [2010] NSWSC 1422 
R v Huy Anh Le [2008] VSC 624 
R v Ian Stuart Rau [2010] VSC 370 
R v Ida Ronen [2005] NSWSC 991 
R v Izhar Ronen [2005] NSWSC 991 
R v Joffe [2015] NSWSC 741 
R v Julie Anne Laird [2005] VSC 185 
R v Linacre [2014] VSC 615 
R v Lirim Emini [2011] VSC 336 
R v Lo [2007] NSWSC 105 
R v Marc Di Cioccio [2012] VSC 15 
R v McKay [2007] NSWSC 275 
R v Mervyn Jacobson [2014] VSC 592 
R v Milne [No 6] [2010] NSWSC 1467 
R v Moylan [2014] NSWSC 944 
R v Maurice Bernstein [2008] VSC 254 
R v Newton Chan [2010] VSC 312 
R v Nitzan Ronen [2005] NSWSC 991 
R v O’Brien [2011] NSWSCS 1553 
R v Omar Jihad Yusuf [2008] VSC 575 
R v Phelan [1976] VSC 355 
R v Radich [1954] NZLR 86 
R v Robert Bart Doff [2005] NSWSC 50 
R v Rodney Stephen Adler [2005] NSWSC 274 
R v Russell Andrew Johnson [2014] VSC 175 
 252 
R v Sargeant (1974) 60 Cr App R 74, 77 
R v Scott [2005] NSWCCA 152 
R v Shawn Darrell Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 
R v Smith (1987) 44 SASR 587 
R v Sonya Denise Causer [2010] VSC 341 
R v Stephen Michael Grant [2006] VSC 235 
R v Stephenson [2010] NSWSC 779 
R v Stoten [2010] QSC 188 
R v Stromer [2015] NSWSC 741 
R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398 
R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 
R v Vardouniotis (2007) 171 A Crim R 227 
R v Vuadreu [2009] VSCA 262 
R v Wendy Hope Jobson [2013] VSC 214 
R v Williams [2005] NSWSC 315 
R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292 
R v Bo Shi Zhu [2013] NSWSC 127 
Re Forbes (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 111 
Ryan v The Queen [2001] HCA 21 
United States v Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458. 
Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465 
Wanganeen v Smith (1977) 73 LSJS 139 
Webb v O'Sullivan [1952] SASR 65 
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 
 
C Legislation 
 
Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 
Crimes Amendment (Gross Violence Offences) Act 2013 (Vic) 
 253 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Torture Prohibition and Death Penalty Abolition) 
Act 2010 (Cth) 
Death Penalty Abolition Act 1973 (Cth) 
Legal Practice Act 1996 (Cth) 
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic)  
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 (UK) 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) 
Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic) 
 
D Other 
 
Attorney-General’s Department (Vic), ‘Sentencing Reform for State’s Most Serious 
Crimes’ (Media Release, 10 June 2016) < http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/sentencing-
reform-for-states-most-serious-crimes/> 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends March 2010 – Repeat 
Imprisonment (2010) 
<http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/C998A7D54EF0B00FCA2
576E70016C6AA/$File/41020_RepeatImprisonment.pdf> 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Measuring Wellbeing: Frameworks for Australian 
Social Statistics (12 October 2001) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/44AD1E3F6E6F27A2CA
25713F0014E6DA?opendocument> 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Prisoners in Australia (17 December 2015) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4517.0> 
 
Bhaacherjee, Anol, Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices 
(PhD Thesis, University of South Florida Scholar Commons, 2012) 
<http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=oa_text
book> 
 
Crimmins, James, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (as 17 March 2015) 
‘Jeremy Bentham’ <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/bentham/> 
 
Department of Justice and Regulation, State Government of Victoria, Corrections 
Statistics: Quick Reference (2 February 2016) 
<http://www.corrections.vic.gov.au/utility/publications+manuals+and+statistics/corr
ections+statistics+quick+reference> 
 254 
 
Durkin, Patrick, ‘Top Judge Takes Aim at White-Collar Criminals’, Australian 
Financial Review (online), June 10 2011 <http://www.afr.com/news/top-judge-takes-
aim-at-whitecollar-criminals-20110609-icrc6> 
 
Freiberg, Arie, ‘Sentencing White-Collar Criminals’ (Paper presented at Fraud 
Prevention and Control Conference, Australian Institution of Crimonology, Surfers 
Paradise, 24-5 August 2000) 
 
Frieswick, Kris, ‘Ex-cons Relaunching Lives as Entrepreneurs’, Inc Magazine 
(online) 29 May 2012 <http://www.inc.com/magazine/201206/kris-
frieswick/catherine-rohr-defy-ventures-story-of-redemption.html> 
 
Gelb, Karen, Sentencing Advisory Council, ‘Myths and Misconceptions: Public 
Opinion versus Public Judgment about Sentencing’ Federal Sentencing Report 
(2006) 
 
Mokhiber, Russell and Robert Weissman, Encyclopaedia of White Collar and 
Corporate Crime (22 October 2004) Dissident Voice 
<http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Oct04/Mokhiber-Weissman1022.htm> 
 
Potas, Ivan, ‘The Principles of Sentencing Violent Offenders: Towards a More 
Structured Approach’ (1991) 
<http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/proceedings/19/potas.pdf> 
 
Sarre, Rick, ‘Beyond ‘What Works?’ A 25 year jubilee retrospective of Robert 
Martinson’ (Paper presented at the History of Crime, Policing and Punishment 
Conference, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 9-10 December 1999) 
 
Simon, Kristina, International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, ‘Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches to Rule of Law Research: A Practitioner’s Guide’ (2016) 
 
Soiferman, Karen, Compare and Contrast Inductive and Deductive Research 
Approaches, Discussion Paper (2010) 
<http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED542066.pdf> 
 
Spigelman, James, ‘Sentencing Guideline Judgments’ (Speech delivered at the 
National Conference of District and County Court Judges, Sydney, 24 June 1999) 
 
Sutherland, Edwin, ‘Thirty-fourth Annual Presidential Address’ (Speech delivered at 
Philadelphia, Pa., 27 December 1939) 
Telfer, Jon, ‘With Greatest Expectation: The Colony, Crime and Corrections In 
South Australia’ (Paper presented at the History of Crime, Policing and Punishment 
Conference, Canberra, 9-10 December 1999) 
 
 
 255 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse University, White Collar 
Crime Prosecutions for November 2015 (20 January 2016) TRAC Reports 
<http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/white_collar_crime/monthlynov15/fil/> 
 
Trochim, William, Research Methods Knowledge Base (25 January 2010) Web 
Center for Social Research Methods <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net> 
 
Walen, Alec, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (as 18 June 2014) 
‘Retributive Justice’, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/justice-
retributive/> 
 
Walker, John, Mark Collins and Paul Wilson, ‘How the Public Sees Sentencing: an 
Australian Survey’, (Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, Report No 4, 
Australian Institution of Criminology, April 1987) 
 
Warner, Kate et al, ‘Gauging Public Opinion on Sentencing: Can Asking Jurors 
Help?’ (Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, Report No 371, Australian 
Institute of Criminology, March 2009) 
 
Warner, Kate, ‘The Historical Bases for Theories of Sentencing, Punishment, 
Deterrence and the Deterrence Value of Sentencing’ (Speech delivered at the ANU 
collect of Law Sentencing: From Theory to Practice Conference, Canberra, 8-9 
February 2014) <https://njca.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Warner-
paper.pdf> 
 
(Marginal) general deterrence doesn’t work –
and what it means for sentencing
Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander*
General deterrence is broadly understood as the theory that correlates
increased sanctions with decreased crime rates. It is one of the principal
objectives of sentencing in Australia; regularly used by courts to increase
penalties in criminal matters in an endeavour to discourage others from
committing offences. Imposing harsh sanctions on offenders, so the theory
runs, discourages by example other people from breaking the law. General
deterrence theory is a virtually unchallenged orthodoxy in Australian courts.
Yet, it is in this area of the criminal law that the greatest discord between
legal theory and social reality exists. The reality is that general deterrence, as
universally applied, does not work. The overwhelming trends evident in
empirical research suggest that higher penalties do not serve as disincen-
tives to crime. The current practice of increasing penalties to give effect to
general deterrence has no social utility. Accordingly, it is merely the infliction
of additional punishment in the absence of any associated direct or indirect
benefit. It is therefore socially and morally unjustifiable. There may yet be
other justifications for imposing harsh penalties on offenders, but they must
be found elsewhere than within the rubric of general deterrence. This article
sets out the current relevance of general deterrence to the sentencing
calculus. It then examines the empirical data regarding the efficacy of
punishment to deter offenders, and makes suggestions for reform in light of
these empirical findings.
INTRODUCTION
It is trite to observe that general deterrence is one of the principal objectives of sentencing. It operates
to increase the severity of the sanctions imposed on offenders by reference to its effects on people
other than the offender. It assumes that the imposition of punishment on offenders will deter other
people from committing (a) the same or similar crimes, and (b) crimes in general. Intuitively, it is a
persuasive theory. This is because it relies upon a series of seemingly sound premises:
P1: Humans have a strong desire to avoid hardships or pain.
P2: Criminal sanctions normally involve the imposition of hardships or pain.
P3: Imposing pain on offenders illustrates to people the adverse consequences stemming from
criminal conduct.
P4: People will avoid engaging in conduct that risks pain being imposed on them.
P5: The greater the potential pain, the stronger the desire to avoid being subjected to it.
Conclusion: General deterrence is justifiable.
The inductive force of this seemingly “sound” reasoning is strong; however, even seemingly
strong inductive arguments can lead to a false conclusion. General deterrence is one such argument.
The false conclusion is exposed and debunked when tested against the empirical evidence. The
overwhelming weight of scientific testing establishes that there is no – or, at best, a slight – connection
between higher penalties and lower crime.
This conclusion is not new. It has been noted repeatedly in the academic literature of the United
States,1 especially in the past five or so years. However, what has not been clearly and widely
* Mirko Bagaric, Deakin University; Theo Alexander, Victorian Bar.
1 The United States is the jurisdiction where most of the empirical testing of general deterrence has been undertaken.
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articulated is that the disjunction between higher penalties and lower crime rates does not necessarily
mean that general deterrence as a theoretical proposition is totally flawed; rather, the crude theory
upon which it has traditionally been based requires re-examination.
There are two forms of general deterrence. Marginal general deterrence concerns the correlation
between the severity of the sanction and the prevalence of an offence. Absolute general deterrence
concerns the threshold question of whether there is any connection between criminal sanctions, of
whatever nature, and the incidence of criminal conduct.2
Only marginal deterrence has been disproved. Absolute general deterrence works. In this article,
the authors examine the research data that demonstrates the failure of marginal general deterrence but
which supports the effectiveness of punishment to achieve absolute general deterrence.3
Implications for sentencing law and practice are also discussed. In short, it means that legislatures
and courts should not increase sentences in the futile pursuit of marginal general deterrence. However,
the pursuit of absolute general deterrence remains a valid sentencing objective. This can be achieved
simply by ensuring that offenders are penalised by the imposition of appropriate pain and hardship, but
such penalties should not be aggravated in order to achieve an unattainable objective.
In precise terms, the impact of the suggested reforms is that penalties should be reduced to the
extent that they are currently increased in pursuit of the objective of marginal general deterrence.
Given the “instinctive synthesis”4 required by the process of criminal sentencing, it is unlikely that
any reduction could be precisely measured. However, essentially it means that penalties in relation to
types of offences where marginal general deterrence currently plays a central role, such as drug and
revenue offences, should be significantly reduced.
These proposed changes can best be achieved by legislative reform. This is unlikely given the
near universal political trend towards tougher sanctions. However, the suggested reforms in this article
can also be achieved by judicial redefinition of the meaning of general deterrence and how it is
accommodated within the sentencing calculus. The authors recommend that general deterrence should
be confined to absolute general deterrence.
The next section of this article provides an overview of the current role of general deterrence in
the sentencing inquiry. This is followed by an examination of the empirical data regarding general
deterrence, and an explanation of possible sociological and institutional reasons for the failure of
marginal general deterrence. The next section provides a basis for rejecting the logical form of the
argument. The authors then look at the success of absolute general deterrence by way of contrast. A
brief discussion of the normative criticisms of general deterrence then follows before reform proposals
are set out in the concluding remarks, along with the limitations of these proposals.
THE ROLE OF GENERAL DETERRENCE IN THE SENTENCING INQUIRY
The form in which general deterrence most often appears in the sentences of courts is as marginal
general deterrence.5 In this form, it has long enjoyed a cardinal role in sentencing law and practice;
widely endorsed as the paramount objective of sentencing. Nearly half a century ago the New Zealand
Supreme Court in R v Radichstated that:
One of the main purposes of punishment … is to protect the public from the commission of such crimes
by making it clear to the offender and to other persons with similar impulses that, if they yield to them,
they will meet with severe punishment. In all civilised countries, in all ages, [deterrence] has been the
main purpose of punishment and still continues so. The fact that punishment does not entirely prevent
2 Zimring F and Hawkins G, Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control (1973) p 14.
3 The analysis in this article builds on the analysis by one of the authors a decade earlier: see Bagaric M, “Incapacitation,
Deterrence and Rehabilitation: Flawed Ideals or Appropriate Sentencing Goals” (2000) 24 Crim LJ 21. The current analysis of
the data on general deterrence has been used to suggest reforms to the specific area of tax offenders: see Bagaric M et al, “The
Fallacy of General Deterrence and the Futility of Imprisoning Offenders for Tax Fraud” (2011) (July) Australian Taxation
Forum. This article extrapolates the reform proposals to sentencing law in general.
4 For a discussion of the current approach to sentencing, see Bagaric M and Edney R, Australian Sentencing (2007) Ch 1.
5 Sir William Young, “The Effects of Imprisonment on Offending: A Judge’s Perspective” [2010] Criminal Law Review 3.
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all similar crimes should not obscure the cogent fact that the fear of severe punishment does, and will,
prevent the commission of many that would have been committed if it was thought that the offender
could escape without punishment, or with only light punishment.6
This passage has been cited with approval in numerous cases7 and deterrence remains a key
sentencing concept in each Australian jurisdiction.8 General deterrence is relevant to sentencing for
most offences, including where the offence is prevalent;9 public safety is at issue;10 the offence is hard
to detect;11 it involves a breach of trust;12 or where vulnerable groups need protection.13
It is particularly important in relation to offences involving a material benefit to the offender.
Thus, in relation to drug distribution offences, tax and social security frauds, it has been held to be the
most important factor in determining a sentence.
In the context of large scale drug offences, the court said in Aconi v The Queen that:
[18] It can … be accepted that the applicant had an important role in the distribution chain, having
access, for distribution purposes, to relatively large quantities of high grade heroin. In those
circumstances this was a case in which the starting point for the sentencing of the applicant could be
expected to be severe. As was pointed out by Kennedy J in Serrette [v The Queen [2000] WASCA 405]
at [2], it has frequently been said that those who engage in the illicit drug trade, whatever their role in
the enterprise, must expect heavy sentences in which general deterrence will be the principal purpose of
the punishment. This is especially so where an offender plays an important role in the distribution
process.14
In a similar vein, in R v Riddell it was noted that:
[57] Courts have also long recognised the importance of general deterrence in sentencing in respect of
drug importation offences. In R v Cheung … Sully J said:
The importation of heroin into this country in any amount and at any time constitutes a deliberate
threat to the well being of the Australian community … The importation or the attempted
importation of, and the trafficking or attempted trafficking [of heroin] … is in a very real sense a
declaration of war upon this community … In the face of such challenges each of the institutional
supports of our society has a role to play. That of the Courts is to punish and deter according to
law. Obviously, the Courts alone cannot meet adequately, let alone defeat, the challenge of which
I have been speaking. What the Courts can do is to punish drug-related crime in a way which
signals plainly to drug traffickers, especially foreign drug traffickers, that the Courts are both able
and willing to calibrate their sentences until a point is reached at which, to a significant extent even
if never perfectly, fear of punishment risked will neutralise the greed which is the only possible
motive of those who … engage in drug-related crime when they are themselves not drug
dependent.15
In the context of taxation offences, in R v Izhar Ronen, the New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal said:
6 R v Radich [1954] NZLR 86 at 87.
7 For example, in Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561 at 569; 29 A Crim R 85, Brennan J stated that the “chief purpose of
the criminal law is to deter those who are tempted to breach its provisions”. See also R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292 at 298-299;
R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182 at 186; R v Lambert (1990) 51 A Crim R 160 at 171.
8 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s 5(1)(b); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act (SA), s 10(j); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT), s 5(1)(c);
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 9(1)(c).
9 R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292 at 299; R v Taylor (1985) 18 A Crim R 14.
10 R v Dixon-Jenkins (1985) 14 A Crim R 372 at 376.
11 R v Jamieson [1988] VR 879; 34 A Crim R 308; R v Pantano (1990) 49 A Crim R 328 at 338.
12 R v Hawkins (1989) 45 A Crim R 430.
13 Kumantjara v Harris (1992) 109 FLR 400; R v Kane (1987) 29 A Crim R 326; DPP (Cth) v D’Alessandro (2010) 26 VR 477.
14 Aconi v The Queen [2001] WASCA 211, approved in Tulloh v The Queen (2004) 147 A Crim R 107.
15 R v Riddell (2009) 194 A Crim R 524 at [57]. The court noted at [58] that: “This passage has been cited with approval on
numerous occasions. Its relevance is not restricted to the importation of the particular drug in that case. It is an important
statement of principle relating to the importation of any illegal drug. Sully J reiterated his comments in R v Nguyen [2004]
NSWSC 144 at [53], which involved the importation of ecstasy. See also R v Chen (2002) 130 A Crim R 300 at [286]; R v Law
(Marginal) general deterrence doesn’t work – and what it means for sentencing
(2011) 35 Crim LJ 269 271
It has been stated time and time again and in all jurisdictions that the most important aspect of
punishment in relation to frauds on the Commonwealth’s revenue is general deterrence.16
More recently, in a unanimous judgment of the Victorian Court of Appeal in DPP (Cth) v
Gregory, Warren CJ, Redlich JA and Ross AJA said that:
[53] In seeking to ensure that proportionate sentences are imposed the courts have consistently
emphasised that general deterrence is a particularly significant sentencing consideration in white collar
crime and that good character cannot be given undue significance as a mitigating factor, and plays a
lesser part in the sentencing process. In the case of taxation offences general deterrence is also given
special emphasis in order to protect the revenue as such crimes are not particularly easy to detect and if
undetected may produce great rewards. “Deterrence looms large” as the present process of self
assessment reposes on the taxpayer a heavy duty of honesty …
[54] In many if not most cases, imprisonment will be the only sentencing option for serious tax fraud in
the absence of powerful mitigating circumstances.17
The same enthusiasm for general deterrence applies in relation to social security offences. Over a
decade ago, Underwood J in Hrasky v Boyd stated:
For many years now, Australian courts have emphasised the importance of general deterrence when
imposing sentence for what is loosely referred to as social security fraud. In Laxton v Justice (1985) 38
SASR 377, Olsson J said at 381:
(1) Offences of this type are now prevalent. The offence is difficult to detect and penalties should
reflect a concern for the protection of the revenue.
(2) Frauds of this kind must be viewed seriously because they threaten the basis of the social
security system which is designed to provide financial security for those in the community
who are in need. A deterrent penalty is called for…18
These comments were expressly endorsed in Emms v Barr19 and have been adopted in numerous
decisions since.20
The allegiance by the courts to general deterrence theory is so steadfast that judges have refused
to renounce it even in the face of apparent legislative disavowal of it as a sentencing objective.
For example, general deterrence is not specifically mentioned as one of the relevant sentencing
factors in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).21 This was apparently in response to a specific recommendation
by the Australian Law Reform Commission that it not be adopted as a sentencing objective because
sentences should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence committed. It was considered
unfair to impose heavier sanction on a particular accused because of the effects it might have on the
behaviour of others (discussed further below).22
In DPP (Cth) v El Karhani, while noting that general deterrence is one of “the fundamental
principles of sentencing, inherited from the ages”, the court attributed the legislative omission of
[2002] NSWSC 952 at [24] and R v Stanbouli (2003) 131 A Crim R 513 at [14] per Hulme J (with whom Spigelman CJ and
Carruthers AJ agreed on this point).” Most recently, see Nguyen v The Queen [2011] VSCA 32; R v Nguyen [2010] NSWCCA
238; DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 243 FLR 28.
16 R v Ronen (2006) 161 A Crim R 300 at [66]. See also R v Peterson [2008] QCA 70 at [22].
17 DPP (Cth) v Gregory (2011) 250 FLR 169 at [53]-[54] (footnotes omitted). The central role of general deterrence in the
sentencing of tax offenders has been noted in numerous decisions: see, for example, R v Nicholson; Ex parte DPP (Cth) [2004]
QCA 393; Sheller JA in DPP v Hamman (unreported, NSWCCA, 1 December 1998) at 6; DPP (Cth) v Rowson [2007] VSCA
176 at [21].
18 Hrasky v Boyd (2009) 9 Tas R 144 at [20]; 113 A Crim R 11.
19 Emms v Barr (2008) 187 A Crim R 390.
20 For example, see Ivanovic v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 28. However, this does not exclude the need to give weight to other
considerations, such as rehabilitation, especially in respect to young offenders. See, for example: R v Wyley [2009] VSCA 17;
DPP v Lawrence (2004) 10 VR 125; R v PJB (2007) 17 VR 300; R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235.
21 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 16A(1) and (2); however, specific deterrence is: s 16A(2)(j).
22 Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) p 18.
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general deterrence to a “legislative slip”.23 The court stated that general deterrence is still an important
sentencing consideration and no less important than the other factors expressly mentioned, even
though it is absent from the detailed list of relevant sentencing criteria.24
The courts appear so keen to invoke the power of general deterrence to discourage offenders from
their criminal ways that they have adopted it a priori as an article of faith. In Yardley v Betts, the court
stated: “the courts must assume, although evidence is wanting, that the sentences which they impose
have the effect of deterring at least some people from committing crime”.25 Similarly in Fern, King CJ
held that:
Courts are obliged to assume that the punishments which Parliament authorises will have a tendency to
deter people from committing crimes. The administration of criminal justice is based upon that
assumption.26
The basis of the imperative to pursue deterrence as a sentencing goal is unclear. It is not as if
there are no other sentencing objectives for which the courts can justify punishing wrongdoers:
denunciation, rehabilitation and reparation to name a few.27 Even if there were not, to the extent that
the law pretends to logical consistency, it would seem preferable to abandon punishment altogether,
than to punish criminals on the basis of a flawed rationale.
It is only on rare occasions that the courts have expressed concern or equivocation regarding the
efficacy of punishment to deter crime. In Pavlic v The Queen, Green CJ stated that:
[G]eneral deterrence is only one of the factors which are relevant to sentence and must not be permitted
to dominate the exercise of the sentencing discretion to the exclusion of all the other factors which the
law requires a judge to take into account. Secondly, although a court is entitled to proceed on the basis
that there is a general relationship between the incidence of crime and the severity of sentences, there is
no justification for the view that there exists a direct linear relationship between the incidence of a
particular crime and the severity of the sentences which are imposed in respect of it such that the
imposition of heavier sentences in respect of a particular crime will automatically result in a decrease in
the incidence of that crime.28
Most recently, in Glascott v The Queen, the Victorian Court of Appeal observed that punishment
will not deter offenders who are “emotionally wrought or otherwise irrational” at the time of
offending.29 Of course, this observation still works on the presumption that offenders would be
deterred if they were in control of their faculties at the time of offending.
Thus, general deterrence has been and remains an important consideration in the sentencing
calculus. In relation to some categories of offences it is even the most important sentencing variable.
When general deterrence is factored into the sentencing equation it is an aggravating factor and
thereby operates to increase the severity of the penalty. The central and repeated rationale offered by
the courts for pursuing this objective is that it will deter other people from committing crime. In the
next section the validity of this assumption will be examined.
THE EMPIRICAL DATA ESTABLISHING THAT GENERAL DETERRENCE DOES NOT
WORK
The theory that criminal sanctions deter crime has a long history, dating back more than 300 years.30
Despite this pedigree, it has been difficult to either prove or disprove the soundness of the theory. The
23 DPP (Cth) v El Karhani (1990) 21 NSWLR 370 at 378; 51 A Crim R 123.
24 See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 16A.
25 Yardley v Betts (1979) 1 A Crim R 329 at 333 (emphasis added). See also R v Dixon (1975) 22 ACTR 13 at 18.
26 R v Fern (1989) 51 SASR 273 at 274 (emphasis added).
27 These are discussed in Bagaric and Edney, n 4.
28 Pavlic v The Queen (1995) 5 Tas R 186 at [6]; 83 A Crim R 13. See also R v Dube (1987) 46 SASR 118.
29 Glascott v The Queen [2011] VSCA 109 at [152].
30 The history of deterrence theory can be traced to the works of Cesare Beccaria (see Beccaria C, On Crimes and Punishments
(Henry Paolucci translation, 1986; original 1764) and Jeremy Bentham (see Bentham J, The Principles of Morals and
Legislation (1988 translation; original 1789).
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main reason for this is the number of other variables that contribute to the crime rate. In order to
demonstrate the link between crime and penalty levels, it would be necessary to control for all other
variables which may affect the crime rate while increasing the dependent variable being the penalty
levels.31 Even if this could be done, it would be difficult, except perhaps in relation to homicide
offences, to get accurate information regarding actual crime rates due to the large number of offences
which are unreported.32
The complexity of the inquiry was noted more than 30 years ago by the Report of the Panel of the
National Research Council in the United States.33 The Panel concluded that the research evidence that
does exist regarding marginal deterrence is, overall, inconclusive.
We cannot yet assert that the evidence warrants an affirmative conclusion regarding deterrence. We believe
scientific caution must be exercised in interpreting the limited validity of the available evidence and a
number of competing explanations for the results. Our reluctance to draw stronger conclusions does not
imply support for the position that deterrence does not exist, since the evidence certainly favors a proposition
supporting deterrence more than it favors one asserting that deterrence is absent.34
Several years earlier, after a comprehensive review of the evidence regarding marginal deterrence,
Zimring and Hawkins were more definitive in their findings regarding the link between harsher
sentences and lower crime. They stated:
Studies of different areas with different penalties, and studies focusing on the same jurisdiction before
and after a change in punishment level takes place, show rather clearly that the level of punishment is
not the major reason why crime rates vary. In regard to particular penalties, such as capital punishment
as a marginal deterrent to homicide, the studies go further and suggest no discernible relationship
between the presence of the death penalty and homicide rates.35
The failure of even the death penalty to act as a marginal deterrence is exemplified by the
experience in New Zealand. Between 1924 and 1962 the death penalty for murder was in force, then
abolished, then revived, and abolished again. The changes generally followed some level of public
debate and were well publicised. Although the murder rates fluctuated during this period, they bore no
correlation to the prevailing penalty, whether capital punishment or life imprisonment.36 Similar
findings have emerged in the United States.37
However, whilst the absence of a link between homicides and the death penalty has been
challenged by some commentators,38 the evidence used in support of the link has been debunked;
primarily because the data upon which it is based is statistically insignificant and the evidence goes
against the overwhelming trend of empirical data. As has been pointed out by Richard Berk,39 the
main findings in support of the hypothesis that capital punishment is a deterrent to homicide relate to
31 For a discussion regarding the difficulties in evaluating data relating to deterrence, see Wilson JQ, “Penalties and
Opportunities” in Duff A and Garland D, A Reader on Punishment (1994) p 177; von Hirsch A et al, Criminal Deterrence and
Sentence Severity (1999) Ch 5.
32 For example, see Walker N, Why Punish? (1991) p 16.
33 Nagel D, “General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence” in Blumstein A et al (eds), Deterrence and
Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates, Report by the Panel on Deterrent and
Incapacitative Effects (1978) p 39.
34 Blumstein et al, n 33, p 7.
35 Zimring and Hawkins, n 2, p 29. See also Morris N, “Impediments to Penal Reform” (1966) 33 University of Chicago Law
Review 632.
36 See Walker N, Sentencing in a Rational Society (1969) pp 60-61, 191. See also Hood R, The Death Penalty: A World-Wide
Perspective (1996) Ch 6, especially pp 211-212.
37 For example, see Cochran J et al, “Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma’s Return to Capital
Punishment” (1994) 32 Criminology 107 at 129.
38 See, for example, Cloninger D and Marchesini R, “Executions and Deterrence: A Quasi-controlled Group Experiment” (2001)
35 Applied Economics 569; Zimmerman PR, “State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder” (2004) 7 Journal of
Applied Economics 163.
39 See Berk R, “New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over Again?” (2005) 2 Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies (2005) 303.
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11 observations40 out of a sample size of 1,000 observations41 where the homicide rate dropped in an
American state following an execution in the previous year. The data is statistically meaningless and
contrary to the trend of 99% of the observations. Berk stated:
Whatever one makes of those 11 observations, it would be bad statistics and bad social policy to
generalize from the 11 observations to the remaining 989. So, for the vast majority of states for the vast
majority of years, there is no evidence for deterrence in these analyses. Even for the remaining 11
observations, credible evidence for deterrence is lacking.42
Berk concluded:
It is apparent that for the vast majority of states in the vast majority of years, there is no evidence of a
negative relationship between executions and homicides.43
The strongest evidence in support of the theory of marginal general deterrence stems from the
considerable drop in serious crime levels in the United States over the past 30 years. This drop
coincided with increased penalties (including mandatory imprisonment in some states) and significant
increases in the imprisonment rate. Statistically, between 1990 and 2009:
(a) the rate of violent crime in the United States dropped by more than 60%, with most of the decline
being recorded after 1996;
(b) the violent victimisation rates per 1,000 people aged 12 years or older dropped from 44 to 17.44
During this period the imprisonment rate rose from 1.15 million to 2.3 million prisoners.45
Currently, the rate at which the United States imprisons its citizens is approximately 750 per 100,000
people (the highest in the world), which is nearly double that of 20 years ago. At face value, these
figures suggest a causal link between imprisoning greater numbers of offenders and effectively
reducing the crime rate.
A number of detailed studies have been undertaken to examine and explain this apparent causal
link between crime and imprisonment rates. For example, William Spelman has stated that up to 21%
of crime reduction is attributable to the increased rate of imprisonment.46 However, Spelman is
unclear whether the reduction is attributable to the incapacitation of offenders (who are thereby
prevented from committing crimes whilst they are imprisoned) or to the salutary effects of marginal
deterrence.47 Clearly, if, during that decade, around one million American offenders were taken from
the streets and imprisoned for various periods of time, it was to be expected that the opportunity to
commit crimes, and hence add to the crime statistics, was significantly impaired.48
40 Situations in which five or more executions occurred in a state in a single year.
41 Each “observation” is the homicide rate in an American state over the period of one year.
42 Berk, n 39 at 330.
43 Berk, n 39 at 330. For a more wide-ranging study with similar conclusions see: Dölling D, Entorf H, Hermann D and Rupp T,
“Is Deterrence Effective? Results of a Meta-analysis of Punishment” (2009) 15 European Journal on Criminal Policy and
Research 201; Donohue J, “Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: The Overall Change over the Previous Decades
and the Benefits on the Margin” in Raphael S and Stoll MA (eds), Do Prisons Make us Safer? (2009); Doob AN and
Webster CM, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis” (2003) 13 Crime and Justice 143.
44 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts at a Glance: Violent Crime Trends, http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/
viortrdtab.cfm viewed 8 September 2011. The rate of decline in other forms of crime was similar.
45 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts at a Glance: Correctional Populations, http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/
tables/corr2tab.cfm viewed 8 September 2011.
46 Spelman W, “What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us About Imprisonment and Crime” (2000) 27 Crime ;& Just 419 at
485. See also Blumstein A and Wallman J, The Crime Drop in America (2000); Levitt SD, “Understanding Why Crime Fell in
the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not” (2004) 18 J Econ Persps 163 at 177.
47 On balance, studies show that a 10% increase in imprisonment rates produce a 2% to 4% reduction in the crime rate, most of
which is in relation to non-violent offenders: see Warren R, “Evidence-based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of
Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy” (2009) 43 USF L Rev 585 at 594 and the references cited
therein.
48 As noted below, some of this reduction is also attributable to more police.
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Further, it has been noted that similar crime reduction trends occurred in Canada, the nearest
neighbour to the United States, over approximately the same period. During that period, the
imprisonment rate in Canada actually fell.49
Empirical evidence not only questions the causal link between higher penalties and lower crime,
but also provides strong evidence of alternative explanations for falling crime rates. For example, it
has been argued that 50% of the fall in the United States crime rate is the result of an increased
number of women from disadvantaged groups (teenagers, the poor and minority groups) having
abortions. It is argued that these pregnancies would have resulted in births of children who would have
been most likely to commit crimes as adults. Thus, so it is argued, the legalisation of abortion in the
1970s resulted in lower crime rates in the 1990s; with each 10% rise in abortions corresponding to a
1% drop in crimes two decades later.50 In commenting on the causal link between increased abortions
and reduced crime, Steven Levitt stated:
The five states that allowed abortion in 1970 (three years before Roe v Wade) experienced a decline in
crime rates earlier than the rest of the nation. States with high and low abortion rates in the 1970s
experienced similar crime trends for decades until the first cohorts exposed to legalized abortion
reached the high-crime ages around 1990. At that point, the high-abortion states saw dramatic declines
in crime relative to the low-abortion states over the next decade. The magnitude of the differences in the
crime decline between high- and low-abortion states was over 25 per cent for homicide, violent crime
and property crime … Panel data estimates confirm the strong negative relationship between lagged
abortion and crime. An analysis of arrest rates by age reveals that only arrests of those born after
abortion legalization are affected by the law change.51
Recent empirical research from Germany is consistent with United States findings regarding the
failure of marginal general deterrence.52 At the Goethe University, Frankfurt, Horst Entorf reviewed
24 years of criminal sentencing practices in West German states for correlates of the crime rate. Entorf
sought to examine the effect of each stage of the prosecution process, from investigation to conviction,
on the commission rates of two specific crimes (“major property” and “violent crimes”), in order to
assess their relative contribution to the overall effect of the criminal prosecution process on crime
rates. The results were analysed by the theoretical econometric analysis methodology, which
considered the deterrent effects of formal and informal, as well as custodial and non-custodial,
sanctions.53
The results of the research challenged the perceived wisdom about marginal general deterrence. It
was discovered that a deterrent effect was found at “the first two stages of the criminal prosecution
process” (charge and conviction) rather than at the “less robust” severity of punishment stage
(sentencing). Entorf also found that:
Results presented in [the] article suggest that crime is particularly deterred by certainty of conviction.
Here, contrary to popular belief, neither police nor judges but public prosecutors play the leading role.
Extending severity of sentences, however, does not seem to provide a suitable strategy for fighting
crime. In particular, the length of the imprisonment terms proves insignificant.54
As a consequence, he suggested that the public policies pursued by courts and legislatures in the
name of marginal deterrence must be reconsidered. Building more prisons, creating harsher mandatory
sentencing regimes and devoting more resources to the detention of offenders must be critically
questioned. Fashionable policies which divert offenders from the criminal justice system (and
49 Paternoster R, “A Century of Criminal Justice: Crimes and Punishment: So, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal
Deterrence?” (2010) J Crim L & Criminology 765 at 803.
50 Ellison M, “US Study Ties Crime Fall to Abortions”, The Age (11 August 1999) p 13.
51 Levitt, n 46 at 182-183.
52 Entorf H, Crime, Prosecutors and the Certainty of Conviction, IZA Discussion Paper No 5670 (Goethe University Frankfurt,
April 2011).
53 Theoretical econometrics studies statistical properties of econometric procedures; such properties include power of hypothesis
tests and the efficiency of survey-sampling methods, of experimental designs, and of estimators. See Pindyck RS and
Rubinfeld DL, Econometric Methods and Economic Forecasts (4th ed, McGraw-Hill, 1998).
54 Entorf, n 52, p 4 (emphasis added).
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therefore reduce the likelihood of conviction after detection) must be abandoned. Political policies to
universally increase minimum sentences and judicial responses to public criticism of “deficient”
sentences should not be countenanced. The role of deterrence must be redefined:
“General deterrence” is still capable of curbing crime rates, but just by a more rigorous application of
existing penal laws rather than by reforms extending the severity of measures. The latter strategy,
followed in the US, might bear the risk that the prison population increases without any effect of
deterrence.55
These conclusions, derived from both common law and civil law experiences over three decades,
beg the question: why do higher sentences fail to deter would-be offenders?
SOCIOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FAILURE OF
MARGINAL GENERAL DETERRENCE
It is not central to the argument in this article to establish why marginal general deterrence does not
work. The only point that needs to be established to negate the justification for marginal general
deterrence as a sentencing objective is that it in fact does not work. However, the law is a conservative
enterprise and a tenable explanation for the failure of marginal general deterrence will assist in
advancing the reform proposals.
The most obvious explanation is that the risks of hardship and pain occasioned by criminal
offending are not adequately transmitted to potential offenders.56 In other words, there is a failure of
“threat communication” as it affects risk perception and negatively impacts crime rates.57 Yet studies
repeatedly show that awareness of potentially severe sanctions does not produce less crime. In one of
the most wide-ranging studies of its type, 1,500 respondents in 54 large urban countries were
interviewed to assess whether respondents had higher estimates of the certainty and severity of
punishment and its timeliness (celerity) in jurisdictions where the levels were in fact higher.58 No such
link was established. The authors of the study (Kleck, Sever, Li and Gertz) noted that this is
irrespective of whether the respondents had prior convictions or had no prior experience with the
criminal justice system. They concluded that:
There is generally no significant association between perceptions of punishment levels and actual levels
that CJS [criminal justice system] agencies work hard to achieve, implying that increases in punishment
levels do not routinely reduce crime through general deterrence mechanisms. Increases in punishment
might do so through incapacitative effects, the effects of treatment programs linked with punishment, or
other mechanisms, but are not likely to do so in any way that depends on producing changes in
perceptions of risk … Thus, increased punishment levels are not likely to increase deterrent effects, and
decreased punishment levels are not likely to decrease deterrent effects.59
A second explanation is that higher sentences do nothing to address the underlying causes of
criminal behaviour. The deterrence argument is based on the economic rationalist theory of choice; it
assumes that offenders rationally “choose” to offend in a type of criminological cost/benefit
calculation. Of course, sociologists argue that this theory fails to account for the myriad reasons that
predispose some individuals, and some groups, to crime. As Henry observed:
[M]uch of the criminological literature has demonstrated that there are a variety of motivations that
shape criminal activity ranging from biological predispositions, psychological personality traits, social
55 Entorf, n 52, p 30.
56 For a discussion of the obstacles confronting this level of knowledge, see Robison P and Darley J, “The Role of Deterrence in
the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At its Worst When Doing its Best” (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal 949.
57 Nagin D, “Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-first Century” in Tonry T (ed), Crime and Justice: A
Review of Research (University Chicago Press) Vol 23.
58 Kleck G et al, “The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research” (2005) 43 Criminology 623.
59 Kleck et al, n 58 at 653-654. See also Watling C et al, “Applying Stafford and Warr’s Reconceptualization of Deterrence
Theory to Drug Driving: Can it Predict Those Likely to Offend?” (2010) 42 Accident Analysis and Prevention 452.
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learning, cognitive thinking, geographical location and the ecology of place, relative deprivation and
the strain of capitalist society, political conflict and social and sub-cultural meaning.60
This observation is considered self evident by many sociologists. Lamenting the failure of politics
to adequately respond to this problem, Michael Tonry has suggested that the (desired) deterrent effect
of harsher penalties on such offenders is “better characterized as ideological rather than as
evidence-based”. In his survey of the academic literature, Tonry made the following simple
observation:
Most people sent to prison are socially and economically disadvantaged, most are or have been alcohol
or drug dependent, and most lack strong private systems of familiar or social support. Most after their
release are stigmatized and often are explicitly handicapped by laws precluding many kinds of
employment. Neither in the United States nor in the United Kingdom are strong systems of state support
in place to provide adequate housing or income to ex-prisoners. In lawyer talk, a judge could take
“judicial notice” (ie form a conclusion without needing to hear evidence) that already disadvantaged
ex-prisoners facing additional handicaps and lacking systems of support are more likely than other
people to engage in crime. Duh!61
A third explanation is the question of delay and similar systemic failure. In a recent wide-ranging
extensive analysis of deterrence research, it has been postulated that a central reason for the
ineffectiveness of marginal general deterrence is the extent of delays between detection and the
imposition of punishment:
It is argued that the empirical evidence does support the belief that criminal offenders are rational
actors, in that they are responsive to the incentives and disincentives associated with their actions, but
that the criminal justice system, because of its delayed imposition of punishment, is not
well-constructed to exploit this rationality.62
This is an argument favoured by economic rationalists who consider that the effectiveness of
punishment is increased by: (1) frequency of application; (2) immediacy of application; and (3)
punishment used in conjunction with positive reinforcement of pro-social behaviour. Thus the amount
of delay is an important part of the punishment-effectiveness matrix. As Friedman and Brinker have
pointed out:
Punishment is not one single strategy but a collection of strategies that exist on a continuum from very
mild to highly aversive approaches. Given our definition of punishment as a behavior-reducing
technique, it is important to understand the nature of this continuum.63
Hence, there are numerous sociological and institutional explanations for the failure of marginal
general deterrence. It is conceded that none of them have been firmly proven. But cumulatively, they
operate to soften the weight of the logical arguments in favour of marginal general deterrence.
THE LOGICAL FAILURE OF THE LOGICAL FORM OF THE ARGUMENT
As discussed in the introduction, the appeal of marginal general deterrence stems from the logical
argument that can be made in support of its objective: the reduction of crime. The authors do not
disagree with this objective, but challenge the means consistently adopted by courts and legislatures to
achieve it. As noted in the preceding section, a number of sociological and institutional arguments
have been advanced to explain the failure of marginal general deterrence. None have universal
acceptance and hence the logical form of the argument remains potentially persuasive.
60 Henry S, On the Effectiveness of Prison as Punishment, Paper presented at the Incarceration Nation: The Warehousing of
America’s Poor Conference Ivy Tech State College (South Bend, Indiana, 24 October 2003) (emphasis added).
61 Tonry M, “Less Imprisonment is No Doubt a Good Thing” (2011) 10(1) Criminology and Public Policy 137 at 139.
62 Paternoster, n 49. The same conclusion is reached in Tonry M, “The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two
Centuries of Consistent Findings” (2009) 38 Crime and Justice 65 at 69, where Tonry stated that “[t]he clear weight of the
evidence is that the marginal deterrence hypothesis cannot be confirmed”. See also Webster C, Doob A and Zimring F,
“Proposition 8 and Crime Rates in California: The Case for the Disappearing Deterrent” (2006) 5 Criminology and Public
Policy 417.
63 Friedman SG and Brinker B, “The Facts About Punishment” (2001) 4 Original Flying Machine 14.
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Cognitive and behavioural explanations have also been advanced to explain the gap between
general marginal deterrence in theory and reality.64 Again, none of these theories have been proven. In
years to come it is hoped that psychologists and other behavioural experts will provide a valid
explanation for the failure of marginal general deterrence.
But it is not necessary to wait until that time to at least diminish the intuitive appeal of the
marginal deterrence theory. The logical form of the argument in favour of marginal general deterrence
is set out in the introduction of this article. As noted, it is an ostensibly logically valid argument. And
in fact, the evidence relating to marginal general deterrence partially supports the argument. As
discussed above, absolute general deterrence does work. This is established by premises one to four.
The premise which has not been validated by empirical inquiry is the last one: the claim that the
greater the potential punishment, the stronger the desire to avoid being subjected to it.
Logically this premise may seem appealing, but paradoxically it is the logical assessment of the
premise that illustrates its flaw. An incontestable aspect of the human condition is that the matters
which influence human action are not confined to logic alone. We are moved significantly, and perhaps
principally, by our emotions and desires. If human action was dictated totally by logic people would
avoid high-risk behaviour which involves short-term enjoyment, but is known to carry significant
risks. The continued high incidence of tobacco use, alcohol consumption and the obesity epidemic
plaguing Australia (which has been subjected to near saturation levels of public health campaigns)65 is
concrete proof that human behaviour is not solely, and perhaps not even principally, guided by logical
considerations.
Accordingly, there is no basis for simply assuming that when deciding whether or not to commit
a crime, humans are automatically influenced by the size of the penalty which may be imposed if
apprehended.
This apparent gulf between our logical beliefs and action is a phenomenon that has been
recognised for centuries. In the 18th century, Scottish philosopher David Hume distinguished between
two states of mind: beliefs and desires.66 Beliefs are copies or replicas of the way we believe the
world to be. Desires are representations of how we would like the world to be; they are our wants and
are impacted greatly by our emotional preferences. On their own, beliefs can never provide a source of
motivation; “they are perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action”.67 It is only
our desires that can motivate us. We can assess beliefs for truth and falsehood – a true belief being one
which is a copy of the way the world actually is. In order for an action to occur, we need: (a) desire
that prompts us to effect a certain change in the world; and (b) a belief informing us how this change
can be achieved.
According to Hume, only beliefs can be true or false, and hence are subject to reason. Desires, on
the other hand are “original facts and realities”;68 they just fall upon us. They cannot be true or false
and therefore are not amenable to rationality: “Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of
64 Many of these catalogued (but not evaluated) in the report by the Sentencing Advisory Council, Does Imprisonment Deter? A
Review of the Evidence (2011), http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/news/2011-04-18/report-reviews-deterrent-effects-
imprisonment viewed 8 September 2011. After conducting a review of some empirical literature the report also concludes that
marginal general deterrence does not seem to work.
65 A federal government study (the National Health Survey) reported that in 2007-2008, 61.4% of Australians were overweight
or obese: Department of Health and Ageing, National Health Survey 2007-08 (2008), http://www.health.gov.au/internet/
healthyactive/publishing.nsf/Content/overweight-obesity viewed 8 September 2011.
66 Hume D, A Treatise of Human Nature (1978 ed; original 1738) p 458. For a fuller account of Hume’s theory of motivation
see Smith M, “Valuing: Desiring or Believing?” in Charles D and Lennon C (eds), Reduction, Explanation and Realism (1992)
and “Realism” in Singer P (ed), A Companion to Ethics (1991) pp 399, 400-402.
67 Hume, n 66, p 458.
68 Hume, n 66, p 416.
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the whole world to the scratching of my finger”.69 A desire “must be accompay’d with some false
judgment, in order to its being unreasonable”; and even then “tis not the [desire] which is
unreasonable, but the judgment”.70
Thus, the fallacy of the logical argument in support of marginal general deterrence is exposed if
one looks at the argument, not through the prism of a purely logical construct, but instead through the
lens of the actual sentiments that shape human conduct. The reason that people are not discouraged
from committing crime by the size of the penalty is obvious: even in rational people there are an array
of other more compelling factors that drive behaviour, these include anger, revenge, greed and
jealousy, which cannot be negated even by harsh penalties.
The only consideration that can dilute the strength of these factors is an individual’s awareness
that to act on them would ensure they remain dissatisfied primarily because they will be apprehended
– hence the success of absolute general deterrence, which is now discussed.
Ultimately, whatever the reasons, the empirical evidence supports the contention that marginal
general deterrence is an illusory concept – a mirage – which does little, if anything, to influence crime
rates and trends.71
THE SUCCESS OF ABSOLUTE GENERAL DETERRENCE
By contrast, the evidence relating to absolute general deterrence is much more positive. There have
been several natural social phenomena which have demonstrated human behavioural responses to a
drastic reduction in the likelihood (perceived or real) of punishment for criminal behaviour. The key
aspect to these phenomena was that the change occurred abruptly and the decreased likelihood of the
imposition of criminal sanctions was the only apparent change in social conditions.
Perhaps the clearest instance of this was the police strike in Melbourne in 1923, which led to over
one-third of the entire Victorian police force being sacked.72 Once news of the strike spread, mobs of
thousands poured into the city centre and engaged in widespread property damage, looting of shops,
and other acts of civil unrest including assaulting government officials and torching a tram. The civil
unrest lasted for two days, and was only quelled when the government enlisted thousands of citizens,
including many ex-servicemen to act as “special” law enforcement officers. This behaviour was in
complete contrast to the normally law-abiding conduct of the citizens of Melbourne.
The Canadian Sentencing Commission, after reviewing the available literature, also took the view
that absolute deterrence works:
Even if there seems to be little empirical foundation to the deterrent efficacy of legal sanctions, the
assertion that the presence of some level of legal sanctions has no deterrent effects whatsoever, has no
justification. The weight of the evidence and the exercise of common sense favour the assertion that,
taken together, legal sanctions have an overall deterrent effect which is difficult to evaluate precisely.73
The Canadian Sentencing Commission noted that “the old principle that it is more the certainty
than the severity of punishment which is likely to produce a deterrent effect has not been invalidated
by empirical research”.74 The connection between the certainty of punishment and the crime rate has
69 Hume, n 66, p 416.
70 Hume, n 66, p 416.
71 Tonry, n 61 at 141.
72 The discussion regarding the events of the strike comes from Milte K and Weber TA, Police in Australia (1977) pp 287-292.
73 Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (1987) p 136. See more recently, Durlauf SN
and Nagin DS, The Deterrent Effect of Imprisonment (2010), http://www.economics.uchicago.edu/pdf/durlauf_060710.pdf
viewed 8 September 2011.
74 Canadian Sentencing Commission, n 73, pp 136-137. In this context certainty means the likelihood of being detected and
having a sanction imposed. See also Entorf, n 52.
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been reproduced by numerous studies.75 This point has not been totally missed by the courts:
The deterrent to an increased volume of serious crimes is not so much heavier sentences as much as the
impression on the minds of those who are persisting in a course of crime that detection is likely and
punishment is certain. The first of these factors is not within the control of the courts, the second is.
Consistency and certainty of sentence must be the aim … Certainty of punishment is more important
than increasingly heavy punishment.76
The strongest empirical evidence in support of absolute deterrence comes from the United States,
which has over the past two decades seen a marked increase in police numbers77 and a sharp decrease
in crime. The near universal trend of data confirms that an increased police presence equates to an
increased actual and perceived likelihood of detection; invariably resulting in a reduction in crime
rates.78
The connection is complex due to the number of changes that occurred concurrently during this
period and which may also have had an effect on the crime rate. The changes include such things as
better police methods, a generally improving economy, and other variables previously noted including
abortion trends and the greater use of imprisonment. However, it has been noted that the greatest
reduction in crime numbers occurs where police are highly visible.
This accords with the ostensible success of “zero tolerance”79 policing, particularly in locations
such as New York City, where the deployment of the greatest number of extra police resulted in the
sharpest decline in crime in the metropolis.80 This trend was evident well over a decade ago. In a
period of only several years following the introduction of zero tolerance policing, the rates of violent
and property crime fell by approximately 35%.81
After evaluating the large number of surveys analysing the connection between more police and
the crime rate, Raymond Paternoster concluded:
What we are left with, then, is that clearly police presence deters crime, but it is probably very difficult
to say with any degree of precision how much it deters. Let us take Levitt’s estimate as a reasonable
guess, that increasing the size of the police force by 10% will reduce crime by about 4% or 5%.82
The causal link between lower crime rates and an increased perception of being caught supports
the theory of absolute deterrence. Being detected acts as a retardant to crime because there is an
75 For example, see Ross HL, “Law, Science and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 1967” (1973) 2 The Journal of
Legal Studies 1 at 26 where road accident casualty rates were compared from 1961 to 1970 in order to determine the impact of
the breathalyser in 1967. A significant drop in the casualty rate was noted after the introduction, thereby leading to the
conclusion that this was due to an increased subjective probability of detection and punishment.
76 R v Griffıths (1977) 137 CLR 293 at 327 (emphasis added).
77 Levitt, n 46 at 177, where Levitt estimated the increase at about 14%.
78 For a discussion, see Eck J and Maguire ER, “Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime?: An Assessment of the
Evidence”, in Blumstein and Wallman, n 47, p 207.
79 Zero tolerance policing is founded on “broken windows” theory which provides that strict enforcement of minor crime and
restoring physical damage and decay, such as broken windows and graffiti, would prevent the fostering of an environment which
was conducive to more serious offences being committed: see Wilson JQ and Kelling G, “Broken Windows” (1982) 249(3) The
Atlantic Monthly 29.
80 Zimring FE, The Great American Crime Decline (2007).
81 Grabosky P, “Zero Tolerance Policing” (1999) 102 Australian Institute of Criminology: Trends and Issues in Crime and
Criminal Justice 1 at 2. Grabosky noted that zero tolerance policing was not solely responsible for the drop in crime. He
suggested that there were numerous contributing factors, including sustained economic growth; a reduction in the use of crack
cocaine; the ageing of the baby-boomer generation beyond the crime-prone years; restricting the access of teenagers to firearms;
and longer sentences for violent criminals. See also Nagin, n 57, pp 30-32; Sampson RJ and Cohen J, “Deterrent Effects of the
Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension” (1988) 22 Law & Soc’y Rev 163; Corman H and Naci Mocan H, “A
Time-series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug Abuse in New York City” (2000) 90 Am Econ Rev 584. See also
Marvell TB and Moody CE, “Specification Problems, Police Levels, and Crime Rates” (1996) 34 Criminology 609; See
Williams KR and Hawkins R, “Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical Review” (1986) 20(4) Law & Society
Review 545.
82 Paternoster, n 49 at 799. See also Levitt, n 46. But see Eck and Maguire, n 78, p 207, who argue that these conclusions are
not valid, principally because of the incomplete nature of the data and cursory analysis involved.
(Marginal) general deterrence doesn’t work – and what it means for sentencing
(2011) 35 Crim LJ 269 281
underlying assumption that if caught then some hardship awaits. Vice versa, if rather than punishing
offenders police handed out lollies or movie tickets, one assumes that more police would result in
more crime.
Thus, absolute general deterrence does work, at least to the extent that if there was no real threat
of punishment for engaging in unlawful conduct, the crime rate would soar. It follows that the threat
of punishment discourages potential offenders from committing crime. This justifies the punishment of
wrongdoers. However, the evidence does not support the view that this relationship operates in a linear
fashion, that is, the deterrent effect of sanctions does not increase in direct proportion to the severity of
sanctions.
While the objective of deterrence justifies imposing punishment, it is at best a remote
consideration when it comes down to the question of how much punishment should be imposed.
Absolute general deterrence provides a justification for imposing punishment but it does not justify the
imposition of penalties that exceed the objective gravity of the offence. The precise duration of
penalties must be determined by other sentencing considerations, such as proportionality.
As discussed above, it seems that people are not totally irrational when they contemplate
committing crime. The evidence shows that to the extent that potential offenders do make a
cost/benefit decision about committing crimes, they generally only weigh up the risk of being caught,
not what will happen when they are apprehended. Thus, the best way to reduce crime is to increase the
perception in people’s minds that they will get caught if they break the law. The size of the penalty
does not seem to impact on this decision.
NORMATIVE OBJECTION TO GENERAL DETERRENCE
The strongest theoretical criticism of general deterrence is that it involves inflicting additional pain on
the individual in order to advance the interests of the community. This concept of sacrificing or
harming the interests of one person to benefit others is a very persuasive criticism of the utilitarian
theory of punishment (and morality in general).83 It is regarded as being repugnant to the current
moral orthodoxy which is the human rights ethic.84 Within this ethic, each individual is regarded as
being morally autonomous and complete and it is therefore inappropriate to aggregate interests to
defeat the rights of personhood.
This objection to marginal general deterrence was noted by Andrew Ashworth who stated that
giving weight to general deterrence involves treating “citizens merely as numbers to be aggregated in
an overall social calculation”.85 At the core of this objection is the Kantian maxim that a person
should always be treated as an ends, and never as a means.86
The normative objection against marginal general deterrence is strong – but not necessarily
insurmountable. Most human rights theorists accept that no right is absolute and can be defeated in
order to promote the greater good.87 Public rights can sometimes trump private rights. But in order to
fall into this category, the offsetting benefit must be clearly established. In the case of marginal general
deterrence, this balancing process does not even commence. This is because the evidence does not
support the theory that increasing the severity of penalties (the offsetting benefit) leads to a reduction
in crime. In other words, if harsher penalties do not equate to fewer crimes, then sacrificing individual
rights for this objective is unjustifiable, and morally unconscionable.
83 McCloskey HJ, Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics (1969) pp 180-181; a similar example to McCloskey’s is provided in
Carritt EF, Ethical and Political Thinking (Oxford, 1947) p 65; Williams B, “A Critique of Utilitarianism” in Smart JCC and
Williams B (eds), Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973) p 99.
84 See, for example, Campbell T, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (1996) pp 161-88, who discusses the near universal
trend towards Bills of Rights and constitutional rights as a focus for political choice. See also Sumner LW, The Moral
Foundation of Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987); Cushman T, Handbook of Human Rights (2011).
85 Ashworth A, “Deterrence” in von Hirsch A and Ashworth A (eds), Principled Sentencing (1999) pp 44, 47.
86 For further discussion, see, for example, Honderich T, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (1984) pp 60-62; Morris H,
“Persons and Punishment” (1968) 52 The Monist 475.
87 See Dworkin R, Taking Rights Seriously (4th ed, 1978) p 202; Nozick R, Philosophical Explanations (1981) p 95.
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Accordingly, the normative objection remains sufficiently strong to justify rejecting marginal
deterrence as a sentencing aim. Unless its effectiveness can be proven, then marginal deterrence
should no longer be pursued by courts, particularly in light of its moral repugnance.
CONCLUDING REMARKS – REFORM PROPOSALS
A number of points emerge from the above discussion. The most important is that courts should no
longer increase sentences to pursue the objective of marginal general deterrence. The practice of
imposing harsher sentences to discourage other offenders from committing the same or similar
offences does not work. The additional pain that is inflicted on offenders to pursue this objective has
no positive social effects and is therefore pointless.
As a result there should follow a general reduction of penalty severity to the extent that marginal
general deterrence currently drives sentencing outcomes. In relation to crimes such as revenue and
drug offences, this would result in a considerable reduction in the tariff for such offences.
These reforms are best achieved by legislative change. This is unlikely to happen as the “law and
order” agenda coalesces with a public perception that being “tough on crime” means increasing
penalties for criminal offences or instigating mandatory sentencing regimes. Political leadership in this
area is unlikely to risk the alienation that challenging, or even confronting, these perceptions would
entail. This is especially true as long as arguments in favour of longer sentences appear, rightly or
wrongly, more economically attractive than those in favour of more police.
These reforms can yet be achieved by judicial reassessment of the meaning and role of general
deterrence in the sentencing process. General deterrence as an objective should be interpreted as
confined to absolute general deterrence. This means that sentences that impose a hardship in the form
of a depravation that people would seek to avoid are seen as intrinsically satisfying the deterrent
objectives of sentencing. Most sentencing options, such as fines, licence disqualifications and
compulsory work orders would satisfy this criteria,88 although a possible exception to this may be
suspended sentences.89 General deterrence could only justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
where the sentence that would be imposed amounted to no hardship whatsoever. Thus, there is a need
to rethink sanctions in the nature of bonds and the statutory equivalents thereto. Instead of imposing a
bond, a fine would normally be a preferable disposition.
The authors do not suggest this reform because imprisonment, and even very long terms of
imprisonment, is inappropriate. Rather, it is just that such dispositions will need to be justified by
reference to other criteria. There are a number of other sentencing objectives which can be used to
justify long jail terms, especially the principle of proportionality and the goal of incapacitation.
Finally, it is important to identify the qualifications or limits to the reforms in this article. The
empirical evidence suggesting that marginal general deterrence does not work is weighty. But it is not
definitive for the reasons set out earlier in this article – in particular the number of variables that
impact on the crime rate. Further, most of the data is derived from the United States. Also, generally
speaking, the data is not offence specific. It may be the case that certain forms of crimes are more
amenable to deterrence by harsh penalties than others and that United States findings are not
transferrable to the Australian setting.
However, the trend of the data against the efficacy of harsh punishment to deter crime is so strong
that it should now be assumed that marginal general deterrence is an illusion. This should be the
default position given that it is morally wrong to sacrifice the interest of individuals for the common
good unless there is a demonstrable overall benefit to be attained. No such demonstrable benefit exists
in the case of marginal general deterrence and it should be abandoned.
88 For a discussion of the ambit of sentencing options throughout Australia, see Laws of Australia, Thomson Reuters service,
Sentencing.
89 It has been argued that suspended sentences constitute no punishment at all, see Bagaric M, “Suspended Sentences and
Preventive Sentence: Illusory Evils and Disproportionate Punishments” [1999] UNSW Law Jl 6.
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The capacity of criminal sanctions to shape the
behaviour of offenders: Specific deterrence
doesn’t work, rehabilitation might and the
implications for sentencing
Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander*
There is a considerable gap between the law and knowledge regarding the
efficacy of state-imposed sanctions to achieve several key sentencing
objectives. Two sentencing objectives which often carry considerable weight
in the sentencing calculus are rehabilitation and specific deterrence, despite
the fact that neither has been proven to be attainable. This article examines
the empirical data on whether specific deterrence and rehabilitation are
attainable, and consequently whether they should be retained or abolished as
sentencing objectives.
INTRODUCTION
The questions addressed in this article
Sentencing is a purposeful endeavour. It has a number of objectives. The key ones include
denunciation, retribution, specific deterrence, general deterrence, community protection and
rehabilitation.1 While these objectives may in theory be desirable, it is not clear whether they are
pragmatically achievable.
Legislatures and courts assume that sanctions can achieve such goals, despite the fact that there is
little, if any, proof (or inquiry) into the efficacy of punishment to achieve them. This is somewhat
ironic given the forensic, evidence-driven, criminal trial process which is a precursor to many
sentencing hearings.
Sentencing is the area of law where there is arguably the greatest gap between theory and
evidence. This article goes some way towards bridging the gap between assumption and knowledge in
relation to two of the key sentencing objectives. It provides an analysis of the current empirical
evidence regarding whether criminal sanctions are capable of (a) rehabilitating offenders; and (b)
specifically discouraging offenders from future offending.
In short, the article seeks to provide answers to the questions: “Does rehabilitation work?” and
“Does specific deterrence work?” If the answer is no, logically and normatively courts and legislatures
should reform this area of the law. Previously, the authors undertook a similar analysis regarding
general deterrence.2
The meaning of specific deterrence and rehabilitation
Specific deterrence aims to discourage crime by punishing individual offenders for their
transgressions, thereby convincing them that crime does not pay. In effect, it attempts to dissuade
offenders from re-offending by inflicting an unpleasant experience on them (normally imprisonment)
which they will seek to avoid in the future.
Rehabilitation, like specific deterrence, aims to discourage the commission of future offences by
the offender. The main difference between the two lies in the means used to encourage desistence from
* Mirko Bagaric: Deakin University. Theo Alexander: Victorian Bar.
1 For a discussion of key sentencing principles, see Mackenzie G and Stobbs N, Principles of Sentencing (2010); Bagaric M and
Edney R, Australian Sentencing (2011) at [1-3910]-[1-42001].
2 Bagaric M and Alexander T, “(Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work – and what it Means for Sentencing” (2010) 35
Crim LJ 269.
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crime. While specific deterrence focuses on frightening an offender into not re-offending,
rehabilitation seeks to alter the values of the offender so that he or she no longer desires to commit
criminal acts: it involves the renunciation of wrong doing by the offender and the re-establishment of
the offender as an honourable, law-abiding citizen.3 It is achieved by “reducing or eliminating the
factors which contributed to the conduct for which [the offender] is sentenced”.4 Thus, it works
through a process of positive internal attitudinal reform.5
Rehabilitation and specific deterrence both aim to alter the behaviour of
offenders
Rehabilitation and specific deterrence generally operate to influence the sentencing discretion in
different ways. Specific deterrence, where it is relevant, aggravates the penalty, whereas rehabilitation
normally mitigates the penalty. Both are analysed in the same article because they have the
commonality that they seek to evoke attitudinal change in the offender, albeit by different means. In
relation to both goals, the court attempts to directly change the sentiments and behaviour of the
particular offender (to make him or her more law-abiding), as opposed to striving to achieve wider
goals such as denunciation and general deterrence which only incidentally relate to the offender.
It is difficult to establish conclusively the efficacy of punishment to attain the goals of
rehabilitation or specific deterrence. This is because of the many variables that influence human
decision-making, and the difficulty of establishing controlled experimental groups in the real
environment that is the criminal justice system. Given that rehabilitative programs are often
undertaken in the prison setting, there is also the real possibility that specific deterrence and
rehabilitation may occur simultaneously, or that they may, in fact, counteract each other. Yet, as
discussed below, it is possible to develop a clear picture of where the evidence currently stands and, in
fact, this is necessary to properly direct future inquiry.
It is clear that criminal inclination can change – but can sentencing impact on
this?
At the outset it is important to recognise that there is no question that people can change their attitudes
and behaviour to become law-abiding. Few people commit offences for the duration of their lives.
Thus, the process of self-reform is not only possible, but typical. The reasons that people stop
committing crime are many and varied, but there are some well-established links between the human
traits and crime, and logically it would seem that the most effective way to reduce recidivism is to
attempt to dissociate the individual from the criminogenic influences.
However, this rarely presents itself as a viable option. Many factors that increase the risk of a
person committing an offence are intrinsic and relate to immutable personal characteristics. As
discussed further below, the main factors that fall into this category, in the Australian context, are
being male, young and Indigenous.
Then there are social or situational considerations that increase the risk a person will offend. Most
of them are entrenched and difficult to surmount, and include lower socio-economic status and
unemployment.6 Poor people are grossly over-represented in jails across the world.7 As people
become more affluent, they commit less crime – apparently because they then have more to lose by
being imprisoned. There are numerous other well-documented causes of crime. Empirical studies also
3 For example, see Vartzokas v Zanker (1989) 51 SASR 277 at 279; 44 A Crim R 243.
4 Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 at 438.
5 See further, Ten CL, Crime, Guilt and Punishment (1987) pp 7-8.
6 Weatherburn D, “What Causes Crime?” (2001) 54 Crime and Justice Bulletin 1 at 6.
7 For example, see Box S, Recession, Crime and Punishment (1987) p 96, who, after reviewing 16 major studies between
income inequality and crime, concluded that income inequality is strongly related to crime; see also Carlen P, “Crime,
Inequality and Sentencing” in Duff RA and Garland D (eds), A Reader on Punishment (1994) p 309. Prison numbers illustrate
this quite graphically. In Australia, the rate of Indigenous imprisonment is 14 times higher than that of the general population:
see ABS, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/4512.0Dec%202006 viewed 22 May 2012.
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show that there is a link between legal compliance and the content of law. Normative issues are
closely linked to compliance with the law. People obey the law not only because it is in their
self-interest to do so, but also because they believe it is morally proper to do so.8 As will be seen later
in this article, it is on these attitudinal dimensions which many rehabilitative programs are focused.
Thus, there is no doubt that an individual’s inclination to commit crime can be changed and
reduced, and in fact most people voluntarily desist from crime at some point – although the general
trend is that “those who start early in crime tend to finish late”.9 This article focuses on whether
external measures taken by the criminal justice system can positively impact on the process.
Overview of conclusions reached
The authors conclude that there is no evidence that inflicting harsh sanctions on people makes them
less likely to re-offend in the future. The evidence is, in fact, to the contrary. The level of certainty of
this conclusion is very high – so high, that specific deterrence should be abolished as a sentencing
consideration.
The evidence about rehabilitation is less conclusive, but on balance it seems that specific forms of
interventions may be able to reduce recidivism. Importantly, it seems that offenders can even be
rehabilitated in a custodial setting. This could potentially have an unexpected impact on the sentencing
calculus. The pursuit of rehabilitation normally leads to less severe sanctions; however, if offenders
could be effectively reformed while in prison, it could diminish the mitigatory role of rehabilitation.
However, the current state of knowledge about the capacity to reform offenders is so rudimentary that
it does not strongly support any change in the law or policy changes. All that can be said with
confidence, at this stage, is that there is a pressing need for more empirical research relating to
rehabilitation.
The role of specific deterrence and rehabilitation in current sentencing practice is considered in
the next part of this article. Then the empirical evidence is examined regarding the efficacy of
punishment to specifically deter offenders followed by the same inquiry made in relation to
rehabilitation. Finally, the authors set out the implications of the findings in this article for law reform
and further research.
THE ROLE OF SPECIFIC DETERRENCE AND REHABILITATION IN CURRENT
SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE
Rehabilitation is expressly set out as a sentencing consideration in the sentencing statutes of all
Australian jurisdictions10 and is an important objective recognised in common law.11 Rehabilitation is
normally given most weight in relation to young offenders and those with a little or criminal record.12
It also has a strong role where the offender has voluntarily disclosed the crime;13 where the offender
has favourably responded to previous court orders14 and where there is a considerable delay between
the offence and sentencing during which the offender has not re-offended.15
8 See Tyler T, Why People Obey the Law (1990) pp 107, 175-176.
9 Weatherburn, n 6 at 3.
10 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), s 7(1)(d); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 16A(2)(n); Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
1999 (NSW), s 11; Sentencing Act 1995 (NT), s 5(1)(b); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s 5(1)(c); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992
(Qld), s 9(1)(b); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), s 10(m); Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), s 3(e)(ii); Sentencing Act 1995
(WA), s 6(4)(b).
11 Yardley v Betts (1979) 22 SASR 108 at 112 (King CJ); 1 A Crim R 329.
12 R v GDP (1991) 53 A Crim R 112; R v E (a child) (1993) 66 A Crim R 14 at 28; R v KT (2008) 182 A Crim R 571; R v MD
(2005) 156 A Crim R 372; R v PP (2003) 142 A Crim R 369.
13 FJL v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 8; Skipworth v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 64 at [13] (McLure J); Cameron
v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 at [65].
14 R v Skilbeck [2010] SASCFC 35.
15 R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517 – but this is given less weight where the cause of the delay is attributable to the offender;
Scook v The Queen (2008) 185 A Crim R 164; Gok v The Queen [2010] WASCA 185.
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Offenders with a poor criminal history are not necessarily excluded from consideration of their
prospects for rehabilitation, particularly where there is some evidence that the offender has taken steps
to integrate him or herself into the community.16 In respect of very grave offences, rehabilitation is
sometimes regarded as irrelevant – swamped by other considerations, in the form of community
protection and general and specific deterrence.17
Basten J in Elyard v The Queen noted that in evaluating an offender’s prospects of rehabilitation,
the court will normally look to several sources, including:
(a) evidence of the past conduct and behaviour of the offender
(b) professional opinions, taking into account past conduct and behaviour and expressing views as to
future prospects, and
(c) at least in some cases, the opinions and expressions of intention of the offender himself or
herself.18
There are a number of common indicators suggestive of good prospects for rehabilitation,
including obtaining employment, completion of a drug rehabilitation program, attendance at a
residential rehabilitation program,19 apology to the victim of the offence, compliance with onerous
bail conditions,20 rendering of compensation, evidence of abstinence from drug or alcohol use,
remorse and support of family members.
Rehabilitation operates normally to reduce the severity of the sanction. Although there are many
rehabilitative programs offered in prison, rehabilitation generally is advanced by defence lawyers as a
basis for avoiding a custodial term, or at least reducing the length of the term that would otherwise
have been imposed. This follows from the fact that a custodial sentence is not considered as
rehabilitative.21
Specific deterrence is a central common law sentencing objective and is given express statutory
recognition in all Australian jurisdictions.22 Specific deterrence applies most acutely in relation to
serious offences23 and to offenders with significant prior convictions,24 since it is assumed previous
sanctions have failed to stop their offending behaviour. Conversely, it has little application where an
offender has voluntarily desisted from further offending25 or where the offender was suffering from
impaired intellectual or mental functioning at the time of the offence.26
Where specific deterrence is applicable to the sentencing of an offender, it operates to increase the
severity of the sanction. It is not feasible to ascertain the exact weight that is accorded to specific
deterrence given the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing (where only two considerations –
pleading guilty and co-operating with authorities – are accorded specific weighting);27 however,
16 Vartzokas v Zanker (1989) 51 SASR 277 at 279 (King CJ); 44 A Crim R 243.
17 R v Hakeem [2007] VSC 5; R v Carroll (2008) 188 A Crim R 253; Gonzales v The Queen (2007) 178 A Crim R 232.
18 Elyard v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 43 at [19] (Basten JA).
19 Miller v Burgoyne (2004) 150 A Crim R 7.
20 Pappin v The Queen [2005] NTCCA 2 at [16]-[18] (Martin CJ).
21 For example, see R v Houston (1982) 8 A Crim R 392 at 399; Muldrock v The Queen (2001) 244 CLR 120 at [56]-[58].
22 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss 16A(2)(i); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), s 7(1)(b); Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
1999 (NSW), s 3A(b); Sentencing Act (NT), s 5(1)(c); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), s 9(1)(c); Criminal Law
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), s 10(1)(j); Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), s 3(e)(i); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s 5(1)(b).
23 See, for example, DPP v Zullo [2004] VSCA 153; DPP v Lawrence (2004) 10 VR 125.
24 See, for example, Saunders v The Queen [2010] VSCA 93.
25 R v Pickett [2010] NSWCCA 273.
26 R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; 169 A Crim R 581; Melham v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 121; R v HBA [2010] QCA 306
at [31]; R v Goodger [2009] QCA 377 at [21]; Startup v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 5.
27 See Makarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; 204 A Crim R 434.
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logically, it can operate to extend the length of a prison term or convert what would have otherwise
been a non-custodial term into a term of imprisonment.28
INEFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIAL DETERRENCE
As noted in the introduction to this article, it is difficult to obtain information regarding the
effectiveness of sanctions in deterring offenders from committing offences at the expiry of a sanction.
Offenders may not re-offend for numerous reasons, apart from the fear of being subject to more
punishment.
In some cases the offending is aberrant conduct which would not have been repeated; a suitable
opportunity may not again present itself (this obviously relates most acutely to opportunistic offences);
rehabilitation may have occurred;29 or the socio-economic status of the offender may improve for the
better. Further, offenders are obviously always ageing, and, as discussed below, empirical evidence
strongly supports the view that criminal behaviour is mainly a young man’s endeavour.
However, the overwhelming weight of evidence available supports the view that severe
punishment (namely imprisonment) does not deter offenders: the recidivism rate of offenders does not
vary significantly regardless of the form of punishment to which they are subjected.
One of the rare studies which has been used to suggest that prison can deter offenders is a six-year
follow-up study of a large sample of offenders sentenced in Wales and England in January 1972.30 The
study revealed that reconviction rates for imprisonment were lower than for suspended sentences.
Nigel Walker suggested that this supports the capacity of imprisonment to specifically deter offenders.
This hypothesis, though, is far from strong. As Walker noted:
Strictly speaking, all that this tells us is that the suspended sentence is less effective than an actual
prison sentence. It is theoretically possible that the absolute efficacy of an actual prison sentence is nil
(or even a minus quality) and that the absolute efficacy of a suspended sentence is even less: that is, that
it increases the likelihood of reconviction.31
While Walker ultimately thinks that this explanation is unlikely, it is unsound to rely on
comparisons involving the use of suspended sentences. The sting in the suspended sentence
supposedly lies in the risk that the offender may be sent to jail if he or she transgresses during the term
of the sentence. However, it is questionable whether such a risk is capable of comprising a punitive
measure. Every person in the community faces the risk of imprisonment if he or she commits an
offence punishable by imprisonment.32
In this way the natural and pervasive operation of the criminal law casts a permanent Sword of
Damocles over all our heads: each action we perform is potentially subject to the criminal law. Despite
this, it is not tenable to suggest that we are all undergoing some type of criminal punishment.
Accordingly, the suspended sentence is arguably not, in fact, a sanction in the proper sense. Walker
further noted that the results of the same survey indicated that re-conviction rates for offenders dealt
with by way of fine were about the same as that expected for the whole sample; “neither markedly
better nor markedly worse than those for imprisonment”.33 Thus, when a hard form of treatment
(imprisonment) is compared with the fine, which is a much softer sanction, there is no variation in the
28 Field v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 70; Saunders v The Queen [2010] VSCA 93.
29 See Nagel D, “General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence” in Blumstein A, Cohen J and Nagin J (eds),
Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates, Report by the Panel on Deterrent
and Incapacitative Effects (Washington, 1978) p 95, where he alludes to the difficulty in distinguishing between rehabilitation
and specific deterrence.
30 See Walker N, Why Punish? (1991) p 44.
31 Walker, n 30, p 44.
32 Which are the only type of offences for which a suspended sentence can generally be restored.
33 Walker, n 30, p 45.
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re-conviction rate. However, if specific deterrence did work, one would expect the pain of
imprisonment to be a more powerful regulator of future behaviour than a fine.34
ABS study on reimprisonment casts doubt on specific deterrence
The crudest way to measure the effectiveness of specific deterrence is to measure the trajectories of
offenders once they are released from prison, so far as their subsequent criminal offending is
concerned. A comprehensive study into this was undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics
(ABS) in 2010.35
The report is significant for a number of reasons. It is an Australian study; it was conducted over
an extensive period; the sample size is very large; and it was conducted by an independent body. The
report is based on a 14-year longitudinal study for the period 1 July 1994 to 30 June 2007. The study
grouped prisoners into two cohorts. The first consisted of those released between I July 1994 and
30 June 1997. This consisted of 28,584 people. The second comprised prisoners released between
1 July 2001 and 30 June 2004. It consisted of 26,700 people.
The study compared recidivism rates from both cohorts within three years of release. It also
examined the 10-year reimprisonment rate for the earlier cohort.
More generally, the report looked at the general profile of prisoners. In relation to the total prison
numbers, 92% were male and 18% were Indigenous. The median age of prisoners for their first stint of
imprisonment was 28 years old.36
In terms of the general imprisonment rate during the study period, it was noted that from 1994 to
2007 the prison population grew on average at the rate of 3.7% annually and the number of prisoners
with prior imprisonment grew at a rate of 3.2% each year, although this was not steady – with the rate
ranging from 56% to 62%.37 Thus, more than half of all the people sentenced to imprisonment during
the survey period had previously served a term of imprisonment.
The data on the portion of released prisoners who return to imprisonment within the respective
three-year periods are even more illuminating. The report noted that for the 1994 to 1997 cohort, about
20% were reimprisoned within two years; one-quarter was reimprisoned within three years, and 40%
by the end of the 10-year survey period.38
A surprising finding, given that rehabilitative measures had presumably improved in the decade to
2004-2007, was that prisoners released in the later cohort were more likely to be reimprisoned than the
earlier cohort over an equivalent three-year follow up period.39 The reimprisonment rate for the latter
cohort was 17% higher than for the earlier one – the rate for 1994 to 1997 was 25.1% compared to
29.5% for the 2004 to 2007 cohort.40
These findings are significant because in raw terms they provide firm evidence that imprisonment
does not strongly diminish the likelihood of re-offending. Forty per cent of individuals who are
sentenced to imprisonment are not sufficiently discouraged by the experience to ensure that they are
not again imprisoned. The figure of 40% is conservative because the study only recorded
reimprisonment rates; it did not record recidivism per se. Thus, released offenders who committed
34 There is some evidence to show that offenders who are dealt with lightly are unlikely to re-offend. A study of shoplifters
showed that those who were dealt with by simply being apprehended and interrogated by store police, and then set free, rarely
re-offended: see Andenaes J, “Does Punishment Deter Crime?” in Ezorsky G (ed), Philosophical Perspectives of Punishment
(1978) p 342.
35 ABS, An Analysis of Repeat Imprisonment Trends in Australia Using Prisoner Census Data from 1994 to 2007 (2010),
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/26D48B9A4BE29D48CA25778C001F67D3/$File/
1351055031_aug%202010.pdf viewed 22 May 2012 (ABS Report).
36 ABS Report, n 35, p 15.
37 ABS Report, n 35, p 12.
38 ABS Report, n 35, p 16.
39 The implications of this are further discussed later in the article.
40 ABS Report, n 35, p 25.
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crimes for which they were not imprisoned were not recorded. Of course, this information alone does
not present a knock-down argument against specific deterrence – it is possible that the rate of
offending that resulted in imprisonment would have been higher had the cohorts not had a first stint of
imprisonment.
However, drilling into the data raises further concern about the efficacy of specific deterrence. The
report identified several statistically relevant key factors that affected reimprisonment. The most
important were:
• Age: Prisoners aged 17-19 years old were 2.6 times more likely than the general cohort to be
reimprisoned; whereas those aged 35 and above were less than 0.5 times likely to be
reimprisoned;41
• Indigenous background: Prisoners with this profile were twice as likely to be reimprisoned within
10 years;
• Offence type: Prisoners who were released after being sentenced for burglary or theft had the
highest rate of reimprisonment, whereas those serving time for drug or sex offences had the
lowest reimprisonment rates;
• Prior imprisonment: An offender who has been in jail previously was nearly three times more
likely to be imprisoned within 10 years than a first-time prisoner; and
• Length of imprisonment: The reimprisonment rate for prisoners over a 10-year period who served
0 to six months was 0.8, but increased to 1.2 times for those who served more than 18 months.42
The last consideration is illuminating. If imprisonment did actually deter future offending, it is to
be expected that a longer period of imprisonment would be more effective at achieving this objective.
The fact that the opposite occurs casts considerable doubt on the plausibility of specific deterrence.
This is reinforced by studies that compare re-offending rates of prisoners with similar profiles and
backgrounds, with adjustments made for factors which are known to influence re-offending. A
limitation of this type of analysis is that it is most often undertaken overseas, and in particular in the
United States. However, a relatively recent analysis was undertaken in Australia.
Australian study involving matched pairs of offenders
Don Weatherburn, in a study for the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, which
was also released in August 2010, titled The Effect of Prison on Adult Re-offending,43 compared
re-offending rates for people convicted of burglary and non-aggravated assault. The study compared
96 “matched pairs” of burglars and 406 matched pairs of offenders convicted of non-aggravated
assault. Offenders were matched by reference to offence type, previous convictions, prior prison terms,
number of concurrent offences and bail status at final hearing. A regression process was undertaken to
control factors such as gender, race, age, plea and legal representation. One member of each pair
received a non-custodial term for the relevant offence, the other was sentenced to prison.
The study looked at offenders who were convicted in the years 2003 and 2004 and each matched
pair was followed up for five years or until he or she was convicted of another offence (whichever
came first).44
The study noted that “prison exerts no significant effect on the risk of recidivism for burglary …
[and] … the effect of prison on those who were convicted of non-aggravated assault seems to have
been to increase the risk of further offending”.45 The report concluded that:
41 ABS Report, n 35, p 21. Studies in the United States have shown that the peak age for violent offences is 18 and the peak age
for property offences is 16 and the rate of offending then typically declines at the age of 30. See Farrington D, “Age and Crime”
in Tonry M and Morris N (eds), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, Vol 7 (1986) p 189; Nagin D, Farrington D
and Moffitt T, “Life Course Trajectories of Different Types of Offenders” (1995) 33 Criminology 111.
42 See ABS Report, n 35, pp 23, 30.
43 Weatherburn D, The Effect of Prison on Adult Re-offending (2010), http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_
bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/cjb143.pdf/$file/cjb143.pdf viewed 22 May 2012.
44 ABS Report, n 35, p 5.
45 ABS Report, n 35, p 10.
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There is no evidence that prison deters offenders convicted of burglary or non-aggravated assault. There
is some evidence that prison increases the risk of offending amongst offenders convicted of
non-aggravated assault but further research with larger samples is needed to confirm the results.46
This conclusion is limited by the fact that it relates to only two offence categories, but is made more
compelling by the fact that it is consistent with the overwhelming trend of international research and
literature reviews in this area.47
Wide-ranging international studies also suggest specific deterrence is a
fallacy
One of the most wide-ranging studies that has been conducted regarding the effectiveness of special
deterrence was a literature review by Gendreau et al48 published in 1999 involving a review of 50
different studies, which related to a sample of 336,052 offenders – dating back to 1958 – which
provided 325 comparisons. The study compared the recidivism rate of people who were sentenced to
imprisonment as opposed to community service and those who were sentenced to longer and shorter
terms of imprisonment.
The review established that recidivism rates for offenders who were sent to jail were similar to
those who received a community sanction. Longer terms of imprisonment also did not reduce
re-offending and, in fact, resulted in a 3% increase in recidivism. The authors concluded:
The data in this study represents the only quantitative assessment of the relationship between time spent
in prison and offender recidivism. The database consisted of 325 comparisons involving 336,052
offenders. On the basis of the results, we can put forth one conclusion with a good deal of confidence.
None of the analysis conducted produced any evidence that prison sentences reduce recidivism. Indeed,
combining the data from the more vs. less and incarceration vs. community groupings resulted in 4%
and 2% increases in recidivism.49
This is confirmed by more recent empirical analysis. Nagin et al provided the most recent
extensive literature review regarding specific deterrence.50 They reviewed separately the impact of
custodial sanctions versus non-custodial sanctions and the effect of the length of sentence on
re-offending. The review examined six experimental studies where custodial versus non-custodial
sentences were randomly assigned; 11 studies which involved matched pairs; 31 studies which were
regression based; and seven other studies which did not neatly fit into any of those three categories,
and included naturally occurring social experiments which allowed inferences to be drawn regarding
the capacity of imprisonment to deter offenders.51
The last category included a study based on clemency granted to over 20,000 prisoners in Italy in
2006. A condition of release was that if those who were released re-offended within five years they
would be required to serve the remaining (residual) sentence plus the sentence for the new offence. It
was noted that there was a 1.24% reduction in re-offending for each month of the residual sentence.
This observation can be explained on the basis that the threat of future imprisonment discouraged
imprisonment. However, it was also noted that offenders who had served longer sentences prior to
46 ABS Report, n 35, p 1.
47 In the Australian context, the same conclusions have been reached in relation to juvenile offenders in the following reports:
Kraus J, “A Comparison of Corrective Effects of Probation and Detention on Male Juvenile Offenders” (1974) 49 British
Journal of Criminology 49; Weatherburn D et al, “The Specific Deterrent Effect of Custodial Penalties on Juvenile Reoffending”
(2009) (2009) 33 Australian Institute of Criminology Reports: Technical and Background Paper 10.
48 Gendreau P, Goggin C and Cullen F, The Effects of Prison Sentences on Recidivism, Department of the Solicitor General
Canada (1999), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/e199912.htm viewed 22 May 2012.
49 Gendreau et al, n 48.
50 Nagin DS, Cullen FT, and Johnson CL, “Imprisonment and Reoffending” (2009) 38 Crime & Justice 115 at 145. The main
studies are summarised in Weatherburn, n 43 and in Sentencing Advisory Council, Does Imprisonment Deter? A Review of the
Evidence (2011).
51 Nagin et al, n 50, pp 144-155.
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being released had higher rates of re-offending, supporting the view that longer prison terms reduce
the capacity for future imprisonment to shape behaviour.52
Nagin et al concluded that offenders who are sentenced to imprisonment do not have a lower rate
of recidivism than those who are not and, in fact, some studies show that the rate of recidivism is
higher:
Taken as a whole, it is our judgment that the experimental studies point more toward a criminogenic
rather than preventive effect of custodial sanctions. The evidence for this conclusion, however, is weak
because it is based on only a small number of studies, and many of the point estimates are not
statistically significant.53
The review suggests that not only do longer jail terms not deter, but neither do tougher jail
conditions. Studies also show that offenders who are sentenced to maximum security prisons as
opposed to minimum security conditions do not re-offend less.
These general findings are supported by a more recent experimental study by Green and Winik54
who observed the re-offending of 1003 offenders who were initially sentenced for drug-related
offences between June 2002 and May 2003, by a number of different judges whose sentencing
approaches varied significantly (some were described as “punitive”, others as “lenient”), resulting in
differing terms of imprisonment and probation. The study concluded that the length of imprisonment
or probation had no effect on the rate of re-offending during the four-year follow-up period.
Speculation regarding the reasons for the failure of specific deterrence
Accordingly, the weight of evidence supports the view that subjecting offenders to harsh punishment is
unlikely to increase the prospect that they will become law-abiding citizens in the future. This
conclusion is so well established that in some circles the debate has moved on from whether specific
deterrence works, to identifying the reasons that it does not and why it probably increases recidivism
rates. Nagin et al suggested a number of reasons including that prison culture normalises and fosters
criminal orientations; prison stigmatises people and reduces their opportunities to integrate into the
normal community through employment and other activities; and prison fails to address the reasons
for the offending.55
However, the search for the reasons for the failure of specific deterrence is arguably misplaced. It
assumes that there ought to be a link between the experience of imprisonment and crime reduction.
There is no necessary basis for this assumption. Imprisonment is the most severe sanction in our
system of justice. It is unpleasant. It necessarily involves a deprivation of liberty and a consequential
inability to engage in and pursue many of the activities that are central to living a prosperous life, such
as family relationships, career opportunities, shaping one’s environment and so on. These deprivations
are obvious to all members of the community. It is not clear that the experience of these denials should
be more determinative than the threat of them. In any event, from the perspective of law reform, the
important inquiry is whether specific deterrence works, not the reasons for this – and on this matter,
the issue is resolved.
REHABILITATION: NO CLEAR EVIDENCE WHETHER IT WORKS
Overview of historical context and conflicting evidence
The effectiveness of rehabilitation as a way of reducing repeat offending has been the subject of a
large number of studies. The most damaging objection to rehabilitation as a suitable goal of sentencing
has been that it does not work. Following extensive research conducted between 1960 and 1974,
Robert Martinson concluded in an influential paper that empirical studies had not established that any
52 Nagin et al, n 50, pp 155.
53 Nagin et al, n 50, p 145.
54 Green D and Winik D, “Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on
Recidivism Among Drug Offenders” (2010) 48 Criminology 357.
55 Nagin et al, n 50, pp 126, 128. See also Jacobs B, “Deterrence and Deterrability” (2010) 48 Criminology 417.
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rehabilitative programs had worked in reducing recidivism.56 Several years after this work, the Panel
of the National Research Council in the United States also noted that there were no significant
differences between the subsequent recidivism rates of offenders regardless of the form of punishment.
“This suggests that neither rehabilitative nor criminogenic effects [that is, the possible corrupting
effects of punishment] operate very strongly.”57
However, several years later, Martinson softened his position, stating that some types of
rehabilitation programs, particularly probation parole, may be effective and that generally “no
treatment … is inherently either substantially helpful or harmful. The critical factor seems to be the
conditions under which the program is delivered”.58 And indeed there is now mounting evidence that
rehabilitation works for some in some circumstances. Stephen Brody made the following cautionary
observations slightly more than a decade ago:
Research so far has on the whole confirmed what one would expect: that individual success may
sometimes be claimed by routine psychotherapy or counselling with intelligent, articulate, neurotic
offenders; by guidance in personal, social, and domestic matters among those hampered by
incompetence in these spheres; by sympathy and encouragement for those unsure of their limits and
capabilities; and by direct assistance and support for those weighed down by practical difficulties. But
none of these approaches is appropriate for other than a minority of the offender population, whose
misdemeanours reflect some real psychological maladjustment and not just their social “deviance”.59
That there is some level of success with rehabilitative techniques in relation to the least
dysfunctional offenders does not strongly support the rehabilitative ideal. It is equally consistent with
the proposition that crime is an aberrant act for people with this profile.
However, further support for the rehabilitative ideal started occurring approximately 20 years ago.
Following a wide-ranging review of the published studies in rehabilitation (which compared the
recidivism rate of offenders who were subject to rehabilitative treatment to those who were not),
Howells and Day in 1999 suggested that certain programs appeared to reduce recidivism. In particular,
success had been observed in relation to cognitive-behavioural programs. These programs target
factors that are (presumably) changeable and are directed at the criminogenic needs of offenders, that
is, factors which are directly related to the offending, such as anti-social attitudes, self-control, and
problem-solving skills.60 Promising programs have been developed in the areas of anger management,
sexual offending and drug and alcohol use. These appear to be more successful than programs based
on, for example, confrontation or direct deterrence, physical challenge, or vocational training.61
Some more recent studies have tended to debunk the view the rehabilitative techniques are finally
starting to make positive inroads. The most commonly used rehabilitation program in the United
Kingdom is known as the Reasoning and Rehabilitation (R&R) Program. It is grounded in the theory
that many people commit crime because of deficits in their “social intelligence”. To remedy this, the
program uses cognitive-behavioural and educational methods to tackle the deficiency. Initially, there
were a number of surveys that showed positive outcomes associated with this technique.
However, the optimism regarding the effectiveness of R&R programs has been questioned. In
1995, Wilkinson noted:
56 Martinson RM, “What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform” (1974) 35 Public Interest 22 at 25.
57 Blumstein et al, n 29, p 66.
58 Martinson R, “New Findings. New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reforms” (1979) 7 Hofstra Law Review
243 at 254.
59 Brody S, “How Effective are Penal Treatments?” in von Hirsch A and Ashworth A (eds), Principled Sentencing (1999) pp 9,
11.
60 Howells K and Day A, “The Rehabilitation of Offenders: International Perspectives Applied to Australian Correctional
Systems” (1999) 112 Australian Institute of Criminology: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1.
61 Howells and Day, n 60 at 3. See also Lipsey M and Cullen F, “The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of
Systematic Reviews” (2007) 3 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 297; Wexler D, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Readiness for Rehabilitation” (2006) Florida Coastal Law Review 111; King M, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence Initiatives in
Australia and New Zealand and Overseas” (2011) 21 JJA 19.
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How effective the programme is seen as being in reducing offending depends on the outcome measure
chosen and on how comparisons are made. Considering that 67% of the R&R group were reconvicted
within two years compared to 56% of offenders sentenced to custody from time of sentence, it would
seems R&R did not reduce offending. Alternatively, the fact that 5% fewer of the R&R group were
reconvicted than predicted on the basis of age and previous convictions, compared to 14% more of the
custody group after release, could be taken as indicating success.62
It concluded that the evidence did not support the hypothesis that the programs reduce recidivism
by promoting pro-social attitudes.
Enhanced commitment to rehabilitation in Australia
Australian jurisdictions have been devoting increased resources into rehabilitation over the past
decade. The rehabilitative methods employed in Australian are set out in a detailed study of the
programs in a paper written by Heseltine et al for the Australian Institute of Criminology and
published in 2011.63 The paper focused only on rehabilitation programs in the custodial environment,
particularly changes and improvements to prison-based correction rehabilitation programs since 2004
– when the previous report was issued.
In relation to the overall national picture, the report noted:
Each jurisdiction, without exception, has attempted to respond to the challenges that were identified in
the 2004 program review. In particular, recent years have seen the development of a number of more
intensive programs … Furthermore, each jurisdiction has demonstrated an ongoing commitment to the
delivery of custodial offender treatment programs in ways that are congruent with current conceptions
of “good practice”. There is an increased confidence in being able to move from theory through to
policy and practice, especially in relation to the development of programs for sex and violent offenders.
In conclusion, the overall quality of Australian offender rehabilitation programs appears to be
improving, although ongoing evaluations have yet to establish the effectiveness of these programs on
criminal justice outcomes.64
A variety of the programs are delivered in Australian prisons. The precise programs are catalogued in
the above report.65 The main programs are:
• Cognitive skills programs, which use cognitive behavioural methods to improve decision-making
and problem-solving skills, teach moral thinking and self-regulation, and equip offenders to
understand the antecedents of offending and develop plans to prevent relapse;
• Drug and alcohol programs, which explain the effects of drugs and alcohol, the link between
substance abuse and offending, teaching techniques to cease using drugs and alcohol, and
restructure cognition related to substance use and work on techniques to improve interpersonal
skills;
• Anger management programs, which use cognitive behavioural and interpersonal methods in an
attempt to improve insight into angry responses, reduce stress, restructure anger cognition and
develop problem-solving and interpersonal skills and a plan to prevent relapse;
• Sex offender programs, which use behavioural and cognitive methods to assist offenders better
understand the effects on the victims, develop relationship skills and alter deviant arousal
responses and develop a plan to prevent relapse;
• Violent offender programs, which, like sex offender programs, also principally employ behaviour
and cognitive behavioural strategies to prevent re-offending;
62 Wilkinson J, “Evaluating Evidence for the Effectiveness of the Reasoning and Rehabilitation Programme” (2005) 44 The
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 70 at 81.
63 Heseltine K, Day A and Sarre R, Prison-based Offender Rehabilitation Programs: The 2009 National Picture in Australia
(2011), http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/5/6/4/%7B564B2ECA-4433-4E9B-B4BA-29BD59071E81%7Drpp112.pdf viewed
22 May 2012.
64 Heseltine et al, n 63, p x.
65 Heseltine et al, n 63, pp 15-33.
The capacity of criminal sanctions to shape the behaviour of offenders
(2012) 36 Crim LJ 159 169
• Domestic violence programs, which use cognitive behavioural techniques to assist offenders to
develop understanding of the nature of abuse, improve their ability to manage negative emotion,
change attitudes about violence, learn about the impact of their offending on victims and improve
relationship skills; and
• Special programs for female and Indigenous offenders, both of which modify elements of more
general programs to the needs of those offenders.
The report noted that: there are well-established programs in the Australian Capital Territory; an
increasing number of programs in New South Wales; substantial development of programs in the
Northern Territory; an increasing suite of programs in Queensland; South Australia had delivered on
its 2004 plan to develop intensive sex offender and violent offender programs; Tasmania had
developed numerous new intensive offender rehabilitation programs since 2004; in Victoria more than
5,000 offenders participated in rehabilitation programs and retention rates for those undertaken in
custody exceeded 90%; and in Western Australia a lack of experienced staff compromised the delivery
of therapeutic programs for several years, although this had considerably improved in the last two
years of the reporting period.66
More rehabilitative programs, yet higher reimprisonment rates
From the perspective of this article, the most interesting part of the report was the effectiveness of the
increased commitment to the rehabilitative ideal. Unfortunately, no information was available about
whether this additional commitment to rehabilitation had proven to be effective – the necessary data
and information were simply not available. The report stated:
The current study aimed to review the effectiveness of prison-based offender rehabilitation programs.
This was not possible given the paucity of research reports/evaluations and research reports that are
currently available.67
While there was no direct evaluation of the programs, it is possible to make an indirect, albeit
crude assessment, of their effectiveness. As noted above, a parallel study was undertaken by the ABS
on prisoner recidivism over the 14-year period 1994 to 2007, and most relevantly for current purposes,
the study looked at two cohorts of prisoners for the years 1994 to 1997 and 2004 to 2007. The study
noted that over a three-year follow-up period the rate of reimprisonment increased – and in fact
considerably – for the latter cohort.
Tellingly, this was during the period when rehabilitative methods had become more sophisticated
and more widely used in the prison environment. This suggests a failure of these programs. This
conclusion, however, is tentative and is subject to a number of caveats. There is no data on the exact
number of offenders in the respective cohorts who underwent rehabilitative programs, and there is no
data on the completion rate of those who participated in such courses.
The trend of recent evidence suggests rehabilitation is possible for some
offenders
The report by Heseltine et al, while being unable to evaluate the effectiveness of rehabilitation
programs currently operating in Australian prisons, summarised recent studies into the effectiveness of
certain rehabilitation programs, and noted that while there were mixed results, there were some
programs that reported positive outcomes.
This was especially the case in relation to sexual offender programs, where some studies showed
that the recidivism rate of offenders completing the program was less than half of that of other
offenders.68 The results of programs directed towards violent offenders were less positive, but a
wide-ranging review of studies focusing on United Kingdom programs noted that reductions in
66 See Heseltine et al, n 63, pp 46, 51, 58, 61, 63, 67, 71.
67 Heseltine et al, n 63, p 37.
68 Heseltine et al, n 63, p 14.
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offending for violent offences by around 7%-8% had occurred.69 Overseas studies reported some
success with anger management programs, but an Australian study (a shorter program of 20 hours)
showed no positive outcomes related to program completion. There is no cogent evidence supporting
the effectiveness of domestic violence programs or victim awareness programs. However, drug and
alcohol programs have been shown to be effective at reducing substance abuse and re-offending.
This assessment is consistent with the findings of Mitchell et al, who undertook a major analysis
of studies into the effectiveness of drug treatment programs in prison.70 The studies they focused on
related to drug users and compared re-offending patterns of offenders who completed a drug
rehabilitation program with those who did not complete a program, or completed only a minimum
program between the years 1980 to 2004. They analysed 66 studies in total. The report concluded that:
Overall, this meta-analytic synthesis of evaluations of incarceration-based drug treatment programs
found that such programs are modestly effective in reducing recidivism.71
Moreover, it was noted that programs which involve dealing with the multiple problems of drug users
(termed “therapeutic communities”) were the most successful, whereas there was no evidence to
support good outcomes associated with “boot camp” programs.
Forum sentencing, circle sentencing and drug courts
The sentencing process has also been used in a bid to decrease re-offending. A number of different
initiatives have been used, including forum sentencing, drug courts and circle sentencing. These have
had mixed results.
Forum sentencing is based on restorative justice. It is conducted in two courts in New South
Wales and involves offenders being dealt with by way of “community conference” as opposed to the
normal criminal justice process. A study by the New South Wales Bureau of Crimes Statistics and
Research compared re-offending rates of 264 offenders who were dealt with by way of forum
sentencing, to those dealt with by the conventional sentencing process.72 The study concluded that
there was no evidence that forum sentencing reduced the likelihood of re-offending, the amount of
time before re-offending occurred, or the seriousness of any subsequent reoffending.73
A variant of forum sentencing is “circle sentencing” which is used in relation to eligible
Indigenous offenders.74 A 2008 study into its effectiveness indicated similar negative results to forum
sentencing:
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented here suggests that circle sentencing has no effect on the
frequency, timing or seriousness of offending.75
More success has been attained by drug courts, whose processes involve judicial supervision of
offenders and compulsory drug treatment. There are also rewards and sanctions to encourage
compliance with programs. A study published in 2008 examined the recidivism rate of offenders who
were dealt with by the drug court in New South Wales, and found that those who completed the drug
court program were 37% less likely to be reconvicted of offences than a comparison group.76 The
findings of the study led the researchers to recommend expanding the operation of drug courts.
69 Heseltine et al, n 63, pp 18, 20, 22, 27 30.
70 Mitchell O, Wilson D and Mackenzie D, The Effectiveness of Incarceration-based Drug Treatment on Criminal Behaviour,
Campbell Collaboration Criminal Justice Review Group (2006), http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/98 viewed
22 May 2012.
71 Mitchell et al, n 70, p 17.
72 Jones C, “Does Forum Sentencing Reduce Re-offending?” (2009) 129 Crime and Justice Bulletin 1, http://
www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/CJB129.pdf/$file/CJB129.pdf viewed 22 May 2012.
73 Jones, n 72 at 12.
74 A form of this type of sentencing is used in all Australian jurisdictions, except Tasmania.
75 Fitzgerald J, “Does Circle Sentencing Reduce Aboriginal Offending?” (2008) 115 Crime and Justice Bulletin 1,
http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/cjb115.pdf/$file/cjb115.pdf viewed 22 May 2012.
76 Weatherburn D et al, “The NSW Drug Court: A Re-evaluation of its Effectiveness” (2008) 121 Crime and Justice Bulletin 1
at 11.
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Thus, the most that can be confidently said at this point regarding the capacity of criminal
punishment to reform is that there is some evidence that it will work for a portion of offenders and that
there is no firm evidence showing that it cannot work for the majority of offenders.
Overall, the jury is still out on the ability of criminal sanctions to reform offenders. In 1992, one
commentator stated: “our understanding … of what works, with which offenders and under what
conditions, in reducing offending … [is] still embryonic”.77 Twenty years later, that remains the case.
CONCLUSION
Sending offenders to jail does not reduce the likelihood that they will re-offend. This is established by
numerous studies which find no link between increased legal compliance and experience in jail and
the length of the jail term. The evidence is so powerful and pointed, that this finding can be expressed
with a very high degree of certainty. It follows that the legislature should abolish specific deterrence as
a sentencing objective.
The weight of evidence, in fact, suggests that sentencing offenders to imprisonment may
marginally increase the chance of recidivism. However, the evidence pointing to this conclusion is not
definitive and, hence, no policy or legal changes should be made on the basis of this assertion.
These changes should result in more lenient sentences in cases where the offender has a
considerable criminal history and therefore where specific deterrence would normally have loomed
large in the sentencing determination.
The evidence relating to rehabilitation is less clear. A striking aspect of rehabilitation is how little
is known about its effectiveness, especially in the Australian context where considerable (and
increasing) resources are directed in the hope of rehabilitating offenders. The weight of empirical data
(though it is far from uniform or consistent) suggests that rehabilitative programs can reduce the
likelihood of recidivism, especially for certain forms of offences, such as sex-offenders. Moreover, it
seems that this can be achieved with programs that are administered in a custodial setting.
If this is proven to be correct, it entails that, paradoxically, the goal of rehabilitation should lose
its mitigatory impact, insofar as being a basis for not imprisoning offenders or reducing the length of
prison terms is concerned (if effective rehabilitation programs become widespread in prisons).
However, the actual level of knowledge regarding the impact of rehabilitative programs on recidivism
rates is so small that no policy or legal changes should be made at this point.
There is a pressing need for detailed and wide-ranging research to be undertaken first on the
effectiveness of rehabilitative programs in the custodial setting; secondly, outside the custodial setting;
and thirdly, comparing the effectiveness of these programs. This research will have strong implications
for the desirability of continuing to pursue the rehabilitative ideal and the manner in which it should
be pursued, and, in particular, the extent to which rehabilitation should mitigate the punitive aspects of
a sentence.
77 McIvor G, Sentenced to Serve: Evaluative Studies in Social Work (1992) p 13.
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I    INTRODUCTION 
The totality principle applies in cases of multiple offending to reduce the total 
effective sentence that is imposed on offenders. This is normally achieved by 
either making some or all of the individual sentences concurrent, or by reducing 
the length of the individual sentences. Although totality is a well-established 
sentencing doctrine, its scope and its impact on the overall sentence are unclear. 
Current orthodoxy maintains that principles of proportionality and mercy 
underpin totality. This article argues that neither of these is capable of providing 
a solid foundation for totality, and that this area of law will remain 
unsatisfactorily indeterminate until a clear and defensible rationale is adopted. It 
is suggested that the main justification for the principle is that offenders who are 
sentenced for multiple offences have not had the opportunity to be rehabilitated 
through the imposition of earlier sanctions. While this provides a logical basis for 
distinguishing these offenders from those who have been sentenced for each 
offence separately, the size of the sentencing discount merited is not considerable 
given the relative importance of rehabilitation in the overall sentencing calculus. 
 
A    Totality in Sentencing 
Sentencing is not an exact science, thus there is no single sentence that is 
objectively correct.1 This view has resulted in suggestions that sentencing law is 
unprincipled and a jurisprudential wasteland. 2 
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The complexities and vagaries of sentencing law are compounded when an 
offender is sentenced for more than one offence. In such circumstances, the 
effective sentence is governed by several discrete sentencing considerations, the 
most important of which is the principle of totality.3 
The totality principle is a ‘principle of sentencing formulated to assist a court 
when sentencing an offender for a number of offences.’4 It operates to ensure that 
the sentence reflects the overall criminality of the offending behaviour, as 
opposed to a linear, mathematical cumulation of the penalty for each offence. 
This stance is to be contrasted with the position in other jurisdictions where 
consecutive sentences are common, the most obvious example being the United 
States,5 where penalties exceeding imprisonment for over a century are 
sometimes imposed. Such hardships are not confined to offences that shock the 
community. It has been noted that ‘[t]he same wrong can be prosecuted as 
multiple offenses, resulting in decades- to centuries-long sentences for first-time 
non-violent offenders, sentences sometimes far surpassing those for murderers.’6  
The effect of the totality principle is normally to reduce the overall sentence. 
Accordingly, offenders who are sentenced for a number of offences at the same 
time receive a reduced sentence compared to those who commit identical 
offences consecutively after the sentence for each offence has been served. An 
offender who commits a robbery on each of five consecutive days and is 
sentenced for all of the robberies at the one hearing will serve considerably less 
time in prison than an offender who commits five robberies several years apart, 
and is sentenced for each offence individually. 
While, in theory, the totality principle can be stated with elegant simplicity, 
its scope and application are unclear. In particular, the manner in which the 
principle applies to offences of a different nature and those committed many 
years apart is uncertain. The logical reasoning process by which the totality 
computation is achieved remains obscure – verging on arbitrary. Moreover, the 
justification and rationale for totality remains unsettled and, in fact, there has 
been surprisingly little scholarly consideration of its foundation. 
                                                 
3  Totality is a commonly invoked sentencing principle. A recent report, published by the Victorian 
Sentencing Advisory Council, analysed the sentencing appeals determined by the Victorian Supreme 
Court of Appeal for two calendar years (2008 and 2010): Sentencing Advisory Council, ‘Sentence 
Appeals in Victoria: Statistical Research Report’ (Report, Sentencing Advisory Council, March 2012). In 
2008, there were 114 offender appeals and totality was invoked as a ground in 21 of these appeals – 
making it the fifth most utilised appeal ground: at 92. In 2010, there were 153 offender appeals and 
totality was again invoked as an appeal ground on 21 occasions – making it the fifth most frequently 
utilised ground for that year as well: at 95. Totality was invoked as an appeal ground less commonly in 
relation to Crown sentencing appeals: at 93, 96. Although in 2010, the approach to cumulation was 
invoked by the Crown as a ground of appeal in seven of the 27 cases. 
4  Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59, 62 [8] (‘Mill’). 
5  For a good overview of the position in the United States, see Soo-Ryun Kwon, Amanda Solter and Dana 
Marie Isaac, ‘Cruel and Unusual: US Sentencing Practices in a Global Context’ (University of San 
Francisco School of Law, Center for Law and Global Justice, 2012) 36–42. 
6  Ibid 37. The totality principle discussed in this paper focuses on Australian case law and legislation. 
However, it operates similarly in the United Kingdom: see Sentencing Council, ‘Offences Taken into 
Consideration and Totality: Definitive Guideline’ (2012). 
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B    Overview of Article: Key Findings and Reform Proposals 
In this article we provide a rationale for the totality principle and discuss the 
extent to which totality should operate to mitigate sentences.  
In the next section, we examine the current operation of the principle and 
argue that its scope is vague. We also examine the mechanics by which totality is 
given effect and the circumstances in which it applies. 
In section three, we discuss the rationale and justification for the principle. It 
emerges that there is no accepted, stand-alone jurisprudential or normative 
justification for totality. On the basis of the current approach, the only ideal that 
potentially justifies totality is the principle of proportionality. However, this 
alone cannot justify substantial reductions in sentences. In the end, the totality 
principle seems to be based on an innate desire not to impose sanctions that crush 
offenders. It is not clear whether this merciful tendency should outweigh the 
dictates of a rational system of punishment and sentencing. 
In section four we make reform proposals. To the greatest extent possible, 
luck should not define much of what is meaningful in people’s lives.7 Whether or 
not an offender guilty of multiple offences or a repeat offender happens to get 
sentenced consecutively or at the same time for all or some of the offences, is 
often a matter of fortuity. Thus, a principled reason is necessary to justify totality. 
On a closer analysis there is, in fact, a tenable basis for punishing less severely 
offenders who are sentenced for multiple offences than those who commit 
identical offences and are sentenced consecutively. 
Two aspects of sentencing aim to dissuade offenders from reoffending: 
specific deterrence and rehabilitation. Offenders who are sentenced for multiple 
offences are denied the advantages of such interventions in relation to each 
offence – had they been sentenced consecutively they may have been deterred 
from reoffending or rehabilitated. This sets them apart from offenders who 
commit offences consecutively. Potentially, this different treatment supports 
lower sentences for offenders sentenced for multiple offences. 
However, logically, the validity of this justification is contingent on the 
efficacy of sentencing to achieve the goals of specific deterrence and 
rehabilitation. The current state of the relevant empirical data provides some 
support for this proposition so far as rehabilitation is concerned,8 but not so in the 
case of specific deterrence.9  
Totality applies not only to sentences of imprisonment, but also to other 
sentencing dispositions such as fines and civil penalties.10 However, in the 
context of imprisonment it applies most acutely and has been subject to the most 
extensive analysis. In this article, the focus is on its application in relation to 
                                                 
7  See generally Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1982); Mirko Bagaric, How 
to Live: Being Happy and Dealing with Moral Dilemmas (University Press of America, 2006) ch 1. 
8  See discussion in section IV C below.  
9  See discussion in section IV B below. 
10  See Camilleri’s Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Agency (1995) 32 NSWLR 683, 704; 
Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560, 581 [94]. 
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sentences of imprisonment. The recommendations made in the last part of the 
article, however, apply to all applications of totality. 
 
II    EXISTING LAW 
A    Common Law Doctrine 
1 Circumstances in Which Totality Applies 
Totality is a common law construct. It applies in cases of multiple offending 
by the one offender. More specifically, the circumstances in which it applies are: 
(i) when an offender is being sentenced for more than one offence; (ii) when an 
offender is already undergoing a prison term and is being sentenced for a 
separate offence or offences; and (iii) when an offender has completed a sentence 
and is being sentenced for an offence which was committed before or during the 
period of the initial sentence. 
While totality has a statutory basis or recognition in all Australian 
jurisdictions, the common law remains highly relevant. 
 
2 The Totality Principle 
The totality principle can be stated in concise terms: it ‘requires a sentencing 
judge to impose a sentence or sentences which reflect the overall criminality of 
the offending for which the offender has been convicted.’11 
In a more expansive form, the totality doctrine is set out in the following 
passage by David Thomas in Principles of Sentencing,12 which is regularly cited 
by Australian courts as being explanatory of the principle: 
The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series 
of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is 
imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles 
governing consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider 
whether the aggregate is ‘just and appropriate’. The principle has been stated 
many times in various forms: ‘when a number of offences are being dealt with and 
specific punishments in respect of them are being totted up to make a total, it is 
always necessary for the court to take a last look at the total just to see whether it 
looks wrong[‘]; ‘when … cases of multiplicity of offences come before the court, 
the court must not content itself by doing the arithmetic and passing the sentence 
which the arithmetic produces. It must look at the totality of the criminal 
behaviour and ask itself what is the appropriate sentence for all the offences’.13 
Thus, the effect of the principle is to reduce the sentence which an offender 
would have otherwise received.14 In R v MAK (‘MAK’) the Court stated that the 
                                                 
11  Contin v The Queen [2012] VSCA 247, [38]. See also Johnson v The Queen (2004) 78 ALJR 616, 623 
[18] (‘Johnson’); R v Richardson [2010] SASC 88, [24]. 
12  David Thomas, Principles of Sentencing (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) 56–7 (citations omitted). 
13  For example, see Mill (1988) 166 CLR 59, 62; R v Bagnato (2011) 112 SASR 39, 61 [84] (‘Bagnato’); 
Einfeld v The Queen (2010) 266 ALR 598, 638 [181]; Hankin v The Queen (2009) NTLR 110, 129–30 
[83]. 
14  A good overview of the workings of the principle is provided by Howie J in Cahyadi v The Queen (2007) 
168 A Crim R 41. 
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totality principle should not be applied in a manner that gives the impression that 
there ‘is some kind of discount for multiple offending’.15 However, 
pragmatically, there is no limit at all, given that the effect of the principle is 
precisely to reduce the total effective sentence in cases of multiple offending. 
The statement in MAK is, however, defensible if it is interpreted to mean that 
totality should not be applied to the extent that it confers an unjust penalty 
reduction in cases of multiple offending.16  
It is settled that the totality principle is a final step in the sentencing process, 
which requires the sentencer to reflect on the entire gravamen of the offending 
and impose an appropriate penalty. In R v Creed, Chief Justice King stated that 
ultimately a sentencing judge has to ‘stand back and look at the overall picture 
and decide whether the total of what would otherwise be the appropriate sentence 
is a fair and reasonable total sentence to impose.’17 In a similar vein, in 
Postiglione v The Queen, Justice Kirby described the principle of totality as 
being in the nature of a check to be applied after reaching a conclusion as to the 
appropriate sentence, having regard to the objective criminality of the conduct 
and matters of mitigation.18 
 
B    Mechanics of the Totality Process 
Offenders are ultimately concerned with the total effective sentence that is to 
be served, rather than with the mechanism by which it is arrived at. However, the 
courts have stated that the methodology for invoking the totality principle is 
important. The preferred approach in sentencing an offender for a number of 
offences is to determine the exact penalty for each offence and then set an 
effective term. In Pearce v The Queen (‘Pearce’), McHugh, Hayne and Callinan 
JJ noted one way to give effect to the proportionality principle: 
To an offender, the only relevant question may be ‘how long’, and that may 
suggest that a sentencing judge or appellate court should have regard only to the 
total effective sentence that is to be or has been imposed on the offender. Such an 
approach is likely to mask error. A judge sentencing an offender for more than one 
offence must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider 
questions of cumulation or concurrence, as well, of course, as questions of 
totality.19 
However, there are in fact a number of ways to apply the totality principle.20 
The first is to adopt the approach in Pearce and impose a proportionate sentence 
                                                 
15  (2006) 167 A Crim R 159, [18]. This notion has been approved of in numerous cases, see, eg, Baghdadi v 
The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 212, [43] (‘Baghdadi’); Paxton v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 242, [212]; 
R v Hay [2009] NSWCCA 228, [124]. 
16  As discussed later, the difficulty of this construction lies in the fact that there is no basis for ascertaining 
the size of the discount that is appropriate. 
17  (1985) 37 SASR 566, 568. 
18  (1997) 189 CLR 295, 340–1 (‘Postiglione’). The same view was taken by Doyle CJ and Olssen J in R v 
Major (1998) 70 SASR 488, 490 and in R v Place (2002) 81 SASR 395, 426. See also Johnson (2004) 78 
ALJR 616. 
19  (1998) 194 CLR 610, 623–4 [45]. See also Johnson (2004) 78 ALJR 616, 624 [26].  
20  For a discussion of the degree of flexibility that is available, see Yeonata v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 
211. 
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for each offence and then to make some or all of the discrete sentences 
concurrent – either wholly or in part.21 The second way, which was expressly 
endorsed by the High Court in Mill, is to lower the sentence for each offence or 
for some of the offences below that which would otherwise have been imposed.22 
This approach is used less commonly. However, it is sometimes the only method 
by which the principle of totality can be given effect – for example, when the 
offender has already served a sentence for a relevant offence.23 
A middle course is referred to as ‘moderate and cumulate’.24 The difference 
between this approach and the first is discussed in Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Vic) v Grabovac, where the Court expressed disapproval of a 
moderate and cumulate technique. The Court stated: 
In general a court should avoid imposing artificially inadequate sentences in order 
to accommodate the rules relating to cumulation. In other words, … where 
practicable when applying accepted rules of sentencing as to totality, 
proportionality and the like and in order to fashion an appropriate total effective 
head term in relation to a series of offences, it is preferable to achieve a 
satisfactory result by passing appropriate individual sentences and to make those 
sentences wholly or partially concurrent, rather than by an order or orders for the 
cumulation of unnecessarily reduced individual sentences. Nevertheless, a rule of 
this kind can only be a precept or guideline to be applied as and when 
practicable.25 
Subsequent decisions have not rejected the moderate and cumulate approach, 
and it has been suggested that there is no meaningful distinction between this and 
the first approach.26 This is correct from the perspective of the total effective 
sentence that is arrived at, but the ‘moderate and cumulate’ approach does 
                                                 
21  It has been noted that there is a some leeway accorded in fixing each individual sentence and that an 
appeal court will not scrutinise each sentence too finely. In Hennessy v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 241, 
the Court stated at [23]–[24]: 
  While it may have been better for his Honour to have fixed different sentences for each offence, there is a 
point at which the criticism is one of form rather than substance. As long as each sentence is within the 
range applicable for the criminal conduct and the level of accumulation and concurrency is such that there 
is no error in totality, it is imposing too strict a regime on sentencing judges to require them to fix a 
different sentence for each offence charged. Ultimately, as the High Court has made clear in Pearce, the 
task is one of fixing an appropriate sentence duration for each offence and thereafter considering the degree 
of concurrence or accumulation that reflects the totality of criminal conduct. 
 See also KC v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 216, [31]; Warner (AKA Jeremy Pachenko) v The 
Queen [2013] NSWCCA 10, [46]. 
22  (1988) 166 CLR 59, 66–7 [16]. This approach is appropriate despite the seemingly prescriptive 
preference for the first approach by the High Court in Pearce. The supposed tension between the 
approaches in Mill and Pearce was reconciled by Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in Johnson (2004) 
78 ALJR 616, 624 [26], as follows: 
  [T]he joint judgment in Pearce recognises the currency of Mill by referring to the principle of totality 
which it reiterates. The joint judgment in Mill expresses a preference for what should be regarded as the 
orthodox, but not necessarily immutable, practice of fixing a sentence for each offence and aggregating 
them before taking the next step of determining concurrency. Pearce does not decree that a sentencing 
judge may never lower each sentence and then aggregate them for determining the time to be served. 
23  See Mill (1988) 166 CLR 59, 66–7 [18]. 
24  This approach was endorsed in R v Izzard (2003) 7 VR 480, 485–6 [21]–[23]. 
25  [1998] 1 VR 664, 680. 
26  See DHC v The Queen [2012] VSCA 52, [98] (Weinberg JA). 
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involve a different mathematical computation to the first approach. This can be a 
difference in substance, as opposed to merely form. If an offender is acquitted on 
appeal on some charges but not others, the first approach is likely to attract a 
higher remaining sentence – although it could then be adjusted on appeal. 
The fourth technique to give effect to proportionality is not to specify the 
sentence for each offence, but to impose an aggregate sentence. In DHC v The 
Queen, it was noted that where there is a large number of individual offences, it 
is appropriate to confer an aggregate sentence.27 As noted below, statutory 
provisions in several jurisdictions expressly permit sentence aggregation. The 
final method by which the totality principle is applied is by manipulation of the 
commencement time for sentences.28 
 
C    Statutory Recognition of the Principle 
Aspects of the totality principle or the mechanics by which totality can be 
given effect have a statutory foundation in most Australian jurisdictions. 
However, the totality principle per se has not been systematically developed or 
enshrined in any of the relevant statutory schemes. The complexities and nuances 
associated with the principle are not addressed in the sentencing legislation and, 
hence, prior to considering the detail of the principle, it is appropriate to briefly 
discuss the relevant legislative provisions. 
The only jurisdiction to expressly endorse the totality principle is Western 
Australia. Section 6(3)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides that a 
sentence can be reduced because of ‘any rule of law as to the totality of 
sentences.’ This is complemented by section 88 which creates a presumption of 
concurrency. 
In the Commonwealth jurisdiction, the totality principle is recognised by 
section 16B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which requires a court sentencing an 
offender to have regard to any other sentence yet to be served for any other state 
or federal offence.29 Further, pursuant to section 19AD of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth), a court, when sentencing an offender for a federal offence who is already 
the subject of a non-parole period for a federal offence, is to have regard to a 
number of factors in deciding whether to impose a new parole period and, if so, 
the length of the period. The relevant factors are the existing non-parole period, 
the prior criminal history of the offender and the nature and circumstances of the 
offence. 
Sections 9(2)(k)–(m) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) 
incorporate the totality principle by prescribing that in sentencing an offender a 
court is to have regard to: 
  
                                                 
27  [2012] VSCA 52, [77], [85]–[88], [98]. See also Bagnato (2011) 112 SASR 39, [56]–[60] (Gray and 
Sulan JJ). 
28  See, eg, Baghdadi [2012] NSWCCA 212. 
29  See Postiglione (1997) 189 CLR 295. 
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(k)  sentences imposed on, and served by, the offender in another State or a 
Territory for an offence committed at, or about the same time, as the offence 
with which the court is dealing; and  
(l)  sentences already imposed on the offender that have not been served; and  
(m)  sentences that the offender is liable to serve because of the revocation of 
orders made under this or another Act for contraventions of conditions by the 
offender … 
Section 155 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) creates a 
presumption of concurrency when an offender is sentenced to imprisonment for 
more than one offence or is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, 
however, discretion is provided in section 156 to order cumulative sentences in 
such circumstances. 
In New South Wales, section 55(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW) creates a presumption of concurrency when an offender is 
sentenced to imprisonment for more than one offence or is already undergoing a 
sentence of imprisonment. However, this is displaced in relation to certain 
offences committed while in custody. Section 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) provides for aggregate sentences in certain 
circumstances, which (as we have seen above) can be used to facilitate the 
totality principle. 
In the Northern Territory, section 50 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) creates 
a presumption of concurrency when an offender is sentenced to imprisonment for 
more than one offence or is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment. 
However, section 51 also expressly permits discretion to accumulate sentences in 
such circumstances. Section 52 allows for aggregate sentences to be imposed 
where two or more sentences are handed down at the one time, thereby 
facilitating the totality principle. 
Section 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) is similar to 
section 52 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT). It expressly permits aggregate 
offences, stating: 
If a person is found guilty by a court of a number of offences, the court may 
sentence the person to the one penalty for all or some of those offences, but the 
sentence cannot exceed the total of the maximum penalties that could be imposed 
in respect of each of the offences to which the sentence relates. 
To similar effect are section 57(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 
(ACT) and section 11(2) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). 
In Victoria, section 9(2) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) provides that if an 
aggregate sentence is imposed by a court for one or more offences, the sentence 
cannot exceed that which would have been imposed if a separate sentence was 
imposed for each offence. Section 16(1) creates a presumption in favour of all 
sentences being concurrent, but this is displaced in relation to certain offences 
and forms of offending, including where the offence is a prison or escape 
offence,30 the offender is a serious offender,31 or the offence is committed while 
                                                 
30  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 16(1A)(b), 16(3). 
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the offender is on parole32 or while on bail.33 Thus, a number of circumstances 
are set out where the principle is displaced, and concurrency is only permitted in 
cases where exceptional circumstances exist. The importance of the totality 
doctrine is underlined by the preparedness of the courts to find exceptional 
circumstances and their willingness to reduce the total effective sentence (by 
applying the totality principle), even in the absence of such circumstances.34 
Justice of Appeal Redlich in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Johnson 
stated that in situations where the legislature has indicated a preference for 
cumulative sentences, the totality principle can still apply by adopting the second 
technique for lowering the overall sentence (ie, by lowering the individual 
sentences). His Honour indicated that: 
while some approaches to applying the principle of totality may be inconsistent 
with the requirements of s 16(3B) of the Sentencing Act 1991, others may not. A 
sentencing court is not entitled to set its face against the clear wording of s 16(3B) 
and pursue an application of the principle of totality that may call for orders of 
concurrency or only partial cumulation in developing a head sentence that reflects 
the total criminality of the accused. However, a sentencing court may be entitled 
to tailor the application of the principle to avoid contravening the section … 
Nothing in the language of s 16(3B) suggests, in terms, that it is intended to 
diminish the totality principle.35 
 
D    Circumstances in Which Totality Operates 
The most straightforward situation where totality applies is when an offender 
is sentenced for a number of similar offences committed within a relatively short 
period of time. In such circumstances, concurrent sentences are normally 
imposed.36 However there is no strict rule to this effect. In Koncurat v Western 
                                                                                                                         
31  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 16(1A)(c). For comments on this see McL v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 452, 
where McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated at 476–7 [76]: 
  The need for judges not to compress sentences is especially important where the accused person is a 
‘serious sexual offender’ within the meaning of s 16(3A) of the Sentencing Act, and similar provisions. 
Section 16(3A) gives effect to a legislative policy that serious offenders are to be treated differently from 
other offenders. It was plainly intended to have more than a formal effect, which is the effect it would 
frequently have if its operation was subject to the full effect of the totality principle. Given the terms of s 
16(3A), the scope for applying the totality principle must be more limited than in cases not falling within 
that section. The evident object of the section is to make sentences to which it applies operate cumulatively 
rather than concurrently. The section gives the judge discretion to direct otherwise. But the object of the 
section would be compromised and probably defeated in most cases if the ordinary application of the 
totality principle was a sufficient ground to liven the discretion. Since the relationship between s 16(3A) 
and the totality principle does not arise in this appeal, it is enough to say that sentencing judges need to be 
astute not to undermine the legislative policy inherent in s 16(3A) by applying the totality principle to the 
sentences as if that section (or s 6E which replaced it) was not on the statute book. 
32  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 16(1A)(d), 16(3B). The principle is applied even when there are no 
exceptional circumstances: R v Warwick (Sentence) [2012] VSC 382. 
33  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 16(1A)(e), 16(3C). 
34  Arnautovic v The Queen [2012] VSCA 112. 
35  (2011) 213 A Crim R 262, 276–7 [68]–[69]. See also Waugh v The Queen [2013] VSCA 36, [29]; 
Arnautovic v The Queen [2012] VSCA 112. 
36  See, Dicker v Ashton (1974) 65 LSJS 150, 151; R v Faithfull (2004) 142 A Crim R 554; DPP (Vic) v 
Grabovac [1998] 1 VR 664. 
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Australia the court noted that the ‘so-called “one transaction rule” or “continuing 
episode rule”‘37 is ‘not a rule at all. It is merely a guideline.’38 A degree of 
cumulation may be ordered in relation to offences committed over a similar 
period where the offences violate different interests or cannot be regarded as part 
of the single criminal enterprise, or where concurrency would not reflect the 
gravity of the overall offending.39 
The totality principle becomes more complicated where the offences are 
committed over a longer period of time, are committed in different jurisdictions, 
where the offender has served part of a sentence or the offender commits 
offences of a different nature. 
Several complexities associated with the principle were clarified in the 
seminal High Court decision dealing with totality. Mill concerned a situation 
where the offender committed two armed robberies in Victoria and one in 
Queensland within the space of about six weeks over the period 8 or 9 December 
1979 to 19 January 1980. On 1 September 1980 he was sentenced in Victoria for 
armed robberies committed in Victoria to an effective term of ten years’ 
imprisonment, with a non-parole period of eight years. On his release, he was 
returned to Queensland and in March 1988 he was sentenced to eight years 
imprisonment with a recommendation that he be eligible for parole after three 
years, in light of the sentence he had completed in Victoria. The High Court, in 
allowing the appeal, made several important points about the scope of the totality 
principle.  
First, it applies when the offences are committed in different jurisdictions. 
Secondly, it applies not only to setting the non-parole period, but also the head 
sentence.40 Thirdly, the principle also applies in relation to offences where the 
sentence has been partially or totally served.41 This last point was emphasised by 
McHugh J in the subsequent High Court decision of Postiglione, where his 
Honour stated that: ‘in order to comply with the totality principle, a sentencing 
judge must consider the total criminality involved not only in the offences for 
which the offender is being sentenced, but also in any offences for which the 
offender is currently serving a sentence.’42 
In the circumstances, the High Court in Mill held that the proper approach 
that should have been taken to the Queensland sentence is: ‘to ask what would be 
likely to have been the effective head sentence imposed if the applicant had 
committed all three offences of armed robbery in one jurisdiction and had been 
sentenced at one time’.43  
                                                 
37  [2010] WASCA 184, [40], citing Steytler P in State of Western Australia v Miller (2005) 30 WAR 38, 
[14]–[17]. 
38  Ibid, citing Dicker v Ashton (1974) 65 LSJS 150, 151. 
39  Royer v Western Australia (2009) 197 A Crim R 319. 
40  Mill (1988) 166 CLR 59, 65–6 [14]. 
41  See also R v Suckling (1983) 33 SASR 133. 
42  (1997) 189 CLR 295, 308. See also R v Hunter (2006) 14 VR 336. 
43  (1988) 166 CLR 59, 66 [16]. 
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Thus, when an offender already under sentence is being sentenced for other 
offences, the guiding principle for the judge or magistrate is to ascertain the 
sentence that would have been imposed if the offender was sentenced for all of 
the offences at the one time. 
More complicated is where the offences are committed over a long period of 
time. This issue has been considered in a number of cases and it is now clear that 
even where the offences are committed over a very long period of time, the 
principle of totality applies where the offences are of a similar nature.44 The 
principle also applies where the offences are committed over a short period of 
time, but the sentencing occurs much later for reasons not related to the operation 
of the criminal justice system, for example, where the offender remains silent and 
evidence of his or her involvement in the offence comes to light several years 
later.45 
Where an offender is reimprisoned for breaching parole, and the new 
offences are similar to those which resulted in the original jail term, it is unclear 
whether the totality principle applies to the entire time spent in custody for the 
original offence, or merely the additional period that the offender is sentenced to 
serve as a result of breaching parole. In Contin v The Queen, the Victorian Court 
of Criminal Appeal expressly refused to resolve the matter, noting that there are 
authorities supporting either approach.46 A stricter approach was adopted in the 
more recent decision of McCartney v The Queen, where it was held that where an 
offender is sentenced for offences committed while he or she is on parole, the 
sentencer, in applying the totality principle, is required to have regard only to the 
additional period of imprisonment to be served as a result of the breach of 
parole.47 
The application of the totality doctrine to offences of a different nature 
remains uncertain. It is well established that the principle can apply to offences 
between indictments or within the same indictment.48 Earlier, authorities 
confined the principle to offences that were of a similar nature or in some way 
connected.49 However, the trend of recent decisions is to abolish the need for the 
offences to be similar.50 Authorities suggest that in some instances, total 
concurrency for distinct offences is appropriate. In R v King, the Court noted that 
‘complete concurrency for separate crimes may be appropriate at times’51 but 
then approved Justice Hidden’s comment in R v Cutrale that ‘it is more likely 
that, where the offences are discrete and independent criminal acts, the sentence 
for one offence can not comprehend the criminality of the other.’52  
                                                 
44  See, eg, R v Wright [2009] VSCA 27, where the offender sexually abused a number of boys over a period 
spanning nearly a decade. 
45  RLS v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 236. 
46  [2012] VSCA 247, [71].  
47  [2012] VSCA 268, [100]. A broad approach is taken in Waugh v The Queen [2013] VSCA 36, [26]. 
48  DPP (Vic) v Marino [2011] VSCA 133, [53]. 
49  R v Harrison (1990) 48 A Crim R 197. 
50  R v Hunter (2006) 14 VR 336. 
51  [2011] NSWCCA 274, [20]. 
52  Ibid. 
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The application of the totality principle is generally not contingent upon the 
nature of the offence in question, thus, the principle transcends all offence types. 
There is one qualification to this – offences against the person. In most 
circumstances where the offences have caused harm to more than one victim 
(even if they are committed as part of the single transaction, for example, 
dangerous driving causing multiple deaths), total concurrency is not 
appropriate.53 This is justified by the need to recognise the importance of 
separateness of victims and the loss and trauma experienced by them.54 However, 
even this principle is not absolute. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v 
Marino the Court stated: 
It is understandable that, in relation to death and serious injury involving multiple 
victims, ordinarily, some cumulation is required in respect of the offences relating 
to each victim. The cases, however, are not authority for the proposition that, 
where the offending results in any injury to more than one victim, a sentencing 
judge must provide for some cumulation in respect of the offences relating to each 
victim. Cumulation may well be appropriate in many such cases. However, as I 
have already stated, cumulation must be applied in the light of the principle of 
totality.55 
Where the offences relate to one victim, total concurrency will also often not 
be appropriate where the criminality relates to different forms of harm.56 
The area where totality is most obscure is the extent to which it can operate 
to reduce a sentence. Apart from the fact that in some instances total concurrency 
is appropriate, there is no settled principle regarding this issue. As discussed 
below, this is partly due to the unclear nature of the rationales supposedly 
underpinning the doctrine. It is also largely a manifestation of the general 
approach to sentencing decisions, which by its very nature is open-ended. 
The overarching methodology and conceptual approach that sentencing 
judges undertake is known as ‘instinctive synthesis’. The term originates from 
the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria decision of R v Williscroft, where 
Adam and Crockett JJ stated that ‘ultimately every sentence imposed represents 
the sentencing judge’s instinctive synthesis of all the various aspects involved in 
the punitive process.’57 
The general methodology for reaching sentencing decisions has been 
considered by the High Court on several occasions, and the Court has 
consistently adopted the instinctive synthesis approach and rejected the 
alternative, which is normally referred to as the two step approach.58 The 
alternative approach involves a court setting an appropriate sentence 
                                                 
53  Similar comments have been made in relation to burglary offences: R v Harris (2007) 171 A Crim R 267. 
54  See, eg, Richards v The Queen (2006) 46 MVR 165; R v Janceski (2005) 44 MVR 328. 
55  [2011] VSCA 133, [53] (citation omitted). See also R v KM [2004] NSWCCA 65. 
56  Nguyen v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 14; R v BWS [2007] NSWCCA 59. 
57   [1975] VR 292, 300 (Adams and Crockett JJ). 
58  Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 375 [39] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) 
(‘Markarian’); Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 527 [18], 528 [25], 534 [44]. 
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commensurate with the severity of the offence, then making allowances up and 
down in light of relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances.59 
In Wong v The Queen (‘Wong’), most members of the High Court saw the 
process of sentencing as an exceptionally difficult task with a high degree of 
‘complexity’.60 Exactness is supposedly not possible because of the inherently 
multifaceted nature of that activity.61 
Despite the uncertainty of outcome that is produced by the instinctive 
synthesis approach, this methodology was confirmed by the majority in 
Markarian, where it was noted that ‘[f]ollowing the decision of this Court in 
Wong it cannot now be doubted that sentencing courts may not add and subtract 
item by item from some apparently subliminally derived figure, passages of time 
in order to fix the time which an offender must serve in prison.’62 
Thus, the general approach to sentencing decisions militates against a high 
level of clarity regarding the precise operation of the totality principle.63 
However, as noted above, it is clear that the principle is capable of weighing 
heavily in the sentencing decisions, to the point where, in some cases, total 
concurrency is available even in relation to serious offences. 
 
E    The Concept of a Crushing Sentence as Guiding the Principle 
The concept of a crushing sentence is integral to the totality principle. A 
crushing sentence is commonly defined as one that destroys an expectation of a 
meaningful life after release.64 In R v Beck the Court described a crushing 
sentence (of nine and a half years imprisonment) as one which risked ‘provoking 
within the applicant a feeling of helplessness and the destruction of any 
reasonable expectation of a useful life after release.’65 
Whether a sentence is crushing is not solely determined by a numerical 
figure, although the length of the sentence is a cardinal consideration in 
evaluating whether a sentence is crushing. The age of the offender is another 
important consideration. 
In Haines v The Queen, it was noted that in considering whether a sentence is 
crushing, other relevant considerations include ‘maximum penalties, any standard 
non-parole periods, the objective and subjective factors’.66 
                                                 
59  This approach is described (but not endorsed) by McHugh J in Markarian (2005) 228 CLR 357, 377–9 
[51]–[54].  
60  (2001) 207 CLR 584, 612 [77] (Gaudron J, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
61  See the dicta of McHugh J who notes the difficulties of any ‘attempts to give the process of sentencing a 
degree of exactness which the subject matter can rarely bear’: AB v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 111, 120 
[13]. 
62  (2005) 228 CLR 357, 375 [39] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); see also Hili v The 
Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520. 
63  For criticism of the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing, see Mirko Bagaric, ‘Sentencing: The 
Road to Nowhere’ (1999) 21 Sydney Law Review 597. 
64  Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372, [56]–[59].  
65  [2005] VSCA 11, [22]. 
66  [2012] NSWCCA 238, [57]. 
152 UNSW Law Journal Volume 36(1) 
Ultimately, the notion of a ‘crushing’ sentence remains impressionistic. In R 
v Vaitos, Young CJ stated: 
Is the effective sentence to be regarded as crushing? This question can only be 
answered in relation to the facts of the case. The answer cannot be arrived at 
mathematically by reference to the offender’s age and the length of sentence to be 
served. In the particular case of this applicant, having regard to the very large 
number of very serious offences, and notwithstanding the severity of the effective 
sentence, I have come to the conclusion that the point has not been reached at 
which this Court is required to set aside the sentence as crushing.67 
It is not clear whether the desire to avoid a crushing sentence is part of or 
incidental to the totality principle. In R v Piacentino, Eames JA (with whom 
Buchanan and Vincent JA agreed) observed that the concept of a crushing 
sentence is distinct from the principle of totality, and, in particular, that totality 
applies even when the sentence is not crushing. Justice of Appeal Eames noted: 
As Callaway JA observed in R v Barnes, there is a difference between the 
principle of totality and the avoidance of a ‘crushing’ sentence – because a 
sentence of three years, for example, might offend totality principles and yet not 
be so long as to crush the offender – and the requirement to ‘stand back’ and 
assess the overall criminality applies even where the sentence would not be 
described as crushing.68 
A different view is taken in Western Australia, where the desire not to 
impose a crushing sentence is regarded as the second limb of the totality 
requirement. In Roffey v The State of Western Australia,69 McLure JA stated: 
The appellant relies on the totality principle which comprises two limbs. The first 
limb is that the total effective sentence must bear a proper relationship to the 
overall criminality involved in all the offences. … The second limb is that the 
court should not impose a ‘crushing’ sentence.70 
Pragmatically, the issue of whether the desire to avoid a crushing sentence is 
core to the totality principle or an external check to its application is moot. There 
are three reasons for this. First, as noted above, the meaning of a crushing 
sentence is unclear and hence, at its highest, it only provides a slight qualification 
to the principle. Secondly, both approaches recognise that the totality principle 
can apply even when the sentence is not crushing. Thirdly, there is no question 
that in some instances a crushing sentence is appropriate and, in fact, must be 
imposed.71 
The avoidance of crushing sentences is at best an aspirational aim of 
sentencing as opposed to a firm requirement. The fact that tariffs for certain 
                                                 
67  (1981) 4 A Crim R 238, 257. 
68  (2007) 15 VR 501, 507 [33] (citation omitted). 
69  [2007] WASCA 246. 
70  Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246, [24]–[25]. This has been expressly 
approved in a number of cases, see, eg, Koncurat v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 184. See also 
Bagnato (2011) 112 SASR 39; Narrier v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 193. 
71  Also, it is clear that totality does not only apply in the case of potentially crushing sentences. In Johnson 
(2004) 78 ALJR 616, 624 [22] Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ stated: ‘We would with respect doubt 
that it is only in a case of an otherwise crushing burden of an aggregation of sentences that the totality 
principle may be applied.’ 
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categories of offences have increased considerably in recent years72 indicates a 
dilution of the desire to avoid crushing sentences. In R v E, Doyle CJ stated: 
‘[c]are must be taken in using the concept of a crushing sentence. Not 
uncommonly, for particularly serious crimes, a sentence that is crushing in its 
effect must be imposed.’73  
The lack of weight given to a crushing sentence is highlighted in Paxton v 
The Queen (‘Paxton’) where Johnson J (Tobias AJA and Hall J agreeing) stated 
that ‘[c]ourts are not unfamiliar with descriptions of sentences as “crushing” but 
that does not articulate some applicable test. A life sentence would presumably 
fall within the ambit of that description but the legitimacy of availability of a life 
sentence is not open to challenge.’74 
Logically, sentences of life imprisonment are crushing. Nevertheless, they are 
often imposed in relation to single offences, such as murder.75 The desire not to 
impose crushing sentences does not apply a meaningful fetter to the imposition of 
such penalties in relation to single offences. It follows that it must impose even 
less of a restraint in cases of multiple offences, given that, all things being equal, 
they are more serious single offences. Accordingly, at best, the concept of a 
crushing sentence is a weak consideration in the context of the application of the 
totality principle. 
 
F    Summary: Scope and Application 
Thus, the totality principle is unclear at the margins, but the following rules 
emerge regarding its scope and application: 
• The principle of totality applies to guide sentencing regarding the 
appropriate penalty in cases of multiple offending; 
• The effect of the principle is to reduce the overall penalty, compared to a 
linear cumulation of the sentence for each offence; 
• It applies to all situations where multiple offending is considered by the 
courts, including when an offender is being sentenced for more than one 
offence, when an offender is already undergoing a sentence and is being 
sentenced for separate offences, and when an offender has completed a 
sentence and is being sentenced for an offence which was committed 
before or during the period of the initial sentence; 
• The main technique for achieving totality is to make sentences totally or 
partially concurrent. Where this is not feasible, the sentence for each 
offence is reduced;  
                                                 
72  This is especially the case in relation to drug offences and offences against the person. See Mirko Bagaric 
and Richard Edney, Australian Sentencing (Thomson Reuters, 2011). 
73  (2005) 93 SASR 20, 30 [38]. This was approved in R v Walkuski [2010] SASC 146, [5]. 
74  [2011] NSWCCA 242, [213], citing Ta’ala v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 132, [40]–[42] (Grove J). 
75  The principle of totality has limited application in such instances: see Roberts v The Queen [2012] VSCA 
313, [105]. 
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• Totality applies even when the offences are committed over a longer 
period and are of a different nature, although the longer the time period 
between offences and the more disparate they are in nature, the less 
concurrency will apply; 
• Offences against the person will rarely result in total concurrency, even 
when the harm is caused by the single act; 
• The totality principle is informed by the desire to avoid crushing 
sentences. While the concept of crushing is unclear, it generally applies 
where, given the length of the sentence and the age of the offender, it 
would engender a feeling of hopelessness; 
• In relation to serious crimes, a crushing sentence may be necessary; 
• A sentence does not need to be crushing to attract the operation of the 
totality principle; 
• There is no standard formula for giving effect to concurrency. The 
reduction in penalty, as compared to a linear cumulation of each 
sentence, is a matter for the sentencing judge or magistrate whose choice 
is close to an unfettered discretion; and  
• The principle (as discussed below) has two rationales: proportionality 
and mercy. Both are vague, hence totality remains obscure.76  
 
III    RATIONALE FOR THE TOTALITY PRINCIPLE: 
PROPORTIONALITY AND MERCY 
A    Judicial Comments 
There is scant discussion regarding the justification for the totality principle. 
The most succinct and clear rationale is in R v Walkuski, where Doyle CJ stated 
that ‘[i]t can also be said that the concept of totality reflects two particular 
considerations. One of them is proportionality. The sentence must bear an 
appropriate proportion to the overall criminality involved. The other is mercy.’77 
Thus, the concerns that underpin totality are proportionality and mercy, which 
themselves are discrete sentencing considerations. 
More extensive analysis of the rationale for totality has occurred, but it has 
not clarified the underpinnings of the doctrine. In Bogdanovich v The Queen,78 
Ashley and Weinberg JJA stated: 
The totality principle is said to ‘defy precision either of description or 
implementation’. Sometimes it is described as a requirement of ‘just deserts’, and 
whether the total effective sentence offends that principle is often a ‘matter of 
impression’. … The problem [of application] is exacerbated, however, when the 
sentencing judge must have regard not merely to totality in relation to the offences 
                                                 
76  See also R v XX (2009) 195 A Crim R 38, 48 [52] for an overview of the totality principle. 
77  R v Walkuski [2010] SASC 146, [6]. 
78  [2011] VSCA 388. 
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for which the offender is being sentenced, but also other periods of incarceration 
in respect of earlier and unrelated offending.79 
The concept of ‘just deserts’ articulated in the above passage is not a separate 
justification but seems to be a reference to the proportionality principle, which is 
commonly interchanged with the just deserts concept.80 An illuminating aspect of 
the above passage is the recognition that totality is an obscure principle and, in 
fact, so obscure that courts have recognised it as being impressionistic. 
We now consider whether proportionality and mercy can underpin the totality 
principle. 
 
B    Proportionality: Too Vague to be Instructive 
As the High Court stated in Hoare v The Queen, ‘a basic principle of 
sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court should 
never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the 
gravity of the crime considered in the light of its objective circumstances.’81 
The principle of proportionality (at least in theory) operates to ‘restrain 
excessive, arbitrary and capricious punishment’82 by requiring that punishment 
must not exceed the gravity of the offence, even where it seems certain that the 
offender will immediately re-offend.83 
The key aspect of the principle is that it has two limbs. The first is the 
seriousness of the crime and the second is the harshness of the sanction. Further, 
the principle has a quantitative component – the two limbs must be matched. In 
order for the principle to be satisfied, the seriousness of the crime must be equal 
to the harshness of the penalty. 
Proportionality is one of the main objectives of sentencing.84 In Veen v The 
Queen (No 1)85 and Veen v The Queen (No 2),86 the High Court stated that 
proportionality is the primary aim of sentencing. It is considered so important 
that it cannot be trumped even by the goal of community protection, which at 
various times has also been declared as the most important aim of sentencing.87 
Thus, in the case of dangerous offenders, while community protection remains an 
                                                 
79  Bogdanovich v The Queen [2011] VSCA 388, [63]–[66] (citations omitted). This was approved in Contin 
v The Queen [2012] VSCA 247. 
80  See, eg, Jami L Anderson, ‘Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism’ (1997) 16 Criminal Justice 
Ethics 13; Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford University Press, 1993); M Bagaric, 
Punishment and Sentencing; A Rational Approach (Routledge, 1st ed, 2001) ch 1–4. 
81  (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354 (emphasis altered). 
82  Richard G Fox, ‘The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law 
Review 489, 492. 
83  See, eg, R v Jenner [1956] Crim L R 495, in which the court reduced a term of imprisonment despite 
believing that ‘it appeared likely that [the offender] would commit a crime as soon as he was released 
from prison’. 
84  Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 44 (1988) 15–16; New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission, Sentencing, Discussion Paper No 33 (1996) ch 3; Home Office, Great Britain, 
‘Criminal Justice and Protecting the Public’ (White Paper, Home Office, 1990) 5. 
85  (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467. 
86  (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472. 
87  See, eg, Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433. 
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important objective, at common law it cannot override the principle of 
proportionality. It is for this reason that preventive detention is not sanctioned by 
the common law.88 Proportionality has also been given statutory recognition in 
all Australian jurisdictions.89 
There has been no systematic, doctrinally sound approach to defining the 
factors that are relevant to proportionality. Rather than positively defining the 
factors that are relevant to offence severity, it has proved easier to dismiss some 
considerations as being irrelevant. Factors such as ‘good character, … 
repentance, restitution, possible rehabilitation and intransigence’90 have been 
excluded.91 However, some factors have been positively identified as relevant to 
offence seriousness. These include: the consequences of the offence, as well as 
the level of harm; the victim’s vulnerability and the method of the offence;92 the 
offender’s culpability, which turns on such factors as the offender’s mental 
state93 and his or her level of intelligence; the level of sophistication involved;94 
the protection of society;95 and even the offender’s previous criminal history.96 
The problem with such a list is that despite its non-exhaustive character, it is 
too particular, and is no more than a non-exhaustive list of common aggravating 
factors. Once considerations such as the method of the offence and the victim’s 
vulnerability are included, there appears to be no logical basis for not including 
other considerations that are typically thought to increase the severity of an 
offence such as breach of trust, the prevalence of the offence, profits derived 
from the offence, and an offender’s degree of participation. Such an approach is 
devoid of an overarching justification and is, ultimately, baseless. 
                                                 
88  Chester v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 611, 618. See also R v Chivers [1993] 1 Qd R 432, 437–8. 
89  The Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(a) provides that one of the purposes of sentencing is to impose just 
punishment (s 5(1)(a)), and that in sentencing an offender the court must have regard to the gravity of the 
offence (s 5(2)(c)) and the offender's culpability and degree of responsibility (s 5(2)(d)). The Sentencing 
Act 1995 (WA) states that the sentence must be ‘commensurate with the seriousness of the offence’ (s 
6(1)) and the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), s 7(1)(a) provides that the sentence must be ‘just and 
appropriate’. In the Northern Territory and Queensland, the relevant sentencing statute provides that the 
punishment imposed on the offender must be just in all the circumstances (Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 
5(1)(a); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(a)), while in South Australia the emphasis is upon 
ensuring that ‘the defendant is adequately punished for the offence’ (Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 
(SA) s 10 (1)(j)). The need for a sentencing court to ‘adequately punish’ the offender is also fundamental 
to the sentencing of offenders for Commonwealth matters (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(k)). The same 
phrase is used in the New South Wales Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, s 3A(a). 
90  Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 491. 
91  See also Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, 363. 
92  This includes the matters such as use of weapons and whether there was a breach of trust: see Richard G 
Fox, ‘The Meaning of Proportion in Sentencing’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 489, 499–
500. 
93  For example, whether it was intentional, reckless or negligent. 
94  See Richard G Fox, ‘The Meaning of Proportion in Sentencing’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law 
Review 489, 498–501; New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Discussion Paper No 33 
(1996) 62–4. 
95  Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 474. 
96  R v Mulholland (1991) 1 NTLR 1, 13 where prior convictions were treated as part of the objective 
circumstances of the offence on the basis that they are relevant to the mens rea of the offender in 
committing the offence. This view was rejected in R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566. 
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It is for this reason that despite the widespread recognition of the principle, 
there is no convergence in sentences either within or across jurisdictions – even 
those that ostensibly place cardinal emphasis on proportionality in sentencing 
determinations.97 The vagaries are so pronounced that it is verging on doctrinal 
and intellectual fiction to suggest that an objective answer can be given to 
common sentencing dilemmas, such as how many years of imprisonment is 
equivalent to the pain felt by an assault victim, or whether a burglar should be 
dealt with by way of imprisonment or fine, or the appropriate sanction for a drug 
trafficker. Certainly, there is no demonstrable violation of proportionality if a 
mugger, robber or drug trafficker is sentenced to either 12 months or 12 years 
imprisonment.98 
Some commentators have argued that proportionality is so vague as to be 
meaningless, in light of the fact that there is no stable and clear manner in which 
the punishment can be matched to the crime.99 Jesper Ryberg notes that one of 
the key and damaging criticisms of proportionality is that it ‘presupposes 
something which is not there, namely, some objective measure of appropriateness 
between crime and punishment.’100 The most obscure and unsatisfactory aspect 
of proportionality is that there is no stable and clear manner in which the 
punishment can be matched to the crime. Jesper Ryberg further notes that to give 
                                                 
97  See also Jesper Ryberg, The Ethics of Proportionate Punishment: A Critical Investigation (Springer, 
2004) 2. 
98  Just deserts (or retributive) theorists contend that proportionality is capable of providing clear guidance 
regarding choice of punishment: see also Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and 
Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals (Rutgers University Press, 1985); Andrew von Hirsch and 
Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford University Press, 2005); 
Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, ‘Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis’ (1991) 11 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. In our view, just deserts theory is doctrinally flawed. The main reason 
for this is that it cannot justify the need for punitive measures without resort to consequential 
considerations. The consequentialist considerations they normally invoke are said to come in the form of 
deterrence or victim (or community) satisfaction that is supposedly achieved by imposing hardships on 
wrongdoers. But reliance on such matters makes these theories incoherent. It means that punishment is 
not desirable in itself. Instead, it is only a worthwhile objective to the extent that it actually achieves such 
outcomes. In the end, this makes these theories simply a species of utilitarianism. Ultimately, the reliance 
on consequences undercuts the stability of many retributive theories. Without adverting to 
consequentialist considerations, it is impossible to justify the link between crime and punishment. See 
Stanley I Benn and Richard Stanley Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State (Allen & Unwin, 
1959): 
  We can justify rules and institutions only by showing that they yield advantages. Consequently, 
retributivist answers to the problem can be shown, on analysis, to be either mere affirmations of the 
desirability of punishment or utilitarian reasons in disguise … To say, with Kant, that punishment is a good 
in itself, is to deny the necessity for justification; for to justify is to provide reasons in terms of something 
else accepted as valuable’: at 175–6. 
 See also Mirko Bagaric and Kumar Amarasakera, ‘The Errors of Retributivism’ (2000) 24 Melbourne 
University Law Review 124. In our view, the proportionality principle is most strongly underpinned by a 
utilitarian approach to punishment: see Mirko Bagaric, ‘Proportionality in Sentencing: Its Role and 
Justification’ (2000) 12 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 142. 
99  As noted in section II of this article, the courts have not attempted to exhaustively define the factors that 
are relevant to proportionality. 
100  Ryberg, above n 97, 184. 
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content to the theory it is necessary to rank crimes, rank punishments and ‘anchor 
the scales’.101 
Thus, even when it comes to matching the punishment for one offence, there 
is considerable speculation about whether it can be done with any degree of 
objectivity or precision. This uncertainty is necessarily compounded when an 
offender is sentenced for more than one offence. 
What is clear, however, is that the first limb of the proportionality principle, 
in fact, directly contradicts the totality thesis. The harm caused by a number of 
offences is no less when it is committed by one offender. The total harm caused 
by five rapes (on five different victims) is identical whether they are committed 
by five different offenders or the one offender. Thus, on the basis of this limb, 
proportionality does not in fact support, let alone justify, the totality principle. 
However, proportionality may go some way to justifying totality if one 
focuses on the impact of the severity of punishment on an offender. It has been 
suggested that the hardship inflicted by a term of imprisonment increases at a 
higher rate than the duration of a sentence. In Paxton v The Queen, Johnson J 
(Tobias AJA and Hall J agreeing) adopted the earlier remarks by Malcolm CJ in 
R v Clinch, stating: 
the severity of a sentence increases at a greater rate than any increase in the length 
of the sentence. Thus, a sentence of five years is more than five times as severe as 
a sentence of one year. Similarly, while a sentence of seven years may be 
appropriate for one set of offences and a sentence of eight years may be 
appropriate for another set of offences, each looked at in isolation. Where both 
sets were committed by the one offender a sentence of 15 years may be out of 
proportion to the degree of criminality involved because of the compounding 
effect on the severity of the total sentence of simply aggregating the two sets of 
sentences.102  
This involves a degree of speculation. In fact the converse could equally be 
argued: a sentence of, say, one year, is more than one quarter as onerous as a 
sentence of four years imprisonment. This is especially the case because the 
principal dichotomy between sentencing options is imprisonment or no 
imprisonment. Even a short jail term results in the potentially severe incidental 
harm in the form of the stigma associated with a jail term and other social, 
economic and employment deprivations and limitations.103 Arguably, these 
incidental deprivations are not made meaningfully worse by a longer term of 
imprisonment. 
Thus, intuitively, there is some appeal to the argument that the impact of 
sentences compounds at a greater rate than their linear length, but this is by no 
means incontestable. There is at best a weak argument in support of the 
contention that proportionality can justify totality. And, to the extent that it can 
                                                 
101  Ibid 185. Even retributivists have been unable to invoke the proportionality principle in a manner which 
provides firm guidance regarding appropriate sentencing ranges: see, eg, von Hirsch and Ashworth, 
above n 98; von Hirsch and Jareborg, above n 98. 
102  [2011] NSWCCA 242, [212] (citations omitted). 
103  Gresham M Sykes, ‘The Pains of Imprisonment’ in Gresham M Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Study 
of a Maximum Security Prison (Princeton University Press, 1958) 285, 287. 
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underpin the totality principle, the utility of this is limited given the vague nature 
of the proportionality principle. 
 
C    Mercy: A Feeling Rather Than a Legal Construct 
The other purported justification for the totality principle is the principle of 
mercy.104 However, mercy itself is a fragile construct. It is devoid of any 
recognisable legal foundation and is unpredictable in its application. Its 
application appears to be grounded in the capacity of the offender’s subjective 
circumstances to enliven judicial sympathy. Further, there is no guidance 
regarding the extent to which it operates to reduce a sentence. 
The nexus between mercy and sympathy was noted by King CJ in R v 
Osenkowski: 
There must always be a place for the exercise of mercy where a judge’s 
sympathies are reasonably excited by the circumstances of the case. There must 
always be a place for the leniency which has traditionally been extended, even to 
offenders with bad records when the judge forms the view, almost intuitively in 
the case of experienced judges, that leniency at that particular stage of the 
offender’s life might lead to reform.105 
Comments in R v Kane also endorse the sympathy rationale but attempt to 
inject an aspect of principle. The Court stated that: 
mercy must be exercised upon considerations which are supported by the evidence 
and which make an appeal not only to sympathy but also to well-balanced 
judgment. … If a court permits sympathy to preclude it from attaching due weight 
to the other recognized elements of punishment, it has failed to discharge its 
duty.106 
However, there is no indication of what is meant by ‘a well-balanced 
judgment’. The term cannot relate to established mitigating factors because 
mercy operates outside them. The operation of the principle of mercy was most 
recently considered at length by the full bench of the Victorian Court of Appeal 
in Markovic v The Queen; Pantelic v The Queen.107 The Court noted that 
hardship faced by a family as a result of an offender’s imprisonment is grounds 
for the exercise of mercy in exceptional circumstances, but that the principle of 
                                                 
104  Judges and magistrates do not possess the prerogative of mercy: Johanson v Dixon (No 3) [1978] VR 
377. The concept is part of the sentencing discretion. A related concept to mercy is parsimony, which is 
the view that a sentence should not be harsher than that required to fulfil its social purpose: NOM v DPP 
& Ors [2012] VSCA 198, [68]. It has been expressly noted that parsimony is probably not part of 
sentencing law: see Blundell v The Queen (2008) 70 NSWLR 660, 665–6 [39]–[47]; Foster v The Queen 
[2011] NSWCCA 285, [50]–[53](Adams J). If the principle is part of sentencing law, its inexactness is 
incapable of shoring up other principles, such as totality.  
105  (1982) 30 SASR 212, 212–13. This is approved in R v Davies (2006) 164 A Crim R 353; R v Darby 
[2011] NSWCCA 52. See also Richard G Fox, ‘When Justice Sheds a Tear: The Place of Mercy in 
Sentencing’ (1999) 25 Monash University Law Review 1. 
106  [1974] VR 759, 766. 
107  (2010) 30 VR 589. 
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hardship only applies when recognised mitigating circumstances are 
exhausted.108 
Thus, as mercy is grounded in sympathy and, is by its nature an emotional 
response, it is difficult, if not impossible, to demarcate its bounds.109 Arguably, it 
has no role in a system of law that purports to comply with the virtues of the rule 
of law, which minimally commands that the law must consist of predetermined 
rules and principles,110 such that it is knowable and predictable.111 The fragility 
of the concept of mercy as an appropriate legal principle undermines its capacity 
to explain and justify subordinate principles, such as totality.  
A further conceptual difficulty with mercy in the context of totality is that it 
is superfluous. As we saw above, a key aspect of the proportionality principle is 
that it is meant to guard against excessive punishment. It is unclear why this 
objective should be advanced by two independent rationales in the context of the 
principle of totality.112 
Even if mercy can underpin totality, the boundless nature of mercy means 
that it is incapable of providing any guidance regarding the extent to which 
totality should moderate sentences. 
 
IV    REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS 
A    Overview of Other Potential Rationales for Totality 
The totality principle is vague in its scope and operation because the ideas 
supposedly underpinning it are themselves obscure. Proportionality is unable to 
match with any degree of precision the competing limbs of the doctrine, while 
mercy is more akin to an emotional retort than a justifiable legal standard. 
However, it may yet be that totality is justifiable. Offenders who are 
sentenced for multiple offences at the same time can be distinguished from 
offenders sentenced to the same offences separately, following the expiration of 
                                                 
108  For a recent application of this principle, see El-Hage v The Queen [2012] VSCA 309, where a sentence 
was reduced on account of hardship to the family caused by the imprisonment of the offender. 
109  The suggestion that there is a concept of ‘rational mercy’ is debunked by David Hume’s theory of human 
motivation, which distinguishes between two states of mind: beliefs and desires. For a fuller account of 
Hume's theory of motivation see Michael Smith, ‘Valuing: Desiring or Believing?’ in David Charles and 
Kathleen Lennon (eds), Reduction, Explanation and Realism (Oxford University Press, 1992) 323; 
Michael Smith, ‘Realism’, in Peter Singer (ed), A Companion to Ethics (Basil Blackwell, 1991) 399, 
400–2. According to Hume, there are two broad mental states. Beliefs are copies or replicas of the way 
we believe the world to be. Desires (which is the realm in which emotions reside) are our wants; the 
states that move us to act. Beliefs are capable of being right or wrong and hence are rational. Desires on 
the other hand are not amenable to reason and hence it is flawed to place them within a logical construct.  
110  For a discussion on the distinction between rules and principles, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Duckworth, 4th ed, 1977) 22–8, 76–7. 
111  See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, 1979) ch 11, 211, 214–16; John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) 270–6. 
112  Potentially, mercy could still be relevant to the extent that proportionality sets the lower limit for an 
appropriate penalty. However, in reality, the need for merciful intervention in relation to sentences that 
are as lenient as possible within the bounds of proportionality is questionable.  
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each sentence. While sentencing is, essentially, a punitive exercise, some of its 
objectives are designed to either assist the offender or at least reduce the prospect 
that he or she will reoffend. Thus, sentencing has a positive aspect from the 
perspective of the offender. Offenders who have been sentenced for multiple 
offences separately, following the expiration of each sentence, have had the 
benefit of interventions with the potential to curtail their criminality. Those 
sentenced for multiple offences at the same time have not benefitted from this 
positive aspect of sentencing. Arguably, their culpability is less than offenders 
who have completed their sentencing and then re-offended.  
The two main sentencing objectives designed to discourage reoffending by 
particular offenders (as opposed to potential offenders) are specific deterrence 
and rehabilitation. Specific deterrence aims to discourage crime by punishing 
individual offenders for their transgressions and, thereby, convincing them that 
crime does not pay. In effect, it attempts to dissuade offenders from reoffending 
by inflicting an unpleasant experience (normally imprisonment) which they will 
seek to avoid in the future.113 
Specific deterrence is a central common law sentencing objective and is 
given express statutory recognition in all Australian jurisdictions.114 Specific 
deterrence applies most acutely in relation to serious offences115 and offenders 
with significant prior convictions,116 since it is assumed that previous sanctions 
have failed to stop their criminal behaviour. Conversely, it has little application 
where an offender has voluntarily desisted from further offending117 or where the 
offender was suffering from impaired intellectual or mental functioning at the 
time of the offence.118 
Rehabilitation, like specific deterrence, aims to discourage the commission of 
future offences. The main difference between these objectives lies in the means 
used to encourage desistence from crime. Specific deterrence focuses on 
frightening an offender into not reoffending. Rehabilitation, by contrast, seeks to 
alter the values of the offender so that he or she no longer desires to commit 
criminal acts – it involves the renunciation of wrongdoing by the offender and 
the re-establishment of the offender as an honourable, law-abiding citizen.119 It is 
achieved by ‘reducing or eliminating the factors which contributed to the conduct 
                                                 
113  See Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (Routledge-Cavendish, 2001) ch 
6. 
114  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(j); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7(1)(b); Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A(b); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(1)(c); Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(c); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(i); Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 
3(e)(i); Sentencing Act 1991(Vic) s 5(1)(b). 
115  See, eg, DPP (Vic) v Zullo [2004] VSCA 153; DPP (Vic) v Lawrence (2004) 10 VR 125. 
116  See, eg, Saunders v The Queen [2010] VSCA 93. 
117  R v Pickett [2010] NSWCCA 273. 
118  R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; Melham v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 121; R v HBA [2010] QCA 306, 
[31]; R v Goodger [2009] QCA 377, [21]; Startup v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 5. 
119  See, eg, Vartzokas v Zanker (1989) 51 SASR 277, 279. 
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for which [the offender] is sentenced’.120 Thus, it works through a process of 
positive, internal attitudinal reform.121 
Offenders who are sentenced and then reoffend have not had the advantage 
that these sentencing aims seek to achieve. However, this is only an actual 
detriment if, in fact, it is likely that specific deterrence or rehabilitation would 
have diminished the likelihood of subsequent offending. 
We now analyse the efficacy of the sentencing process in achieving the goals 
of specific deterrence and rehabilitation. There have been hundreds of relevant 
empirical studies. Hence, it is not feasible to summarise them all here. However, 
as now discussed, the trend of the evidence is now relatively settled and it is 
tenable to provide an overview of the current state of knowledge regarding these 
topics. 
 
B    Specific Deterrence Does Not Work 
The available empirical data suggest that specific deterrence does not work. 
The evidence suggests that inflicting harsh sanctions on individuals does not 
make them less likely to re-offend in the future. The level of certainty of this 
conclusion is very high – so high that specific deterrence should be abolished as a 
sentencing consideration. 
There have been numerous studies across a wide range of jurisdictions and 
different time periods which come to this conclusion.122 Daniel Nagin, Francis T 
Cullen and Cheryl L Jonson provide the most recent extensive literature review 
regarding specific deterrence.123 They reviewed the impact of custodial sanctions 
versus non-custodial sanctions and the effect of sentence length on reoffending. 
The review examined six experimental studies where custodial versus non-
custodial sentences were randomly assigned;124 11 studies which involved 
matched pairs;125 31 studies which were regression based126 and seven other 
studies which did not neatly fit into any of those three categories, and included 
naturally occurring social experiments which allowed inferences to be drawn 
regarding the capacity of imprisonment to deter offenders.127 
                                                 
120  Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433, 438. 
121  See also C L Ten, Crime, Guilt and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
1987) 7–8. 
122  These are summarised recently in Mirko Bagaric and Theo Alexander, ‘The Capacity of Criminal 
Sanctions to Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might, 
and the Implications for Sentencing’ (2012) 36 Criminal Law Journal 159. 
123  Daniel S Nagin, Francis T Cullen and Cheryl L Jonson, ‘Imprisonment and Reoffending’ (2009) 38 
Crime & Justice 115, 145. The main studies are summarised in: Don Weatherburn, Sumitra Vignaendra 
and Andrew McGrath, ‘The Specific Deterrent Effect of Custodial Penalties on Juvenile Reoffending’ 
(2009) 132 Crime and Justice Bulletin; Donald Ritchie, ‘Does Imprisonment Deter? A Review of the 
Evidence’ (Report, Sentencing Advisory Council, 2011). 
124  Nagin, Cullen and Jonson, above n 123, 144–5. 
125  Ibid 145–54. 
126  Ibid 154–5. 
127  Ibid. 
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The last category included a study based on clemency granted to over 20 000 
prisoners in Italy in 2006. A condition of release was that if those who were 
released reoffended within five years they would be required to serve the 
remaining (residual) sentence plus the sentence for the new offence. It was noted 
that there was a 1.24 per cent reduction in reoffending for each month of the 
residual sentence. This observation can be explained on the basis that the threat 
of future imprisonment discouraged reoffending. However, it was also noted that 
offenders who had served longer sentences prior to being released had higher 
rates of reoffending, supporting the view that longer prison terms reduce the 
capacity for future imprisonment to shape behaviour.128 
Nagin et al suggest that offenders who are sentenced to imprisonment do not 
have a lower rate of recidivism than those who receive a non-custodial penalty 
and, in fact, that some studies show that the rate of recidivism among offenders 
sentenced to imprisonment to be higher. They conclude that: 
Taken as a whole, it is our judgment that the experimental studies point more 
toward a criminogenic [that is, the possible corrupting effects of punishment] 
rather than preventive effect of custodial sanctions. The evidence for this 
conclusion, however, is weak because it is based on only a small number of 
studies, and many of the point estimates are not statistically significant.129 
The review suggests that not only do longer jail terms not deter, but neither 
do tougher jail conditions. Studies also show that offenders who are sentenced to 
maximum security prisons as opposed to minimum security conditions do not 
reoffend less.130 
These general findings are supported by a more recent experimental study by 
Donald Green and Daniel Winik.131 They observed the reoffending of 1003 
offenders who were initially sentenced for drug-related offences between June 
2002 and May 2003 by a number of different judges whose sentencing 
approaches varied significantly (some were described as ‘punitive’, others as 
‘lenient’), resulting in differing terms of imprisonment and probation. The study 
concluded that neither the length of imprisonment nor probation had an effect on 
the rate of reoffending during the four year follow-up period.132 
Accordingly, the weight of evidence supports the view that subjecting 
offenders to harsh punishment is unlikely to increase the prospect that they will 
become law-abiding citizens in the future. 
It seems that specific deterrence embedded in an earlier sanction would not 
have reduced the likelihood of reoffending. It follows that there is no basis for 
treating offenders sentenced for multiple offences at the same time differently 
from offenders sentenced consecutively. Thus, the fact that offenders who are 
sentenced for multiple offences at the same time have been denied the specific 
                                                 
128  Ibid 155. 
129  Ibid 145. 
130  Ibid 124. 
131  Donald P Green and Daniel Winik, ‘Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects of 
Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders’ (2010) 48 Criminology 357. 
132  Ibid. 
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deterrent aspect of an earlier sanction cannot justify their overall penalty being 
reduced on account of the totality principle. 
 
C    Rehabilitation Probably Does Work 
The evidence about rehabilitation is less conclusive but more promising – on 
balance, it seems that specific forms of intervention may be able to reduce 
recidivism. The effectiveness of rehabilitation in reducing repeat offending has 
been the subject of a large number of studies. Following extensive research 
conducted between 1960 and 1974, Robert Martinson, in an influential paper, 
concluded that empirical studies had not established that any rehabilitative 
programs had worked in reducing recidivism.133 The Panel of the National 
Research Council in the United States, several years after this work, also noted 
that there were no significant differences between the subsequent recidivism rates 
of offenders regardless of the form of punishment. As they stated,’[t]his suggests 
that neither rehabilitative nor criminogenic effects operate very strongly’.134 
In recent years, the research has taken on a more optimistic note. Most 
Australian jurisdictions have devoted increasing resources to rehabilitation over 
the past decade. The most recent wide-ranging Australian study regarding the 
effectiveness of rehabilitation is a report by Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and 
Rick Sarre for the Australian Institute of Criminology, published in 2011.135 The 
report focused on changes and improvements to prison based correction 
rehabilitation programs in the custodial environment since 2004, when the 
previous report was issued.136 
The report by Heseltine et al, while unable to evaluate the effectiveness of 
rehabilitation programs currently operating in Australian prisons, summarised 
recent studies into the effectiveness of certain rehabilitation programs. It noted 
that while there were mixed results, there were some programs that reported 
positive outcomes. 
This was especially the case in relation to sexual offender programs, where 
some studies showed that the recidivism rate of offenders completing the 
program was less than half of that of other offenders.137 The results of programs 
directed towards violent offenders were less positive, but a wide-ranging review 
of studies focusing on United Kingdom programs noted that reductions in 
offending for violent offences by around seven to eight per cent had occurred. 
Overseas studies reported some success with anger management programs, but 
                                                 
133  R M Martinson, ‘What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform’ (1974) 35 Public Interest 
22, 25. 
134  Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin (eds), Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating 
the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates (National Academy of Sciences, 1978) 66. 
135  Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and Rick Sarre, ‘Prison-Based Offender Rehabilitation Programs: The 
2009 National Picture in Australia’ (Report, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011) 
<http://www.aic.gov.au/ 
 documents/5/6/4/%7B564B2ECA-4433-4E9B-B4BA-29BD59071E81%7Drpp112.pdf>. 
136  Ibid 2. 
137  Ibid 14. 
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an Australian study (of a shorter 20 hour program) showed no positive outcomes 
related to program completion. There is no cogent evidence supporting the 
effectiveness of domestic violence or victim awareness programs. However, drug 
and alcohol programs have been shown to be effective at reducing substance 
abuse and reoffending.138 
This assessment is consistent with the findings of Mitchell, Wilson and 
MacKenzie who undertook a major analysis of studies into the effectiveness of 
drug treatment programs in prison.139 The studies they focused on related to drug 
users and compared reoffending patterns of offenders who completed a drug 
rehabilitation program with those who did not complete a program, or completed 
only a minimum program between the years 1980 and 2004. They analysed 66 
studies in total. The report concluded that ‘[o]verall, this meta-analytic synthesis 
of evaluations of incarceration based drug treatment programs found that such 
programs are modestly effective in reducing recidivism.’140 
Moreover, it was noted that programs that dealt with the multiple problems of 
drug users (termed therapeutic communities) were the most successful, whereas 
there was no evidence to support good outcomes associated with ‘boot camp’ 
programs.141 
Thus, there is some support for the view that criminal punishment can assist 
to reform certain categories of offenders; although there is no firm evidence 
showing that it cannot work for the majority of offenders. 
Therefore, offenders who have not been subject to the rehabilitative aspects 
of sentencing may indeed be at a disadvantage compared with those who have 
previously been sentenced. Accordingly, it can be tenably asserted that offenders 
who are sentenced for multiple offences are disadvantaged compared to those 
sentenced consecutively.  
 
D    Implications for Totality 
The current rationales for totality are flawed. The only tenable basis for 
conferring a sentencing discount to offenders who are sentenced for more than 
one offence is that they were deprived of the opportunity for internal attitudinal 
reform that would probably have been a part of the sentence if they were 
sentenced for one offence initially. Being deprived of this opportunity potentially 
increases their likelihood of reoffending, hence, they are less culpable than 
                                                 
138  Ibid 27. 
139  Ojmarrh Mitchell, David B Wilson and Doris L MacKenzie, ‘The Effectiveness of Incarceration-Based 
Drug Treatment on Criminal Behaviour (Systematic Review, The Campbell Collaboration, 18 September 
2006) <www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/98/>. 
140  Ibid 17. 
141  Ibid. 
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offenders who reoffend consecutively, despite being subjected to the 
rehabilitative aspects of the sentencing process.142 
While this provides a justification for the totality principle, it entails that 
there should be a number of changes to its application.  
First, it should be irrelevant whether the offences are of a similar nature – the 
same discount should apply for similar or different offence types. The length of 
time between offences should not be an important consideration. However, where 
an offender has already been subjected to a sentence and reoffends while on 
parole, the application of the totality principle is greatly diluted, given that he or 
she has been subjected to a significant part of the rehabilitative aspect of the 
sanction and has still reoffended. 
The extent of the discount remains obscure given that the impact of 
rehabilitation is speculative and the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing 
does not readily permit numerical computations. However, consistent with 
current sentencing orthodoxy, it would seem that totality should not significantly 
reduce the total effective sentence. While rehabilitation is an established 
sentencing consideration, it is not a particularly important variable. There are 
dozens of other mitigating and aggravating considerations143 and, in principle, 
rehabilitation is seemingly no more powerful than most others. This statement 
cannot be conclusively proven because the instinctive synthesis approach to 
sentencing does not generally permit mathematical comparisons to be made of 
the respective importance of sentencing considerations.144 However, this 
uncertainty cuts both ways – unless there is a demonstrable reason to assert that 
rehabilitation is a cardinal consideration, the default position is that it ranks 
approximately equal to other established sentencing variables. In light of this, to 
then suggest that totality should operate generally to greatly reduce penalties is 
flawed because it is a case of a stream rising higher than its source. 
 
V    CONCLUSION 
Totality is a well-established sentencing principle. The circumstances in 
which it applies are also relatively well settled, although there remains some 
                                                 
142  The argument for a discount in these circumstances applies with less force in relation to offenders who 
have previously been sentenced and have again reoffended. Where an offender has been, for example, 
convicted and sentenced 10 years earlier and is now being sentenced for multiple offences, the first 
sentence obviously did not succeed in totally rehabilitating the offender. However, he or she is not 
thereafter precluded from attempts at rehabilitation by other sentences and hence a totality discount is still 
appropriate in these circumstances.  
143  Joanna Shapland identified 229 factors: J Shapland, Between Conviction and Sentence: The Process of 
Mitigation (Routledge, 1981) 55; Roger Douglas identified 292 relevant sentencing factors: R Douglas, 
Guilty Your Worship: A Study of Victoria’s Magistrates’ Courts (La Trobe University, 1980). 
144  There are, in fact, two sentencing considerations that carry quantifiable reductions. They are pleading 
guilty (generally up to 25 per cent) and assisting authorities (generally up to 50 per cent). Both of these 
reductions are obviously considerable. Notably, rehabilitation is not treated similarly which suggests it is 
not as weighty as these considerations. For a further discussion regarding the operation of these 
mitigating factors, see Bagaric and Edney, above n 72. 
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uncertainty regarding its operation when parole is violated and its application to 
offences of a completely different nature. However, the manner in which it 
applies, in the form of the size of the sentence reduction that it should confer, is 
obscure. This is a matter of ongoing concern. It is also unclear at what point the 
offending is so serious that the principle of totality ceases to have a meaningful 
operation. Crushing sentences are appropriate in some circumstances, however, 
they have not been defined with any degree of precision. 
Thus, aspects of totality are obscure, leading to impressions of arbitrariness. 
This is regrettable given that imprisonment is the harshest penalty that the 
community imposes on individuals. The totality principle will remain unclear 
because the underpinning rationales are themselves uncertain.  
While proportionality is relatively coherent and grounded, numerous 
definitional and pragmatic aspects remain unresolved, meaning that it is 
incapable of providing clear guidance regarding the appropriate sentence. 
Mercy is the most unstable rationale because it has no role in a system of law 
given that it is principally based on stimulating the ‘feelings’ as opposed to 
engaging with the rationality of the sentencer. Moreover, the weight mercy 
should be accorded in the sentencing calculus is indeterminate. 
The most tenable justification for the principle of totality stems from the goal 
of rehabilitation. Offenders who are sentenced for multiple offences and did not 
undergo the rehabilitative effect of an earlier sentence are disadvantaged 
compared to those who had the opportunity to rehabilitate from an early 
sentence, but failed to do so. Hence, totality is a justifiable principle, but the 
extent to which it moderates sentencing is probably overstated. The weight that 
any considerations relating to rehabilitation should be accorded in the sentencing 
determination is modest given the lack of empirical clarity regarding its 
effectiveness – it seems, at this point, to work for some offenders but not all and, 
of course, it is not possible to determine which offenders would have benefited 
from a rehabilitative intervention and which would not. However, it does follow 
from this rationale that the totality principle is not contingent upon the offences 
being of a similar nature nor having being committed over a short timeframe. 
Further developments in totality theory and application are contingent upon a 
fuller understanding of the principle of proportionality and, in particular, whether 
longer sentences are disproportionately harsher than their linear increase would 
suggest. If this is the case, potentially, there is a basis for strong application of 
the totality principle, such that offenders who are sentenced for multiple offences 
are entitled to a significant sentence reduction, as is currently the situation. 
However, this is undermined significantly by a clear minded assessment of the 
other limb of the proportionality thesis – the level of harm caused by a number of 
criminal acts is the same, whether it is by the one offender or multiple offenders. 
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FIRST-TIME OFFENDER, PRODUCTIVE OFFENDER, 
OFFENDER WITH DEPENDENTS: WHY THE PROFILE OF 
OFFENDERS (SOMETIMES) MATTERS IN SENTENCING 
Mirko Bagaric* & Theo Alexander** 
ABSTRACT 
Should a single mother of four young children who commits theft 
be sentenced to a lesser sanction than a woman who commits the 
same crime but has no dependents?  Should a billionaire 
philanthropist be sentenced to a lesser penalty than the average 
citizen for assaulting a random bystander?  Should a first-time thief 
receive a lighter sanction than a career thief for the same theft?  
The relevance of an offender’s profile to sentencing is unclear and is 
one of the most under-researched and least coherent areas of 
sentencing law.  Intuitively, there is some appeal in treating 
offenders without a criminal record, those who have made a positive 
contribution to society, or who have dependents more leniently than 
other offenders.  However, to allow these considerations to mitigate 
penalty potentially licenses offenders to commit crime and 
decouples the sanction from the severity of the offense, thereby 
undermining the proportionality principle.  This article analyzes the 
relevance that an offender’s profile should have in sentencing.  We 
conclude that a lack of prior convictions should generally reduce 
penalty because the empirical data shows that, in relation to most 
offenses, first-time offenders are less likely to reoffend than 
recidivist offenders.  The situation is more complex in relation to 
offenders who have made worthy social contributions.  They should 
not be given sentencing credit for past achievements given that past 
good acts have no relevance to the proper objectives of sentencing 
and it is normally not tenable, even in a crude sense, to make an 
informed assessment of an individual’s overall societal contribution.  
However, offenders should be accorded a sentencing reduction if 
they have financial or physical dependents and if imprisoning them 
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is likely to cause harm to their dependents.  Conferring a 
sentencing discount to first-time offenders and those with 
dependents does not license them to commit crime or unjustifiably 
encroach on the proportionality principle.  Rather, it recognizes the 
different layers of the legal system and the reality that sentencing 
law should not reflexively overwhelm broader maxims of justice, 
including the principle that innocent people should not suffer.  This 
article argues that fundamental legislative reform is necessary to 
properly reflect the role that the profile of offenders should have in 
the sentencing regime. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The impact that the past criminal history and achievements of 
offenders and their family ties should have on sentencing outcomes 
is one of the most unsettled and doctrinally complex areas of 
sentencing law.  The main overarching guiding sentencing principle 
is the proportionality doctrine, which in its most basic form requires 
that the punishment should fit the crime.1  Thus, a key focus of the 
sentencing inquiry is on the harshness of the sanction and the 
seriousness of the offense.2  The offender’s profile, at least 
ostensibly, stands outside this perspective. 
However, on closer analysis considerations personal to the 
offender are inextricably bound up in the sentencing inquiry.  Thus, 
in most sentencing systems the key consideration affecting the 
penalty (apart from the circumstances of the offense) is the prior 
criminal history of the offender.3  Moreover, the proportionality 
principle does not exhaust the range of considerations that properly 
inform the correct sentence and its duration.  Other sentencing 
considerations, such as rehabilitation, may be capable of 
accommodating factors relating to the offender into the sentencing 
inquiry. 
In this article, we examine the relevance that three 
considerations that relate to the profile of many offenders should 
have in the sentencing calculus: the absence of prior convictions;   
the offender’s past positive good acts; and the offender’s family ties, 
 
1 See infra Part II. 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 26. 
3 See Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, in 22 
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 303, 304 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997).  The 
“recidivist premium” extends beyond the common law world to countries such as China, 
Ghana, Israel, and Korea.  See id. at 309; JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT 
OFFENDERS: EXPLORING COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 115–16 (2008). 
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particularly where other individuals are financially or physically 
dependent on the offender. 
The complexity of the inquiry regarding the profile of the offender 
has resulted in an incoherent and unsatisfactory jurisprudence.  
The general trend of the sentencing landscape is that the absence of 
prior convictions is a mitigating sentencing consideration, except in 
relation to certain defined offenses.4  However, there has been no 
considered attempt by the courts to justify the rationale for this 
discount, nor to identify the circumstances in which the sentencing 
reduction does not apply.  Past good acts do not normally mitigate 
penalty.5  Family ties can, in some situations, mitigate penalty, but 
these circumstances (on their face) are rare.6 
We conclude that the current state of the law in this area is 
fundamentally normatively and empirically flawed.  The absence of 
prior convictions should mitigate more significantly than is 
currently the case, given that the empirical data shows that in 
relation to most offense types, first offenders are statistically less 
likely to reoffend than recidivists.  Offenders who have made 
significant social contributions should not receive a discount.  
However, offenders who have dependents should be treated more 
leniently than other offenders.  The interests of the dependents 
should not be totally ignored in the sentencing calculus.  They are 
innocent parties whose flourishing will necessarily be diminished by 
imprisonment of the offender.  The objectives of sentencing law are 
important, but sentencing law does not overwhelm, and is not 
superior to, other legal imperatives such as the prohibition against 
punishing the innocent.  The interest of blameless dependents 
should not be totally subordinated to the need to thoroughly punish 
offenders.  First-time offenders and offenders with financial or 
physical dependents should receive a penalty reduction in the order 
of twenty-five percent.  For considerations of clarity, the nature and 
quantum of the penalty adjustments in this article are examined 
from the perspective of a reduction to a term of imprisonment.  
However, in principle, in relation to proposed short terms of 
imprisonment, the mitigation that should be provided to first-time 
offenders and those with defendants could result in a penalty 
 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 52–54, 85, 106–13. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 55–59; AMY BARON-EVANS & JENNIFER NILES 
COFFIN, NO MORE MATH WITHOUT SUBTRACTION: DECONSTRUCTING THE GUIDELINES’ 
PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON MITIGATING FACTORS 127–28 (2011), available at http:// 
www.fd.org/pdf_lib/WS2011_06/Litigating_Mitigating_Factors.pdf. 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 65–67, 120–21, 128. 
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substitution, such that a term of imprisonment is avoided 
altogether in favor of, say, probation or a fine. 
The manner in which the profile of the offender should be 
accommodated in the sentencing calculus is discussed in the context 
of the sentencing systems operating in the United States and 
Australia.  The sentencing regimes in these jurisdictions have many 
commonalities (principally because they have the same overarching 
goals in the form of community protection, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation),7 however, the means invoked to pursue these 
objectives are strikingly different.8  The contrasting manner in 
which these respective sentencing systems deal with an offender’s 
profile illustrates possible approaches to the issue.  It is argued, 
however, that ultimately both sentencing systems are flawed when 
it comes to incorporating the profile of offenders into sentencing 
determinations. 
In Part II of this article, we examine the manner in which 
sentencing law currently deals with the offender’s profile.  The 
remaining part of the article makes reform recommendations 
regarding the manner in which the profile of the offender should be 
factored into the sentencing inquiry.  Part III argues that first 
offenders should receive a discount for all offense types, with the 
possible exception of property offenses.  This is followed in Part IV 
by an explanation of the reasons that past good acts should not 
mitigate penalty.  In Part V, we argue that offender dependency 
should reduce penalty.  This is a particularly complex, multilayered 
issue which requires consideration of a number of multidisciplinary 
principles and ideals, including the right to a family, the 
proscription against punishing the innocent, and the doctrine of 
double effect.  Part VI of the paper provides an overview of the main 
rationales of sentencing and notes that implementation of the 
recommendations will not undermine any of the key sentencing 
objectives so long as the recidivist premium for serious sexual and 
violent offenders is maintained even in relation to offenders with 
 
7 See Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, ¶ 3 (Austl.) (noting the purposes of 
punishment in Australia); Katelyn Carr, Comment, An Argument Against Using General 
Deterrence as a Factor in Criminal Sentencing, 44 CUMB. L. REV. 249, 280 (2013/2014) 
(“Currently, the United States Sentencing Guidelines embrace not one, but four basic 
purposes of punishment: rehabilitation, incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence.”).  For a 
discussion of the capacity of punishment to achieve these objectives, see Mirko Bagaric, From 
Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: Reducing the Rate of Imprisonment and Crime 
While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 349, 354 (2014). 
8 See infra Part II. 
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dependents.9  The concluding remarks, in Part VII, set out the 
reforms that should occur to accommodate the analysis in this 
article. 
II.  THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A.  The United States 
The United States does not have uniform sentencing laws or 
procedures.  Each state and the federal jurisdiction have their own 
sentencing system.10  The federal sentencing regime in particular is 
important given that approximately ten percent of all inmates have 
been sentenced for violating federal criminal laws11 and, as has 
been noted by Douglas A. Berman and Stephanos Bibas, this system 
“profoundly shapes American criminal justice.”12  There are a 
number of key similarities that mark sentencing law throughout the 
United States, notwithstanding the uniqueness of each sentencing 
system. 
A defining feature of sentencing in the United States is the heavy 
reliance on standard or fixed penalties.  Most jurisdictions in the 
United States have some form of standard or mandatory penalty 
provisions.13  These penalties are normally set out in grids which 
utilize two main variables in arriving at the set penalty: offense 
seriousness and criminal history.14  The penalties prescribed in the 
grids are generally severe and this has contributed to a steep 
increase in prison numbers over the past two decades.15  Currently, 
more than two million Americans are incarcerated.16  This equates 
 
9 Although, as is discussed infra, the loading that is currently accorded for prior offending 
should be significantly diminished.   
10 See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006); see also Ronald F. Wright, Federal or State? Sorting as a Sentencing 
Choice, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2006, at 16 (discussing the differences between the state and 
federal sentencing systems). 
11 See infra note 16. 
12 Berman & Bibas, supra note 10, at 40. 
13 See CTR. FOR LAW AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 45 (2012) available at www.usf 
ca.edu/law/docs/criminalsentencing. 
14 See, e.g., FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2013). 
15 See Charlie Savage, Dept. of Justice Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 2013, at A1 (attributing the dramatic increase in the federal prison population to 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses). 
16 See LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 243936, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, 
at 3 (2013).  The exact number of prisoners is 2,228,400.  Id.  More than 200,000 inmates are 
in federal prisons.  Total U.S. Correctional Population Declined in 2012 for Fourth Year, 
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to an imprisonment rate of over 900 people per 100,000 adults,17 
and sets the United States apart from all other nations on the basis 
that it imprisons more of its citizens than any other country.18 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines” or “Guidelines”) are perhaps the best known standard 
penalty laws and are typical of the manner in which such 
sentencing provisions operate.19  The Guidelines adopt two key 
variables which operate to determine the penalty level, which is 
prescribed in the form of a range.  The variables are offense severity 
and an offender’s criminal history.20 
The penalty levels and ranges are precisely designated.  There are 
forty-three levels in total, with the penalty range gradually 
increasing from the bottom level (one)21 to the highest level (forty-
three).22  The incremental increase in the ranges is illustrated by 
the fact that the top of the range in one level overlaps with the 
bottom of the range in the next level.23  The objective of the 
Guidelines is to further the central objectives of sentencing, in the 
form of “deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and 
rehabilitation.”24  In addition to this, the Guidelines seek to promote 
the principle of proportionality,25 which contends that the harshness 
of the sanction should be matched by gravity of the crime.26 
The principle of proportionality is, however, compromised by the 
fact that the offender’s criminal history has a cardinal impact in 
determining the appropriate penalty range.  Each offense has six 
different penalty ranges correlating with designated criminal 
history points,27 which range from one to thirteen or more.28  The 
 
BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpus12pr 
.cfm. 
17 See GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 16, at 2. 
18 See Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
2008, at A1. 
19 The Guidelines are promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission and issued 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).  FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1.  For analysis 
and criticism of the Guidelines, see BARON-EVANS & COFFIN, supra note 5. 
20 See FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A. 
21 Correlating to zero to six months imprisonment.  See id. 
22 Correlating to life imprisonment.  See id. 
23 See id. § 1A1.4(h). 
24 Id. § 1A1.2. 
25 Id. § 1A1.3. 
26 JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT: A CRITICAL 
INVESTIGATION 12 (2004). 
27 Criminal history points are principally determined by reference to the seriousness of the 
past offending and the time period since the past offenses.  See FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2(e). 
28 See id. § 5A. 
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first criminal history category incorporates zero to one criminal 
history points, while the sixth (and highest) category applies for 
thirteen or more criminal history points.29  The designated penalty 
level for the same offense varies markedly depending on an 
offender’s criminal history, so much so that the average penalty 
difference between a first offender and serious recidivist is 
approximately double.30  By way of example, the presumptive 
penalty for an offense at level twenty for an offender with a criminal 
history score of I is thirty-three to forty-one months.31  This 
escalates to seventy to eighty-seven months for an offender who 
commits the same offense but has a criminal history score of VI.32 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that these Guidelines are 
advisory, instead of mandatory.33  Despite this, the courts are still 
required to take the Guidelines into account in sentencing 
offenders.34  As noted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission: “An 
advisory guideline . . . continues to promote certainty and 
predictability in sentencing, thereby enabling the parties to better 
anticipate the likely sentence based in the individualized facts of 
the case.”35  It is perhaps for reasons associated with this that more 
than half of federal sentences continue to be imposed within the 
range stipulated in the Guidelines.36 
As noted above, the main variables that determine the 
appropriate advisory penalty range are the seriousness of the 
offense and the prior criminal history of the offender; however these 
considerations are not exhaustive.  There are also a large number of 
circumstances that are set out in the Guidelines which allow a court 
to deviate from the prescribed sentencing range.37  These come in 
two forms: “departures” and “adjustments.”  Departures, strictly 
speaking, are designated aggravating and mitigating considerations 
prescribed in Chapter Five, Part K of the Guidelines and include 
factors such as assisting authorities and diminished capacity.38  
 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
34 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). 
35 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A2. 
36 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
tbl.N (2010); Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior 
Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160 (2010). 
37 See FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3A1.1–.5, 3B1.1–.5, 3C1.1–.4, 3E1.1, 
4A1.1, 4A1.3, 4B1.1, 4B1.3–.5, 5H1.1, 5H1.3–.4, 5H1.7–.9, 5H1.11, 5K1.1, 5K2.0–.24. 
38 Id. §§ 5K1.1, 5K2.13. 
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Departures in fact also refer to atypical or unusual cases where the 
normal operation of an aggravating or mitigating factor would have 
an unwarranted result.39  Adjustments are aggravating and 
mitigating factors which, if applicable, result in a reduction or 
increase in penalty by a set amount.40  The Guidelines also 
expressly exclude certain considerations as relevant to penalty, such 
as race, religion, and economic status.41 
There are over forty aggravating and mitigating considerations 
set in the Guidelines, with the number of aggravating factors 
exceeding mitigating factors by a ratio of approximately two to 
one.42  The fact that there are more aggravating than mitigating 
considerations is in keeping with the approach in other states.43 
For the purpose of this article, the most important category of 
mitigation in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is matters personal 
to the offender.  To this end, the Guidelines stipulate that the 
following factors can reduce a penalty: 
 prior clean record (i.e. “aberrant behavior”),44 except in 
relation to designated offenses, which are discussed 
further below,45 and 
 military service (“[if it] is present to an unusual degree 
and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered 
by the guidelines”).46 
The Guidelines also state that several factors personal to the 
offender cannot reduce penalty.  They are: 
 employment record;47 
 family ties and responsibilities;48 
 
39 See id. § 1A1.4(b). 
40 See, e.g., id. §§ 3A1.1–.5, 3B1.1–.5, 3C1.1–.4, 3E1.1. 
41 Id. §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.4–.6, 5H1.10–.12, 5K1.2, 5K2.0(d). 
42 Id. §§ 3A1.1–.5, 3B1.1–.5, 3C1.1–.4, 3E1.1, 4A1.1, 4B1.1, 4B1.3–.5, 5H1.1, 5H1.3–.4, 
5H1.11, 5K1.1, 5K2.1–.21, 5K2.24. 
43 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88  B.U. 
L. REV. 1109, 1128–29 (2008). 
44 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.20.  This will only be satisfied if “the 
defendant committed a single criminal occurrence or single criminal transaction that (1) was 
committed without significant planning; (2) was of limited duration; and (3) represents a 
marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life.”  Id. § 5K2.20(b). 
45 Id. § 5K2.20(c); see also BARON-EVANS & COFFIN, supra note 5, at 185–96 (discussing the 
background of the aberrant behavior provision).  While over seventy-four percent of judges 
stated that aberrant behavior is “ordinarily relevant” to whether a penalty should be reduced, 
in 2010, this consideration was cited in only 1.7% of cases in which a below-Guideline penalty 
was imposed.  Id. at 194. 
46 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11. 
47 Id. § 5H1.5; see also BARON-EVANS & COFFIN, supra note 5, at 106–09 (arguing that 
employment record should be mitigatory). 
48 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6; see also BARON-EVANS & COFFIN, supra 
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 civic, charitable, or public service or employment-related 
contributions;49 and 
 record of prior good works.50 
The appropriateness of the above Guidelines was reconsidered in 
2010 when the U.S. Sentencing Commission altered military service 
from being an irrelevant to a relevant factor but preserved the 
status of the other considerations detailed above as being normally 
irrelevant to penalty.51 
Thus, on their face the Guidelines prescribe that the absence of 
prior convictions can mitigate penalty.52  The policy statement 
greatly attenuates the circumstances where aberrant conduct 
mitigates penalty.  It provides: 
 (a) IN GENERAL.—Except where a defendant is convicted 
of an offense involving a minor victim under section 1201, an 
offense under section 1591, or an offense under chapter 71, 
109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United States Code, a 
downward departure may be warranted in an exceptional 
case if (1) the defendant’s criminal conduct meets the 
requirements of subsection (b); and (2) the departure is not 
prohibited under subsection (c). 
 (b) REQUIREMENTS.—The court may depart downward 
under this policy statement only if the defendant committed 
a single criminal occurrence or single criminal transaction 
that (1) was committed without significant planning; (2) was 
of limited duration; and (3) represents a marked deviation by 
the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life. 
 (c) PROHIBITIONS BASED ON THE PRESENCE OF 
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.—The court may not depart 
downward pursuant to this policy statement if any of the 
following circumstances are present: 
 (1) The offense involved serious bodily injury or death. 
 (2) The defendant discharged a firearm or otherwise used 
a firearm or a dangerous weapon. 
 (3) The instant offense of conviction is a serious drug 
 
note 5, at 109–17 (arguing that family ties and responsibilities should be mitigatory). 
49 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11; see also BARONS-EVANS & COFFIN, 
supra note 5, at 127–39 (discussing the background of this provision). 
50 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11; see also BARON-EVANS & COFFIN, 
supra note 5, at 127–39 (discussing the background of this provision). 
51 See FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11; BARON-EVANS & COFFIN, supra 
note 5, at 128–35 (discussing the backdrop to these changes). 
52 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.20. 
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trafficking offense. 
 (4) The defendant has either of the following: (A) more 
than one criminal history point, as determined under 
Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood) 
before application of subsection (b) of § 4A1.3 (Departures 
Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category); or (B) a 
prior federal or state felony conviction, or any other 
significant prior criminal behavior, regardless of whether the 
conviction or significant prior criminal behavior is countable 
under Chapter Four.53 
The impact of this is to limit the discount to first offenders who 
have not committed an offense against a minor, or an offense that 
involves serious harm to another person, or a firearm or a serious 
drug offense.54 
The Guidelines also state that prior good acts and family 
connections (including the dependency of others) are irrelevant to 
sentence.55  While the Guidelines stipulate that the latter two 
factors should not reduce penalty, as noted above, post-Booker this 
is not an obligatory stipulation and judges can mitigate penalty for 
these reasons.56  Further, the Guidelines expressly state: “The 
Commission recognizes that there may be other grounds for 
departure that are not mentioned; it also believes there may be 
cases in which a departure outside suggested levels is warranted.  
In its view, however, such cases will be highly infrequent.”57 
And in fact, in some instances, courts have invoked good acts as a 
basis for penalty reduction58—although at times the mitigating bar 
has been elevated to require the acts to be extraordinarily good.59 
Several state legislative schemes also expressly provide that good 
acts should mitigate.  These typically state that the “character and 
attitudes” of an offender are mitigating.  For example, in Idaho it is 
stipulated that where “[t]he character and attitudes of the 
defendant indicate that the commission of another crime is 
 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. §§ 5H1.6, 5H1.11. 
56 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364–65 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
57 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(b). 
58 See United States v. Nowak, No. 05-CR-205, 2007 WL 528194, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 15, 
2007); United States v. Arthur, No. 04-CR-122, 2006 WL 3857491, at *10 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 22, 
2006); United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04-CR-30-PS, 2005 WL 300073, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 
2005); Hessick, supra note 43, at 1123–24. 
59 See United States v. Repking, 467 F.3d 1091, 1095–96 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); 
United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 915 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Strange, 370 F. 
Supp. 2d 644, 649 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Hessick, supra note 43, at 1124. 
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unlikely,”60 this weighs against a sentence of imprisonment.61  More 
broadly, in North Carolina it is prescribed that if an offender “has 
been a person of good character or has had a good reputation in the 
community” then this is a mitigating factor.62 
Good acts are also relevant to mitigation in capital cases.63  
However this approach cannot be universalized to the sentencing 
for other offenses given that the individualized nature of sentencing 
in this domain stems from the Eighth Amendment.64 
In relation to family ties, section 5H1.6 of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines states: “In sentencing a defendant convicted of an 
offense other than an offense described in the following paragraph, 
family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in 
determining whether a departure may be warranted.”65 
The commentary to this provision elaborates on the 
circumstances when family obligations may warrant a departure.  
The commentary provides: 
Circumstances to Consider.— 
 (A) In General.—In determining whether a departure is 
warranted under this policy statement, the court shall 
consider the following non-exhaustive list of circumstances: 
 (i) The seriousness of the offense. 
 (ii) The involvement in the offense, if any, of members of 
the defendant’s family. 
 (iii) The danger, if any, to members of the defendant’s 
family as a result of the offense. 
 (B) Departures Based on Loss of Caretaking or Financial 
Support.—A departure under this policy statement based on 
the loss of caretaking or financial support of the defendant’s 
family requires, in addition to the court’s consideration of the 
non-exhaustive list of circumstances in subdivision (A), the 
presence of the following circumstances: 
 (i) The defendant’s service of a sentence within the 
applicable guideline range will cause a substantial, direct, 
and specific loss of essential caretaking, or essential 
 
60 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2521(2)(i) (West 2014). 
61 Id.; see also Hessick, supra note 43, at 1117–18 & n.31 (stating that the other state 
legislative schemes that accord weight to good character include Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, North Dakota, and New Jersey). 
62 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e)(12) (2014). 
63 Hessick, supra note 43, at 1118. 
64 Id. at 1127. 
65 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (2013) (emphasis added). 
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financial support, to the defendant’s family. 
 (ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support 
substantially exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to 
incarceration for a similarly situated defendant.  For 
example, the fact that the defendant’s family might incur 
some degree of financial hardship or suffer to some extent 
from the absence of a parent through incarceration is not in 
itself sufficient as a basis for departure because such 
hardship or suffering is of a sort ordinarily incident to 
incarceration. 
 (iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is one for 
which no effective remedial or ameliorative programs 
reasonably are available, making the defendant’s caretaking 
or financial support irreplaceable to the defendant’s family. 
 (iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of 
caretaking or financial support.66 
Despite the narrow framework regarding the circumstances when 
family ties should reduce a sentence, the courts have, post-Booker, 
regularly invoked family ties and responsibility as a basis for 
imposing a sentence below the Guideline range—in fact, this is the 
most commonly employed mitigating factor in Chapter 5 of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual for reducing penalty.67 
An example of family obligations reducing a sentence is the 
decision in United States v. Schroeder68 where the court stated that 
the sentencing court’s decision to ignore the illness of an adopted 
child as being relevant to sentence was an error.69  The offender in 
this case was a carer for his adopted daughter who was prone to 
illness as a result of having a compromised immune system.70  In 
reaching this decision, the court noted that in order for such family 
ties and responsibilities to reduce penalty below the Guideline level 
the situation must be extraordinary.  The court stated: 
 A defendant’s extraordinary family circumstances can 
constitute a legitimate basis for imposing a below-guide-lines 
sentence.  Sentencing Guideline 5H1.6 provides that “family 
ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in 
 
66 Id. § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1. 
67 BARON-EVANS & COFFIN, supra note 5, at 115.  In the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 family 
ties were involved in about twelve percent of cases in order to reduce penalty below the 
Guideline level.  Id. 
68 United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2008). 
69 See id. at 756. 
70 Id. at 750–51. 
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determining whether a departure may be warranted,” but a 
district court may impose a below-guidelines sentence “once 
it finds that a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities . . . 
are so unusual that they may be characterized as 
extraordinary.”  
 . . . . 
 The court’s observation that Schroeder’s criminal conduct 
was the cause of the alleged hardship to his daughter is an 
obvious and not dispositive one, since the culpability of a 
defendant who appears for sentencing is a given.  When a 
defendant presents an argument for a lower sentence based 
on extraordinary family circumstances, the relevant inquiry 
is the effect of the defendant’s absence on his family 
members.  The defendant’s responsibility for the adverse 
effects of his incarceration on his family is not the 
determinative issue.  If it were, there would never be an 
occasion on which the court would be justified in invoking 
family circumstances to impose a below-guide-lines sentence.  
The court was required to consider Schroeder’s family 
circumstances argument and provide an adequate analysis of 
how much weight, if any, it should command.  The fact that 
the consequences of incarceration are attributable to his own 
misconduct may be a factor in the analysis but it is not the 
sole factor nor is it dispositive.  Thus, on remand the court 
should consider whether Schroeder’s family circumstances 
are a mitigating factor.71 
Family considerations can also be mitigating pursuant to some 
state sentencing statutes.72  The most direct and clear expression of 
this is found in North Carolina, where section 15A-1340.16(e)(17) of 
the General Statutes of North Carolina states a mitigating factor 
 
71 Id. at 755–56 (quoting United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 906 (7th Cir. 1994)) (citing 
United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992)); see United States v. Tiller, 549 F. 
App’x 795, 800 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Gutierrez-Sierra, 513 F. App’x 767, 770 
(10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Loya-Castillo, 498 F. App’x 799, 802 (10th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Barnes, 660 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. O’Doherty, 643 
F.3d 209, 215 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Runyan, 639 F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Gary, 613 F.3d 706, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pape, 601 F.3d 
743, 747 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1148 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Peña, 930 F.2d 
1486, 1495 (10th Cir. 1991).  For a strict application of the extraordinary circumstances test, 
see United States v. Culbertson, 406 F. App’x 56, 58–59 (7th Cir. 2010), and Gary, 613 F.3d at 
709–11. 
72 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(10) (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-
04(11) (2013). 
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as: “[t]he defendant supports the defendant’s family.”73 
B.  Australia 
Like the situation in the United States, there is no uniform 
sentencing system in Australia.  Each of the eight jurisdictions has 
its own sentencing law and process, which is prescribed by a 
combination of legislation and common law.74  In addition to this, 
the federal jurisdiction has its own discrete sentencing system.75  
While there is divergence in terms of the finer details of each of the 
sentencing systems, the broad approach is similar. 
The key sentencing objectives are community protection, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation.76  The proportionality principle is 
also a cardinal consideration in determining the nature of a 
sanction and its length or severity.77 
A key point of departure between the sentencing systems in 
Australia and the United States is that standard or mandatory 
penalties in Australia are rare.78  Instead sentencing in Australia is 
largely a discretionary process, whereby judges have considerable 
discretion to impose a penalty, so long as it does not exceed the 
maximum penalty for the relevant offense.79  This methodology is 
termed the “instinctive synthesis.”80 
In accordance with this approach, judges are required to identify 
all of the factors that are relevant to a particular sentence and 
arrive at a judgment regarding the precise penalty that is 
 
73 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e)(17) (2014). 
74 See Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/se 
ntencing-guidelines/australia.php (last updated Jan. 28, 2015); HONOR FIGGIS, NSW 
PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY RESEARCH SERV., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 18/98, MANDATORY AND 
GUIDELINE SENTENCING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (1998), available at http://www.parliamen 
t.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/80ABE5B6C693DC94CA256ECF0009D847/$Fi
le/18-98.pdf. 
75 Sentencing Guidelines: Australia, supra note 74. 
76 See RICHARD EDNEY & MIRKO BAGARIC, AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE 5 (2007); supra text accompanying note 7. 
77 See Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, ¶ 7(Austl.); Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 
164 CLR 465, ¶8 (Austl.); Veen v The Queen (No 1) (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467 (Austl.). 
78 See LENNY ROTH, NSW PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., MANDATORY SENTENCING 
LAWS 2, 5, 8–12 (2014), available at http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publica 
tions.nsf/key/Mandatorysentencinglaws/$File/mandatory+sentencing+laws.pdf (outlining the 
existing mandatory penalty provisions across Australian jurisdictions). 
79 See id. at 1–2. 
80 R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292, ¶ 31 (Austl.); see also Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2, 
¶ 41 (Austl.) (“[T]he synthesis of the ‘raw material’ which must be considered on sentencing, 
including material like sentencing statistics and information about the sentences imposed in 
comparable cases, is the task of the sentencing judge . . . .”). 
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appropriate in all of the circumstances.81  However, judges are not 
required, nor permitted, to set out with particularity the precise 
weight that has been conferred to any particular sentencing factor.82 
Another important contrast between the sentencing systems in 
the United States and Australia is that there are a far greater 
number of aggravating and mitigating considerations in Australia.  
One study identified nearly 300 such considerations in Australia.83  
The large number of factors that increase and decrease penalties in 
Australia combined with the instinctive synthesis approach to 
sentencing has resulted in the sentencing process being criticized 
for its obscurity, lack of transparency, and unpredictability.84 
For the purposes of this article, the most important mitigating or 
aggravating factors are those relating to the profile of the offender.  
In Australia, at common law, the starting position regarding an 
offender’s character is that the absence of prior convictions is a 
mitigating factor.85  So too is an offender’s character and past good 
acts.86  At common law, the concept of character has not been 
explored with any degree of precision and, in particular, it has not 
been distinguished from simply the absence of prior convictions.87  
Some legislative provisions do, however, stipulate a distinction 
between the absence of prior convictions and good character.  For 
example, in New South Wales, the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 states the absence of significant prior convictions88 and 
good character mitigate penalty.89 
Section 16A of the Commonwealth’s Crimes Act 1914 provides 
that in determining the appropriate sentence the court is to 
consider the “character” and “antecedents” of the accused.90  The 
 
81 See Sarah Krasnostein & Arie Freiberg, Pursuing Consistency in an Individualistic 
Sentencing Framework: If You Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got 
There?, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 268–69 (2013). 
82 See id. at 269. 
83 See Roger Douglas, Sentencing, in GUILTY, YOUR WORSHIP: A STUDY OF VICTORIA’S 
MAGISTRATES’ COURTS 55, 62 (1980) (identifying 292 relevant sentencing factors in a study of 
Victoria’s magistrates’ courts). 
84 See Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: The Road to Nowhere, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 597, 608–14 
(1999). 
85 See, e.g., DPP (Cth) v D’Alessandro (2010) 26 VR 477, ¶ 26 (Austl.) (“It is true that the 
respondent has no prior convictions.  He therefore comes to be sentenced as a person of good 
character.”). 
86 See R v Gent (2005) 162 A Crim R 29, ¶¶ 48–49 (Austl.). 
87 See, e.g., D’Alessandro, 26 VR 477, ¶ 26 (failing to distinguish the offender’s good 
character from his lack of prior convictions). 
88 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(3)(e) (Austl.). 
89 Id. s 21A(3)(f). 
90 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(m) (Austl.). 
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term “antecedents” is generally understood to mean the criminal 
history of the offender.91  Section 8(1)(b) of Victoria’s Sentencing Act 
1991 states that in determining whether to record a conviction, one 
of the considerations that a court is to consider is “the character and 
past history of the offender.”92  Victoria is one of the few 
jurisdictions that defines character.  Section 6 states: 
 In determining the character of an offender a court may 
consider (among other things): 
 (a)  the number, seriousness, date, relevance and nature of 
any previous findings of guilt or convictions of the offender; 
and 
 (b) the general reputation of the offender; and 
 (c) any significant contributions made by the offender to 
the community.93 
While these provisions distinguish between the absence of prior 
convictions and good character,94 the courts in applying these 
provisions have not carefully analyzed them and the two concepts 
are typically fused, such that the absence of prior convictions is a 
proxy for good character.  Thus, in Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Cth) v D’Alessandro, the court stated: “It is true that the 
respondent has no prior convictions.  He therefore comes to be 
sentenced as a person of good character.”95 
In R v Gent, the court noted that there is a distinction between 
the lack of prior convictions and good character, but did not 
elaborate on how good character is ascertained in a concrete 
manner.  The court stated: 
It has been said that there is a certain ambiguity about the 
expression “good character” in the sentencing context.  
Sometimes, it refers only to an absence of prior convictions 
and has a rather negative significance, and sometimes it 
refers to something more of a positive nature involving or 
including a history of previous good works and contribution 
to the community.96 
Accordingly, the absence of prior convictions alone is mitigating.  
Further, it has been held that a penalty reduction may be 
 
91 Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257, 277 (Austl.) (Windeyer, J.). 
92 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 8(1)(b) (Austl.). 
93 Id. s 6. 
94 Id. ss 6, 8(1)(b). 
95 DPP (Cth) v D’Alessandro (2010) 26 VR 477, ¶ 26 (Austl.). 
96 R v Gent (2005) 162 A Crim R 29, ¶ 49 (Austl.) (citing R v Levi (Unreported, NSW Court 
of Criminal Appeal, 15 May 1997) at 5). 
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warranted if there is simply a lack of prior convictions for the 
current offense type for which the offender is being sentenced.97  
However, there is no evidence that the absence of prior convictions 
plus positive good deeds is more mitigating than the absence of 
prior convictions alone. 
In establishing good character, one relatively settled principle is 
that the current offenses should normally be ignored.  In Ryan v 
The Queen,98 Judge McHugh stated: 
 It is necessary to distinguish between the two logically 
distinct stages concerning the use of character in the 
sentencing process.  First, it is necessary to determine 
whether the offender is of otherwise good character.  When 
considering this issue, the sentencing judge must not 
consider the offences for which the prisoner is being 
sentenced.  Because that is so, many sentencing judges refer 
to the offender’s “previous” or “otherwise” good character.99 
The willingness of courts to find good character simply on the 
basis of the absence of prior convictions is indicative of a broad 
approach to this trait as being mitigating, but this is largely 
negated by the large number of exclusions to the circumstances 
when good character is operative to mitigate penalty.100 
The courts have held that the good character is of far less 
significance (i.e. has little mitigatory operation) in four situations.  
The first situation is where the offense in question is normally 
committed by people without a criminal history.101  Secondly, no 
reduction is appropriate where the offender’s good character 
enabled him/her to occupy the position from which the offenses 
could be committed.102  Thirdly, good character does not reduce 
penalty where there is a powerful countervailing sentencing 
objective that typically applies to the offense in question.103  This is 
normally the case in relation to very serious offenses.104  Finally, 
 
97 Tran v The Queen [2011] VSCA 383, ¶ 29 (Austl.). 
98 Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267 (Austl.). 
99 Id. ¶ 23. 
100 See Gent, 162 A Crim R  29, ¶¶ 52–54 (citing Ryan, 206 CLR 267, ¶¶ 33–34; R v 
Kennedy [2000] NSWCCA 527, ¶¶ 21–22 (NSW)) (summarizing the situations in which prior 
good character has less of an impact on sentence). 
101 See Kennedy, [2000] NSWCCA 527, ¶ 21. 
102 R v Coukoulis (2003) 138 A Crim R 520, ¶ 42 (Austl.); Kennedy, [2000] NSWCCA 527, ¶ 
21. 
103 See, e.g., Coukoulis, 138 A Crim R 520, ¶ 42. 
104 See McMahon v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 147, ¶¶ 33, 76–77 (Austl.) (noting that a 
strong need for general deterrence reduces the weight given to the defendant’s good character 
(citing R v Williams (2005) 152 A Crim R 548, ¶¶ 60–61 (Austl.))); Kennedy, [2000] NSWCCA  
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good character is of little relevance where the offender is sentenced 
for a number of offenses which are committed over a period of 
time.105 
Broken down to offense type, good character is of less significance 
in relation to a number of offense types—often because more than 
one of the exceptions applies.  Thus, driving offenses causing death 
or serious injury106 and child pornography107 do not attract a 
significant first-time offender discount because they are often 
committed by people with this profile.108  Good character is not a 
significant consideration for white collar financial offenses109 or 
child sexual offenses110 because it is often the good character of the 
offender that enabled him/her to occupy a position enabling him/her 
to commit the offense, and these offenses are normally committed 
by people of good character.111 
First-time offenders who commit drug distribution offenses also 
do not get a considerable discount, because general deterrence is a 
strong consideration in relation to this offense type and it, too, is 
 
527, ¶¶ 21, 25. 
105 See Kennedy, [2000] NSWCCA 527, ¶ 22. 
106 In R v MacIntyre (1988) 38 A Crim R 135 (Austl.), Chief Judge Lee at CL stated in 
relation to the offense of culpable driving that: 
His Honour took into account, of course, the good character of the respondent, and 
properly so.  But it must be said that this class of offence is one which in many, perhaps 
even in most, cases is committed by persons who are not in any sense members of the 
criminal class or who even have criminal convictions against them, and for that reason 
the courts need to tread warily in showing leniency for good character to avoid giving the 
impression that persons of good character may, by their irresponsible actions at the 
time, take the lives of others and yet receive lenient treatment. 
Id. at 139; see also Pasznyk v The Queen [2014] VSCA 87, ¶ 67 (Austl.) (“Culpable driving is 
an offence frequently committed by people of otherwise good character, so that the offending 
in such cases truly might be described as an aberration.” (footnote omitted)). 
107 See Mouscas v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 181, ¶ 37 (Austl.) (“For the offence of 
possession of child pornography where general deterrence is necessarily of importance and is 
frequently committed by persons of prior good character, it is legitimate for a court to give 
less weight to prior good character as a mitigating factor.”); see also R v Gent (2005) 162 A 
Crim R 29, ¶¶ 62–64 (Austl.) (discussing the approach of giving less weight to prior good 
character in child pornography cases); Heathcote v The Queen [2014] VSCA 37, ¶ 46 (Austl.) 
(holding that the sentencing judge correctly assigned minimal weight to the offender’s prior 
good character in case involving child pornography offenses). 
108 See Gent, 162 A Crim R 29, ¶¶ 63–64 (noting that child pornography offenses are often 
committed by persons of prior good character); Pasznyk, [2014] VSCA 87, ¶ 67 (Austl.) (noting 
that culpable driving offenses are often committed by persons of prior good character). 
109 See R v Coukoulis (2003) 138 A Crim R 520, ¶ 42 (Austl.). 
110 See Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267, ¶¶ 33–35 (Austl.). 
111 See T v The Queen (1990) 47 A Crim R 29, 39 (Austl.) (“[I]t lamentably is all too 
common for the perpetrators of these [child sexual abuse] offences to be men who in other 
respects have led exemplary lives and have commanded the respect of others.”); R v Swift 
(2007) 169 A Crim R 73, ¶ 46 (Austl.) (noting that white collar offenders are usually first-time 
offenders who generally lead “blameless lives” otherwise). 
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supposedly often committed by offenders without prior 
convictions.112  Armed robbery is another serious offense for which 
the weight accorded to the good character discount is reduced.113 
In some circumstances, a first-time offender is charged with a 
number of offenses.  This often occurs in relation to child sexual 
offenses and child pornography offenses,114 and in these 
circumstances little weight is accorded to previous good character.  
In R v Kennedy, the court stated: 
 Less weight might also be given to prior good character in 
a case where there is a pattern of repeat offending over a 
significant period of time.  That will frequently be the case in 
child sexual assault offences because such offences are often 
committed during a period of an ongoing relationship 
between the offender and the complainant.115 
Thus, while the good character is a mitigating factor, the 
significance of this consideration is undermined by the large 
number of exceptions relating to when it can reduce penalty. 
In Australia, hardship to family members116 can mitigate 
penalty.117  This is a common law principle, which has also been 
 
112 In Gent, the court stated: 
 The rationale for extending less weight to prior good character may vary depending 
upon the class of offence.  With respect to drug couriers, Street CJ (Glass JA and 
Yeldham J agreeing) said: “This Court and other criminal courts have said on many 
occasions that, in the drug traffic in particular, the circumstances that the accused 
person has a clear earlier record will have less significance than in other fields of crime.  
Very frequently, those selected to play some part in the chain of drug trafficking, as the 
appellant plainly enough was, are selected because their records, their past and their 
lifestyles are not such as to attract suspicion.  It is this in particular which has led the 
courts to take in the case of drug trafficking a view which does not involve the same 
degree of leniency being extended to first offenders.” 
Gent, 162 A Crim R 29, ¶ 55 (citation omitted) (quoting R v Leroy (1984) 55 ALR 338, ¶ 25 
(Austl.)); see also DPP (Cth) v Thai [2014] VSCA 122, ¶ 14 (Austl.) (“[I]n cases of sentencing 
for the importation of drugs, previous good character ordinarily has less significance than it 
may have in other cases.”); Dao v The Queen [2014] VSCA 93, ¶ 9 (Austl.) (footnote omitted) 
(“[P]ast good character is of lesser weight in sentencing for large scale drug trafficking 
offences.  General deterrence is at the forefront of sentencing considerations, and that applies 
to persons of past good character as much as to inveterate criminals.”). 
113 See R v Knell [2001] VSCA 82, ¶ 9 (Austl.). 
114 See Gent, 162 A Crim R 29, ¶ 54 (citing Ryan, 206 CLR 267, ¶ 34). 
115 R v Kennedy [2000] NSWCCA 527, ¶ 22 (Austl.); see also Versi v The Queen [2013] 
NSWCCA 206, ¶¶ 179–81 (Austl.) (noting that if the offense is not an isolated one, good 
character should be given less mitigating weight (citing Kennedy, [2000] NSWCCA 527, ¶¶ 
21–22; R v Hermann (1988) 37 A Crim R 440, 448 (Austl.))). 
116 In R v MacLeod the court held that, in principle, hardship to nonfamily members (in 
this instance employees of the offender) could mitigate a penalty.  R v MacLeod [2013] 
NSWCCA 108, ¶¶ 42–44 (Austl.).  However, on the facts of the case, the hardship was not 
sufficiently severe.  Id. ¶¶ 51–55. 
117 See, e.g., R v Le (1999) 107 A Crim R 355, 356–57 (Austl.). 
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adopted in a number of statutory regimes.  Section 10(1)(n) of South 
Australia’s Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 provides that when 
a court is sentencing an offender, it must have regard to “the 
probable effect any sentence under consideration would have on 
dependants of the defendant.”118  In a similar vein, in the 
Commonwealth sphere, section 16(A)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 
provides that in sentencing an offender, the court must take into 
account “the probable effect that any sentence or order under 
consideration would have on any of the person’s family or 
dependants.”119 
While hardship to others can mitigate penalty, the courts have 
applied this test with a degree of reluctance and have demanded 
that the hardship reach extreme levels before it can moderate 
penalty: exceptional hardship120 must be demonstrated.121  The 
reasons for this are set out in Markovic v The Queen as follows: 
 The case law reveals that the “exceptional circumstances” 
 
118 Criminal Law Sentencing Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(n) (Austl.). 
119 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(p) (Austl.). 
120 In some instances, the test for hardship to others to be taken into account has been held 
to be at the level of the “truly exceptional.”  See R v Day (1998) 100 A Crim R 275, 277–78 
(Austl.) (Wood, J.) (quoting R v Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 510, 516 (Austl.)).  Another 
manner in which this test has been expressed has been to confine the relevance of hardship to 
others for the purpose of sentence to what have been termed “extreme cases,” which would 
justify a departure from the general prohibition precluding consideration of matters of 
hardship to others.  See T v The Queen (1990) 47 A Crim R 29, 40 (Austl.) (quoting Boyle v 
The Queen (1987) 34 A Crim R 202, 206 (Austl.)); R v Adami (1989) 42 A Crim R 88, paras. 
20–22 (Austl.) (citing R v Amuso (1987) 32 A Crim R 308 (Austl.); R v Moffa (No. 2) (1977) 16 
SASR 155 (Austl.); R v Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291 (Austl.)); Boyle, 34 A Crim R at 204–05, 206 
(Burt, C.J.) (quoting Wirth, 14 SASR at 294).  The reference to “extreme” cases may also 
include what may be termed “unusual” situations that may arise in the context of hardship to 
others.  This was evident in the case of R v Le, where an appeal was allowed.  Le, 107 A Crim 
R at 355.  In the period between the date of sentence and the hearing of the appeal the 
appellant’s husband, who had been caring for the couple’s two young children, died and 
Justice Grove noted that the “unusual” circumstances of the case would permit the release of 
the appellant so she could take care of her children.  Id. at 356–57; see also R v Richards 
(2006) 160 A Crim R 120, ¶¶ 43–44, 49, 51 (Austl.) (holding that the impact of an immediate 
prison sentence on the defendant’s son, who had psychological problems and for whom the 
defendant was the primary caregiver, was relevant to the defendant’s sentencing, and that 
the sentence imposed on the defendant was “manifestly excessive” and should be reduced); 
Hull v Western Australia (2005) 156 A Crim R 414, ¶ 19 (Austl.) (“In extreme cases, a 
sentencing court may take into account serious illness suffered by a member of the offender’s 
family where that family member will be subjected to an unusual measure of hardship as a 
result of the offender’s imprisonment and where the offender will therefore be subjected to an 
unusual measure of hardship as a result of their imprisonment.” (citing Anderson v The 
Queen (1997) 92 A Crim R 348 (Austl.)). 
121 See Markovic v The Queen [2010] VSCA 105, ¶3 (Austl.).  In this case, the court held 
that there is no “residual discretion of mercy” that can mitigate penalty for hardship if the 
exceptional circumstances test is not satisfied.  Id. ¶¶ 15–16 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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test was developed in response to several considerations, as 
follows.  First, it is almost inevitable that imprisoning a 
person will have an adverse effect on the person’s 
dependants. 
 . . . . 
 Secondly, the primary function of the sentencing court is 
to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the 
crime.  Thirdly, to treat family hardship as the basis for the 
exercise of leniency produces the paradoxical result that a 
guilty person benefits in order that innocent persons suffer 
less.  Fourthly, to treat an offender who has needy 
dependants more leniently than one equally culpable co-
offender who has none would “defeat the appearance of 
justice” and be “patently unjust.”  Hence it is only in the 
exceptional case, where the plea for mercy is seen as 
irresistible, that family hardship can be taken into 
account.122 
The trend of the decisions demonstrates that courts have applied 
the test strictly.123  For example, in R v Nagul124 the court held that 
family hardship in the form of the offender’s wife being diagnosed 
with cancer and their son completing secondary school did not cross 
the threshold to constitute a mitigating consideration.125 
A broader, more compassionate approach (from the perspective of 
the offender and his/her family members) was taken in R v Hill,126 
where the court stated: 
 In the present case, medical evidence and a further 
 
122 Id. ¶¶ 6–7 (footnotes omitted). 
123 See, e.g., DPP (Cth) v Gaw [2006] VSCA 51, ¶¶ 20–21, 23 (Austl.) (Calloway, J.A.). 
124 R v Nagul [2007] VSCA 8 (Austl.). 
125 Id. ¶¶ 36, 46.  The court stated: 
 In the present case, I am of the view that the circumstances of hardship do not 
warrant the exercise of mercy such as to reduce the period of the head sentence that 
would otherwise be appropriate. . . . It is impossible not to sympathise with the 
applicant’s family and recognise the hardship that they will bear because of his 
imprisonment, but in all the circumstances, as I have said, I consider that this does not 
justify the exercise of discretion to extend mercy in relation to the head sentence.  It is 
important to bear in mind in this context the caution sounded by Callaway JA in 
Carmody, namely that the sentencing judge will be failing in his or her duty of proper 
sentencing considerations where overwhelmed by an emotional response to the hardship 
that a sentence would impose upon the family of the offender.  Similarly the exercise of 
mercy should not undermine the general principle that, save for exceptional 
circumstances, hardship to family members by reason of the offender’s imprisonment is 
not a relevant consideration for sentencing purposes. 
Id. ¶ 46 (footnote omitted) (citing Carmody v The Queen (1998) 100 A Crim R 41, 46–47 
(Austl.)). 
126 R v Hill (2011) 110 SASR 588 (Austl.). 
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affidavit has been put before this Court.  This material was 
not before the sentencing judge.  The further evidence 
discloses a significant hardship suffered by the defendant’s 
family, by reason of the support that was given by him to his 
ailing father prior to his incarceration.  The defendant’s 
mother is a nurse at the Lyell McEwin Hospital.  The family 
is financially reliant upon her retaining her employment.  
She works two days a week, during which time the 
defendant would ordinarily assume the position of primary 
caregiver to his father.  Since his incarceration, his 14-year-
old sister has had to assume some of these responsibilities 
which the defendant would otherwise have attended to.  This 
has placed additional strain on the family, and has had a 
particularly acute effect on the defendant’s father’s mental 
health. 
 The hardship identified is one that goes beyond the 
economic or emotional hardship to be expected when one is 
imprisoned.  An approach to sentencing that weighs the 
interests of the defendant’s family with other matters, such 
as the gravity of the offending, is warranted.127 
While it is generally accepted that in order for hardship to family 
to be mitigating it must be exceptional,128 there is some authority 
that, in the context of the Crimes Act 1914, normal hardship is 
sufficient.  Judge Beech-Jones, in dissent, in R v Zerafa129 stated: 
If in other contexts Courts are bound to consider the impact 
of their orders on innocent third parties, why is the impact 
on children of any sentence under consideration to be 
excluded unless their hardship is only exceptional?  The 
primary objects in sentencing of “retribution, deterrence [and 
 
127 Id. ¶¶ 42–43.  Family hardship also mitigated penalty in DPP (Vic) v Coley [2007] 
VSCA 91, ¶ 45 (Austl.) and MGP v The Queen [2011] VSCA 321, ¶ 10 (Austl.).  Where the 
offender is a female and is pregnant or has a very young child, this is a mitigatory factor.  See 
HJ v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 21, ¶¶ 66, 76; R v Togias (2001) 127 A Crim R 23, ¶ 7. 
128 It should be noted that family hardship which is not exceptional can mitigate penalty if 
knowledge of the hardship causes additional distress to the offender, making his time in 
imprisonment more onerous.  In Markovic, the Court of Appeal stated: 
An offender’s anguish at being unable to care for a family member can properly be taken 
into account as a mitigating factor—for example, if the court is satisfied that this will 
make the experience of imprisonment more burdensome or that it materially affects the 
assessment of the need for specific deterrence or of the offender’s prospects of 
rehabilitation.  These are conventional issues of mitigation, and they are not subject to 
the “exceptional circumstances” limitation. 
Markovic v The Queen [2010] VSCA 105, ¶ 20 (Austl.) (footnote omitted). 
129 R v Zerafa [2013] NSWCCA 222 (Austl.). 
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the] protection of society” described by Wells J in Wirth can 
still be given effect to without requiring sentencing courts to 
divide the forms of hardship occasioned to an offender’s 
family into those which meet the description “exceptional” 
and those which do not.  The assessment of probable 
hardship to family members is a task that sentencing courts 
are perfectly able to undertake, and no doubt they do.  In any 
event, the words of the section and the secondary materials 
indicate a clear policy choice on the part of the legislature on 
this topic.130 
C.  Overview of Relevance of Offender Profile in Sentencing in the 
United States and Australia 
Thus, it is clear that there are starkly different approaches to the 
relevance of the profile of the offender in determining criminal 
penalty in the United States and Australia. 
In summary, the above analysis reveals the following ten points: 
1. The United States and Australian sentencing regimes both 
recognize that there are at least three different aspects of 
an offender’s profile that can potentially impact on 
criminal penalty. 
2. The considerations are the absence of prior convictions, 
good deeds, and family obligations. 
3. To the extent that these considerations apply in the 
sentencing realm they mitigate, rather than aggravate, 
penalty. 
4. The Australia sentencing regime allows more scope for the 
profile of the offender to mitigate penalty than in the 
United States. 
5. The absence of prior convictions can mitigate penalty in 
Australia.  However, there are a number of offense types 
where good character carries little weight, including white 
collar crime, child sexual offenses, and very serious 
offenses. 
6. The absence of prior convictions can mitigate penalty in 
 
130 Id. ¶ 140 (citing Patrick Stevedores Operations No. 2 Proprietary Ltd. v Mar. Union of 
Austl. (1998) 195 CLR 1, ¶¶ 65–66 (Austl.); Silktone Proprietary Ltd. v Devreal Capital 
Proprietary Ltd. (1990) 21 NSWLR 317, 324, 332 (Austl.)).  This is consistent with the 
approach in the Australian Capital Territory.  For a discussion of the approaches in the 
respective jurisdictions, see Sakovits v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 109, ¶ 22 (Austl.) (citing 
Zerafa, [2013] NSWCCA ¶ 93). 
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the United States.  However, as is the case in Australia, 
they are not mitigatory in relation to child sexual offenses, 
serious violent offenses, and drug offenses.  Unlike 
Australia, in these circumstances, the absence of prior 
convictions does not normally mitigate at all, as opposed to 
having a reduced mitigatory weight. 
7. Past good character can mitigate penalty in Australia.  
However, the utility of this principle is to some degree 
undermined by the fact that past good character is often 
simply equated with the absence of prior convictions. 
8. Past good character normally does not mitigate in the 
United States. 
9. In Australia family ties can mitigate penalty where the 
imprisonment of the offender would cause exceptional 
hardship to dependents of the offender. 
10. In the United States there is a statutory preference 
against family ties mitigating penalty; however, the 
judiciary invoke it as a mitigating factor relatively 
infrequently. 
 We now consider which of the above approaches, if any, is sound.  
As it transpires, few of the above principles can withstand critical 
analysis. 
III.  THE ABSENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS SHOULD MITIGATE  
As we have seen, prior convictions aggravate penalty.131  
However, it is not the case that the absence of an aggravating factor 
should necessarily mitigate penalty.  In order for the absence of 
prior convictions to mitigate penalty, it is necessary to make an 
independent argument in support of this proposition. 
To this end, it is important to ground the existence of any 
mitigating (or aggravating) factors within the construct of a 
coherent doctrinal rubric.  Despite the multifaceted nature of 
aggravating and mitigating considerations, one of us has recently 
argued 
that considerations should only aggravate or mitigate 
sentence if they: (i) advance an objective of sentencing (which 
itself is justifiable); (ii) are necessary to give effect to the 
proportionality principle; (iii) are justified by reference to 
 
131 See supra text accompanying notes 30–32; see also Roberts, supra note 3, at 309 
(“Today, most jurisdictions employ explicit statutory sentencing enhancements for recidivist 
offenders . . . .”). 
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broader objectives of the criminal justice system; or (iv) are 
supported by reference to the requirements of broader 
(concrete) principles of justice.132 
The most compelling argument for the relevance of a good 
criminal record to sentencing stems from the first of these 
considerations: the objectives of the sentencing system.  A key 
objective of the sentencing system is to reduce crime.  Indeed, 
protection of the community has been described as the cardinal goal 
of sentencing.133  The community has less reason to fear offenders 
who are unlikely to reoffend than those who have a high likelihood 
of reoffending. 
The absence of a prior conviction (or only a minor criminal record) 
should mitigate penalty if it is demonstrated that first-time 
offenders or those with only minor prior convictions are less likely 
to reoffend than offenders with a long criminal history.  The 
empirical data regarding the impact of prior convictions on 
recidivism have been analyzed in two relatively recent reports in 
both the United States and Australia. 
A report by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, titled Recidivism of 
Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010, 
examined the recidivism patterns of prisoners released in 2005.134  
The report examined the recidivism patterns of prisoners for five 
years postrelease.135 
The report noted that the last time a similar wide-ranging 
analysis was undertaken was for prisoners released twenty-one 
years earlier—in 1994.136  The utility of the 1994 study was to some 
extent limited because it tracked prisoners for only three years 
postrelease.137  The current study noted that it was not possible to 
exactly match the study of the two cohorts for a number of reasons, 
including the increased accuracy of the 2005 data,138 more states 
participated in the latter survey (thirty in 2005 compared to fifteen 
 
132 Mirko Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing: Why 
Less Is More When It Comes to Punishing Criminals, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (2015). 
133 See, e.g., Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433, 438 (Austl.); see also infra Part VI 
(discussing how the community protection consideration should impact sentencing). 
134 MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
NCJ 244205, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 
2005 TO 2010, at 1 (2014). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 2. 
137 Id. at 1. 
138 Id. at 3–4. 
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in 1994),139 and a greater portion of older offenders were released in 
2005.140  Noting these differences, the report noted that it is not 
tenable to make accurate comparisons of the respective recidivism 
rates.141  However, the best comparison that could be made was to 
compare the reoffending rates for the respective cohorts (while 
controlling for known disparities) for arrests for violent offenses.142  
This comparison showed that the proportion of released prisoners 
who were arrested for a violent offense within three years in 1994 
and 2005 was very similar, with a slight increase for the 2005 
cohort (21.8% for the 2005 cohort compared to 21.3% for the 1994 
cohort).143  This (slight) increase is despite the fact that during this 
period one would have assumed that the quality and effectiveness of 
rehabilitation programs would have improved.144 
Given the limited span of the 1994 study, the observations below 
relate to findings concerning the 2005 cohort.  The study noted that 
there were 404,638 prisoners released in 2005 from prisons in 30 
states, which held 76% of the total prison population in the United 
States.145  The prisoners that were released in 2005 were divided 
into four cohorts: drug offenders (31.8%), property offenders 
(29.8%), violent offenders (25.7%), and public order offenders 
(12.7%).146 
In terms of crude findings, the report showed a very high 
correlation between previous imprisonment and reoffending.  
Overall, more than two-thirds (67.8%) of the 404,638 prisoners 
released in 2005 were arrested within three years of release and 
more than three-quarters (76.6%) were arrested within five years of 
release.147 
The report also revealed a distinction in the recidivism rate for 
offenders depending on the type of offense they committed.  By 
reference to the five-year time frame, the offenders who reoffended 
at the greatest rates were property offenders.148  This was followed 
 
139 Id. at 2. 
140 Id.  As noted below, older offenders reoffend less frequently.  Id. at 1. 
141 Id. at 2. 
142 Id. at 5. 
143 Id. 
144 For an overview of the effectiveness of rehabilitative techniques, see Mirko Bagaric & 
Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: 
Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might and the Implications for Sentencing, 
36 CRIM. L.J. 159, 161, 167–71 (2012). 
145 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 6. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1. 
148 Id. 
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by drug offenders, public order offenders, and then violent 
offenders.149  In exact terms the reoffending rates for these cohorts 
over five years were property offenders (82.1%), drug offenders 
(76.9%), public order offenders (73.6%), and violent offenders 
(71.3%).150  These offenses are further broken down into more 
specific offense types.151  The types of offenses which meaningfully 
departed from these averages in terms of having a lower recidivism 
rate for the respective offense cohorts are homicide (51.2%) and rape 
(60.1%), both of which are categorized as violent offenses; 
fraud/forgery (77.0%), which are property offenses; and driving 
under the influence (59.9%), which is a public order offense.152  The 
offense types which had noticeably higher recidivism rates are 
robbery (77.0%) and assault (77.1%), both of which are violent 
offenses, and larceny/motor vehicle theft (84.1%) and burglary 
(81.8%), both of which are property offenses.153 
The data becomes especially illuminating when broken down into 
the types of offenses for which offenders recidivate.  Overall, 28.6% 
of the released cohort was arrested for a crime of violence within 
five years.154  The arrest percentages for the other offense types 
were higher: property offenses (38.4%), drug offenses (38.8%), and 
public order offenses (58%).155  The data also indicated crime-type 
specialization, with a higher portion of offenders incarcerated for 
violent offenses being more inclined to commit an offense of violence 
postrelease (33.1%), compared to those incarcerated for a property 
offense (28.5%), public order offense (29.2%), and drug offense 
(24.8%).156  Similar specialization patterns also applied for property, 
drug, and public order offenses.157 
When recidivism did occur, it normally occurred shortly after 
release.  More than a third (36.8%) of prisoners who were arrested 
within five years of release, were arrested within the first six 
months postrelease and more than half (56.7%) were arrested 
within a year of release.158 
 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1, 8. 
151 Id. at 8. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 9. 
155 Id.  The combined total is more than 100% because some offenders were arrested for 
more than one offense.  Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 1. 
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The age of the offender was an important predictor of reoffending.  
Within five years of release, 84.1% of offenders who were 24 years 
or younger were arrested.159  By contrast only 69.2% of offenders 
aged 40 or older were arrested within five years.160 
Another important finding to emerge from the study was that 
recidivism rates increase significantly depending upon the extent of 
inmate criminal history.  The percentage of inmates with four or 
fewer prior arrests who committed another offense within five years 
after release was 60.8%.161  This increased to 75.9% for inmates 
with five to nine prior arrests and 86.5% for inmates with ten or 
more prior arrests.162 
The study also examined recidivism by variables other than 
arrest.  These included conviction and return to prison.163  The 
advantage of using arrest as the determinant is that it happens 
earlier in time, whereas conviction and return to prison can take 
considerably longer, taking the event outside the five year study 
period.164  However, examining the data from the perspective of a 
return to prison is illuminating because it provides a useful contrast 
to similar data in Australia (which is discussed below). 
The report noted that within three years of release 49.7% of 
inmates were reimprisoned and this grew to 55.1% within five years 
of release.165  Broken down to offense type for which an inmate was 
imprisoned the most likely cohort to be reimprisoned were property 
offenders (61.8%), compared to drug offenders (53.3%), public order 
offenders (52.6%), and violent offenders (50.6%).166 
The findings in this report are generally consistent with the 
situation in Australia.  The most recent wide-ranging report on 
recidivism levels in Australia notes that for offenders released from 
Australian prisons during the 2009–2010 financial year, the rate at 
which prisoners were returned to prison within two years was 
39.3%.167  This had remained relatively steady over the preceding 
 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 10. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 14–15. 
164 See id. (indicating that percentages are higher for arrests than convictions or return to 
prison). 
165 Id. at 15. 
166 Id. 
167 STEERING COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF GOV’T SERV. PROVISION, PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, 
REPORT ON GOVERNMENT SERVICES 2013, at C.21–.22 (2013), available at http://www.pc.gov.a 
u/research/recurring/report-on-government-services?id=141009&queries_year_query=2013&s 
earch_page_144758_submit_button=Submit&current_result_page=1&results_per_page=0&su
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five years, with the highest rate being forty percent and the lowest 
38.5%.168  The actual recidivism levels were higher given that the 
data do not include released prisoners who reoffended within two 
years but received a sanction other than imprisonment.169 
This report did not provide information regarding recidivism and 
offense type.  However, an earlier report by the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics170 set out more acute findings regarding reoffending for 
a number of prisoner cohorts, including one focusing on prisoners 
released during the period July 1, 1994 through June 30, 1997.171  
The report noted that recidivism levels varied markedly depending 
on the offense type for which an offender was incarcerated.172  
Offenders imprisoned for theft and burglary were returned to prison 
(over a ten-year period) more than fifty percent of the time,173 
compared to drug and sexual assault offenders whose rate of prison 
return was less than twenty-five percent.174  Moreover, the report 
noted significant levels of offense specializations—when offenders 
did return to prison, they were disproportionately more likely to 
have committed their original offense type than were other 
prisoners.175 
The significant advantage of both the United States and 
Australian studies is that they involve very high numbers of 
offenders, the offending types are broken down into offense 
categories, and they track offenders for a considerable period of 
time.176  It is not tenable, however, to make a direct comparison of 
the studies given that offense classifications are not identical, the 
follow-up period is longer in Australia (for the 1994–1997 cohort), 
and the classification of criminal history is different (the Australian 
report compares first-time offenders with repeat offenders while the 
United States report focuses on offenders with varying numbers of 
prior convictions: four or fewer, five to nine, and ten or more).177  
 
bmitted_search_category=&mode=. 
168 Id. at C.22. 
169 See id. at C.20. 
170 JESSICA ZHANG & ANDREW WEBSTER, AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, AN ANALYSIS OF 
REPEAT IMPRISONMENT TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA USING PRISONER CENSUS DATA FROM 1994 TO 
2007 (2010), available at http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/26D48B9A 
4BE29D48CA25778C001F67D3/$File/1351055031_aug%202010.pdf. 
171 Id. at ii, 10. 
172 Id. at 29. 
173 Id. at 29–30. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 31–32. 
176 See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 8; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra 170, at 22. 
177 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 6, 10; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 22, 30–
31. 
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However, despite these caveats, a number of clear conclusions 
emerge.  They are as follows: 
 first-time offenders, and those with a minor criminal 
record, reoffend at a considerably lower rate than 
offenders with a significant criminal history;178 
 the offenders who reoffend most frequently are property 
offenders and, in particular, inmates who have been 
convicted of burglary and larceny (known as theft in 
Australia);179 
 offenders who tend to recidivate the least are those 
convicted of violent and sexual offenses;180 and 
 offenders tend to specialize in offense type.181 
The above analysis is counter to existing sentencing orthodoxy in 
the United States and Australia, that serious offenders (such as 
violent, sex and drug offenders) should receive little, if any, 
mitigating consideration for the absence of prior convictions.  
Further, in Australia, white collar offenders also get less of a 
reduction on the basis of prior criminal record.182  The rationale for 
this is that such offenses are normally committed by people who do 
not have a criminal past.183 
The observation that certain offenses are committed more 
frequently by offenders without a criminal record is no more 
relevant than to note that certain offenses are committed more 
regularly by offenders of a certain race, or indeed, height or weight 
range.  Observations of this nature only assume relevance if they 
impact on a sentencing objective.  On this standard, the 
disproportionate commission of certain offenses by first-time 
offenders is inert.  Sentencing is a purposive endeavour and its 
objectives are forward looking and come in the form of deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and community protection.184  The only nonforward 
looking aim is the principle of proportionality, which informs how 
much punishment is appropriate.  Moreover, it is flawed to not 
 
178 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 8, 10; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 22, 30–
31. 
179 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 8, 10; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 22, 30–
31. 
180 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 8, 10; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 22, 30–
31. 
181 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 8, 10; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 22, 30–
31. 
182 See Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, A Rational Approach to Sentencing White-Collar 
Offenders in Australia, 34 ADEL. L. REV. 317, 323–24 (2013). 
183 See id. at 324. 
184 See infra Part VI. 
BAGARIC & ALEXANDER 3/3/2015  5:44 PM 
2014/2015] Offender Profile in Sentencing 427 
provide a discount to offenders simply because the offense is 
serious.  Offenders with a good criminal record who commit serious 
offenses are less likely to reoffend than those with an established 
criminal past.185  Community protection remains relevant, and 
possibly even more relevant, to serious offenders. 
Accordingly, reforms should be introduced that acknowledge the 
empirical data regarding the disproportionately lower rate of 
recidivism of offenders with no, or only a minor, criminal record.  All 
offenders with a good prior record should receive this discount.  If 
an exception is to be made to this, it should be for property 
offenders who, the data indicate, reoffend at a higher rate than 
other offenders.186  This is especially the case in relation to inmates 
convicted of burglary and larceny.187 
White collar offending can also loosely be termed a property 
crime.188  However, in neither the United States nor the Australian 
study is there an attempt to separately evaluate this form of crime.  
However, to the extent that the data match the offending types 
which are commonly committed by white collar offenses, they most 
naturally correlate with ‘deception’ offenses in Australia and fraud 
or forgery offenses in the United States.189  As noted above, both of 
these offense types have lower recidivism levels than other types of 
property offenses.190 
The other important operational consideration is the appropriate 
size of the discount.  It needs to be large enough to reflect the lower 
risk presented by first-time offenders but, at the same time, not so 
large that the penalty would be so light as to be grossly 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime.  A reduction in the 
order of twenty-five percent satisfies these considerations.  This is 
the typical penalty reduction that offenders in Australia receive if 
they plead guilty to an offense191 and that guilty plea has not 
resulted in patently disproportionate sanctions being imposed.192  At 
the same time, it is considerable enough to offer offenders a 
 
185 See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 10; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 31–32. 
186 See ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 30. 
187 See id. 
188 Bagaric & Alexander, supra note 182, at 320. 
189 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 8; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 44. 
190 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 8; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 30. 
191 See Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (Cth) s 22 (Austl.); Penalties and Sentences 
Act 1992 (Cth) s 13 (Austl.); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (Cth) s 10B–C (Austl.); 
Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339, ¶ 6 (Austl.); Phillips v The Queen (2012) 222 A 
Crim R 149, ¶ 42 n.38 (Austl.). 
192 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (Cth) s 22; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 
(Cth) s 10B–C. 
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pragmatic incentive to plead guilty, and hence, it is a meaningful 
degree of mitigation. 
Accordingly, all offenders with a good criminal record should 
receive a sentencing discount.  The definition of a good criminal 
record is admittedly obscure.  The United States study focused on 
offenders with varying numbers of prior convictions, while the 
Australian study contrasted repeat offenders with those who had no 
prior convictions.193  In both systems, a significantly lower rate of 
recidivism was noted when compared with other surveyed 
cohorts.194  This difference was most marked in relation to the 
Australian study.195  Considerations of clarity and empirical force 
incline to the view that the good prior track record should be 
confined to first offenders. 
IV.  GOOD ACTS SHOULD NOT MITIGATE PENALTY  
We now turn to whether good acts should mitigate penalty.  The 
most extensive consideration of whether good acts should mitigate 
penalty is by Carissa Hessick.  She contends that offenders who 
have committed past good acts should get a reduction in penalty.196  
However, this conclusion does not stem from an overarching 
analysis of the doctrinally sound role of good acts in the sentencing 
calculus, but derives from the role that bad acts, and in particular 
prior convictions, currently play in sentencing law and practice.197  
Hessick correctly observes that prior criminal history is a strong 
aggravating sentencing factor and, for reasons of parity, she 
contends that prior good acts should have the opposite effect.198  
However, this approach does not firmly press the argument for good 
acts being mitigatory.  First, “[m]itigating and aggravating factors 
 
193 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 6; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 19. 
194 DUROSE ET AL., supra note 134, at 10; ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 30. 
195 See ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 170, at 35–38 (discussing the empirical data 
collected on recidivists’ repeat participation in criminal conduct). 
196 Hessick, supra note 43, at 1133. 
197 Id. at 1134. 
198 Id. at 1135–36.  Hessick does, however, contend that good acts would not be mitigating 
under theories of mitigation proposed by other commentators, because they do not relate to 
the seriousness of the crime, the offender’s decision to commit the crime, or offender’s 
culpability.  Id. at 1136; see also Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1435–36 
(2004) (identifying a system where leniency in sentencing may be granted after considering 
other facets of the defendant’s character outside the commission of the crime); Carol S. 
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization 
Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 846–48 (1992) (defining evidence of 
good character as a mitigating factor to the severity of sentencing). 
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do not represent different sides of the same coin.”199  Thus, for 
example, while a vulnerable victim increases the penalty, a robust 
and resilient victim does not reduce the sanction—the opposite of an 
aggravating factor does not necessarily mitigate.  Moreover, while 
prior convictions do have a profound aggravating impact, it is not 
the case that this approach is logically or normatively defensible.  
Indeed, it has been recently argued that prior convictions should 
assume far less prominence in the sentencing inquiry.200  Thus, in 
order to assess the relevance of good acts to sentencing, a wider 
examination is necessary. 
A potential obstacle to good acts reducing penalty relates to the 
definitional issue of what exactly constitutes a “good” act.  Hessick 
attempts to overcome this line-drawing difficulty by stating that the 
focus should not be on whether an offender is a “good” person, or the 
offender’s motives, but the nature of the act itself.201  There is some 
validity to this approach.  While the number of concrete ways in 
which a person can behave is almost incalculable, there are some 
actions that are objectively and unequivocally positive.  Common 
examples include paying taxes and engaging with people in a polite 
and civil tone. 
Even more praiseworthy are benevolent acts that benefit others, 
and which involve no tangible benefit to the individual, such as 
charity work and donating money to the less well off.  Then there 
are some acts, often underpinned by rare talent or commitment (or 
both), which enhance the lives of many people.  The setting in which 
this can occur comes in a variety of forms; ranging from music, 
sport, and art (forums in which millions of people can be engaged) to 
medical research (which can develop new medicines that save 
millions of lives).  By way of further example, Hessick contends that 
military service (and charitable work) should mitigate irrespective 
of the motive.202 
Thus, it is possible to identify, with a degree of accuracy, acts 
which are positive.  However, the line-drawing exercise is 
considerably complicated by the fact that humans perform an 
infinite number of acts and tasks.  Moreover, while people perform 
 
199 Julian V. Roberts & Mike Hough, Exploring Public Attitudes to Sentencing Factors in 
England and Wales, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 168, 183 (Julian V. 
Roberts ed., 2011). 
200 See Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime—Not the Prior Convictions of 
the Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to 
Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 415 (2014). 
201 See Hessick, supra note 43, at 1161–62. 
202 Id. at 1148. 
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many acts, they are not necessarily consistent and coherent in their 
behavior, and hence there is a degree of arbitrariness associated 
with focusing only on certain categories of acts for sentencing 
purposes.  Bad acts (apart from prior convictions) must also be 
factored into this assessment. 
At this point, the inquiry becomes very complex.  To make an 
assessment about an individual’s overall weight of good and bad 
acts would require “a superhuman level of insight into the 
individual.”203  For this reason, Andrew Ashworth contends that 
judges “should not be interested in inquiring either into any bad 
social deeds the offender has been involved in, except previous 
offences, or into any good social deeds.”204 
Complexity in line-drawing or definition of a legal concept is not a 
principled reason for rejection of a proposal.205  However, in relation 
to any legal issue, accuracy in outcome is important.  There must be 
a basis for confidence that the principle is likely to be correctly 
applied, otherwise the integrity of the process is undermined.  
Integrity risks need to be factored into the decision regarding 
whether a principle should be adopted.  The risk of error needs to be 
accommodated.  If the concept in question is inherently vague, only 
a strong argument in support of the principle can justify the 
exhaustive search necessary to formulate the criteria and determine 
the boundaries which might give the principle workable legal 
operation.  No such strong justification exists for incorporating good 
acts into the sentencing inquiry. 
Past positive contributions should not mitigate criminal sanctions 
because they do not bear on the objectives of the sentencing system.  
There is no evidence that charity workers, for example, recidivate 
less frequently than other offenders.  Further, there are no wider 
principles of law and justice that support punishing offenders who 
have committed commendable acts less harshly.  In a market-based 
system, many good acts are rewarded financially, and where there 
is no financial benefit, people often receive nontangible rewards in 
the form of feelings of satisfaction and accomplishment.  Thus, to 
confer a sentencing discount for past acts would be to “double-dip” 
when it comes to acknowledging such behavior.  Thus, no good acts 
should mitigate penalty, including military service. 
It is pertinent to note, however, that good acts can be divided into 
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two temporal components.  The first are those prior to the sentence.  
Second, are those that are likely to occur in the future, but may be 
frustrated by the imposition of a criminal sanction.  A stronger 
argument can be made in favor of the latter acts being mitigatory.  
These acts have not occurred and hence, unlike past acts, the 
benefit to others has not yet been transmitted. 
But even the prospect of such actions should not mitigate penalty.  
In any decision making process, concrete benefits should be 
preferred over speculative ones.  In a properly crafted sentence, the 
benefits of a proportionate sentence are clear,206 whereas the 
performance of future good acts is never certain.  Moreover, the 
capacity of an individual to significantly improve the lives of others, 
to the point that the lives of others would be diminished if the 
proposed acts were not performed, is slight.  Boxer Mike Tyson 
entertained and delighted millions of people with his punching 
prowess prior to being imprisoned for three years for rape at the 
height of his career in 1991.207  However, his incarceration did not 
cause a meaningful reduction in the well-being of any other person. 
Theoretically, it is possible to imagine situations where 
imprisoning an offender will reduce the flourishing of many people.  
A classic instance is a brilliant scientist on the verge of a life-saving 
medical breakthrough.  However, the rarity of such an episode 
underscores the undesirability of such a principle.  General legal 
principles should not be developed to accommodate extreme 
scenarios.208 
V.  OFFENDERS WITH PHYSICAL OF FINANCIAL DEPENDENTS SHOULD 
RECEIVE A REDUCED SENTENCE 
However, different conclusions apply regarding the sentencing of 
offenders with certain family ties.  The lives of nearly all individuals 
are interconnected with other people.  There is enormous diversity 
in the type of connections that individuals have and the number of 
people with whom they are connected.  Despite this, certain 
connections are demonstrably more profound and important than 
 
206 See Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality in 
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others.  An individual’s life can, in some situations, become so 
interconnected with others that they become dependent on them. 
There are different forms of dependency.  The main ones are 
emotional, physical and financial.  There is no clear line regarding 
when any of these forms of interconnectedness becomes a 
dependency, but in general terms, a dependency occurs where the 
other person’s flourishing is significantly negatively impacted if the 
relationship were to be severed.209 
As noted above, the concept of dependence has been broached in 
sentencing cases, but has not been defined with any degree of 
precision.210  This reflects the peripheral relevance of family ties in 
the sentencing domain.  The form of dependency that is the most 
obscure, and perhaps the most common, is emotional dependence.  
This is a concept that does not have a legal recognition in other 
areas of the law.  It is not one that requires examining in the 
sentencing context either.  It is inherently vague and unverifiable 
with any degree of rigor, and hence, incapable of forming a concept 
which can properly inform outcomes in the sentencing realm. 
Other forms of dependence are, however, more concrete.  
Financial and physical dependence are relatively well established in 
other areas of law, such as migration211 and social security.212  The 
criteria used to establish these form of dependency (or adaptations 
of them) can be readily transported to sentencing law.  The classic 
instance of financial dependency is a sole parent who works to 
support the material needs of his/her children.  Physical 
dependency includes situations where a spouse caters for the 
mobility requirements of a seriously chronically ill partner, for 
example, one with severe symptoms of multiple sclerosis or 
dementia. 
There are two principles that weigh in favour of financial or 
physical dependency having a mitigating effect.  The first is the 
right to family.  The other is the prohibition against punishing the 
innocent.  We consider them in that order. 
The right to a family is enshrined in a number of international 
and domestic law legal instruments.  Article 17 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or 
 
209 For a further discussion of this topic, see generally Bagaric, supra note 206. 
210 See supra Part II. 
211 See, e.g., Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Austl.). 
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correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 
 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.213 
Article 23 of the same instrument states: 
 1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit 
of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State. 
 2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to 
marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 
 3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and 
full consent of the intending spouses.214 
The right to a family has been one of the less commonly litigated 
human rights, and hence, there is little developed jurisprudence 
regarding its meaning and scope.  It expressly includes the right to 
found a family, and by implication, the capacity to live in a familial 
structure.215  Imprisoning a family member, and especially the 
family member who is the principal provider for the family, places 
at risk the integrity, flourishing, and sometimes, the viability of the 
family as a unit.216 
However, irrespective of the content of the right to a family, it is 
unlikely that it can be invoked to ground a strong stand alone 
argument in favor of reducing the sanctions imposed on offenders 
with dependents.  This is because of an intrinsic feature of rights. 
No right is absolute. This has been acknowledged by leading 
rights proponents.  Ronald Dworkin accepts that it is correct for a 
government “to infringe on a right when it is necessary to protect a 
more important right, or to ward off some great threat to society.”217  
In a like manner, Robert Nozick states that consequential 
“considerations would take over to avert ‘moral catastrophe.’”218 
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Rights can be defeated in two broad situations.  The first is where 
they clash with a more important right.219  The right to physical 
integrity is normally subordinate to the right to life.220  Thus, it is 
permissible to harm a person who uses potentially life-threatening 
force against another individual.221  In fact, sometimes it is even 
permissible to kill an attacker.222 
The second situation where rights can sometimes be eroded is 
where they are contrary to the common good.223  For example, the 
right to protest on the roadways can often be defeated by the right 
of a community to be able to efficiently travel, and security concerns 
override the right to privacy of passengers who board planes, who 
must make themselves subject to identity checking and a search of 
their baggage and clothing.224 
There is no clear methodology for identifying the hierarchy of 
rights and the circumstances when rights may be limited.  Hence 
the often abstract notion of a right is rarely a defining concept in 
favor of implementing a concrete social, economic, or legal proposal.  
This is especially so in relation to rights whose contours are 
indeterminate and still evolving, such as the right to a family.  The 
scope for this right to be used as a jurisprudential sword to carve 
out mitigation for offenders with dependents is further minimized 
by the fact that in some contexts it is expressly subject to the 
interests of the criminal justice system.  Thus, for example, Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: 
 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence. 
 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.225 
While the right to a family has tenable application to the 
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sentencing of offenders with dependents, its obscure nature and the 
jurisprudential complexities associated with its limits when 
contrasted with competing considerations diminish its capacity to 
be operationalized in the sentencing realm so as to ground the basis 
for a concrete mitigating factor.226  Yet, there is a more forceful 
principle, which can be invoked to this end. 
Mitigation for dependency can also be supported on the basis of 
the principle that the innocent should not be punished.  This 
principle is not only widely accepted and weighty but is also 
seemingly clear-cut.227  The proscription applies most acutely in 
relation to people who have committed no crime and who are 
subjected to criminal sanctions.  The principle has been most 
dramatically illustrated in the context of punishment deliberately 
inflicted on people known to be innocent.  A good example is the 
following dilemma devised by H. J. McCloskey:228 
Suppose a sheriff were faced with the choice either of 
framing [an African American] for a rape which had aroused 
white hostility to [African Americans] (this particular 
[African American] being believed to be guilty) and thus 
preventing serious anti-[African American] riots which 
would probably lead to loss of life, or of allowing the riots to 
occur.  If he were . . . [a] utilitarian he would be committed to 
framing the [African American].229  
The proscription against punishing the innocent is so powerful 
that it is one of the reasons that utilitarianism has fallen out of 
favor as the most influential theory of punishment230—it is thought 
that any theory that commits us to such heinous outcomes must be 
flawed.231  The proscription against punishing the innocent extends 
to not only punishing accused persons that are known to be 
innocent, but also to those that the system does not know to be 
innocent; that is, to all wrongful convictions.232  
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On closer analysis, however, the scope of the operation of the no 
punishment of the innocent principle is unclear.  In particular, it is 
not certain whether the principle extends to those who indirectly 
suffer from the punishment, such as the dependents of offenders.  
The answer to this in part turns on the definition of punishment.  A 
large number of definitions of punishment have been proposed.  
According to John McTaggart and Ellis McTaggart, punishment is 
“the infliction of pain on a person because he has done wrong.”233  
More expansive is one of the most influential modern day 
sentencing jurists, Andrew von Hirsch, who states: “[P]unishing 
someone consists of visiting a deprivation (hard treatment) on him, 
because he has committed a wrong, in a manner that expresses 
disapprobation on the person for his conduct,”234 or “[p]unishing 
someone consists of doing something painful or unpleasant to him, 
because he has purportedly committed a wrong.”235  Jeremy 
Bentham used more succinct terms in stating that “all punishment 
is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.”236  C. L. Ten emphasizes 
the hardship that is an inherent aspect of punishment.  According 
to him, punishment “involves the infliction of some unpleasantness 
on the offender, or it deprives the offender of something valued.”237  
This is a theme which has also been noted by R. A. Duff who stated: 
“The intrinsic point of punishment is that it should hurt—that it 
should inflict suffering, hardship or burdens.”238  A more extensive 
definition is offered by Nigel Walker, who believes that punishment 
“involves the infliction of something which is assumed to be 
unwelcome to the recipient: the inconvenience of a disqualification, 
the hardship of incarceration, the suffering of a flogging, exclusion 
from the country or community, or in extreme cases death.”239 
Despite the different language that has been used to define and 
describe punishment, broken down to its core and intrinsic features 
it can be defined as a deprivation or hardship which is imposed for a 
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transgression which has been committed.240 
Thus, orthodox terminology and thinking suggests that 
punishment by its very nature involves the infliction of a degree of 
inconvenience or hardship on an offender by an authority (i.e., a 
court) and it also involves a connection between the offending and 
the punishment.241  However, while conventional thinking debunks 
the concept of punishing being applicable to hardship which is not 
imposed by an authority, legal principle and practice is more 
accommodating to a wider understanding of the meaning of 
punishment.242 
Courts in Australia have accepted that incidental suffering 
sustained by the offender can be used as a basis for offsetting or 
reducing the need for formal punishment.243  Thus, injuries 
sustained by an offender during the commission of an offense244 and 
public humiliation245 and reduced employment prospects246 
stemming from the offense are mitigatory.247  These incidental 
hardships are regarded as offsetting the need for a fully 
proportionate penalty because they are a component of a net 
punishment experienced by the offender.248 
This evinces a liberal approach to the nature of punishment, 
given that there is no requirement for the court to intentionally 
impose the hardship.  Pain occasioned to the offender’s dependents 
is arguably even more closely associated with the orthodox view of 
punishment than incidental punishment, given that it is foreseeable 
at the time of the imposition.  Accordingly, by analogy, it too should 
operate to mitigate penalty on the basis of an extended approach to 
the understanding of the concept of punishment.249  Of course, 
analogies are only as strong as the cornerstones that are utilized.  
The suggestion that incidental harm suffered by offenders is a form 
of punishment is contestable. 
However, even if the analogy breaks down, the ideal behind the 
analogy can be persuasively recast.  Recasting the principle “the 
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innocent should not be punished” into the principle that “the 
innocent should not suffer” circumvents the stricture possibly 
associated with the concept of punishment, without meaningfully 
eroding the appeal and persuasiveness of the principle.  It is clear 
that dependents of offenders are innocent.250  It is also clear that 
they suffer if the offender is imprisoned.  The only way to 
ameliorate this suffering is to not imprison the offender, or to 
reduce the severity of the punishment, and in particular, the length 
of the prison term. 
Thus, there is a coherent argument for accommodating the 
interests of dependents into the sentencing calculus.  It could be 
countered that pain experienced by dependents should be ignored 
because the hardship they experience, while foreseeable, is not 
intended.  This form of argument invokes the “doctrine of double 
effect.”251  This is the principle that it is permissible to perform an 
act having two effects, one good and one bad, where the good 
consequence is intended and the bad merely foreseen, there is 
proportionality between the good and bad consequences, and those 
consequences occur relatively simultaneously.252 
The doctrine is employed in a wide variety of situations in an 
attempt to justify practices which result in bad consequences which 
were foreseeable.  In the wartime or battlefield context it 
supposedly justifies why it is permissible to bomb a military target 
despite the fact that it will invariably result in civilian deaths.  In 
the medical setting it is sometimes invoked to justify killing unborn 
babies where the pregnancy is a demonstrable risk to the life of the 
mother.  Moreover, it is sometimes used to explain why it is 
permissible to prescribe or administer high quantities of pain killers 
to terminally ill patients, even though it may result in their 
death.253 
The soundness of the doctrine, however, is not universally 
accepted.  The key distinction employed by the doctrine is devoid of 
a coherent foundation.  There is no basis for distinguishing between 
consequences that are intended as opposed to those that are 
“merely” foreseen—certainly in a manner that is morally 
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significant.254  It is untenable for a person who wishes to make a 
political protest to throw a bomb into a crowd and to exculpate 
himself/herself from censure on the basis that the death of the 
bystanders was merely foreseen—his/her actual intention 
(supposedly) being to highlight an important social injustice.255 
The correct approach is that there is no logical or normative 
difference between consequences that we foresee and those which 
we intend.  Individuals are responsible for all consequences which 
they knowingly cause.  The only tenable foundation for the 
distinction adverted to by the doctrine of double effect is the 
consequentialist position that it is acceptable to bring about 
consequences which are merely foreseen if these bad consequences 
are outweighed by the benefits resulting from the act.256  And, from 
the perspective of the innocent person who suffers from the 
imposition of a criminal sanction, it certainly does not matter 
whether his/her suffering is intentional or merely foreseen: it hurts 
just the same.  The doctrine of double effect is devoid of an 
overarching justification, and cannot be used to ignore the plight of 
the dependents of offenders. 
There is no clear basis for determining the discount that should 
be available to offenders who have dependents.  It needs to be 
significant enough to ease some of the suffering of the dependents, 
but not so large so as to meaningfully impinge on the 
proportionality principle.  Once again, a twenty-five percent 
discount is appropriate for reasons set out in relation to the 
proposed first-offender discount. 
The operation of mitigating factors should not operate in a simple 
cumulative manner; otherwise, a combination of mitigating factors 
could potentially amount to a discount of 100% or more.  Instead, 
the discounts or additions are to be applied individually, to the 
contracted sentence, following application of the previous 
consideration.  Thus, a first offender who has dependents should not 
receive a fifty percent discount of the entire sentence.  Rather, the 
discount is 42.5% (i.e., twenty-five percent plus the remaining part 
of the sentence—seventy-five percent—multiplied by twenty-five 
percent).  This discount is not inconsiderable.  However, as 
discussed above, neither are the principles in support of the 
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considerations which underpin the reductions. 
VI.  FIRST-OFFENDER AND DEPENDENTS DISCOUNTS WILL NOT 
UNDERMINE OTHER VALID SENTENCING OBJECTIVES 
The core argument in this article in favor of a sentencing discount 
for first-time offenders is that the community has less to fear from 
offenders who have not previously committed an offense.  The 
objective of community protection will not be meaningfully 
undermined if first-time offenders receive a shorter sentence, given 
that first-time offenders are less likely to reoffend than other 
offenders.257  The rationale in favor of a discount for offenders with 
dependents is different: it stems from the need to observe the 
principle that the innocent should not suffer. 
However, the analysis thus far has not taken into account all key 
objectives of sentencing.  Prior to confirming the recommendations 
in this paper, it is necessary to assess whether the proposals would 
conflict with or undermine any of the main sentencing objectives.  
If, for example, shorter sentences for first-time offenders would 
limit the capacity for punishment to deter crime, it may be 
appropriate to abandon or attenuate the proposals in this article. 
The key contemporary sentencing objectives are incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence.258  We 
now assess the desirability of the reforms in this article through the 
lens of each of these aims.  We start with the objectives that do not 
in fact influence the current discussion.  Rehabilitation cannot 
operate to counter the proposals.  Rehabilitation, when it is 
applicable, favors a more lenient sentence259 and hence the 
proposals are consistent with this objective.260 
Specific deterrence and general deterrence also cannot properly 
be invoked to counter the proposals, given the limited efficacy of 
sentencing to achieve these ends.  There have been an enormous 
number of empirical studies regarding whether sentencing can 
achieve these goals.  We have recently analyzed this data at 
length.261  The following is a summary of the current knowledge. 
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The theory of specific deterrence is the view that offenders can be 
dissuaded from committing crime in the future by inflicting 
hardship on them.  If offenders are met with an undesirable 
sanction for committing crime they will, so the theory runs, be 
reluctant to again commit an offense because of their desire to avoid 
the same unpleasant experience.262  This theory is not supported by 
the empirical data.263  Thus, mitigating the penalties that are 
imposed on some offenders will not make them more likely to 
reoffend in the future.264 
The studies that establish the inability of sentencing to deter 
specific offenders have been undertaken over several decades and 
across a wide range of jurisdictions and different time periods.265  A 
relatively recent literature review of the studies examining the 
efficacy of criminal punishment to achieve the goal of specific 
deterrence was undertaken by Daniel Nagin, Francis Cullen, and 
Cheryl Jonson.266  The authors looked at over fifty separate studies 
which analyzed the impact of custodial sanctions on reoffending and 
contrasted this with the recidivism levels associated with less harsh 
sanctions.267  They also reviewed studies which focused on 
ascertaining if sentence duration impacted the rate of 
reoffending.268 
The authors concluded that harsher sentences do not lead to 
lower rates of offending.269  In fact, imprisonment may lead to 
slightly higher rates of recidivism than less harsh sanctions.270  The 
authors noted: 
 Taken as a whole, it is our judgment that the 
experimental studies point more toward a criminogenic 
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es/default/files/publication-documents/Does%20Imprisonment%20Deter%20A%20Review%20 
of%20the%20Evidence.pdf; DON WEATHERBURN ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, THE 
SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECT OF CUSTODIAL PENALTIES ON JUVENILE REOFFENDING 2 (2009), 
available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/A/3/D/%7bA3DB5DEB-2A53-4272-87CF-CE510 
D13481B%7dtbp33.pdf. 
264 Bagaric & Alexander, supra note 144, at 167. 
265 See, e.g., Id. at 163–67 (examining various studies on the effectiveness of specific 
deterrence). 
266 Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment & Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115 (2009). 
267 Id. at 143–45, 154–55. 
268 Id. at 143. 
269 See id. at 178. 
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BAGARIC & ALEXANDER 3/3/2015  5:44 PM 
442 Albany Law Review [Vol. 78.2 
[(that is, the possible corrupting effects of punishment)] 
rather than preventive effect of custodial sanctions.  The 
evidence for this conclusion, however, is weak because it is 
based on only a small number of studies, and many of the 
point estimates are not statistically significant.271 
This position is confirmed by more recent research.272  It is futile 
to argue for increased penalties with the aim of decreasing the 
likelihood that offenders will reoffend in the future.  Accordingly, it 
cannot be validly asserted that the proposals in this paper should 
not be pursed because the goal of specific deterrence will be 
compromised. 
The type of deterrence that is most commonly invoked in support 
of harsh criminal sanctions is general deterrence.273  This is the 
theory that people will be discouraged from committing criminal 
offenses if they are aware of the penalties that are imposed on 
actual offenders.274 
General deterrence can be broken down into two separate 
theories.  The most common manner in which it is typically 
employed is what is known as marginal general deterrence.275  It is 
the theory that there is a causal nexus between the harshness of 
criminal sanctions and the incidence of crime: supposedly, crime 
will be reduced with increasingly harsh penalties.276  The more 
modest general deterrence theory is that there is a link between the 
imposition of some form of hardship (which need not be particularly 
severe) and the crime rate.  This is known as absolute general 
deterrence.277 
The weight of the existing empirical data suggests that only 
 
271 Id. at 145. 
272 See Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate 
the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 
CRIMINOLOGY 357, 381 (2010) (finding that incarceration had little effect on likelihood of 
recidivism). 
273 See Dieter Dölling et al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of a Meta-Analysis of 
Punishment, 15 EUR. J. CRIM. POL’Y RES. 201, 201 (2009). 
274 See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 200 
(2013). 
275 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN 
CRIME CONTROL 14 (1973). 
276 See id. at 14, 72. 
277 See id.; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Enforcing the Selective Service Act: Deterrence of 
Potential Violators, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1152 n.12 (1978) (“Absolute deterrence refers to 
whether the creation of a sanction, usually by legislative enactment, reduces or eliminates a 
particular type of behavior.  The concept of absolute deterrence does not address differences 
resulting from variations in the nature of the sanctions themselves.”). 
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absolute general deterrence is valid.278  If individuals did not believe 
that as a result of criminal activity they could be subjected to a 
sanction, the crime rate would escalate considerably.279  Accordingly 
there is a causal nexus between the rate of crime and the presence 
of criminal penalties.  This nexus does not extend to a link between 
more severe penalties (even in the form of the death penalty) and 
less crime.280  The upshot of this is that general deterrence theory 
can be used to justify the existence of criminal sanctions, but not to 
justify the need for particularly harsh penalties.281 
Thus, deterrence properly informs sentencing only to the extent 
that it requires a hardship to be imposed for criminal offending.  It 
does not require a particularly burdensome penalty, merely one that 
people would seek to avoid.  This aim can be satisfied by a fine or a 
short prison term.  Thus, a twenty-five percent reduction to a term 
of imprisonment for first-time offenders or those with dependents 
cannot reduce the deterrent impact of a sentence (to the extent that 
deterrence is achievable through a state imposed system of 
 
278 See RITCHIE, supra note 263, at 7, 15 (finding that while absolute deterrence enjoys 
historical support, the existing research suggests that increases in sentence severity do not 
correspond to increased deterrent effects). 
279 See id. at 7. 
280 See John J. Donohue III, Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: Overall 
Changes and the Benefits on the Margin, in DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 269, 274, 309 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009) 
(noting that research on the impact of imprisonment on crime is unable to separate the effects 
of incapacitation from deterrence); William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison 
Expansion, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 97, 123 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 
2000) (concluding that the dramatic increase in the incarceration rate had a limited impact 
on the observed decrease in the crime rate in the United States); NIGEL WALKER, 
SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 60–61, 191–92 (1969); John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence 
or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma’s Return to Capital Punishment, 32 
CRIMINOLOGY 107, 129 (1994); Dölling et al., supra note 273, at 220–22 (finding that the 
threat of the death penalty did not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the 
crime rate); Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl M. Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting 
the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 187–89 (2003); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding 
Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 
J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 175–76 (2004) (expressing skepticism about the deterrent effect of the 
death penalty); William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us About 
Imprisonment and Crime, 27 CRIME & JUST. 419, 423 (2000) (noting that research on prison 
effectiveness has been unable to distinguish between the effects of incapacitation and 
deterrence).  But see Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A 
Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569, 576 (2001) (finding support for 
the deterrence hypothesis in the death penalty context); Paul R. Zimmerman, State 
Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163, 187–88, 190 
(2004) (finding that while there was an observed deterrent effect between the death penalty 
and the murder rate, the deterrent effect was related to the actual implementation of 
executions, as opposed to just having the death penalty available). 
281 See Bagaric & Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work, supra note 261, 
at 282–83. 
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sentencing). 
Incapacitation and community protection are often used 
interchangeably282—the principal means by which the community is 
protected from criminals is by incapacitating them behind prison 
walls.283  There is no need to incapacitate offenders (from the 
perspective of community protection) if they would not offend if they 
were not imprisoned.  As noted above, empirical data establishes 
that offenders with a criminal past are less likely to commit another 
offense than criminals with a long criminal history and hence this 
cohort of offenders is entitled to a discount.284  However, this is not 
necessarily the case with offenders who have dependents.  Often 
they will have a criminal record.285 
In Part II of this article, we noted that in all sentencing systems 
there is a heavy loading that is applicable to recidivists.  One of us 
has recently argued that this premium is too weighty.286  However, 
victimology studies establish that sexual and violent offenses 
(unlike other offenses) often have a lasting destructive impact on 
the lives of victims.287  Moreover, these offenses are 
disproportionately committed by recidivists.288  Accordingly, it has 
been suggested that recidivist offenders who commit serious violent 
or sexual offenses should receive a penalty loading, albeit one that 
is lighter than is currently the situation.289  The premium that 
should be imposed for these types of offenses on recidivists is twenty 
to fifty percent.290  Offenders who have dependents and fall into this 
cohort group should still have a reduced penalty, but the discount 
will need to be calculated with reference to the serious offender 
recidivist enhancement.  This means that offenders with 
 
282 See Kevin Bennardo, Incarceration’s Incapacitative Shortcomings, 54 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2014) (discussing the different types of incapacitation theories). 
283 See id. at 2. 
284 See Alex R. Piquero et al., The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 359, 438 
(2003). 
285 Criminal Mothers Strongly Influence Crime in Children, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY 
(May 9, 2011), http://aic.gov.au/media/2011/may/20110509.html. 
286 See Bagaric, supra note 200, at 415. 
287 See MIKE DIXON ET AL., INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, CRIMESHARE: THE UNEQUAL 
IMPACT OF CRIME 17, 22–23, 25 (2006), available at http://www.ippr.org/assets/media/images/ 
media/files/publication/2011/05/crimeshare_1500.pdf; Rochelle F. Hanson et al., The Impact of 
Crime Victimization on Quality of Life, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 189, 189, 194 (2010); Adriaan 
J. M. Denkers & Frans Willem Winkel, Crime Victims’ Well-Being and Fear in a Prospective 
and Longitudinal Study, 5 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 141, 155–57 (1998). 
288 See Geoffrey S. Weed, Ending Recidivism: How a Judicial Paradigm Shift Could 
Prevent Recidivism by Sex Offenders, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 457, 462 
(2014). 
289 See Bagaric, supra note 200, at 359–61, 410–11. 
290 Id. at 411. 
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dependents who have a criminal record and commit serious sexual 
or violent offenses should still have their penalty mitigated by 
twenty-five percent in the interests of their dependents but this 
reduction will in some cases not totally cancel out the recidivist 
premium.291 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The focus of sentencing is most directly on the nature of the 
offense, and in particular, the harm caused by the crime.  Factors 
personal to the offender typically assume little relevance, apart 
from prior convictions which can carry considerable aggravating 
weight.  One of the key reasons that the profile of the offender has 
not assumed a greater role in the sentencing inquiry is because this 
area of law is under-researched and underdeveloped. 
A systematic analysis of the relevance of offender profile to 
sentencing reveals that it should assume more prominence than is 
currently the situation.  So far as sentencing is concerned, there are 
three aspects to an offender’s profile.  The first is the offender’s 
prior criminal history.  Much has been written, and even more 
legislated upon, regarding a bad criminal history.  This article has 
examined good criminal history.  Pursuant to the objectives of 
sentencing, it emerges that good criminal history should have a 
considerable impact on sentencing.  First-time offenders reoffend at 
lower rates than repeat offenders, and hence, are less of a danger to 
the community.  The objective of community protection applies less 
acutely to them.  It follows that first offenders should receive a 
sentencing discount in the order of twenty-five percent.  This rule 
should not be subject to any exceptions depending on offense type as 
is currently the situation. 
The second relevant aspect of an offender’s profile is any past 
good act.  On close analysis, it emerges that offenders who have 
committed previous past good acts should not get a discount beyond 
that associated with a good criminal history (assuming that, in fact, 
they have not previously committed an offense).  There is no tenable 
basis for accurately calculating the net caliber of an individual’s 
acts, and even if such a calibration could be undertaken, it would be 
futile given that an offender’s past conduct is irrelevant to any 
proper objective of sentencing. 
 
291 There will be no cancellation where the recidivist loading is in excess of twenty-five 
percent. 
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The impact that sentencing has on the lives of people connected to 
an offender is an area that is not currently sufficiently 
accommodated in the sentencing calculus.  Offenders should be 
punished commensurate with the gravity of their offense.  However, 
principles which are acutely applicable to the sentencing domain do 
not exhaust the range of considerations that should properly inform 
sentencing outcomes. Sentencing is not superior to other areas of 
law.  There is a need for legal and normative coherence in all areas 
of the law.  The principle that the innocent should not suffer is 
universal, and should be accommodated.  Offenders who have 
physical or financial dependents should have a penalty reduction in 
the order of twenty-five percent.  Operationalizing a clear principle 
of this nature will have an especially positive impact in the United 
States federal system by abolishing a major disjunct that currently 
exists in relation to this area of the law.  As we have seen, the 
current default position pursuant to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines is that family ties are not relevant to sentencing, 
however, the reality reveals that this consideration is often applied 
by courts to mitigate sentence.  
The recommendations in this article, if adopted, will make 
sentencing law consistent with the available empirical evidence 
regarding recidivism levels and cohere the law with wider principles 
of justice, while continuing to emphasize the importance of 
matching the punishment to the crime. 
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A RATIONAL APPROACH TO SENTENCING  
WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN AUSTRALIA
AbstrAct
There are no overarching (and few settled) principles governing the 
sentencing of white-collar offenders. This is especially the situation in 
relation to the relevance of public opprobrium to the sentencing calculus 
and the manner in which employment deprivations stemming from the 
penalty impact on the sentence. To the extent that there is general conver-
gence in the approach to sentencing white-collar offenders, the approach is 
often not sound. This is the case in relation to the minor sentencing discount 
accorded for previous good character, and the prevailing orthodoxy which 
assumes that offences targeted at major institutions, such as banks, mean-
ingfully impair community confidence in such institutions. Fundamental 
reform of the manner in which white-collar offenders are sentenced is 
necessary in order to make this area of law more coherent and doctrinally 
sound. These reforms include providing a significant and pre-determined 
discount for restitution, reducing the weight given to general deterrence in 
the sentencing calculus, and providing a greater discount for previous good 
character and employment deprivations suffered as a direct result of the 
sentence. Further, crimes against individuals should be regarded as being 
more serious than those committed against large corporations or the public 
revenue. The article focuses on the existing law in Australia, however, the 
reform proposals and doctrinal analysis could be applied to all jurisdictions.
I  IntroductIon
White-collar crime stands apart from other criminal offences. The differences are often exacerbated when it comes to sentencing white-collar offenders. Considerations that often distinguish white-collar 
offences from other types of crime include:
• white-collar offenders are not normally from socially-deprived backgrounds;
• white-collar offenders often do not have prior convictions;
• white-collar offences often involve a breach of trust or violation of some other 
moral virtue, such as loyalty;
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• the offences are normally well planned or may continue over a long period of 
time;
• it is often possible to fully remedy the resulting tangible harm through monetary 
restitution;
• there is no limit to the maximum benefit derived from the crime;
• the harm caused by the offence often goes beyond that inflicted on individuals 
and extends to financial institutions and markets; 
• there are often non-criminal sequels to the conduct in question; and
• there is often a range of incidental sanctions which are suffered by white-collar 
offenders, including loss of reputation and reduction of future career prospects.
The unique features of white-collar offending have resulted in a fluid and unsettled 
jurisprudence in the sentencing of such offenders. This is unremarkable given the 
absence of legislative fiat dealing expressly with this criminological subset. This article 
examines the nature of white-collar crime with a view to providing a framework for a 
rational and consistent approach to sentencing white-collar offenders.
In part II of the article, we define ‘white-collar crime’. Part III analyses the current 
sentencing approach to white-collar criminals. In part IV, we suggest how the 
sentencing of white-collar criminals should be reformed.
The reforms we ultimately propose include: making restitution to the victim a stronger 
mitigating factor; providing a greater sentencing discount for previous good character; 
recognising the impact of incidental harms, such as diminished career prospects, in 
the sentencing process; and making the measure of harm caused by the offence the 
key determinant in sentence severity, consistent with the concept of proportionality.
II  the defInItIon of WhIte-collAr crIme
There is no universally-accepted definition of white-collar crime despite the 
concept first being introduced over 80 years ago by Edwin Sutherland as ‘a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of 
his occupation’.1 This definition is forensically inadequate because notions such 
as ‘respectability’ and ‘social status’ are too obscure to be meaningful,2 and 
1 This was the description given by Sutherland in a speech he delivered to the American 
Sociological Society in 1939: see J Kelly Strader, Understanding White-Collar Crime 
(LexisNexis, 2002) 1.
2 Richard Quinney, ‘The Study of White-Collar Crime: Toward a Re-orientation in 
Theory and Research’ in Gilbert Geis and Robert F Meier (eds), White-Collar Crime 
— Offenses in Business, Politics and the Professions (Free Press, 1977) 285.
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white-collar offending clearly transcends occupational or workplace transgres-
sions.3
In a relatively recent analysis of white-collar crime in his book, Lying, Cheating 
and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime, Stuart Green declines to 
attempt an exhaustive definition of what is encompassed by the concept. He notes 
the failure of sociologists to ascribe a consistent meaning to ‘white-collar crime’, 
observing that the conduct often concerns behaviour at the margins of the criminal 
spectrum. The diversity of conduct falling within the rubric of ‘white-collar’ leads 
Green to steer away from identifying semantic parameters, instead observing that 
such offending shares certain characteristics with other similar types of offending, 
though no single characteristic is essential.4
According to Green, key characteristics include: a diffused type of harm (often 
harming financial environments as opposed to identifiable individuals); wrongdoing 
that violates accepted norms (such as employee fidelity); and, a diminished role for 
mens rea.5 However, he concedes that many offences stand apart from this model. 
Thus, some offences which have a high mens rea, such as bribery and obstruction 
of justice offences, still fall within the white-collar crime rubric. The wrongs that 
Green identifies which are committed by white-collar criminals include breaches of 
trust, loyalty, dishonesty, deception and lying.6
The nebulous nature of white-collar crime is further illustrated by Arie Freiberg, 
who notes:
Discussion of the problem of sentencing [a] ‘white-collar criminal’ is plagued 
by the initial problem of identifying the subject matter. There is no discrete 
group of offences which can readily be identified as ‘white-collar crime’ … 
[O]ver recent years, the phrase has been extended … to cover any occupational 
deviance, whether by persons of high status or not, and violation of professional 
ethics. It would thus extend to cover the case of an academic who demands 
sexual favours in return for good grades. To some it has come to refer to almost 
any form of illegal behaviour other than conventional street crimes.7
3 For a discussion of the evolution of the white-collar terminology, see Kam Wong, 
‘From White-Collar Crime to Organizational Crime: An Intellectual History’ (2005) 
Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 14. 
4 Stuart P Green, Lying, Cheating and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime 
(Oxford University Press, 2006) 18.
5 Ibid 34.
6 Ibid.
7 Arie Freiberg, ‘Sentencing White-Collar Criminals’ (Paper presented at the Fraud 
Prevention and Control Conference, Australian Institute of Criminology, Surfers 
Paradise, Queensland, 24–25 August 2000) 2 <http://aic.gov.au/media_library/
conferences/fraud/freiberg.pdf> (citations omitted).
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The United States Department of Justice gave a partial definition of white-collar 
crime in the following terms:
Nonviolent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception by 
persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi- 
professional and utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; 
also, nonviolent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by 
anyone having special technical and professional knowledge of business and 
government, irrespective of the person’s occupation.8
Indeed, a workable definition of white-collar crime has proved so elusive that some 
commentators have suggested defining the phrase by what it is not. Thus, J Kelly 
Strader posits that a white-collar crime is one that does not:
(a) necessarily involve force against a person or property;
(b) directly relate to the possession, sale, or distribution of narcotics;
(c) directly relate to organized crime activities;
(d) directly relate to such national policies as immigration, civil rights, and 
national security; or
(e) directly involve ‘vice crimes’ or the common theft of property.9
While definitions of white-collar crime can vary widely, it does not mean that the 
search for a definition should be abandoned. A working definition is crucial to the 
coherent analysis of existing jurisprudence, as well as to the process of informed 
decision-making and to any proposals for reform.
A white-collar crime involves an act which involves the taking of money or property 
(such as shares) or avoiding a legal obligation (such as a tax liability) without legal 
justification by an individual who is in a position of substantial influence regarding the 
relevant transaction. Examples of influence are where a bank employee transfers bank 
money into his or her account or where an individual submits a fraudulent tax return 
or deposits a false cheque or subverts the normal operation of the market system. It 
is further illustrated by paradigm instances of white-collar offending, which include:
• theft of company assets by company directors and employees (such as bankers);
• theft of client money by lawyers and accountants;
• insider trading and other market manipulation by people employed in industries 
associated with the financial markets; 
8 Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, Dictionary of Criminal 
Justice Data Terminology (2nd ed, 1981) 215, quoted in Strader, above n 1, 2.
9 Strader, above n 1, 2.
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• complex tax fraud; 
• corruption; and
• money laundering. 
III  current ApproAch to sentencIng WhIte-collAr offenders
A  General Matters Relevant to Sentence
Sentencing is a complex activity and it is not feasible in an article of this size (and with 
its focus) to explain the key principles and rules.10 However, by way of background, 
we provide an overview of the structure of the sentencing law and the manner in 
which sentencing determinations are made as a backdrop to the remaining discussion.
Sentencing law and practice is not uniform throughout Australia. Each of the nine 
jurisdictions has distinctive statutes which guide sentencing decisions.11 Sentencing 
law throughout Australia is, however, remarkably similar in the context of white- 
collar offending. This is because all of the sentencing statutes set out similar 
objectives of sentencing, in the form of general and specific deterrence, community 
protection, denunciation and rehabilitation.12 In relation to each statutory scheme, 
there is no attempt to prioritise these sometimes conflicting objectives.13 The High 
Court of Australia has established that the key consideration in setting the penalty 
is the proportionality principle, which stipulates that the harshness of the sanction 
should match the seriousness of the offence.14
Moreover, the aggravating and mitigating considerations that inform the sentencing 
determination are largely universal. These factors are, principally, a manifesta-
tion of the common law, although some statutory schemes set out such matters in 
detail.15 Important factors that can aggravate or mitigate penalty include the level 
of harm caused by the offence, the offender's prior criminal record, remorse, the 
attitude of the victim (including victim impact statements), the level of planning 
10 For an extensive analysis, see Richard G Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and 
Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1999); Mirko Bagaric and 
Richard Edney, Thomson Reuters, Australian Sentencing, vol 1 (at Release 10); Geraldine 
Mackenzie and Nigel Stobbs, Principles of Sentencing (Federation Press, 2010).
11 The main statutes that deal with sentencing in the respective Australian jurisdictions 
are as follows: Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt 1B 
ss 16–22A; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW); Sentencing Act 1995 
(NT); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 
(SA); Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA).
12 See Bagaric and Edney, above n 10, [1-39101].
13 Ibid.
14 See further the discussion below.
15 See especially the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A.
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involved, the prevalence of the offence, the effect of the proposed sanction, hardship 
to others (especially the offender's family), any guilty plea, voluntary reparation, 
worthy social contributions, and assistance to the criminal justice system.16
All Australian sentencing schemes provide for the imposition of a similar range of 
sanctions. The least serious is a finding of guilt without any further harshness being 
imposed on the offender, and the most severe being a term of imprisonment.17
Further, the High Court has made clear that sentencing decisions are an ‘instinctive 
synthesis’ of all of the relevant variables as opposed to a mathematical calibration 
of each determinant that is relevant in a particular case.18 As a result, there is no 
single penalty which is objectively correct in any case. As was noted recently by the 
Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in Freeman v The Queen:19 
[i]t is a basic principle of sentencing law that there is no single correct sentence 
in a particular case. On the contrary, there is a ‘sentencing range’ within which 
views can reasonably differ as to the appropriate sentence.20
Within this rubric, sentencing principles relating to white-collar crime are largely 
unsettled, but, in practice, there is nonetheless a number of widely-accepted and 
observed rules. Prior to examining the issue in some depth, it is possible to provide 
a framework by setting out some core matters.
White-collar offences are generally regarded as being committed principally for 
greed,21 thus, a paramount consideration in sentencing is the amount of money 
16 Bagaric and Edney, above n 10, [1-42001], [1-60721].
17 Bagaric and Edney, above n 10, [1-501].
18 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 
520. The instinctive approach to sentencing means that discussions of sentencing 
which focus on increases and reductions in penalties are somewhat obscure, given 
that generally a mathematical or clear weighting is not ascribed to relevant variables. 
In this discussion we focus in particular on mitigating considerations. Although the 
extent to which any mitigating factors reduce the sanction is unclear, it is settled that 
where more than one mitigating factor is applicable, the factors operate in a cumulative 
manner to reduce sentence. There is no precise mathematical precision associated 
with this process other than the limitation that the factors cannot cumulate so signifi-
cantly to result in a disproportionate sentence. This allows the courts to adopt a ‘rolled 
up’ or an ‘analytical approach’: see R v Ehrlich (2012) 219 A Crim R 415 (Adams J); 
R v NP [2003] NSWCCA 195 (17 July 2003); R v El Hani [2004] NSWCCA 162 (21 
May 2004). The extent to which mitigating factors impact on sentence is made clearer 
by the fact that, as discussed below, certain considerations (namely, plea of guilty and 
assistance to authorities) attract a mathematical reduction to the penalty. 
19 [2011] VSCA 214 (27 July 2011).
20 Ibid [6].
21 See, eg, R v Mercieca [2004] VSCA 170 (10 September 2004).
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involved.22 Other important considerations are the level of sophistication and 
planning of the offence23 and whether or not a breach of trust occurred.24 Offences 
committed over a long period of time are normally considered to be more serious.25 
That may be because long periods of time provide an offender the opportunity 
to desist from offending. Where an offender has desisted it is a strong mitigating 
factor, especially if coupled with an offender who voluntarily discloses the crimes 
to police.26 The most important sentencing objective that the courts emphasise in 
sentencing white-collar criminals is general deterrence. It is mainly for this reason 
that white-collar crimes involving large amounts (roughly in the order of $100 000) 
normally result in an immediate custodial term being imposed, irrespective of other 
mitigatory factors.27
A good recent example of the general approach to sentencing white-collar offenders 
is set out in the comments of Warren CJ, Redlich J and Ross AJA in DPP (Cth) v 
Gregory28 in the context of rejecting an appeal against sentence for a tax evasion 
offence. The passage is set out at some length to illustrate the complexity of the 
sentencing inquiry in such matters:
In seeking to ensure that proportionate sentences are imposed, the courts have 
consistently emphasised that general deterrence is a particularly significant 
sentencing consideration in white-collar crime and that good character cannot 
be given undue significance as a mitigating factor, and plays a lesser part in the 
sentencing process … Moreover, general deterrence is likely to have a more 
profound effect in the case of white-collar criminals. White-collar criminals 
are likely to be rational, profit seeking individuals who can weigh the benefits 
of committing a crime against the costs of being caught and punished. Further, 
white-collar criminals are also more likely to be first time offenders who fear 
the prospect of incarceration. 
In many if not most cases, imprisonment will be the only sentencing option 
for serious tax fraud in the absence of powerful mitigating circumstances. A 
sophisticated degree of planning accompanied by a lack of contrition should 
ordinarily lead to a more severe sentence of imprisonment. But despite the 
recognised importance of general deterrence, tax fraud has not always been as 
22 Freiberg, above n 7, 9. See also, Hoy v The Queen [2012] VSCA 49 (7 March 2012).
23 R v Coukoulis (2003) 7 VR 45; R v Webber (2000) 114 A Crim R 381; R v Cameron 
(1993) 171 LSJS 305 (SACCA).
24 R v Smith (2000) 114 A Crim R 8.
25 R v Ralphs [2004] VSCA 33 (9 March 2004) (fraud by a law clerk over a nine year 
period); R v Grossi (2008) 23 VR 500 (theft from employer lasting six years); R v 
Galletta [2007] VSCA 177 (30 August 2007) (theft from employer for nine years).
26 R v Lopez [1999] NSWCCA 245 (12 March 1999); R v Kittson [2008] VSCA 77 (5 May 
2008).
27 R v Whitnall (1993) 42 FCR 512; R v Nguyen [1997] 1 VR 386; DPP (Cth) v Carter 
[1998] 1 VR 601; R v Schwabegger [1998] 4 VR 649, 654.
28 DPP (Cth) v Gregory (2011) 250 FLR 169. 
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severely enforced as other forms of criminality. Over a decade ago this court, 
constituted by Winneke P, Brooking and Callaway JJA observed in R v Nguyen 
and Phan that the seriousness of the offence of defrauding the Commonwealth of 
income tax ‘has not always been sufficiently reflected in the sentence passed’ …
A sentence imposed for fraud upon the taxation revenue, is intended to reaffirm 
basic community values that all citizens according to their means should fairly 
share the burden of the incidence of taxation so as to enable government to 
provide for the community, that the revenue must accordingly be protected, 
and that the offender should be censured through manifest denunciation. When 
these considerations are not reflected in the responses of the courts, the criminal 
justice system itself fails to achieve its objectives.29
Several notable aspects emerge from the above passage. First, the preparedness of the 
court to look widely at the harm caused by a white-collar offence, in this case tax 
evasion, and focus not only on the obvious and immediate victim (the tax office) but also 
the ultimate victim (the general public). Second, the degree of planning and sophistica-
tion of the offence is important. Third, general deterrence is given considerable weight 
in the sentencing calculus because of the need to discourage similar offending. It is 
assumed that this will be especially effective in the case of those inclined to commit 
white-collar offences, because they do not normally have prior convictions and are 
likely to be rational agents who undertake a cost/benefit analysis prior to engaging in 
offending. Finally, it is noted that previously, in some instances, white-collar crimes 
were inadequately punished, which justifies an increase in current tariffs.
The cardinal role of general deterrence in relation to such crimes has been confirmed 
by numerous other authorities. For example, Sheller JA in Director of Public Pro-
secutions (NSW) v Hamman30 stated:
General deterrence is a predominant consideration when sentencing for offences 
of defrauding the revenue. Appeal Courts have discussed and emphasised 
the seriousness of frauds committed to the detriment of the public revenue. 
Inevitably, the Australian system of tax collection depends upon the honesty of 
taxpayers and, in particular, upon their fully declaring in each year of income 
what their gross income is.31
The previous good character of the offender is recognised in the sentencing 
calculus. However, as was highlighted in R v Gregory above, the current sentencing 
orthodoxy maintains that this is the very feature of many white-collar offenders 
which enables them to commit such crimes, and accordingly, little weight is usually 
attributed to this factor.
29 Ibid 182–4 [53], [54], [57] (citations omitted, emphasis added).
30 (Unreported, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Sheller JA, 1 December 
1998).
31 Ibid 6. See also R v Bromley (2010) 79 ATR 692, 697 [31]; R v Nicholson; Ex parte DPP 
(Cth) [2004] QCA 393 (22 October 2004) [20]; R v Wheatley (2007) 67 ATR 531.
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In R v Coukoulis32 the role of good character in sentencing white-collar offenders 
was addressed by Ormiston JA in the context of a solicitor who committed a large-
scale fraud (of more than $8 million from over 40 people — mainly clients), where 
his Honour said:
[A]lthough the fact that the appellant has had no prior convictions is of importance 
and must be recognised, these are the very circumstances in which he was able to 
deceive so many of his clients. His very reputation, as a solicitor and generally in 
the community, enabled him to obtain the moneys he stole, to persuade his clients 
and others that he was always acting in their interests, to reassure them and to 
allow him to dissuade them from enquiring further as to the precise manner of 
their moneys' application. Implicit faith was, wrongly, placed in him in circum-
stances where, were the moneys obtained by an unqualified person or through 
a person with a lesser reputation, those depositors might well have been more 
cautious about protecting themselves against possible misuse of their moneys.33
It is notable that, as in Coukoulis, above, assessing the harm done required the court to 
look again beyond the immediate victim, and to recognise the damage caused to the 
profession and the wider community in which the offender practised the profession. In 
evaluating the harm, the court also stated that the victims were caused greater distress 
because the offence involved a breach of trust. It was partly for this reason that the 
court stated that a heavy penalty was necessary to appropriately denounce the conduct.
In R v Swift34 Nettle JA (with whom Vincent JA and Habersberger AJA agreed) 
noted that there is no tariff for white-collar offences, but that a breach of trust is a 
strongly aggravating factor, as is the financial vulnerability of the victim. Moreover, 
the Court gave little weight to factors personal to the accused (including loss of 
reputation and excellent prospects of rehabilitation) and rejected an appeal against 
a term of imprisonment of five years and three months for offending that spanned 
over two years, and totalled approximately $1.5 million.
In McMahon v The Queen35 the offender pleaded guilty to 38 counts of tax fraud and 
42 counts of identity fraud, and was sentenced to a total effective term of six years 
imprisonment with a minimum term of four years. In rejecting his appeal against 
sentence, the New South Wales Court of Appeal again noted that while previous 
good character is relevant to the sentencing of white-collar offenders, it is pragmat-
ically of little weight given the strong need for general deterrence.36
The Court also rejected a submission that white-collar offenders should be met 
with a shorter non-parole period, primarily because of the growing seriousness 
32 (2003) 7 VR 45.
33 Ibid 59–60 [42] (emphasis added). See also R v Kelvin (2000) 46 ATR 1.
34 (2007) 15 VR 497.
35 [2011] NSWCCA 147 (22 June 2011).
36 Ibid [76].
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and visibility of such offences (in the community) and the fact that such offences 
are difficult and expensive to detect.37 Even where a sentencing court is moved by 
an ‘exceptionally good prior character’ to wholly suspend a sentence of imprison-
ment, such as in R v Pollard38 which involved electronic theft from an employer of 
about $92 000 over three months, the Court of Criminal Appeal declared that such 
a sentence would be manifestly inadequate. It opined that ‘[t]he limited relevance of 
prior good character in formulating the length of an appropriate sentence cannot be 
transformed into a more compelling factor for the purposes of determining whether 
a sentence of imprisonment should be suspended’.39
In Stevens v The Queen40 the Court again noted the increasing seriousness with 
which such offending is viewed — even when a breach of trust is not involved 
— and the institutional damage that it can cause. That case involved a number of 
systematic deceptions in a bank, over a 16 year period which totalled approximately 
$400 000. It noted that there can be no tariff for such offending, given the wide 
range of circumstances in which it can be committed, and the impact that a crime 
has on public confidence in a system is a strong aggravating consideration:
If public confidence in the integrity of the [electronic banking] system is to 
be maintained the courts have an obligation to ensure that when dishonest 
breaches of its security are identified the offenders are appropriately punished. 
Both personal and general deterrence are of particular significance in relation to 
these types of offences.41
Although there is no tariff, the courts have on occasions catalogued a large number 
of other white-collar facts and penalties to provide some level of consistency to 
the sentences imposed. Recent examples of this are Pollock v Western Ausralia,42 
Brennan v Western Australia43 and Scook v The Queen.44
Voluntary restitution by the offender is consistently regarded by the courts as an 
important consideration. However, where restitution does occur, it does not auto-
matically result in a significant discount because of the perception that an offender 
is ‘buying his or her way out of prison’.45 In R v Phelan,46 Hunt CJ at CL stated that 
37 Ibid [82]–[84]; See also Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 538–41 [59]–[67].
38 [2006] NSWCCA 405 (15 December 2006).
39 Ibid [19]. It should be noted that the Court declined to allow the Crown appeal on the 
basis of the double jeopardy principle.
40 (2009) 262 ALR 91.
41 Ibid 104 [79] (McClellan CJ at CL).
42 [2011] WASCA 133 (15 June 2011) [42].
43 [2010] WASCA 19 (15 February 2010).
44 (2008) 185 A Crim R 164.
45 See Kovacevic v Mills (2000) 76 SASR 404, 421 [81] (Doyle CJ, Mullighan, Bleby and 
Martin JJ).
46 (1993) 66 A Crim R 446.
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offenders should not be able to purchase a lesser sentence, but then qualified this 
by stating: ‘[w]here there has been a substantial degree of sacrifice involved in the 
repayment, that is a matter which may properly be taken into account by way of 
mitigation’.47
Thus, to the extent that voluntary restitution currently impacts upon a sentence, it 
is only in circumstances where the restitution constitutes a demonstrable hardship 
to the offender that it will provide a significant mitigation of penalty. The utilitarian 
benefits of reparation to the victim appear to be a secondary consideration.
B  Impact of Incidental Burdens and Hardships
A particularly complex sentencing issue is the extent to which courts factor into the 
sentence hardships or burdens which directly stem from the offending, but which are 
not strictly part of the court-imposed penalty. These are referred to as the ‘incidental 
burdens or hardships’ flowing from the offence. They take two broad forms: those 
which are imposed by the courts and those not imposed by courts but are a direct 
consequence of the sentence. We consider them in that order.
There are three forms of curial deprivations. The first are confiscation orders. The 
second are restitution orders. The third are disqualifications from being involved 
with companies.48 The main forms of non-curial hardships are:
• shame, embarrassment and social ostracism; and 
• reduced employment and career prospects.
We first look at the current legal position regarding incidental curial deprivations.
1  Confiscation Proceedings
Confiscation proceedings are being increasingly used against offenders, especially 
in relation to drug and property offences.49 Broadly, these proceedings can result in 
reclamation of property or money derived from the offence, or go further and strip 
47 Ibid 448. This approach was endorsed by Spigelman CJ (Price J agreeing) in Thewlis 
v The Queen (2008) 186 A Crim R 279, 280 [4]. See also R v Conway (2001) 121 A 
Crim R 177; R v Berlinsky [2005] SASC 316; Stratford v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 
279 (18 September 2007) [22]–[24]; Chandler v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 240 
(20 October 2008).
48 For an extensive analysis of incidental curial deprivations, see Fox and Freiberg, 
above n 10, ch 6.
49 The relevant statutory provisions are: Confiscation of Criminal Assets Act 2003 
(ACT); Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth); Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime 
Act 1989 (NSW); Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW); Criminal Property 
Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT); Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld); Criminal 
Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA); Crime (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1993 (Tas); 
Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic); Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA).
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the offender of property or assets regardless of whether they can be directly linked 
to the criminal activity or not. In essence, the general approach taken by sentencing 
courts is that the first type of orders will not result in mitigation of penalty, whereas 
the second will. The principles are set out in R v McLeod50 as follows:
The obligation to disgorge the proceeds of crime is not a penalty. Disgorgement 
is necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. Forfeiture of the proceeds of crime 
has, nevertheless, been treated as a mitigating factor in some cases. Thus, it has 
been said that pecuniary penalty orders which relate entirely to profits from the 
unlawful activity constitute an additional punishment. 
Disgorgement of benefits apart, forfeiture is relevant to penalty. At common 
law, forfeiture of lawfully-acquired property has generally been regarded as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing, since it places the offender in a worse position 
than he/she was before the commission of the offence. That is, forfeiture has a 
punitive or deterrent effect. 
The sentencing principle of proportionality requires that the nature and extent 
of any forfeiture of property be considered in fixing the sentence. That is not to 
say that such orders are always to be viewed as warranting mitigation of penalty. 
It is necessary to consider whether the forfeiture will have a disproportionate or 
exceptional effect on the offender and may have a substantial deterrent effect.51
In that case, the Court also held that, in setting the penalty, the likelihood of future 
hardship in terms of exaction of property may be taken into account. This approach 
is reflected in s 320 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth).52 In McMahon v The 
Queen53 the Court stated that repayment of money (in this case to the Australian 
Taxation Office) through a pecuniary penalty order is not in itself mitigatory,54 
however, consent to such an order can be taken into account as an indication of 
genuine contrition and remorse.55
50 (2007) 16 VR 682.
51 Ibid 685–6 [16]–[18]. In R v Ford (2008) 100 SASR 94 a similar approach was taken 
by Gray J (with whom Doyle CJ agreed).
52 This states: 
   A court passing sentence on a person in respect of the person’s conviction of an indictable 
offence:
  (a)  may have regard to any cooperation by the person in resolving any action taken 
against the person under this Act; and
  (b)   must not have regard to any forfeiture order that relates to the offence, to the extent 
that the order forfeits proceeds of the offence; and
  (c)   must have regard to the forfeiture order to the extent that the order forfeits any 
other property; and
  (d)   must not have regard to any pecuniary penalty order, or any literary proceeds 
order, that relates to the offence.
53 [2011] NSWCCA 147 (22 June 2011).
54 As a consequence of s 320(d) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth).
55 McMahon v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 147 (22 June 2011) [72].
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The situation is different in New South Wales and Western Australia, where s 24B 
of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Act 2010 (NSW) and s 8(3) of the 
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), respectively, preclude confiscation orders of any nature 
from being taken into account to reduce penalty.56
2  Restitution
Courts in all jurisdictions have power to order restitution to victims of property 
offences.57 In Victoria, for example, where goods have been stolen and a person 
found guilty of an offence connected with the theft, the court may order that the 
person return the stolen goods or the proceeds of their sale to their true owner.58 As 
noted above in Kovacevic v Mills,59 restitution in the context of property offences is 
a mitigating consideration, but is not necessarily a weighty factor.
3  Disqualifications
Individuals convicted of certain offences are disqualified — normally automatically 
— from being involved in the management of corporations for some period of time. 
‘Managing corporations’ is defined expansively, not only prohibiting offenders 
from acting as company directors, but also from participating in corporate decision 
making or significantly affecting a company’s financial standing, or from communi-
cating instructions or wishes to directors who might customarily act in accordance 
with those instructions. It, thus, operates as an effective total ban on any managerial 
involvement with a company.60 The key provisions are contained in s 206B of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) as follows:
(1) A person becomes disqualified from managing corporations if the person:
(a)  is convicted on indictment of an offence that:
(i) concerns the making, or participation in making, of decisions 
that affect the whole or a substantial part of the business of the 
corporation; or
(ii)  concerns an act that has the capacity to affect significantly the 
corporation's financial standing; or
56 In Stock v The Queen (2011) 206 A Crim R 574 it was held that confiscation proceed-
ings even prior to the legislative changes in NSW were not normally mitigatory. This 
was also the view in Greco v R [2010] NSWCCA 268 (25 November 2010).
57 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 21B; Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 19–20; Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 43; Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 88; Penalties and 
Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 35, 194; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 52; 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 65; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 84; Sentencing Act 1995 
(WA) ss 109–122.
58 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 84.
59 Kovacevic v Mills (2000) 76 SASR 404, 421 [81].
60 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206A.
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(b)  is convicted of an offence that:
(i)  is a contravention of this Act and is punishable by imprison-
ment for a period greater than 12 months; or
(ii)  involves dishonesty and is punishable by imprisonment for at 
least 3 months; or
(c)  is convicted of an offence against the law of a foreign country that is 
punishable by imprisonment for a period greater than 12 months.
The disqualification follows automatically upon conviction and the sentencing court 
is given no discretion.61 While not all white-collar offenders will suffer hardship 
equally as a consequence, Martin and Webster point out that any disqualification 
or disability ‘contributes significantly to the social stigma of the finding of guilt or 
conviction’.62 For those offenders whose occupation involved the management of a 
company, the disqualification presents an obvious and significant hardship. Courts 
have recognised this in some cases63 but not in others.64 Freiberg observes: ‘[t]he 
courts have been ambivalent on this issue, sometimes decreasing a sentence to take 
into account the additional detriment, and sometimes refusing to do so. The cases 
present no clear pattern’.65
It should be noted that white-collar offenders can also be subject to disqualification 
orders consequent upon civil penalty proceedings, even where there are no criminal 
proceedings afoot.66 The discretion resides with the prosecuting authority,67 and 
there is no bar to pursuing a white-collar offender criminally after the conclusion of 
a civil penalty proceeding.68
61 However, the Court has power upon application by the disqualified person to grant 
leave to manage a corporation in the future: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206G.
62 J P Martin and D Webster, The Social Consequences of Conviction (Heinemann 
Educational, 1971) as cited in Fox and Freiberg, above n 10, 526.
63 For example, specific reference to disqualification can be found in R v Chan (2010) 
79 ACSR 189, 194 [20] (Forrest J); DPP v Tang (aka Widjaja) (Unreported, County 
Court of Victoria, Patrick J, 8 December 2011) 68.
64 No reference to the statutory disqualification was made at all in R v Hartman (2010) 
81 ACSR 121 or R v Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 (12 August 2011).
65 Freiberg, above n 7, 12.
66 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1317DA, 206C.
67 The matters that inform the discretion whether to proceed by civil or criminal proceed-
ings are unclear and the lack of transparency involved in this decision was noted by 
Higgins J in R v Whitnall (1993) 42 FCR 512, 518. See further Michelle Welsh, ‘The 
Regulatory Dilemma: The Choice Between Overlapping Criminal Sanctions and Civil 
Penalties for Contraventions of the Directors’ Duty Provisions’ (2009) 27 Company 
and Securities Law Journal 370; Michael Gething, ‘Do We Really Need Criminal 
and Civil Penalties for Contraventions of Directors’ Duties?’ (1996) 24 Australian 
Business Law Review 375.
68 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317P.
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4  Public Opprobrium and Social Ostracism
A common non-curial hardship stemming from white-collar offending is shame 
and embarrassment. The law is not settled on the impact that this should have on 
sentence. It was considered by the several members of the High Court in Ryan v 
The Queen,69 but a majority of the Court did not endorse a clear position. Kirby and 
Callinan JJ stated that public opprobrium was a factor which could be taken into 
account to reduce the sanction imposed by the court, whereas McHugh J took the 
opposite approach. Gummow J did not canvass the issue, while Hayne J ‘substan-
tially’ agreed with McHugh J.70 Callinan J stated:
Of course the abuse of an office to commit a crime is greatly to be deplored but the 
crime of a person occupying an office of some prominence will often attract much 
greater vilification, adverse publicity, public humiliation, and personal, social and 
family stress than a crime by a person not so circumstanced. When these conse-
quences are attracted they should not be ignored by the sentencing court.71
Kirby J agreeing with Callinan J stated:
[s]tigma [stemming from conviction] commonly add[s] a significant element of 
shame and isolation to the prisoner and the prisoner's family. This may comprise 
a special burden that is incidental to the punishment imposed and connected with 
it. If properly based on evidence, it could, in a particular case, be just to take such 
considerations into account in fixing the judicial punishment required.72
McHugh J rejected the relevance of public opprobrium because:
First, it would seem to place a burden on the sentencing judge which would be 
nearly impossible to discharge. The opprobrium attaching to offences varies 
greatly from one offender and one offence to another. How a judge could realis-
tically take such a matter into account is not easy to see …
Secondy, the worse the crime, the greater will be the public stigma and opprobrium. 
The prisoner who rapes a child will undoubtedly be subject to greater public 
opprobrium and stigma thanthe prisoner who rapes an adult person.73
In R v Bunning74 the Court regarded it as mitigating that the offender ‘lost his 
reputation, his career [as a police officer] … and suffered public humiliation’.75
69 (2001) 206 CLR 267.
70 Ibid 313–14 [157].
71 Ibid 318–19 [177].
72 Ibid 304 [123]. In McDonald v The Queen (1994) 48 FCR 555 Burchett and Higgins JJ, 
at 564–5 [23], gave this considerable mitigating weight. 
73 Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267, 284–5 [53], [55].
74 [2007] VSCA 205 (27 September 2007).
75 Ibid [47].
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The balance of authority indicates that shame can be a mitigating factor but that it 
generally carries little weight. In Kenny v The Queen,76 Howie and Johnson JJ stated 
that public shame could be given some weight if it was so significant as to damage the 
person physically or psychologically. In Einfeld v The Queen77 Basten JA (Hulme and 
Latham JJ agreeing on this issue) endorsed the position in Kenny, above, and stated that 
in that case two considerations could affect the manner in which public opprobrium 
factors into the sentencing calculus. The first was the offender’s status as a former judge, 
which made the offence worse and gave rise to an increased level of public humiliation. 
Second, the offender used his previous position to advance his unlawful purpose.78
An extensive analysis of the authorities was undertaken in R v Nuttall; Ex parte 
Attorney-General (Qld)79 by Muir JA (Fraser and Chesterman JJA agreeing). The 
Court ‘assumed’ public opprobrium was relevant in light of the fact that it was not 
submitted that the sentencing judge failed to take it into account, but noted that 
public humiliation was of little weight given that it was inevitable:
The attainment of high public office brings with it public exposure and media 
scrutiny as well as power, fame and prestige. Criminal abuse of the office, if 
detected, will inevitably attract media attention and result in shame and distress 
to the offender and his family.80
In part IV(D) below, we discuss the weight that public opprobrium should have in 
the sentencing calculus. 
5  Employment Deprivations: Dismissal or Loss of Opportunity to Work
There is no generally agreed approach to the relevance of employment deprivations to 
sentence. A number of different approaches have been taken. In both Kovacevic v Mills81 
and G v Police82 the sentence was mitigated to avoid damage to the offender's career 
prospects. In a similar vein, there have been a number of instances where sentences have 
been discounted because of consequential damage to career or prospects.83 On the other 
76 [2010] NSWCCA 6 (12 February 2010).
77 (2010) 266 ALR 598.
78 Ibid 621 [98]–[101].
79 (2011) 209 A Crim R 538.
80 Ibid 553 [65].
81 (2000) 76 SASR 404.
82 (1999) 74 SASR 165.
83 See Moorhead v Police [1999] SASC 243 (7 June 1999); R v Richards (1980) 2 Cr 
App R (S) 119; Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267; Simmonds v Bureau of 
Customs [2001] SASC 306 (29 August 2001); Hook v Ralphs (1987) 45 SASR 529; 
R v McDermott (1990) 49 A Crim R 105; McDonald v The Queen (1994) 48 FCR 
555; R v Purdon (Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal for New South Wales, Hunt, 
McInerney and Donovan JJ, 27 March 1997).
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hand, in R v Boskovitz84 and Brewer v Bayens85 a sentence was imposed regardless of 
the effects on career or prospects, while in R v Liddy [No 2]86 and Hook v Ralphs87 the 
sentence was designed or calculated to destroy career or prospects.88
The strongest statement regarding the supposed irrelevance of reduced employment 
prospects to the sanction which is imposed is found in the comments of McPherson 
JA in R v Qualischefski.89 His Honour stated:
The applicant … claims that a conviction for possession of cannabis will have dire 
consequences for him if it continues to be recorded. It will, he says, lose him his 
job as a computer operator with the Health Department, along with his career, his 
social position and his lifestyle. Those consequences are undoubtedly severe; but, 
if for that reason, appeals like this are allowed and recording of convictions set 
aside, the impact of the administration of justice will in the course of time be no 
less serious. It will mean that we are sanctioning the division of offenders into two 
classes. There will be those with good jobs and careers, enviable social positions 
and prosperous life-styles. Their convictions will not be recorded for fear of the 
damage it may do them. Then there will be those without jobs, or career prospects, 
or with standards of living that are already depressed. In their case, convictions 
will be recorded. Such an outcome seems to me to be quite wrong and thoroughly 
indefensible. It smacks of privilege, and can only lead to the evolution of a special 
class of persons in society who are exempt from the full operation of the criminal 
law, at least at its lower reaches … 
Most recently, in R v Nuttall; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld)90 Muir JA (Fraser and 
Chesterman JJA agreeing) took the view that: ‘the respondent’s loss of employment 
and lack of job prospects on his release are relevant considerations’.91 However, it is 
clear that the courts have failed to adopt a systematic or principled approach to the 
impact of likely employment deprivations on sentence.
84 [1999] NSWCCA 437 (20 December 1999).
85 (2002) 26 WAR 510. The appellant psychologist was convicted of solicitation 
consequent upon a random police sting operation. A conviction was recorded despite 
(or regardless of) the likely effects on his career, PhD studies and occupational contri-
butions to the community.
86 (2002) 84 SASR 231.
87 (1987) 45 SASR 529.
88 A sentence meant to put an end to a career may also be discounted because it has had 
that intended effect. In R v Whitnall (1993) 42 FCR 512, the sentence was increased as 
a consequence of the defendant’s career.
89 (Unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Fitzgerald P, McPherson JA, Ambrose J, 12 
August 1994) 4 (emphasis added). This case is discussed in Andrew West, ‘Prospec-
tive Loss of Employment as a Factor in Mitigation of Penalty’ (1996) 16 Queensland 
Lawyer 157.
90 [2011] 2 Qd R 328.
91 Ibid 343 [59].
334 BAGARIC AND ALEXANDER — SENTENCING WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS 
C Summary of Sentencing Principles Relevant to White-Collar Offences
The above analysis demonstrates that sentencing principles and practices are not 
uniform or well-settled in relation to white-collar criminals. However, some key 
themes emerge from the decisions:
• The type of conduct which constitutes a white-collar crime varies widely, hence, 
it is not feasible for a sentencing tariff to be developed.
• A key consideration in determining offence severity for white-collar crimes is 
the amount of money or value of property involved.
• General deterrence is commonly identified as the paramount objective in 
sentencing white-collar offenders. This serves to increase the penalty — often 
considerably — at the expense of all other sentencing factors.
• Crimes that are well-planned and committed over a long period of time are often 
punished more heavily.
• Breach of trust is a strong aggravating factor.
• Restitution of the amount taken is a mitigating factor but, generally, does not 
carry considerable weight.
• Offences against individuals are sometimes regarded as being more serious, 
but there is no clear acceptance of this proposition. It is assumed that offences 
against institutions can damage institutional and investor confidence, threaten 
the revenue or endanger the community good generally.
• Previous good character carries little mitigating weight, given that this is said to 
be both typical and facilitative of white-collar offending.
• The fact that an offender has made a worthwhile contribution to the community 
is often of little mitigating weight.
• Good family background is also of little mitigating weight.
• Extra-curial harm suffered as a result of being convicted and punished, in the 
form of loss of reputation, social and public humiliation and embarrassment and 
reduction in employment prospects, normally has little weight.
• Penalties imposed incidentally or consequently upon conviction in the form of 
confiscation, restitution and/or disqualification orders may or may not be taken 
into account, depending on the jurisdiction and the reason for the penalty.
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IV  flAWs WIth the current sentencIng ApproAch
There are several flaws with the current approach to sentencing white-collar 
offenders. Unsupportable assumptions underlying current sentencing practices and 
inconsistency in approach are evident. We start with a consideration of the propor-
tionality principle and its implications for sentencing practice for white-collar 
offending.
A  The Principle of Proportionality:  
Offences Against Individuals Are More Serious
The key determinant in the sentencing of white-collar offenders, as with all 
offenders, is the principle of proportionality.92 In crude terms, this means that the 
punishment must fit the crime. This is underpinned by the broader principle that 
benefits and burdens should be distributed with regard to, and commensurate with, a 
person's merit or blame.  Proportionality operates to restrain not only sentences that 
are too heavy, but also those that are too light.93  A clear statement of the principle of 
proportionality is found in the High Court case of Hoare v The Queen:94
a basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed 
by a court should never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or 
proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in light of its objective 
circumstances.95
The proportionality principle has two limbs: the harm caused by the offence and 
the level of pain inflicted by the punishment. The requirement of proportionality is 
satisfied if these limbs are aligned.
In Veen v The Queen96 and Veen v The Queen [No 2]97 the High Court stated that 
proportionality is the primary aim of sentencing. Proportionality is considered so 
important that it cannot be trumped even by the goal of community protection, which 
92 Preserving proportionality between the seriousness of the offence and the severity 
of the sentence is a principle adhered to by all western legal systems: see Richard 
S Frase, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Sentencing Policy and Research’ in Michael 
Tonry and Richard S Frase (eds), Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 259, 261, cited in Ruth Kannai, ‘Preserving Pro-
portionality in Sentencing: Constitutional or Criminal Issue’ (Paper presented at 
18th International Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal 
Law, Montreal, August 2004) <http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/ 2004/Kannai.pdf>.
93 R v Hernando (2002) 136 A Crim R 451, 459 (Heydon JA). 
94 (1989) 167 CLR 348.
95 Ibid 354 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ) (emphasis in original).
96 (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467 (Stephen J), 478 (Jacobs J).
97 (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
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at various times has also been declared as the most important aim of sentencing.98 
Thus, for dangerous offenders, while community protection remains an important 
objective, at common law it cannot override the principle of proportionality. It is for 
this reason that preventive detention is not sanctioned by the common law.99 
Proportionality has also been given statutory recognition in most Australian juris-
dictions. For example, in Victoria, the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) provides that one 
of the purposes of sentencing is to impose just punishment,100 and that in sentencing 
an offender the court must have regard to the gravity of the offence101 and the 
offender's culpability and degree of responsibility.102 The Sentencing Act 1995 
(WA) states that the sentence must be ‘commensurate with the seriousness of the 
offence’,103 and the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) provides that the sentences 
must be ‘just and appropriate’.104 In the Northern Territory and Queensland, the 
relevant sentencing statutes provide that the punishment imposed on the offender 
must be just in all the circumstances,105 while in South Australia the emphasis is 
upon ensuring that ‘the defendant is adequately punished for the offence’.106 The 
need for a sentencing court to ‘adequately punish’ the offender is also fundamental 
to the sentencing of offenders for Commonwealth matters.107 The same phrase is 
used in New South Wales.108
The courts have not attempted to exhaustively define the factors that are relevant to 
proportionality. The broad approach taken to this problem is to adopt the principle 
that the upper limit for an offence depends on its objective circumstances. However, 
some factors have been positively identified as relevant to offence seriousness. 
These include the consequences of the offence (including the level of harm), the 
victim’s vulnerability, the method of the offence, the offender’s culpability (which 
turns on such factors as the offender’s mental state),109 and the level of sophistica-
tion involved.110
98 For example, see Channnon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433; R v Valenti (1980) 2 A 
Crim R 170, 174; DPP (Cth) v El Karhani (1990) 21 NSWLR 370, 377.
99 Chester v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 611, 618.
100 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(a).
101 Ibid s 5(2)(c).
102 Ibid s 5(2)(d).
103 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(1).
104 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7 (1)(a). The Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), 
however, does not refer to the principle of proportionality.
105 Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5 (1)(a); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s (9)(1)
(a).
106 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(k).
107 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(k).
108 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A(a).
109 For example, whether it was intentional, reckless or negligent.
110 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Discussion Paper No 33 
(1996) 62–4.
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In terms of property offences, the harm comes in two main forms. The first 
is financial loss to the victim. This is dependent on the value of property taken 
from the victim, and the means of the victim. To this end, high value offences will 
usually cause more suffering than small ones, and real individuals are usually more 
harmed than large institutions, which have a greater capacity to recover losses or 
build them into their financial planning. Thus, crimes committed against individu-
als, especially those who are financially vulnerable or fragile (ie the most poor, the 
unemployed or financially struggling), cause more direct and much greater harm 
than crimes committed against the revenue or large corporations. An individual’s 
capacity to recover is often limited and their interests are demonstrably set back by 
such crimes. 
Accordingly, the law should be reformed to reflect the fact that white-collar offences 
involving the taking of money from individuals should be punished more heavily. 
Not only would this more clearly adapt the proportionality principle, but it would 
also enhance the doctrinal consistency of sentencing principle. Victim vulnerability 
is an entrenched aspect of sentencing practice. It is an established aggravating factor 
in relation to a range of offences, including assaults against the elderly111 young,112 
and people with an intellectual disability.113
The second type of harm that is caused by white-collar offending is damage to 
institutional integrity and investor confidence. Depending on the crime, harm is 
normally caused to institutions, by insider trading offences, or to the body politic 
itself, by revenue offences. Sentencing courts often use the collective ‘community 
interests’ as a catch-all phrase to describe the victim. It could be argued that where 
the victim is everyone as opposed to someone, this type of offending is as serious, 
or perhaps even worse, than crimes against individuals. Former Federal Court judge 
Raymond Finkelstein, who heard many of the largest white-collar criminal trials 
and pleas, publicly adheres to this view.114
However, damage to institutional integrity is speculative at best. There is no evidence 
of a correlation between, say, share market activity and insider trading convictions or 
bank deposits and bank fraud. If such a relationship did exist, presumably, the direct 
victims of such crimes would demonstrate the greatest reduction in confidence in 
the financial system. In the United Kingdom, a scandal involving a pension-fund 
fraud committed by former Member of Parliament Robert Maxwell, which affected 
111 DPP (Vic) v Grabovac [1998] 1 VR 664; R v Eisenach [2011] ACTCA 2 (17 February 
2011); Royer v Western Australia (2009) 197 A Crim R 319 ; R v El-Chammas [2009] 
NSWCCA 154 (2 June 2009).
112 R v AJW (2001) 80 SASR 246; Ollis v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 155 (14 July 2011); 
Rioli v The Queen [2010] NTCCA 13 (18 October 2010); R v Eisenach [2011] ACTCA 
2 (17 February 2011).
113 For instance, see R v Grech [1999] NSWCCA 268 (6 September 1999) [37] (Carruthers 
AJ).
114 Patrick Durkin, ‘Top Judge Takes Aim at White-Collar Criminals’, The Australian 
Financial Review (Sydney), 10 June 2011.
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25 000 individuals, led to a small study on the attitudinal effects of the crime on 
25 of those individuals.115 Spalek concluded that:
The study reported in this paper illustrates that in some cases of fraud, victims 
may not be ‘duped investors’, but rather may distrust particular agents prior to 
any crime occurring, and may therefore be engaging in risk avoidance strategies. 
As a result, becoming the victim of a financial crime may not necessarily lead to 
individuals avoiding the financial system in general, because an integral part of 
their trust may be acknowledging that as investors they run risks.
The absence of a correlation between financial crimes and trust in the political and 
economic arenas is supported by research conducted elsewhere.116 Consequently, 
reform is required such that criminal sanctions (which have real consequences) 
are not made more severe in order to reflect imaginary harm to ‘the community’ 
without tangible evidence in support of that approach.
Arguably, institutional integrity has a relevance beyond investor confidence 
in market systems. Individuals may well be able to operate in a corrupt system, 
however, in a competitive global market, less money may flow into countries which 
have corrupt markets.117 Even this broad consideration of the meaning of institu-
tional integrity does not justify more severe punishment for white-collar criminals. 
There is no evidence that collective market honesty and transparency is a principal 
driver of the international flow of funds — as opposed to where investors feel they 
can maximize their return. Even if a strong link between market integrity and inter-
national money flows is established, the connection between the negative impact on 
the entire market and any single criminal act is likely to be so minor that it would 
violate proportionalism to meaningfully increase sanction severity for this reason. 
B Restitution Should Be a Strong Mitigating Factor — It Should Reduce 
the Penalty By Up to 30 Per Cent
As noted above, one limb of the proportionality principle is the harm caused by the 
offence. This has considerable implications for the manner in which restitution by 
white-collar offenders should be treated. As we have seen, the courts place some 
weight on restitution, but normally it is not a cardinal sentencing consideration. 
115 Basia Spalek, ‘White-Collar Crime Victims and the Issue of Trust’ (Paper presented 
at British Criminology Conference, Leicester, July 2000) <http://www.britsoccrim.
org/v4.htm>. 
116 The general conclusion in these studies is that white-collar crimes have little, if 
any, effect on trust: see, for example, John G Peters and Susan Welch, ‘The Effects 
of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections’ (1980) 74 
American Political Science Review 697; Michael Mills and Elizabeth Moore, ‘The 
Neglected Victims and Unexamined Costs of White-Collar Crime’ (1990) 36 Crime 
and Delinquency 408; Neal Shover, Greer Litton Fox and Michael Mills, ‘Long-Term 
Consequences of Victimization by White-Collar Crime’ (1994) 11 Justice Quarterly 75.
117 We thank the anonymous referee for this observation. 
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The main rationale is that if restitution were given more prominence in sentencing, 
it would theoretically enable wealthy offenders to ‘buy their way out of prison’. 
There is some force to that argument and, in principle, it is an undesirable outcome. 
However, the practical consequence of adhering to that view is damage to victims. It 
means that offenders are not provided with any pragmatic incentive to repay victims 
and thus redress the harm they have caused.
Undeniably, non-restitution of relatively large sums of money, particularly to the 
financially vulnerable, can have a devastating impact on lives: in terms of health, 
enjoyment and longevity.118 This is a high price for victims to pay for doctrinal 
soundness. Thus, the harm from a crime can either be perpetuated, or it can be 
controlled, by acts of restitution. There is no easy way to resolve whether we should 
opt for ‘pure principle’ in the form of not rewarding offenders for paying back 
sums stolen from victims (a deontological perspective), or pursue good outcomes 
for victims and encourage those acts through sentencing discounts (a utilitarian 
perspective). However, as a general rule, speculative benefits should not be preferred 
over concrete benefits. This is certainly the manner in which the sentencing system 
resolves other similar tensions. It is readily observable in other contexts, such as the 
guilty plea discount and the discount for giving evidence against co-offenders.
All accused are entitled to plead not guilty and make the prosecution prove its case. 
In principle, offenders who plead not guilty to a crime should on no account be 
punished more heavily than those who plead guilty (apart from the extent to which 
a guilty plea is indicative of remorse). Yet, for pragmatic reasons, sentencing law 
provides a large discount to offenders who plead guilty. This is for no higher or more 
virtuous reason than without the discount, the court system would become clogged.
The High Court of Australia in Cameron v The Queen119 approved of the plead 
guilty discount and, in the process, the majority of the Court rejected a number of 
arguments against the discount, including that it constitutes a form of discrimina-
tion against offenders who elect to pursue their ‘right’ to a trial.
In all Australian jurisdictions, accused who plead guilty receive a sentencing 
discount.120 This is so, irrespective of whether the plea is coupled with remorse. For 
example, in R v Morton121 the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal stated that:
118 Barbara O’Neill et al, ‘Negative Health Effects of Financial Stress’ (2005) 51 
Consumer Interests Annual <http://www.personalfinancefoundation.org/research/
efd/Negative-Health-Effects-of-Financial-Stress.pdf>.
119 Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339.
120 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(g); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 35(2); 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 13(4); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(2)(j); 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 22(1); Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
Act 1988 (SA) s 10(g); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(e); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) 
s 8(2).
121 [1986] VR 863.
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A plea of guilty may be taken into account regardless of whether or not it is also 
indicative of some other quality or attribute such as remorse … A court may 
always take a plea of guilty into account in mitigation of sentence even though 
it is solely motivated by self-interest.122
The main reason for the discount is purely the utilitarian benefit in the form of 
clearing court backlogs. Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ in Cameron v The 
Queen123 stated:
[Australian courts] have taken the pragmatic view that giving sentence 
‘discounts’ to those who plead guilty at the earliest available opportunity 
encourages pleas of guilty, reduces the expense of the criminal justice system, 
reduces court delays, avoids inconvenience to witnesses and prevents the misuse 
of legal aid funds by the guilty.124 
The guilty plea discount is one of only two situations where a stated numerical 
discount is usually applied by the courts, despite the endorsement of the instinctive 
synthesis approach to sentencing.125 The reason is to underline to the accused the 
reality of the discount and, hence, encourage greater pragmatism by them.
The normal range of the discount is between 10 per cent and about 30 per cent, 
depending on the circumstances of the case. In several jurisdictions it is either 
conventional or a statutory requirement to indicate the size of the discount.126  In 
R v Thomson,127 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal issued a guideline 
122 Ibid 867. This approach was also adopted by Spigelman CJ (with whom other members 
of the Court agreed) in R v Thomson (2000) 49 NSWLR 383, 411 [115] who stated 
that there are ‘benefits to the criminal justice system as a whole’ that result from a 
guilty plea. At 412, [122], his Honour further noted that the ‘public interest served by 
encouraging pleas of guilty for their utilitarian value is a distinct interest’.
123 Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339. 
124 Ibid 73–4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
125 This was most recently endorsed by the High Court in Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 
CLR 520.
126 In New South Wales and Queensland, the Court must indicate if it does not award a 
sentencing discount in recognition of a guilty plea: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) 
Act 1999 (NSW) s 22(2) and Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 13(3)). In South 
Australia, Western Australia and New South Wales, the courts often specify the size 
of the discount given. In Victoria, s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) states that 
when courts provide a discount for a plea of guilty, they must specify the sentence that 
would have been given in the absence of that discount. An appeal does not lie against 
that ‘notional sentence’. See R v Burke (2009) 21 VR 471. Also see Giordano v The 
Queen [2010] VSCA 101 (7 May 2010) [45]. There has been some judicial comment as 
to the artificiality of s 6AAA given the instinctive synthesis that produces the actual 
sentence. See Scerri v The Queen (2010) 206 A Crim R 1, 5 [23]–[25]; R v Flaherty 
[No 2] (2008) 19 VR 305. The rationale and size of the typical discount in Victoria is 
discussed in Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140 (29 June 2012).
127 (2000) 49 NSWLR 383.
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judgement stating that a guilty plea will generally be reflected in a 10 to 25 per cent 
discount on sentence, depending on how early the plea is entered and the complexity 
of the case.128 This suggested range relates only to the utilitarian value of a guilty 
plea to the criminal justice system and does not include additional discounts that 
may be available — for example, where the guilty plea may be said to evidence 
remorse. This now has a legislative basis.
Section 17 of the Criminal Case Conferencing Trial Act 2008 (NSW) states that an 
early plea attracts a discount of up to 25 per cent, and late pleas can obtain a discount 
of up to 12.5 per cent. In Lee v The Queen129 it was held where the plea was taken 
on the second day set for trial that a 12.5 per cent discount was appropriate. The 
co-offender received a 20 per cent discount for pleading on arraignment and it was 
held that the difference was appropriate.130  In Western Australia, the discount often 
ranges from 20 to 35 per cent under the state’s ‘fast track system’.131 The Western 
Australian Court of Appeal rejected submissions that a full ‘discount of the order 
of 30 per cent will automatically be afforded for a fast-track plea of guilty without 
more’.132 There is no requirement to quantify the discount in Western Australia.133 
In South Australia the common range is between 15 to 25 per cent, with 25 per cent 
regularly given for an early plea of guilty.134
Providing assistance to authorities is treated in a similar way to guilty pleas, 
particularly where it results in the detection and prosecution of other offenders. 
It is important to note that, as with the guilty plea discount, this benefit is given 
independent of any reasons or remorse that might be demonstrated by assisting 
authorities. Criminals, in principle, should not be dealt with less severely because 
they opportunistically decide to give evidence against co-offenders. However, as a 
matter of public policy, the law encourages those involved in criminal behaviour to 
betray the confidence reposed in each other by providing a significant discount at 
the sentencing stage of the criminal justice system.135 This is especially apposite 
given that it often places the individual in personal danger.136
128 See also Charkawi v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 159 (4 July 2008); R v Bugeja 
[2001] NSWCCA 196 (11 May 2001).
129 [2011] NSWCCA 169 (28 July 2011).
130 The same discount was accorded in Nakhla v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 143 (24 
June 2011).
131 See, eg, Trescuri v The Queen [1999] WASCA 172 (10 September 1999); Deering v 
Western Australia [2007] WASCA 212 (17 October 2007).
132 Cameron v The Queen [2002] WASCA 81 (22 March 2002) [19].
133 McLean v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 60 (16 March 2011) [57].
134 Fisher v Police (2004) 154 A Crim R 511.
135 Malvaso v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 227, 239 (Deane and McHugh JJ).
136 R v Barber (1976) 14 SASR 388, 390 (Bray CJ). See also DPP (Cth) v AB (2006) 94 
SASR 316.
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Assistance to law enforcement officials enjoys recognition in a number of statutory 
regimes.137 In terms of the size of the discount that is available, it has been held that 
the discount for a plea of guilty and assistance to authorities should be up to 50 per 
cent.138
Thus, when the legal system wishes to strongly encourage a course of conduct, the 
law is willing, with arithmetical clarity, to provide a significant and clear sentencing 
discount in order to encourage that conduct. This occurs despite the courts’ steadfast 
adherence to the instinctive synthesis theory, and despite the questionable morality 
of permitting resource allocation to dictate the punitive consequences of criminal 
conduct. For far better reasons, the same approach should be adopted in respect of 
restitution to victims of crime.
Property offences are one of the few crimes where it is possible to restore the victim, 
economically, to the same position as before the offence. Where restitution does not 
occur, victims can be devastated — especially when they are individuals. There is 
a measurable difference in terms of harm caused between white-collar crimes that 
are restituted and those which are not. This should be reflected in the sentencing 
calculus. White-collar offenders who provide full restitution should get a discount 
of up to 30% — proportionally less for partial restitution.
It is accepted that this will place property offenders in a different situation from other 
offenders, but does not mean that they are given an opportunity to buy their freedom. 
It simply reflects the different nature of their crime: the targeting of commodities 
as opposed to other human interests. Moreover, the lives of victims should not be 
sacrificed in the fanatical pursuit of the dubious principle that offenders should not 
buy their way out of gaol. Principle often yields to the practical imperatives of the 
criminal justice system;139 the lives of individual victims are no less important.
This approach entails that offenders who wish to but cannot make restitution, 
because they have dissipated the proceeds of their offending (for example, because 
of drug or gambling addictions), will receive more severe penalties than offenders 
137 See Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(i); Crimes (Sentencing) Procedure 
Act 1999 (NSW) s 23; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(h); Sentencing 
Act 1995 (NT) s 5(1)(h); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 36. There are also 
similar provisions at the Commonwealth level. See Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16(2)(h).
138 For an example of where a 50 per cent discount was allowed, see R v Johnston (2008) 
186 A Crim R 345, 349–50 [15]–[21] (Nettle JA). For an application of these principles, 
see Dan Ning Wang v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 319 (17 December 2010); Yue Ma 
v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 320 (17 December 2010); R v Nguyen [2010] NSWCCA 
331 (21 December 2010). This contrasts with the decision in R v Sahari (2007) 17 VR 
269 where it was held undesirable to specify a specific discount for cooperating with 
authorities.
139 One of the most fundamental rights, the right to a fair trial, is itself subject to a host 
of competing principles which delimit the scope and content of that right: see Mirko 
Bagaric, Theo Alexander and Marlene Ebejer, ‘The Illusion That Is the Right to a Fair 
Trial in Australia’ (2011) 17(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 59.
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who can make restitution. This is justified on the basis of the practical improvement 
to the lives of victims and the inherent logic in prioritising victim prosperity over 
abstract purity in sentencing.
C Previous Good Character is Relevant: the Need for Doctrinal Coherency 
in Light of the Progressive Loss of Mitigation Theory
As discussed in part III of this paper, the prevailing approach to the relevance 
of previous good character in relation to white-collar offending is that it only 
marginally mitigates. The argument is that most white-collar offenders do not have 
prior convictions, and it is this very characteristic that enables them to secure status 
and positions that later provide the opportunity to offend. This analysis is flawed, at 
least in terms of consistency with the conventional treatment of prior offending, or 
lack of it, in the sentencing calculus.
Prior convictions have their most significant role in sentencing where offenders 
have a long criminal history, in which case they can lead to a considerably longer 
penalty.140 This has fuelled criticism on the basis that it amounts to punishing the 
accused again for their previous crimes, that is, it constitutes double punishment and 
involves punishing people for their character, as opposed to what they have done.141
These criticisms have been met with the endorsement of the ‘progressive loss of 
mitigation’ theory, which is the view that a degree of mitigation should be accorded 
to first-time offenders or those with a minor criminal record. This mitigation is 
‘used up’ by offenders who repeatedly come before the courts, thereby resulting in 
ever-increasing penalties for recidivists.
Hence, it is not that offenders with prior convictions are being punished more 
heavily, rather, that first-time offenders are treated more leniently. Recidivism 
disentitles repeat offenders to the leniency which is normally afforded the first-time 
offender.142
In Veen v The Queen [No 2]143 the High Court set out three other grounds for 
imposing harsher penalties on recidivists:
the antecedent criminal history is relevant … to show whether the instant 
offence is an uncharacteristic aberration or whether the offender has manifested 
140 Approximately 60 per cent of imprisoned offenders have been to prison previously: 
see Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘An Analysis of Repeat Imprisonment Trends in 
Australia’ (Research Paper No 1351.0.55.031, Australian Bureau of Statistics, August 
2010) 12 <http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/>. Hence, this is a common aggravating 
factor.
141 Mirko Bagaric, ‘Double Punishment and Punishing Character: The Unfairness of 
Prior Convictions’ (2000) 19(1) Criminal Justice Ethics 10.
142 See, eg, Baumer v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 51, 58.
143 (1988) 164 CLR 465.
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in his commission of the instant offence a continuing attitude of disobedience 
of the law. In the latter case, retribution, deterrence and protection of the society 
may all indicate that a more severe penalty is warranted. It is legitimate to take 
account of the antecedent criminal history when it illuminates the moral culpa-
bility of the offender in the instant case, or shows his dangerous propensity or 
shows a need to impose condign punishment to deter the offender and other 
offenders from committing further offences of a like kind.144
Thus, it is well settled that, in general, good character results in less punishment. 
The fact that many offenders in a certain category of offending share this trait is no 
basis for diminishing its relevance. Rarity or commonality of a trait in relation to an 
offence type is not a basis for determining its role in the sentencing calculus. More 
than 90% of offenders plead guilty,145 yet this does not diminish the weight given 
to the guilty plea discount. It follows that in relation to white-collar offending, good 
character should be accorded as much weight as in other types of offending.
D Extra-Curial Punishments Which Can Be Tangibly Measured 
Should Reduce Penalty
The other limb of the proportionality equation is the severity of penalty. Impris-
onment is the harshest penalty in our system of law. However, a range of other 
deprivations can be imposed including partial loss of liberty or monetary exactions. 
For this article, the key issue is what types of losses should be regarded as relevant to 
this limb of the proportionality thesis: should this include only those losses directly 
imposed by the courts for sentencing purposes? Or should incidental hardships in 
the form of extra-curial hardship also be included?
As noted above, the main extra-curial penalty suffered by white-collar offenders 
is in the form of employment deprivation: either being dismissed from a job, being 
precluded from pursuing a certain career, such as a lawyer or accountant, or having 
those prospects severely curtailed as a result of a conviction. There is little doubt 
that these are damaging to the offender: ‘a person's employment is usually one of 
the most important things in his or her life. It gives not only a livelihood but an 
occupation, an identity and a sense of self-esteem’.146
144 Ibid 477 [14] (emphasis added). A similar approach was articulated in Field v The 
Queen [2011] NSWCCA 70 (21 April 2011). See also Anderson v The Queen [2010] 
NSWCCA 287 (7 December 2010); Murphy v The Queen (2005) 158 A Crim R 375; 
Tsakonas v The Queen (2009) 197 A Crim R 581; Graham v The Queen [2009] 
NSWCCA 212 (31 August 2009); Wright v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 282 (15 
December 2008); R v Riddle [2010] ACTCA 8 (25 May 2010); Griffith v Tasmania 
[2010] TASCCA 19 (11 November 2010) [14].
145 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Criminal Courts, Australia, 2009–2010’ (Statistics 
Publication No 4513.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 27 January 2011) <http://
www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/ 4513. 02009-10>.
146 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2003] 1 AC 518, 539 [35] (Lord Hoffmann).
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The correct approach to factoring employment deprivations into the sentencing 
equation requires consideration of the very nature of punishment. Criminologists 
and philosophers generally adopt expansive definitions of punishment, recognising 
that incidental negative consequences flowing from a finding of guilt may constitute 
punishment. Antony Duff defines punishment as ‘the infliction of suffering on a 
member of the community who has broken its laws’.147 Andrew von Hirsch states 
that ‘punishing someone consists of visiting a deprivation (hard treatment) on him, 
because he has committed a wrong, in a manner that expresses disapprobation on 
the person for his conduct’.148 Similarly, punishment has been described as pain 
delivery.149 Further, it has been asserted that ‘the intrinsic point of punishment 
is that it should hurt — that it should inflict suffering, hardship or burdens’.150 
Thus, drawing a line through the contemporary terminology, it would seem that 
punishment is a hardship or deprivation; the taking away of something of value for 
a wrong actually or perceived to have been committed. Notably, the definition does 
not take account of the forum (for example, a court, other institution or employer) 
which inflicts the hardship.
Thus it follows that although the experience of hardship by the offender in the form 
of employment deprivations may not be intended as punishment (but instead is, for 
example, to maintain the integrity of a profession) or may only be a consequence 
of punishment (for example, a statutory requirement), it does not mean that such 
deprivations do not of themselves constitute a punishment. As is evident from the 
definition above, what is crucial in this respect is the effect on the person, not the 
reason for which the hardship is inflicted. To ignore those hardships in the sentencing 
calculus is both illogical and contrary to the principle of proportionality.
The loss of a job or exclusion from an occupation tangibly sets back an individual's 
interests and there does not seem to be a justifiable reason for ignoring that aspect 
of a sentence on an offender. Thus, job status is a relevant criterion that should 
be recognised in the sentencing calculus. It has been argued that discrimination 
between offenders already exists in the form of (the privilege of) holding a job.151 
To then allow that job to result in a sentencing discount only further compounds 
the disadvantage that is experienced by the unemployed offender. To this end, it is 
has been argued that an offender who comes from a deprived social background 
should receive a sentencing discount because they have had less opportunity to lead 
147 R A Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge University Press, 1985) 267.
148 Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness in the 
Sentencing of Criminals (Rutgers University Press, 1985) 35.
149 Nils Christie, Limits to Pain (Martin Robertson, 1981) 19, 48.
150 R A Duff, ‘Punishment, Citizenship and Responsibility’ in Henry Tam (ed), 
Punishment, Excuses and Moral Development (Ashgate Publishing, 1996) 17, 18. 
A similar view was adopted by Jeremy Bentham who declared that ‘all punishment 
is mischief, all punishment in itself is evil’: Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to 
the Principles of Morals and Legislation (J H Bums and H L A Hart eds, Oxford 
University Press, 1970) 158.
151 See above, part III.
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law-abiding lives and, hence, are less morally blameworthy. There is significant 
force in this argument. However, this is an argument which has not found favour 
with law-makers. Social deprivation is not, of itself, a mitigating factor because of 
the assumption that it would undermine the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions.152 
Thus, the basic approach of sentencing law is that sentencing is not the place to 
redress social disparity and offenders must be taken as they are found at the time of 
sentencing. This is consistent with the approach to victims — they must be taken as 
they are, and offenders are liable for both the intended and the remote consequences 
of their conduct.153
As noted in part III of this paper, there is some inconsistency and uncertainty 
regarding the impact of criminal wrongdoing on employment. This area of law is 
in need of fundamental reform. Employment deprivations are a form of punishment 
and, consequently, they should be recognised in the overall sanction meted out to an 
offender and subject to the normal sentencing practices and principles governing the 
infliction of criminal punishment.
This would also make sentencing law more consistent. In other instances, incidental 
deprivations stemming from offending are normally regarded as mitigatory. For 
example, a strong mitigating factor is incidental harm suffered by the offender, in 
the form of trauma associated with injuring or killing a friend or relative or also 
suffering serious injury.154 
Offenders who are not Australian citizens or permanent residents can be deported 
if they fail a ‘character test’; being sentenced to a term of imprisonment of a year 
or more can constitute evidence of bad character. Deportation or the risk of depor-
tation is an additional burden that would then be faced by such an offender. Hence, 
logically it should be mitigatory. This was the position taken in Valayamkandathil 
v The Queen;155 Guden v The Queen156 and Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Yildirim.157
Where an offender is harmed in the course of committing an offence, this can also 
reduce the penalty. In Alameddine v The Queen158 the Court regarded the fact that 
the offender was injured when his drug-making laboratory exploded as a matter to 
be taken into account in mitigation.
To be clear, what should mitigate is not only the loss of a job as a result of a criminal 
sanction but also any employment deprivation. This extends to the diminished 
152 Bagaric and Edney, above n 10.
153 DPP (Vic) v Eli [2008] VSCA 209 (27 October 2008).
154 See R v Teh (2003) 40 MVR 195.
155 [2010] VSCA 260 (4 October 2010).
156 (2010) 28 VR 288.
157 [2011] VSCA 219 (28 July 2011).
158 [2006] NSWCCA 317 (10 October 2006).
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capacity of an offender to secure employment and the disqualification or suspension 
of a professional or similar qualification (such as in the areas of law, medicine or 
accounting) that often stems from a criminal sanction. These further hardships are 
normally less certain than the loss of a job and hence should carry less weight as 
penalty reductions than where it is clear that an offender will lose his or her job as 
a consequence of being found guilty of an offence. Moreover, the mitigatory impact 
of employment deprivations should apply even where the offence occurred in the 
employment setting.159  
The other form of incidental non-curial punishment is the censure that an offender 
may receive from family, friends, associates or the wider community. The extent 
of this sanction varies markedly according to such matters as the social connec-
tions and personal antecedents of the offender and the offence in question. This 
form of ‘punishment’ is too obscure and too hard to measure to be factored into the 
sentencing process. There is considerable logical force in the comments by Hayne J 
in Ryan v The Queen160 where he stated:
There is an irreducible tension between the proposition that offending behaviour 
is worthy of punishment and condemnation according to its gravity, and the 
proposition that the offender is entitled to leniency on account of that condem-
nation.161
Although the public opprobrium and social ostracism suffered by an offender may 
be palpable to both the offender and the court, it should not factor into sentencing. 
However, this can only be a provisional view in the absence of a more extensive 
enquiry. It may be that bringing white-collar offenders publicly before the law consti-
tutes both punishment and deterrence. Kahan and Posner suggest that, in certain 
circumstances, shaming might itself ‘provide sufficient deterrence to white-collar 
crime offenders’.162 But even if that is so, acting on such an assumption may result 
in an unjustifiable differential treatment between classes of offender.
E Curial Incidental Sanctions
The current legal position is that curial incidental sanctions are mitigatory. This 
position is correct and not in need of reform.
159 This is to be contrasted with comments in R v Liddy [No 2] (2002) 84 SASR 231. 
160 (2001) 206 CLR 267.
161 Ibid 314 [157].
162 Dan Kahan and Eric Posner, ‘Shaming White-Collar Criminals: a Proposal for 
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ (1999) 42 Journal of Law and 
Economics 365, 368–72, cited in John B Owens, ‘Have We No Shame?: Thoughts on 
Shaming “White-Collar” Criminals, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ (2001) 
49 American University Law Review 1047, 1048.
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F Heavy Penalties Do Not Deter Other White-Collar Criminals:  
Abolish the Emphasis on General Deterrence
The strong emphasis by the courts on general deterrence when sentencing white- 
collar offenders is logically sound — especially in light of the assumption that such 
offenders are more likely to engage in a cost–benefit analysis than other offenders.
However, the assumption underlying this approach is not validated by the empirical 
evidence. The evidence on this front has been considered in a number of recent 
reviews. The studies show that harsh penalties, in the form of imprisonment 
generally and clearly disproportionate penalties, do not discourage crime.163 The 
greatest deterrence against crime is not the size of the penalty, but the perceived 
likelihood of detection.164 Of particular relevance is research establishing that this 
also applies to white-collar offences.165 The upshot is that penalties for white-collar 
crime should not be increased in order to discourage other would-be offenders.
This does not mean that severe punishment is never suitable for white-collar offences. 
Rather, it means that a justification for severe sanctions must be located within 
other sentencing objectives. Moreover, if tough sanctions do not deter white-collar 
offences, there is a need for the criminal justice system to implement other measures 
which will achieve this outcome. It has been suggested that the answer rests in 
greater monitoring of areas where white-collar offences are often committed. Thus, 
in the context of tax crime, it might be that more audits should be undertaken. In 
other areas it might mean that greater measures to monitor compliance are imple-
mented. More generally, a greater proportion of resources should be deployed in 
the areas of policing and crime detection, and even the pathology of white-collar 
offending warrants further investigation.166
163 See, eg, Raymond Paternoster, ‘How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence?’ (2010) 100 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 765; Michael Tonry, 
‘Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent 
Findings’ (2009) 38 Crime and Justice 65, 69; Cheryl Marie Webster, Anthony N 
Doob, and Franklin E Zimring, ‘Proposition 8 and Crime Rates in California: The 
Case of the Disappearing Deterrent’ (2006) 5 Criminology & Public Policy 417.
164 Donald Ritchie, ‘Does Imprisonment Deter? A Review of the Evidence’ (Report, 
Sentencing Advisory Council, April 2011).
165 Mirko Bagaric, Theo Alexander and Athula Pathinayake,‘The Fallacy of General 
Deterrence and the Futility of Imprisoning Offenders for Tax Fraud’ (2011) 26 
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and Commodities Fraud’ (2009) 37 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry 
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V conclusIon
Our analysis suggests that a doctrinally-sound approach to sentencing white-collar 
offenders requires a number of legislative reforms. The key reforms are:
• Providing a numerical and large discount for restitution — the argument that 
restitution allows offenders to buy their way out of gaol is outweighed by the 
good that comes from restoration for victims;
• Abolishing the pursuit of general deterrence and the increases in sentences 
which follow;
• Providing a greater discount for previous good character, consistent with other 
areas of sentencing;
• Providing a greater discount for non-curial harm in the form of employment 
deprivations; and
• Placing more emphasis on the harm caused by the offence to guide the sentence: 
crimes against individuals should be treated more seriously than those against 
the revenue or large corporations.

